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15 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1895–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Reiter v. Coopergreen2 sentences2007See Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 264 , 113 S.Ct. 1213, 1218 , 122 L.Ed.2d 604 (1993)(shipper's assertion that motor common carrier's rate was unreasonable, asserted as a counterclaim in carrier's action to recover freight undercharges, was a compulsory counterclaim for recoupment). 2007See Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 264 , 113 S.Ct. 1213, 1218 , 122 L.Ed.2d 604 (1993)(shipper's assertion that motor common carrier's rate was unreasonable, asserted as a counterclaim in carrier's action to recover freight undercharges, was a compulsory counterclaim for recoupment). | 2 | 2 |
cluster 718259green1 sentence2003A noted reference, relying on both Penrod and FDIC v. Union Entities, 83 F.3d 1020, 1027 (8th Cir.1996), summarizes the predominant view as follows: Discomfort with the idea of extinguishing liens, however, has led a number of appellate courts to add an additional requirement to section 1141(c), requiring that before a lien will be deemed extinguished, not only must the property or claim be dealt with in the plan, but the creditor must have "participated in the reorganization." ... [The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cireuit [in FDIC v. Union Entities ], starting from the premise that liens p | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Dunkelgreen2 sentences1996Additionally, “[o]ne who has no interest in the land has no right to redeem.” Id.; see also Johnson v. Dunkel, 132 Colo. 383, 388 , 288 P.2d 343, 346 (1955) (holding that a landowner who mistakenly claimed ownership of improvements on neighboring land subject to a treasurer’s deed had no interest in the property to claim a right to redeem). 1996Additionally, “[o]ne who has no interest in the land has no right to redeem.” Id.; see also Johnson v. Dunkel, 132 Colo. 383, 388 , 288 P.2d 343, 346 (1955) (holding that a landowner who mistakenly claimed ownership of improvements on neighboring land subject to a treasurer’s deed had no interest in the property to claim a right to redeem). | 1 | 1 |
Hayes v. State of Californiagreen2 sentences1992See also Rodriquez v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth., 193 N.J.Super. 39 , 472 A.2d 146 (1983) (court rejected claim by racetrack patron, assaulted and robbed in parking lot, holding that the mere presence of persons with criminal intent or purpose did not constitute a “dangerous condition” within the meaning of the state’s tort claim act); Hayes v. State, 11 Cal.3d 469 , 113 Cal.Rptr. 599, 601 , 521 P.2d 855, 857 (1974) (liability imposed for an injury caused by a dangerous condition created by a combination of defect in the property and acts of third parties, but not for a dangerous con 1992See also Rodriquez v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth., 193 N.J.Super. 39 , 472 A.2d 146 (1983) (court rejected claim by racetrack patron, assaulted and robbed in parking lot, holding that the mere presence of persons with criminal intent or purpose did not constitute a “dangerous condition” within the meaning of the state’s tort claim act); Hayes v. State, 11 Cal.3d 469 , 113 Cal.Rptr. 599, 601 , 521 P.2d 855, 857 (1974) (liability imposed for an injury caused by a dangerous condition created by a combination of defect in the property and acts of third parties, but not for a dangerous con | 1 | 1 |
Rodriguez v. NJ SPORTS & EXPOSITION AUTHORITY & PINKERTON'S, INC.green2 sentences1992See also Rodriquez v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth., 193 N.J.Super. 39 , 472 A.2d 146 (1983) (court rejected claim by racetrack patron, assaulted and robbed in parking lot, holding that the mere presence of persons with criminal intent or purpose did not constitute a “dangerous condition” within the meaning of the state’s tort claim act); Hayes v. State, 11 Cal.3d 469 , 113 Cal.Rptr. 599, 601 , 521 P.2d 855, 857 (1974) (liability imposed for an injury caused by a dangerous condition created by a combination of defect in the property and acts of third parties, but not for a dangerous con 1992See also Rodriquez v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth., 193 N.J.Super. 39 , 472 A.2d 146 (1983) (court rejected claim by racetrack patron, assaulted and robbed in parking lot, holding that the mere presence of persons with criminal intent or purpose did not constitute a “dangerous condition” within the meaning of the state’s tort claim act); Hayes v. State, 11 Cal.3d 469 , 113 Cal.Rptr. 599, 601 , 521 P.2d 855, 857 (1974) (liability imposed for an injury caused by a dangerous condition created by a combination of defect in the property and acts of third parties, but not for a dangerous con | 1 | 1 |
Creekside at DTC, Ltd. v. Board of Assessment Appealsgreen1 sentence1991See Creekside at DTC, Ltd. v. Board of Assessment Appeals, 811 P.2d 435 (Colo.App.1991). | 1 | 1 |
Ochs v. Town of Hot Sulphur Springsgreen2 sentences1991Cf. Ochs v. Town of Hot Sulphur Springs, 158 Colo. 456, 461-62 , 407 P.2d 677, 680 (1965) (enforcement of municipal "frontage tax" on real property without any corresponding benefit to property results in "taking private property without compensation, and without due process of law"). [8] V. 1991Cf. Ochs v. Town of Hot Sulphur Springs, 158 Colo. 456, 461-62 , 407 P.2d 677, 680 (1965) (enforcement of municipal "frontage tax" on real property without any corresponding benefit to property results in "taking private property without compensation, and without due process of law"). [8] V. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lilley v. Randall
neutral
2 sentences1903He may prosecute his claim for such damages either by an original suit or by way of counterclaim to an action for the purchase price, and, as a general rule, the measure of his damages is the difference between the actual value of the goods and what they would have been worth if the representations had been true. — Lilley v. Randall, 3 Colo. 298 ; Herfort v. Cramer, 7 Colo. 483 ; Peck v. Brewer, 48 Ill. 54 . 1903He may prosecute his claim for such damages either by an original suit or by way of counterclaim to an action for the purchase price, and, as a general rule, the measure of his damages is the difference between the actual value of the goods and what they would have been worth if the representations had been true. — Lilley v. Randall, 3 Colo. 298 ; Herfort v. Cramer, 7 Colo. 483 ; Peck v. Brewer, 48 Ill. 54 . | 2 | 1903–1903 |
Herfort v. Cramer
green
2 sentences1903He may prosecute his claim for such damages either by an original suit or by way of counterclaim to an action for the purchase price, and, as a general rule, the measure of his damages is the difference between the actual value of the goods and what they would have been worth if the representations had been true. — Lilley v. Randall, 3 Colo. 298 ; Herfort v. Cramer, 7 Colo. 483 ; Peck v. Brewer, 48 Ill. 54 . 1903He may prosecute his claim for such damages either by an original suit or by way of counterclaim to an action for the purchase price, and, as a general rule, the measure of his damages is the difference between the actual value of the goods and what they would have been worth if the representations had been true. — Lilley v. Randall, 3 Colo. 298 ; Herfort v. Cramer, 7 Colo. 483 ; Peck v. Brewer, 48 Ill. 54 . | 2 | 1903–1903 |
Peck v. Brewer
green
2 sentences1903He may prosecute his claim for such damages either by an original suit or by way of counterclaim to an action for the purchase price, and, as a general rule, the measure of his damages is the difference between the actual value of the goods and what they would have been worth if the representations had been true. — Lilley v. Randall, 3 Colo. 298 ; Herfort v. Cramer, 7 Colo. 483 ; Peck v. Brewer, 48 Ill. 54 . 1903He may prosecute his claim for such damages either by an original suit or by way of counterclaim to an action for the purchase price, and, as a general rule, the measure of his damages is the difference between the actual value of the goods and what they would have been worth if the representations had been true. — Lilley v. Randall, 3 Colo. 298 ; Herfort v. Cramer, 7 Colo. 483 ; Peck v. Brewer, 48 Ill. 54 . | 2 | 1903–1903 |
Lake Canal Reservoir Co. v. Beethe
green
1 sentence2024Because the treasurer purportedly sold a lien encumbering only the three-quarters interest in the property in violation of the statute, the treasurer lacked authority to issue the treasurer’s deed to Brent, rendering the deed void.4 See Lake Canal Reservoir Co., 227 P.3d at 886 ; see also Red Flower, ¶ 53 (a deed is void when the taxing entity had no authority to issue it). ¶ 34 The basis of Brent’s legal interest in the property was the treasurer’s deed. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Kleppe v. New Mexico
green
2 sentences2006“While courts must eventually pass upon them, determinations under the property clause are entrusted primarily to Congress.” Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 536 , 96 S.Ct. 2285 , 49 L.Ed.2d 34 (1976). 2006“While courts must eventually pass upon them, determinations under the property clause are entrusted primarily to Congress.” Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 536 , 96 S.Ct. 2285 , 49 L.Ed.2d 34 (1976). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
In Re the Marriage of Hall
green
1 sentence2006Similarly, the division in In re Marriage of Hall, 971 P.2d 677 (Colo.App.1998), addressed the issue whether the wife’s obligation to make an equalizing property settlement payment was discharged when the husband failed to file a timely objection to discharge based on § 523(a)(15). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Nicholson v. Han
green
2 sentences1988Here, the court of appeals relied upon Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35 , 162 N.W.2d 313 (1968), a case in which a husband sued the family doctor who had been functioning as a marriage counselor and who had warranted an improvement in marital relations. 1988Here, the court of appeals relied upon Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35 , 162 N.W.2d 313 (1968), a case in which a husband sued the family doctor who had been functioning as a marriage counselor and who had warranted an improvement in marital relations. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Kelley v. People
green
2 sentences1976Kelley v. People, 166 Colo. 322 , 443 P.2d 734 . 1976Kelley v. People, 166 Colo. 322 , 443 P.2d 734 . | 1 | 1976–1976 |
White v. Webb
neutral
1 sentence1895As was said in the case of White v. Webb, 15 Conn. 302 : “ In actions of trover and trespass, for property taken and converted by the defendant, where there is no malicious motive on the part of the defendant, but he takes the property under a claim of right, and the real dispute is as to the title, the rule of damages is the value of the property at the time of the conversion or taking, and interest on that sum to the time .of judgment.” How far these objectionable elements of damage were considered by the jury, or entered into the amount of the verdict, we are unable to determine, and are th | 1 | 1895–1895 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.