construction rule in Maryland

2000See Markey, 92 Md.App. 137, 607 A.2d 82 , a case in which the Court of Special Appeals gave an extensive history of this Court’s treatment of similar restrictive covenants in Maryland, saying in part: A later case, apparently recognizing the reasonableness modification of the strict construction rule, is the often-cited case of Turner v. Brocato, 206 Md. 336 , 111 A.2d 855 (1955).

2000See Markey, 92 Md.App. 137, 607 A.2d 82 , a case in which the Court of Special Appeals gave an extensive history of this Court’s treatment of similar restrictive covenants in Maryland, saying in part: A later case, apparently recognizing the reasonableness modification of the strict construction rule, is the often-cited case of Turner v. Brocato, 206 Md. 336 , 111 A.2d 855 (1955).

2012Gwin *415 v. MVA, 385 Md. 440, 462 , 869 A.2d 822, 835 (2005).

2012Gwin *415 v. MVA, 385 Md. 440, 462 , 869 A.2d 822, 835 (2005).

1994One of the early cases dealing with such provisions in statutes was Johns v. Hodges, 62 Md. 525, 537 (1884), where the Court opined: The office of a proviso in a statute is either to restrain its general application or except something from it and exclude misinterpretation.

1987Securi *645 ties and Exchange Commission v. American Int’l Savings and Loan Association, Inc., 199 F.Supp. 341, 347 (D.Md. 1961); Johns v. Hodges, 62 Md. 525, 537 (1884).

2021“Where the statute in question contains no ambiguity, the intent of the legislature is clear, and the doctrine of liberal construction does not apply.” McLaughlin, supra, 206 Md.

2021“Where the statute in question contains no ambiguity, the intent of the legislature is clear, and the doctrine of liberal construction does not apply.” McLaughlin, supra, 206 Md.

2021App. at 254 (citing Arundel Corp., supra, 383 Md. at 502 ).

2012See Arundel Corp., 383 Md. at 502 , 860 A.2d 886 .

1985Such a construction of the rule would result in an absurdity.” 266 Ark. at 696 , 587 S.W.2d at 570 .

1985Such a construction of the rule would result in an absurdity.” 266 Ark. at 696 , 587 S.W.2d at 570 .

2016As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has noted, this construction of a standard time “conforms to the evident purpose of the legislature to establish a single standard of time which would be in conformity to the standard upon which interstate commerce was based, and to avoid [] confusion ....” State v. Badolati, 241 Wis. 496 , 6 N.W.2d 220, 222 (1942).

2016As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has noted, this construction of a standard time “conforms to the evident purpose of the legislature to establish a single standard of time which would be in conformity to the standard upon which interstate commerce was based, and to avoid [] confusion ....” State v. Badolati, 241 Wis. 496 , 6 N.W.2d 220, 222 (1942).

2015See Holmes, 401 Md. at 457-58 , 932 *606 A.2d 698 (“The intelligent and knowing waiver standard in Section 645A (c)” applies only to situations that “require a litany with the defendant.”) (quoting Curtis, 284 Md. at 149 , 395 A.2d 464 ) (internal citations and footnotes omitted); Rose, 345 Md. at 244 , 691 A.2d 1314 (quoting Curtis, 284 Md. at 149-50 , 395 A.2d 464 , and stating that “[t]his interpretation of Art. 27, § 645[A](c), has been reaffirmed on numerous occasions! ]”) (collecting cases).

2015See Holmes, 401 Md. at 457-58 , 932 *606 A.2d 698 (“The intelligent and knowing waiver standard in Section 645A (c)” applies only to situations that “require a litany with the defendant.”) (quoting Curtis, 284 Md. at 149 , 395 A.2d 464 ) (internal citations and footnotes omitted); Rose, 345 Md. at 244 , 691 A.2d 1314 (quoting Curtis, 284 Md. at 149-50 , 395 A.2d 464 , and stating that “[t]his interpretation of Art. 27, § 645[A](c), has been reaffirmed on numerous occasions! ]”) (collecting cases).

2015See Holmes, 401 Md. at 457-58 , 932 *606 A.2d 698 (“The intelligent and knowing waiver standard in Section 645A (c)” applies only to situations that “require a litany with the defendant.”) (quoting Curtis, 284 Md. at 149 , 395 A.2d 464 ) (internal citations and footnotes omitted); Rose, 345 Md. at 244 , 691 A.2d 1314 (quoting Curtis, 284 Md. at 149-50 , 395 A.2d 464 , and stating that “[t]his interpretation of Art. 27, § 645[A](c), has been reaffirmed on numerous occasions! ]”) (collecting cases).

2015Maryland has a similar doctrine of construction. "[P]arties to a contract are deemed to have contracted with knowledge of existing law and that ‘the laws which subsist at the time and place of the making of a contract ... enter into and form a part of it, as if they were expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms.' " Post v. Bregman, 349 Md. 142, 156 , 707 A.2d 806, 813 (1998) (quoting Wilmington Trust Co. v. Clark, 289 Md. 313, 320 , 424 A.2d 744, 749 (1981)). .

2015Maryland has a similar doctrine of construction. "[P]arties to a contract are deemed to have contracted with knowledge of existing law and that ‘the laws which subsist at the time and place of the making of a contract ... enter into and form a part of it, as if they were expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms.' " Post v. Bregman, 349 Md. 142, 156 , 707 A.2d 806, 813 (1998) (quoting Wilmington Trust Co. v. Clark, 289 Md. 313, 320 , 424 A.2d 744, 749 (1981)). .

2015They cite Virginia and federal cases in support of this assertion.19 Specifically, they draw our attention to a case from 19 Maryland has a similar doctrine of construction. “[P]arties to a contract are deemed to have contracted with knowledge of existing law and that ‘the laws which subsist at the time and place of the making of a contract . . . enter into and form a part of it, as if they (Continued…) 17 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit citing a case of the Virginia Supreme Court, both of which suggest that, when constructing insurance contracts, a relevant “‘statuto

2015Maryland has a similar doctrine of construction. "[P]arties to a contract are deemed to have contracted with knowledge of existing law and that ‘the laws which subsist at the time and place of the making of a contract ... enter into and form a part of it, as if they were expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms.' " Post v. Bregman, 349 Md. 142, 156 , 707 A.2d 806, 813 (1998) (quoting Wilmington Trust Co. v. Clark, 289 Md. 313, 320 , 424 A.2d 744, 749 (1981)). .

2015Maryland has a similar doctrine of construction. "[P]arties to a contract are deemed to have contracted with knowledge of existing law and that ‘the laws which subsist at the time and place of the making of a contract ... enter into and form a part of it, as if they were expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms.' " Post v. Bregman, 349 Md. 142, 156 , 707 A.2d 806, 813 (1998) (quoting Wilmington Trust Co. v. Clark, 289 Md. 313, 320 , 424 A.2d 744, 749 (1981)). .

2003See Criminal Injuries Compensation Bd. v. Remson, 282 Md. 168, 192 , 384 A.2d 58 (1978)(while statutes of a remedial nature “are to be liberally construed with a view toward the effective administration of justice[,] ... they are not to be given such a construction as will defeat or frustrate the legislative intention”); Hyatt v. Hyatt, 53 Md.App. 55, 59 , 452 A.2d 436 (1982)(“doctrine of liberal construction [of remedial statutes] does not permit [a court] to redraft a clearly-written statute, the language of which makes a limited legislative intent apparent”).

2003See Criminal Injuries Compensation Bd. v. Remson, 282 Md. 168, 192 , 384 A.2d 58 (1978)(while statutes of a remedial nature “are to be liberally construed with a view toward the effective administration of justice[,] ... they are not to be given such a construction as will defeat or frustrate the legislative intention”); Hyatt v. Hyatt, 53 Md.App. 55, 59 , 452 A.2d 436 (1982)(“doctrine of liberal construction [of remedial statutes] does not permit [a court] to redraft a clearly-written statute, the language of which makes a limited legislative intent apparent”).

2003See Criminal Injuries Compensation Bd. v. Remson, 282 Md. 168, 192 , 384 A.2d 58 (1978)(while statutes of a remedial nature “are to be liberally construed with a view toward the effective administration of justice[,] ... they are not to be given such a construction as will defeat or frustrate the legislative intention”); Hyatt v. Hyatt, 53 Md.App. 55, 59 , 452 A.2d 436 (1982)(“doctrine of liberal construction [of remedial statutes] does not permit [a court] to redraft a clearly-written statute, the language of which makes a limited legislative intent apparent”).

2003See Criminal Injuries Compensation Bd. v. Remson, 282 Md. 168, 192 , 384 A.2d 58 (1978)(while statutes of a remedial nature “are to be liberally construed with a view toward the effective administration of justice[,] ... they are not to be given such a construction as will defeat or frustrate the legislative intention”); Hyatt v. Hyatt, 53 Md.App. 55, 59 , 452 A.2d 436 (1982)(“doctrine of liberal construction [of remedial statutes] does not permit [a court] to redraft a clearly-written statute, the language of which makes a limited legislative intent apparent”).

2000See Markey, 92 Md.App. 137, 607 A.2d 82 , a case in which the Court of Special Appeals gave an extensive history of this Court’s treatment of similar restrictive covenants in Maryland, saying in part: A later case, apparently recognizing the reasonableness modification of the strict construction rule, is the often-cited case of Turner v. Brocato, 206 Md. 336 , 111 A.2d 855 (1955).

2000See Markey, 92 Md.App. 137, 607 A.2d 82 , a case in which the Court of Special Appeals gave an extensive history of this Court’s treatment of similar restrictive covenants in Maryland, saying in part: A later case, apparently recognizing the reasonableness modification of the strict construction rule, is the often-cited case of Turner v. Brocato, 206 Md. 336 , 111 A.2d 855 (1955).