construction rule in Colorado

2026We interpret words and phrases according to their plain and ordinary meanings, People v. Voth, 2013 CO 61, ¶ 21 , and we will not add or subtract words from a rule, see Turbyne v. People, 151 P.3d 563, 567 (Colo. 2007).

2018We interpret words and phrases according to their plain and ordinary meanings, People v. Voth, 2013 CO 61, ¶ 21 , and we will not add or subtract words from a rule, see Turbyne v. People, 151 P.3d 563, 567 (Colo. 2007).

2026This broad construction principle is based "in the interest of compensating victims of governmental negligence." Douglas , 203 P.3d at 617 -18 (citing Corsentino , 4 P.3d at 1086 ).

2024Provisions waiving immunity are “broadly construed in the interest of compensating victims of governmental negligence.” Douglas, 203 P.3d at 617–18.

2021People v. Angel , 2012 CO 34 , ¶ 17 , 277 P.3d 231 , 235 ; People v. Corson , 2016 CO 33 , ¶ 44 , 379 P.3d 288, 297 ( "To ascertain the appropriate construction of a rule of criminal procedure, we employ the same interpretive rules applicable to statutory construction." ( quoting Kazadi v. People , 2012 CO 73 , ¶ 11 , 291 P.3d 16 , 20 ) ) . ¶32 Crim.

2021People v. Angel , 2012 CO 34 , ¶ 17 , 277 P.3d 231 , 235 ; People v. Corson , 2016 CO 33 , ¶ 44 , 379 P.3d 288, 297 ( "To ascertain the appropriate construction of a rule of criminal procedure, we employ the same interpretive rules applicable to statutory construction." ( quoting Kazadi v. People , 2012 CO 73 , ¶ 11 , 291 P.3d 16 , 20 ) ) . ¶32 Crim.

1982Moreover, such a narrow construction of the privilege would nullify the bylaw review procedure adopted by a hospital in conformity with section 12-43.5-102(2)(a) and, to that extent, would contravene the statutory objective of establishing judicial review as the primary means of redress for disciplinary action imposed in the peer review process. [9] Our construction comports with the broad interpretation of the statutory privilege adopted by this court in Posey v. District Court, 196 Colo. 396 , 586 P.2d 36 (1978).

1982Moreover, such a narrow construction of the privilege would nullify the bylaw review procedure adopted by a hospital in conformity with section 12 — 43.5-102(2)(a) and, to that extent, would contravene the statutory objective of establishing judicial review as the primary means of redress for disciplinary action imposed in the peer review process. 9 Our construction comports with the broad interpretation of the statutory privilege adopted by this court in Posey v. District Court, 196 Colo. 396 , 586 P.2d 36 (1978).

1982Moreover, such a narrow construction of the privilege would nullify the bylaw review procedure adopted by a hospital in conformity with section 12-43.5-102(2)(a) and, to that extent, would contravene the statutory objective of establishing judicial review as the primary means of redress for disciplinary action imposed in the peer review process. [9] Our construction comports with the broad interpretation of the statutory privilege adopted by this court in Posey v. District Court, 196 Colo. 396 , 586 P.2d 36 (1978).

1982Moreover, such a narrow construction of the privilege would nullify the bylaw review procedure adopted by a hospital in conformity with section 12 — 43.5-102(2)(a) and, to that extent, would contravene the statutory objective of establishing judicial review as the primary means of redress for disciplinary action imposed in the peer review process. 9 Our construction comports with the broad interpretation of the statutory privilege adopted by this court in Posey v. District Court, 196 Colo. 396 , 586 P.2d 36 (1978).

2026This broad construction principle is based "in the interest of compensating victims of governmental negligence." Douglas , 203 P.3d at 617 -18 (citing Corsentino , 4 P.3d at 1086 ).

2025Citing several authorities, including People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235 (Colo. 1983), and section 18-3-408, C.R.S. 2024, he contends that one of his “murder convictions must go” because “he has two murder convictions in a case involving the death of a single victim, one more than the Colorado legislature permits.” ¶7 Because Hightower does not reassert his postconviction claim related to the DOC’s alleged failure to transmit the violent offender report, we do not address it.

2025However, even applying the most liberal construction standard to his opening brief, People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 34 , we discern only one contention.

2024“In the construction of a waiver provision of the [C]GIA, strained or forced interpretation of a statutory term should not be adopted.” Id.

2021People v. Angel , 2012 CO 34 , ¶ 17 , 277 P.3d 231 , 235 ; People v. Corson , 2016 CO 33 , ¶ 44 , 379 P.3d 288, 297 ( "To ascertain the appropriate construction of a rule of criminal procedure, we employ the same interpretive rules applicable to statutory construction." ( quoting Kazadi v. People , 2012 CO 73 , ¶ 11 , 291 P.3d 16 , 20 ) ) . ¶32 Crim.

2001Dist., 895 P.2d 1120 (Colo.App.1995), which is in direct contradiction to the majority decision in this case. (3) Whether this court's adoption in Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636 (Colo.1998) of the "deferential construction in favor of the victim" standard for interpretation of the CGIA waiver provisions overruled the "narrow" construction of waiver provisions standard set forth in City & County of Denver v. Gallegos, 916 P.2d 509 (Colo.1996). (4) Whether the court of appeals erred in failing to apply, consistent with Walton v. State , a narrow construction of the immunity provision of the CGIA

2001Dist., 895 P.2d 1120 (Colo.App.1995), which is in direct contradiction to the majority decision in this case. (3) Whether this court's adoption in Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636 (Colo.1998) of the "deferential construction in favor of the victim" standard for interpretation of the CGIA waiver provisions overruled the "narrow" construction of waiver provisions standard set forth in City & County of Denver v. Gallegos, 916 P.2d 509 (Colo.1996). (4) Whether the court of appeals erred in failing to apply, consistent with Walton v. State, a narrow construction of the immunity provision of the CGIA a

2001Dist., 895 P.2d 1120 (Colo.App.1995), which is in direct contradiction to the majority decision in this case. (3) Whether this court's adoption in Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636 (Colo.1998) of the "deferential construction in favor of the victim" standard for interpretation of the CGIA waiver provisions overruled the "narrow" construction of waiver provisions standard set forth in City & County of Denver v. Gallegos, 916 P.2d 509 (Colo.1996). (4) Whether the court of appeals erred in failing to apply, consistent with Walton v. State , a narrow construction of the immunity provision of the CGIA

2001Dist., 895 P.2d 1120 (Colo.App.1995), which is in direct contradiction to the majority decision in this case. (3) Whether this court's adoption in Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636 (Colo.1998) of the "deferential construction in favor of the victim" standard for interpretation of the CGIA waiver provisions overruled the "narrow" construction of waiver provisions standard set forth in City & County of Denver v. Gallegos, 916 P.2d 509 (Colo.1996). (4) Whether the court of appeals erred in failing to apply, consistent with Walton v. State, a narrow construction of the immunity provision of the CGIA a

2001Dist., 895 P.2d 1120 (Colo.App.1995), which is in direct contradiction to the majority decision in this case. (3) Whether this court's adoption in Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636 (Colo.1998) of the "deferential construction in favor of the victim" standard for interpretation of the CGIA waiver provisions overruled the "narrow" construction of waiver provisions standard set forth in City & County of Denver v. Gallegos, 916 P.2d 509 (Colo.1996). (4) Whether the court of appeals erred in failing to apply, consistent with Walton v. State , a narrow construction of the immunity provision of the CGIA

2001Dist., 895 P.2d 1120 (Colo.App.1995), which is in direct contradiction to the majority decision in this case. (3) Whether this court's adoption in Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636 (Colo.1998) of the "deferential construction in favor of the victim" standard for interpretation of the CGIA waiver provisions overruled the "narrow" construction of waiver provisions standard set forth in City & County of Denver v. Gallegos, 916 P.2d 509 (Colo.1996). (4) Whether the court of appeals erred in failing to apply, consistent with Walton v. State, a narrow construction of the immunity provision of the CGIA a

2001We held that an act of a third party was insufficient to create a dangerous condition of a public building under the CGIA, and that "the statute refers to an injury arising from the state of the building itself or the use of a state of the building, but not to one arising from activities conducted within the building." 826 P.2d at 827 . [3] We have since overruled this part of the Jenks opinion.

2001Dist., 895 P.2d 1120 (Colo.App.1995), which is in direct contradiction to the majority decision in this case. (3) Whether this court's adoption in Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636 (Colo.1998) of the "deferential construction in favor of the victim" standard for interpretation of the CGIA waiver provisions overruled the "narrow" construction of waiver provisions standard set forth in City & County of Denver v. Gallegos, 916 P.2d 509 (Colo.1996). (4) Whether the court of appeals erred in failing to apply, consistent with Walton v. State , a narrow construction of the immunity provision of the CGIA

2001Dist., 895 P.2d 1120 (Colo.App.1995), which is in direct contradiction to the majority decision in this case. (3) Whether this court's adoption in Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636 (Colo.1998) of the "deferential construction in favor of the victim" standard for interpretation of the CGIA waiver provisions overruled the "narrow" construction of waiver provisions standard set forth in City & County of Denver v. Gallegos, 916 P.2d 509 (Colo.1996). (4) Whether the court of appeals erred in failing to apply, consistent with Walton v. State, a narrow construction of the immunity provision of the CGIA a

1999Fogg v. Macaluso, supra. In the construction of a waiver provision of the GIA, strained or forced interpretation of a statutory term should not be adopted.

1999State v. Hartsough, 790 P.2d 836 (Colo.1990).

1988The interpretation or construction of a statute is a question of law, Colorado Division of Employment & Training v. Parkview Episcopal Church, 725 P.2d 787 (Colo.1986), as is the construction of a rule promulgated by an administrative agency.

1985This is especially true where, as here, unlawful gambling under the liquor code, in addition to subjecting a licensee to revocation or suspension of their license, subjects him or her to a more severe penalty than unlawful gambling under the criminal code. 2 Although the department's past reliance upon the common meaning of the term gambling in determining whether a violation of the liquor code has occurred is entitled to great weight, Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Barnes , 191 Colo. 278 , 552 P.2d 300 (1976), this principle must be balanced against the strict construction requirement for legisla

1985This is especially true where, as here, unlawful gambling under the liquor code, in addition to subjecting a licensee to revocation or suspension of their license, subjects him or her to a more severe penalty than unlawful gambling under the criminal code. 2 Although the department's past reliance upon the common meaning of the term gambling in determining whether a violation of the liquor code has occurred is entitled to great weight, Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Barnes , 191 Colo. 278 , 552 P.2d 300 (1976), this principle must be balanced against the strict construction requirement for legisla