construction rule in Connecticut

2018Although a construction of Practice Book § 11-21 as mandatory is consistent with the rule's purpose of ending uncertainty about enforcement and ensuring that the trial court has "fresh familiarity" with the case, a construction of the rule as directory-providing the trial court with discretion to forgive lapses in suitable cases, such as when an untimely motion does not prejudice the nonmoving party-still provides far more structure to the proceedings than the amorphous "reasonable" time standard adopted by the Appellate Court in Oakley . 7 Cf. Stewart v. Tunxis Service Center , supra, 237 Con

2018Although a construction of Practice Book § 11-21 as mandatory is consistent with the rule's purpose of ending uncertainty about enforcement and ensuring that the trial court has "fresh familiarity" with the case, a construction of the rule as directory-providing the trial court with discretion to forgive lapses in suitable cases, such as when an untimely motion does not prejudice the nonmoving party-still provides far more structure to the proceedings than the amorphous "reasonable" time standard adopted by the Appellate Court in Oakley . 7 Cf. Stewart v. Tunxis Service Center , supra, 237 Con

1999Other aids include such things as the statutory language itself, legislative history where available, the furthering of the policy and purposes fairly apparent from the statute which include the mischief sought to be proscribed and related statutes.” (Citation omitted.) Singh v. Singh, 213 Conn. 637, 646-47 , 569 A.2d 1112 (1990).

1999Other aids include such things as the statutory language itself, legislative history where available, the furthering of the policy and purposes fairly apparent from the statute which include the mischief sought to be proscribed and related statutes.” (Citation omitted.) Singh v. Singh, 213 Conn. 637, 646-47 , 569 A.2d 1112 (1990).

1999Bridget Convent Corp. v. Milford , 87 Conn. 474 , 478 (1913) Furthermore, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the strict construction rule does apply to a hospital, an institution similar to that operated by the plaintiff.

1999Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc., 239 Conn. 93, 103 , 680 A.2d 1321 (1996), in which we held that the allegations contained in Peabody’s third party complaint were, on their face, insufficient to allege a waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity, because they failed to allege that Peabody itself had a disputed claim under its contract with the state as required by § 4-61.

1999Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc., 239 Conn. 93, 103 , 680 A.2d 1321 (1996), in which we held that the allegations contained in Peabody’s third party complaint were, on their face, insufficient to allege a waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity, because they failed to allege that Peabody itself had a disputed claim under its contract with the state as required by § 4-61.

1999Id.; Arnold College v. Milford , 144 Conn. 206 , 210 (1957) St.

1999Hartford Hospital v. Hartford , 160 Conn. 370 , 375 (1971).

1995In the present case, however, there is no allegation that someone other than the defendants was, or is, occupying the premises of which possession is sought. "[E]ven under the strict construction rule" set forth above, to hold the within notice to quit defective "would be the height of hypertechnicality." Southland Corp. v. Vernon , supra, 1 Conn. App. 453 .

1994This liberal construction doctrine has been exhibited in any number of Connecticut Supreme Court decisions, of which the following is typical: We have previously said that statutes such as § 49-41 are to be literally construed; Pelton King, Inc. v. Bethlehem , 109 Conn. 547 , 553 , 147 A. 144 ; and that the protection which § 49-41 affords is to be applied without reference to whether, as against a private owner, a mechanic's lien might attach for claims for labor or materials furnished.

1994This liberal construction doctrine has been exhibited in any number of Connecticut Supreme Court decisions, of which the following is typical: We have previously said that statutes such as § 49-41 are to be literally construed; Pelton King, Inc. v. Bethlehem , 109 Conn. 547 , 553 , 147 A. 144 ; and that the protection which § 49-41 affords is to be applied without reference to whether, as against a private owner, a mechanic's lien might attach for claims for labor or materials furnished.

1993Even under the strict construction rule of Jo-Mark Sand & Gravel Co. v. Pantenella, [ 139 Conn. 598, 600-601 , 96 A.2d 217 (1953)], it would be the height of hypertechnicality to hold this notice to quit defective.” Southland Corporation v. Vernon, supra, 452-53 .

1993Even under the strict construction rule of Jo-Mark Sand & Gravel Co. v. Pantenella, [ 139 Conn. 598, 600-601 , 96 A.2d 217 (1953)], it would be the height of hypertechnicality to hold this notice to quit defective.” Southland Corporation v. Vernon, supra, 452-53 .

1993Consequently, there has been no expressed intent of the legislature was found from the words employed' to eliminate a spouse's claim for loss of consortium in product liability cases." Id.; Park Regional Corporation v. Town Planning Zoning Commission, 144 Conn. 677 , 682 , 136 A.2d 785 (1957).

1993Consequently, there has been no expressed intent of the legislature was found from the words employed' to eliminate a spouse's claim for loss of consortium in product liability cases." Id.; Park Regional Corporation v. Town Planning Zoning Commission, 144 Conn. 677 , 682 , 136 A.2d 785 (1957).

1985“The rules of statutory construction apply with equal force to Practice Book rules.” Grievance Committee v. Trantolo, 192 Conn. 15, 22 , 470 A.2d 228 (1984).

1985“The rules of statutory construction apply with equal force to Practice Book rules.” Grievance Committee v. Trantolo, 192 Conn. 15, 22 , 470 A.2d 228 (1984).

1984The court in that case stated: “The case has been reserved for advice upon the construction of a clause excluding coverage in an automobile liability insurance policy.” Id., 166 .

1959State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412 , 11 A.2d 856 , decided March 6, 1940, held that there was no ambiguity in the wording of the statutes which made the legislative intent uncertain so as to permit a construction which allowed an exception in favor of a duly licensed physician who prescribes the use of contraceptive measures to a patient who is a married woman when, in his professional opinion, her general health and well-being necessitate it.

1959State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412 , 11 A.2d 856 , decided March 6, 1940, held that there was no ambiguity in the wording of the statutes which made the legislative intent uncertain so as to permit a construction which allowed an exception in favor of a duly licensed physician who prescribes the use of contraceptive measures to a patient who is a married woman when, in his professional opinion, her general health and well-being necessitate it.

1940Ibid.

1927In Brown v. Congdon, 50 Conn. 302, 309 , we held, two judges dissenting, that a new trial would not be granted based upon the misconduct of a juror and that the only proper remedy was a motion in arrest of judgment.

1927Mr. Justice Baldwin was a member of the committee which prepared the Revision of 1875; his statement of the construction of the clause “other reasonable cause” as including, equitable causes may be taken as expressing the view of that committee, and their intention, in omitting from their Revision the statute granting authority to courts of equity to grant new trials, to excise an unnecessary statute the purpose of which was fully included in the authority to grant new trials for “other reasonable cause.” In Bissell v. Dickerson, 64 Conn. 61, 67 , 28 Atl. 226 , the court said, again by Mr. Jus

1927Mr. Justice Baldwin was a member of the committee which prepared the Revision of 1875; his statement of the construction of the clause “other reasonable cause” as including, equitable causes may be taken as expressing the view of that committee, and their intention, in omitting from their Revision the statute granting authority to courts of equity to grant new trials, to excise an unnecessary statute the purpose of which was fully included in the authority to grant new trials for “other reasonable cause.” In Bissell v. Dickerson, 64 Conn. 61, 67 , 28 Atl. 226 , the court said, again by Mr. Jus

1880In the case of Gold et ux. v. Judson et al., 21 Conn., 616 , it was held that to give to the word “ heir ” in a will a different construction from its usual and legal acceptation, the intention of the testator must be clear and decisive.