construction rule in Texas

2009In light of the Comptroller's construction and the requirement that tax exemptions be strictly construed against the taxpayer and in favor of the taxing authority, see First Baptist Church , 833 S.W.2d at 117 , we agree with the district court that, as a matter of law, the rolling stock exemption does not apply to Reynolds's ship unloaders and that summary judgment on that issue was appropriate.

2009In light of the Comptroller’s construction and the requirement that tax exemptions be strictly construed against the taxpayer and in favor of the taxing authority, see First Baptist Church, 833 S.W.2d at 117 , we agree with the district court that, as a matter of law, the rolling stock exemption does not apply to Reynolds’s ship unloaders and that summary judgment on that issue was appropriate. 15 We affirm the district court’s judgment. __________________________________________ Bob Pemberton, Justice Before Chief Justice Jones, Justices Pemberton and Waldrop Affirmed on Motion for Rehearing

1934In delivering the opinion in Gordon's case Mr. Justice Gould said: "Former decisions of this Court have given a construction to the clause of the Constitution making sheriffs 'subject to removal by the judge of the District Court for said county for cause spread upon the minutes of the court' (Constitution, sec. 18, Art. 5; Davis v. State, 35 Tex. 118 ; Ex Parte King, id., 657).

1922But the law, in accordance with the principles of justice — principles which are fundamental and eternal — will require that notice be given before any person be passed upon, either in person, estate, or any other matter or thing to which he is entitled; and though the statutes do not, in terms, require notice, the law will imply that notice was intended. * * * And what the law will imply is as much part and parcel of a legislative enactment as though set forth in terms.” In the case of Gordon v. State, 43 Tex. 330 , our Supreme Court, in discussing the power of a district judge to remove a sh

2011In Melody Home Manufacturing Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.1987), the Texas Supreme Court recognized that “consumers of services do not have the protection of a statutory or common law implied warranty scheme.” Id. at 353 .

2011In Melody Home Manufacturing Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.1987), the Texas Supreme Court recognized that “consumers of services do not have the protection of a statutory or common law implied warranty scheme.” Id. at 353 .

2008Thus, the appropriate deadline under their formulation would have been Monday, December 4, 2006 (the date on which the Prestwoods actually served Dr. Settle with their expert reports and curricula vitae). (7) In addressing the Prestwood's construction of rule 21a, we note that this Court has previously held that the rules of civil procedure are applicable to health care liability claims and that "the legislature intended for claimants to comply with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21a to fulfill the requirements of section 74.351(a)." See Herrera , 212 S.W.3d at 459 . (8) We are not persuaded, h

2008P. 21a. 7 deadline under their formulation would have been Monday, December 4, 2006 (the date on which the Prestwoods actually served Dr. Settle with their expert reports and curricula vitae).7 In addressing the Prestwood’s construction of rule 21a, we note that this Court has previously held that the rules of civil procedure are applicable to health care liability claims and that “the legislature intended for claimants to comply with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21a to fulfill the requirements of section 74.351(a).” See Herrera, 212 S.W.3d at 459 .8 We are not persuaded, however, that when D

2000In Hill v. Hill, 971 S.W.2d 153 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1998, no pet.), the issue was whether findings contained in a judgment could be used to support a claim on appeal although the trial court made separate findings at the request of a party.

1999In Hill v. Hill 971 S.W.2d 153 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1998, no pet.), the issue was whether findings contained in a judgment could be used to support a claim on appeal although the trial court made separate findings at the request of a party.

1966In the early case of Johnson v. Gurley, 52 Tex. 222 (1879), this Court discussed the nature of covenants, conditions and conditional limitations and announced the rule: "In case of doubt as to the true construction of a clause in a lease, it should be held to be a covenant, and not a condition or limitation, as the law does not favor forfeitures." The same view was expressed in Henshaw v. Texas Natural Resources Foundation, 147 Tex. 436 , 216 S.W.2d 566 (1949), wherein it was said: "Since forfeitures are not favored, courts are inclined to construe the provisions in a contract as covenants rat

1966In the early case of Johnson v. Gurley, 52 Tex. 222 (1879), this Court discussed the nature of covenants, conditions and conditional limitations and announced the rule: "In case of doubt as to the true construction of a clause in a lease, it should be held to be a covenant, and not a condition or limitation, as the law does not favor forfeitures." The same view was expressed in Henshaw v. Texas Natural Resources Foundation, 147 Tex. 436 , 216 S.W.2d 566 (1949), wherein it was said: "Since forfeitures are not favored, courts are inclined to construe the provisions in a contract as covenants rat

1946Texas Unemployment Compensation Commission v. Bass, 137 Tex. 1 , 151 S.W.2d 567 ; State v. The Praetorians, 143 Tex. 565 , 186 S.W.2d 973 , 158 A.L.R. 596 .

1942Humble’s second point reads : “The statutory language for construction ‘provided that the term “store”- * * * wherever used in this act shall not include * * * any place of business engaged exclusively in the storing, selling, or distributing of petroleum products and servicing of motor vehicles’ is not an exemption from taxation but is the taxing provision relied upon by the State as imposing liability upon defendant and, therefore, the rule of liberal construction in favor of taxpayer and strict construction against the State applies.” The Humble’s contention under this point is predicated u

1934(Italics ours.) (Cooley's Const. Lim., 58-60; Bennett v. Ward, 3 Caines, 259 .)" *Page 476 Gordon's case follows the generally accepted views. (22 R.

1875(Cooley’s Const. Dim., 58-60; Bennett v. Ward, 3 Caines, 259 .) As presented in the record, the order of removal appealed from, made March 5, 1875, was without notice to the sheriff, and for causes anterior to the election and commission under which he then held his office.

2025Ctr. of Las Colinas, Inc. v. Hogue, 271 S.W.3d 238, 256 (Tex. 2008) (“The Court must not interpret the statute in a manner that renders any part of the statute meaningless or superfluous.”). 29 See Jaster, 438 S.W.3d at 563–65 (discussing that the legislature often uses “action” and “proceeding” interchangeably, and that “action” refers to “an entire lawsuit” or “proceeding,” “not to discrete ‘claims’ or ‘causes of action’ asserted within a suit, cause or proceeding.”). 30 See, e.g., Cappuccitti v. Gulf Indus.

2024Justice Christopher pointed out that the use of “may” does not take on a special meaning in an arbitration contract: 15 “As always, the entire contract must be reviewed to see if it is mandatory or permissive.” Id. at 262 ; see Branch Law Firm, 447 S.W.3d at 395 (“While an arbitration clause standing alone might appear to encompass the claims in question, the court cannot confine its analysis to the construction of that clause alone.”). 13 13 In addition to U.S. Home Corp. and Southern Green Builders, in the trial court, Appellants relied on Bonsmara and the following Texas cases.

2023John cites Conte v. Conte, 56 S.W.3d 830 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.), in support of his argument that his allegations in this lawsuit did not violate the in terrorem clause.

2023Therapists, 511 S.W.3d at 33 . 6 Whether the challenged subsections of the Comptroller Rule are facially invalid turns on the construction of that rule and Section 171.103(a)(1), matters of law that we review de novo.

2022Fontenot, the case that the parties shy away from, applied the construction principle of reading the contract as a whole and not looking “beyond the written language of the contract to determine the intent of the parties unless the disputed language is ambiguous.” Id. at 1214 .

2015Co. v. Pepper, 1940, 134 T. 360, 135 S.W.2d 79 ; Ormsby v. Ratcliffe, 1928, 117 T. 242, 1 S.W.2d 1084 ; North v. Atlas Brick Co., Com.App.1929, 13 S.W.2d 59 .] “The rule seeks to clarify the practice governing presumed findings, but at the same time I see some room for serious debate about the proper construction of the rule in certain instances.