construction standard in Hawaii

2024We further conclude that the indictment against defendant Alvin Tran, charging a violation of HRS § 707-733.6, was sufficiently specific when construed under the liberal construction standard announced in State v. Motta, 66 Haw. 89 , 657 P.2d 1019 (1983), and modified by State v. Wells, 78 Hawai‘i 373, 894 P.2d 70 (1995).

2024We further conclude that the indictment against defendant Alvin Tran, charging a violation of HRS § 707-733.6, was sufficiently specific when construed under the liberal construction standard announced in State v. Motta, 66 Haw. 89 , 657 P.2d 1019 (1983), and modified by State v. Wells, 78 Hawai‘i 373, 894 P.2d 70 (1995).

2020"Under the liberal construction standard, two counts can be read together." Id.

2013State v. Elliott, 77 Hawai'i 309, 313 , 884 P.2d 372, 376 (1994) (applying the liberal construction standard and holding that “the requisite state of mind was omitted from the charge” and therefore the court “perceive[d] no way ... [to] reasonably construe [the indictment] to charge resisting arrest or any included offense”).

2011With respect to its second rationale, the lead opinion maintained that, under the liberal construction standard, “it is proper to ‘consider other information in addition to the charge that may have been provided to the defendant during the course of the case up until the time defendant objected to the sufficiency of the charges against him.’ ” Id. at *3, 657 P.2d 1019 (quoting Wheeler, 121 Hawai'i at 396 , 219 P.3d at 1183 ).

2011With respect to its second rationale, the lead opinion maintained that, under the liberal construction standard, “it is proper to ‘consider other information in addition to the charge that may have been provided to the defendant during the course of the case up until the time defendant objected to the sufficiency of the charges against him.’ ” Id. at *3, 657 P.2d 1019 (quoting Wheeler, 121 Hawai'i at 396 , 219 P.3d at 1183 ).

1997However, the strict construction rule does not permit the court to ignore legislative intent, nor require the court to reject that construction that best harmonizes with the design of the statute or the end sought to be achieved.” State v. Ortiz, 74 Haw. 343, 352 , 845 P.2d 547, 552 , reconsideration denied, 74 Haw. 650 , 849 P.2d 81 (1993) (citations omitted).

1997However, the strict construction rule does not permit the court to ignore legislative intent, nor require the court to reject that construction that best harmonizes with the design of the statute or the end sought to be achieved.” State v. Ortiz, 74 Haw. 343, 352 , 845 P.2d 547, 552 , reconsideration denied, 74 Haw. 650 , 849 P.2d 81 (1993) (citations omitted).

2025The liberal construction standard "essentially prescribes a presumption of validity on indictments that are challenged subsequent to a conviction." Sprattling, 99 Hawai#i at 318, 55 P.3d at 282 .

2024The liberal construction standard “essentially prescribes a presumption of validity on indictments that are challenged subsequent to a conviction.” Sprattling, 99 Hawai‘i at 318, 55 P.3d at 282 .

2024We further conclude that the indictment against defendant Alvin Tran, charging a violation of HRS § 707-733.6, was sufficiently specific when construed under the liberal construction standard announced in State v. Motta, 66 Haw. 89 , 657 P.2d 1019 (1983), and modified by State v. Wells, 78 Hawai‘i 373, 894 P.2d 70 (1995).

2013See Motta, 66 Haw. at 90-91 , 657 P.2d at 1019-20 ; Wells, 78 Hawai'i at 381 , 894 P.2d at 78 . *163 Under this liberal construction standard, a charge that would fail to pass muster if timely challenged in the trial court can nevertheless be found to be sufficient if challenged for the first time on direct appeal.

2020See Tominiko, 126 Hawai#i at 76, 266 P.3d at 1130 (holding that, under the liberal construction standard, a charge for Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence (OVUII) was not 12 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER insufficient for failing to allege that the conduct occurred on a public roadway where a separate count contained the necessary allegation and both counts refer to operating a motor vehicle on the same day in Honolulu, Hawai#i).

2015These post-Wheeler decisions include the following cases: State v. Tominiko, 126 Hawai'i 68, 76 , 266 P.3d 1122, 1130 (2011) (applying Wheeler , which was decided in November 2009, to an August 2008 complaint charging defendant wfth OVUII, and holding that under the liberal construction standard, the charges, read with reference to each other, were sufficient to allege the public-road element to support the OVUII conviction); Walker, 126 Hawai'i at 489 , 273 P.3d at 1175 (applying Wheeler to an April 21, 2008 felony information and complaint and holding that the charging instruments could not

1997When applying this rule, however, we may also consider “precedent, legislative history, and common sense[,]” for “ ‘the strict construction rule does not permit the court to *189 ignore legislative intent, nor require the court to reject that construction that best harmonizes with the design of the statute or the end sought to be achieved.’ ” State v. Gaylord, 78 Hawai'i 127, 138-39 , 890 P.2d 1167, 1178-79 (1995) (quoting Ortiz, 74 Haw. at 352 , 845 P.2d at 552 ) (construing HRS § 708-830(6)(a) strictly in the context of legislative intent).

1997When applying this rule, however, we may also consider “precedent, legislative history, and common sense[,]” for “ ‘the strict construction rule does not permit the court to *189 ignore legislative intent, nor require the court to reject that construction that best harmonizes with the design of the statute or the end sought to be achieved.’ ” State v. Gaylord, 78 Hawai'i 127, 138-39 , 890 P.2d 1167, 1178-79 (1995) (quoting Ortiz, 74 Haw. at 352 , 845 P.2d at 552 ) (construing HRS § 708-830(6)(a) strictly in the context of legislative intent).

2015These post-Wheeler decisions include the following cases: State v. Tominiko, 126 Hawai'i 68, 76 , 266 P.3d 1122, 1130 (2011) (applying Wheeler , which was decided in November 2009, to an August 2008 complaint charging defendant wfth OVUII, and holding that under the liberal construction standard, the charges, read with reference to each other, were sufficient to allege the public-road element to support the OVUII conviction); Walker, 126 Hawai'i at 489 , 273 P.3d at 1175 (applying Wheeler to an April 21, 2008 felony information and complaint and holding that the charging instruments could not

2015These post-Wheeler decisions include the following cases: State v. Tominiko, 126 Hawai'i 68, 76 , 266 P.3d 1122, 1130 (2011) (applying Wheeler , which was decided in November 2009, to an August 2008 complaint charging defendant wfth OVUII, and holding that under the liberal construction standard, the charges, read with reference to each other, were sufficient to allege the public-road element to support the OVUII conviction); Walker, 126 Hawai'i at 489 , 273 P.3d at 1175 (applying Wheeler to an April 21, 2008 felony information and complaint and holding that the charging instruments could not

2011Henee, the charge contained within it “a substantive jurisdictional defect[,]” rendering the court’s December 1, 2008 judgment, convicting Petitioner of Count I, a “nullity.” State v. Cummings, 101 Hawai'i 139, 143 , 63 P.3d 1109,1113 (2003).

2011Henee, the charge contained within it “a substantive jurisdictional defect[,]” rendering the court’s December 1, 2008 judgment, convicting Petitioner of Count I, a “nullity.” State v. Cummings, 101 Hawai'i 139, 143 , 63 P.3d 1109,1113 (2003).

1996See also State v. Burgo, 71 Haw. 198, 202 , 787 P.2d 221, 223 (1990); State v. Kanoa, 67 Haw. 476, 477 , 691 P.2d 1169, 1171 , reconsideration denied, 67 Haw. 684 , 744 P.2d 779 (1984); State v. Murray, 63 Haw. 12, 18 , 621 P.2d 334, 339 (1980); Smith, 59 Haw. at 461 , 583 P.2d at 341-42 ; State v. Ogata, 58 Haw. 514, 517 , 572 P.2d 1222, 1224 (1977).

1996See also State v. Burgo, 71 Haw. 198, 202 , 787 P.2d 221, 223 (1990); State v. Kanoa, 67 Haw. 476, 477 , 691 P.2d 1169, 1171 , reconsideration denied, 67 Haw. 684 , 744 P.2d 779 (1984); State v. Murray, 63 Haw. 12, 18 , 621 P.2d 334, 339 (1980); Smith, 59 Haw. at 461 , 583 P.2d at 341-42 ; State v. Ogata, 58 Haw. 514, 517 , 572 P.2d 1222, 1224 (1977).

1996See also State v. Burgo, 71 Haw. 198, 202 , 787 P.2d 221, 223 (1990); State v. Kanoa, 67 Haw. 476, 477 , 691 P.2d 1169, 1171 , reconsideration denied, 67 Haw. 684 , 744 P.2d 779 (1984); State v. Murray, 63 Haw. 12, 18 , 621 P.2d 334, 339 (1980); Smith, 59 Haw. at 461 , 583 P.2d at 341-42 ; State v. Ogata, 58 Haw. 514, 517 , 572 P.2d 1222, 1224 (1977).

1996See also State v. Burgo, 71 Haw. 198, 202 , 787 P.2d 221, 223 (1990); State v. Kanoa, 67 Haw. 476, 477 , 691 P.2d 1169, 1171 , reconsideration denied, 67 Haw. 684 , 744 P.2d 779 (1984); State v. Murray, 63 Haw. 12, 18 , 621 P.2d 334, 339 (1980); Smith, 59 Haw. at 461 , 583 P.2d at 341-42 ; State v. Ogata, 58 Haw. 514, 517 , 572 P.2d 1222, 1224 (1977).

2026State v. Tran, 154 Hawaiʻi 211, 224, 549 P.3d 296 , 309 (2024) (cleaned up). 7 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Merger of Counts Where there exists a "reasonable possibility that the jury's verdict led to two convictions for 'the same conduct,' . . . the circuit court's failure to charge the jury with respect to merger contravened HRS § 701–109(1)(e) and was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Frisbee, 114 Hawaiʻi 76, 84, 156 P.3d 1182, 1190 (2007).

2026State v. Tran, 154 Hawaiʻi 211, 224, 549 P.3d 296, 309 (2024) (cleaned up). 7 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Merger of Counts Where there exists a "reasonable possibility that the jury's verdict led to two convictions for 'the same conduct,' . . . the circuit court's failure to charge the jury with respect to merger contravened HRS § 701–109(1)(e) and was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Frisbee, 114 Hawaiʻi 76, 84, 156 P.3d 1182, 1190 (2007).

2024State v. Fukusaku, 85 Hawai‘i 462, 492, 946 P.2d 32, 62 (1997) (citations omitted).

2021Thus, just as courts must construe the pleadings of pro se litigants liberally, see Waltrip v. TS Enterprises, Inc., 140 Hawaiʻi 226, 239, 398 P.3d 815, 828 (2016), courts should consider the request for an interpreter by a pro se litigant even more carefully and resolve doubt in favor of appointment where the court has questions about a pro se litigant’s ability to understand and be understood. “[T]he underpinnings of this tenet” – as with the liberal construction rule – “rest on the promotion of equal access to justice.” Villaver, 145 Hawaiʻi at 36, 445 P.3d at 708 (brackets omitted); Standa

2021Thus, just as courts must construe the pleadings of pro se litigants liberally, see Waltrip v. TS Enterprises, Inc., 140 Hawaiʻi 226, 239, 398 P.3d 815, 828 (2016), courts should consider the request for an interpreter by a pro se litigant even more carefully and resolve doubt in favor of appointment where the court has questions about a pro se litigant’s ability to understand and be understood. “[T]he underpinnings of this tenet” – as with the liberal construction rule – “rest on the promotion of equal access to justice.” Villaver, 145 Hawaiʻi at 36, 445 P.3d at 708 (brackets omitted); Standa

2011In applying the liberal construction rule, the Hawaii Supreme Court has recognized that “[o]ne way in which an otherwise deficient count can be reasonably construed to charge a crime is by an examination of the charge as a whole.” State v. Elliott, 77 Hawai'i 309, 312 , 884 P.2d 372, 375 (1994) (citing State v. Schroeder, 76 Hawai'i 517, 530 , 880 P.2d 192, 205 (1994) (construing kidnapping and robbery counts together and as a whole and holding that the allegation that the defendant had used a handgun in the robbery count cured the failure to include this required allegation in the kidnapping

2011In applying the liberal construction rule, the Hawaii Supreme Court has recognized that “[o]ne way in which an otherwise deficient count can be reasonably construed to charge a crime is by an examination of the charge as a whole.” State v. Elliott, 77 Hawai'i 309, 312 , 884 P.2d 372, 375 (1994) (citing State v. Schroeder, 76 Hawai'i 517, 530 , 880 P.2d 192, 205 (1994) (construing kidnapping and robbery counts together and as a whole and holding that the allegation that the defendant had used a handgun in the robbery count cured the failure to include this required allegation in the kidnapping

2011Elliott, 77 Hawaii at 312 , 884 P.2d at 375 ; State v. Sprattling, 99 Hawaii 312, 319 , 55 P.3d 276, 283 (2002) (“[W]e now interpret a charge as a whole, employing practical considerations and common sense.”) (citing State v. Daly, 4 Haw.App. 52, 55 , 659 P.2d 83, 85-86 (1983)).

2011Elliott, 77 Hawaii at 312 , 884 P.2d at 375 ; State v. Sprattling, 99 Hawaii 312, 319 , 55 P.3d 276, 283 (2002) (“[W]e now interpret a charge as a whole, employing practical considerations and common sense.”) (citing State v. Daly, 4 Haw.App. 52, 55 , 659 P.2d 83, 85-86 (1983)).

2010On the contrary ... `we must look to all of the information supplied to him [or her] by the State to the point where the court passes upon the contention that the right has been violated.'") (quoting State v. Treat, 67 Haw. 119, 120 , 680 P.2d 250, 251 (1984)); State v. Elliott, 77 Hawai'i 309, 312 , 884 P.2d 372, 375 (1994)(applying liberal construction standard and noting that "[o]ne way in which an otherwise deficient count can be reasonably construed to charge a crime is by examination of the charge as a whole."); State v. Motta, 66 Haw. 89, 91 , 657 P. 2d 1019, 1020 (1983) (under the libe

2010On the contrary ... `we must look to all of the information supplied to him [or her] by the State to the point where the court passes upon the contention that the right has been violated.'") (quoting State v. Treat, 67 Haw. 119, 120 , 680 P.2d 250, 251 (1984)); State v. Elliott, 77 Hawai'i 309, 312 , 884 P.2d 372, 375 (1994)(applying liberal construction standard and noting that "[o]ne way in which an otherwise deficient count can be reasonably construed to charge a crime is by examination of the charge as a whole."); State v. Motta, 66 Haw. 89, 91 , 657 P. 2d 1019, 1020 (1983) (under the libe

2006See Leslie v. Bd. of Appeals, 109 Hawai'i 384, 393 , 126 P.3d 1071, 1080 (2006) (stating that “[d]eparture from the literal construction of a statute is justified only if such a construction yields an absurd and unjust result obviously inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the statute” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Allstate Ins.

2006See Leslie v. Bd. of Appeals, 109 Hawai`i 384, 393, 126 P.3d 1071, 1080 (2006) (stating that "[d]eparture from the literal construction of a statute is justified only if such a construction yields an absurd and unjust result obviously inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the statute" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Allstate Ins.

2006The liberal construction rule laid down in Motta with respect to such contentions when raised after conviction is therefore inapplicable.” State v. Robins, 66 Haw. 312, 314 , 660 P.2d 39, 41 (1983).

2006The liberal construction rule laid down in Motta with respect to such contentions when raised after conviction is therefore inapplicable.” State v. Robins, 66 Haw. 312, 314 , 660 P.2d 39, 41 (1983).

2005See e.g., State v. Ashley, 701 So.2d 338, 339 (Fla.1997) (answering the certified question, "May an expectant mother be criminally charged with the death of her born alive child resulting from [a] self-inflicted [gun-shot wound to the abdomen] during the third trimester of pregnancy," in the negative); Reinesto v. Superior Court of the State of Arizona in and for the County of Navajo, 182 Ariz. 190 , 894 P.2d 733, 734 (Ariz.Ct.App.1995) (holding that the state could not "prosecute for child abuse a woman who uses heroin during pregnancy and thereafter gives birth to a heroin-addicted child");

2005See e.g., State v. Ashley, 701 So.2d 338, 339 (Fla.1997) (answering the certified question, "May an expectant mother be criminally charged with the death of her born alive child resulting from [a] self-inflicted [gun-shot wound to the abdomen] during the third trimester of pregnancy," in the negative); Reinesto v. Superior Court of the State of Arizona in and for the County of Navajo, 182 Ariz. 190 , 894 P.2d 733, 734 (Ariz.Ct.App.1995) (holding that the state could not "prosecute for child abuse a woman who uses heroin during pregnancy and thereafter gives birth to a heroin-addicted child");

2005See e.g., State v. Ashley, 701 So.2d 338, 339 (Fla.1997) (answering the certified question, “May an expectant mother be criminally charged with the death of her born alive child resulting from [a] self-inflicted [gun-shot wound to the abdomen] during the third trimester of pregnancy,” in the negative); Reinesto v. Superior Court of the State of Arizona in and for the County of Navajo, 182 Ariz. 190 , 894 P.2d 733, 734 (Ariz.Ct.App.1995) (holding that the state could not “prosecute for child abuse a woman who uses heroin during pregnancy and thereafter gives birth to a heroin-addicted child”);

2005See e.g., State v. Ashley, 701 So.2d 338, 339 (Fla.1997) (answering the certified question, "May an expectant mother be criminally charged with the death of her born alive child resulting from [a] self-inflicted [gun-shot wound to the abdomen] during the third trimester of pregnancy," in the negative); Reinesto v. Superior Court of the State of Arizona in and for the County of Navajo, 182 Ariz. 190 , 894 P.2d 733, 734 (Ariz.Ct.App.1995) (holding that the state could not "prosecute for child abuse a woman who uses heroin during pregnancy and thereafter gives birth to a heroin-addicted child");

2005See e.g., State v. Ashley, 701 So.2d 338, 339 (Fla.1997) (answering the certified question, "May an expectant mother be criminally charged with the death of her born alive child resulting from [a] self-inflicted [gun-shot wound to the abdomen] during the third trimester of pregnancy," in the negative); Reinesto v. Superior Court of the State of Arizona in and for the County of Navajo, 182 Ariz. 190 , 894 P.2d 733, 734 (Ariz.Ct.App.1995) (holding that the state could not "prosecute for child abuse a woman who uses heroin during pregnancy and thereafter gives birth to a heroin-addicted child");

2005See e.g., State v. Ashley, 701 So.2d 338, 339 (Fla.1997) (answering the certified question, "May an expectant mother be criminally charged with the death of her born alive child resulting from [a] self-inflicted [gun-shot wound to the abdomen] during the third trimester of pregnancy," in the negative); Reinesto v. Superior Court of the State of Arizona in and for the County of Navajo, 182 Ariz. 190 , 894 P.2d 733, 734 (Ariz.Ct.App.1995) (holding that the state could not "prosecute for child abuse a woman who uses heroin during pregnancy and thereafter gives birth to a heroin-addicted child");