construction rule in Illinois

2017App. 3d at 466 . ¶ 60 The Langford court noted that “defects in a motion for substitution are often held to be ‘technical defects’ not warranting denial of the motion under the liberal construction rule set forth by the Illinois Supreme Court in cases up through People v. Walker.” Langford, 246 Ill.

2017App. 3d at 466 . ¶ 60 The Langford court noted that “defects in a motion for substitution are often held to be ‘technical defects’ not warranting denial of the motion under the liberal construction rule set forth by the Illinois Supreme Court in cases up through People v. Walker.” Langford, 246 Ill.

2011Our supreme court in Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill.2d 407 , 58 Ill.Dec. 725 , 430 N.E.2d 976 (1982), explained the discovery rule in Illinois as follows: "This court has recently considered the discovery rule in depth in two cases, and has adopted a construction of the rule which can be termed neither narrow nor expansive.

2011Our supreme court in Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill.2d 407 , 58 Ill.Dec. 725 , 430 N.E.2d 976 (1982), explained the discovery rule in Illinois as follows: "This court has recently considered the discovery rule in depth in two cases, and has adopted a construction of the rule which can be termed neither narrow nor expansive.

2008The court stated: "Although, it is true that the mere announcement of being 'ready for trial,' by itself, is insufficient to serve as a demand for trial, that statement in the instant case was coupled with the court's construction of the statement as a demand for trial when the court made its declaration, 'the trial demand will show.' Significantly, the State did not object to the court's construction of defense counsel's statement." Moore, 99 Ill.

2008The court stated: “Although, it is true that the mere announcement of being ‘ready for trial,’ by itself, is insufficient to serve as a demand for trial, that statement in the instant case was coupled with the court’s construction of the statement as a demand for trial when the court made its declaration, ‘the trial demand will show.’ Significantly, the State did not object to the court’s construction of defense counsel’s statement.” Moore, 99 Ill.

2001Frye, 153 Ill. 2d at 33 , 605 N.E.2d at 560 .

2001Frye, 153 Ill. 2d at 33 , 605 N.E.2d at 560 .

2000Grossinger, 240 Ill.

2000Grossinger , 240 Ill.

2000App. 3d at 712 , 406 N.E.2d at 126 ), on which point it has been superseded by our decision in Grossinger as more fully elaborated below. 2 Finally, as we discuss in detail below, this construction of the clause as optional renders it invalid.

2000App. 3d at 712 , 406 N.E.2d at 126 ), on which point it has been superseded by our decision in Grossinger as more fully elaborated below. 2: Finally, as we discuss in detail below, this construction of the clause as optional renders it invalid .

1998VonHoldt , 175 Ill. 2d at 434 .

1998VonHoldt, 175 Ill. 2d at 434 .

1983(See Keal v. Rhydderck (1925), 317 Ill. 231 .) Liberal construction should not be used *56 to read into the statute something which is not there.

1983(See Keal v. Rhydderck (1925), 317 Ill. 231 .) Liberal construction should not be used to read into the statute something which is not there.

1983Stat. 1981, ch. 40, par. 1521; In re Adoption of Gardiner (Iowa 1980), 287 N.W.2d 555 .) The liberal construction rule apparently was designed to alleviate the harsh results of the former requirement of strict construction of the procedural aspect of the adoption statute.

1983Stat. 1981, ch. 40, par. 1521; In re Adoption of Gardiner (Iowa 1980), 287 N.W.2d 555 .) The liberal construction rule apparently was designed to alleviate the harsh results of the former requirement of strict construction of the procedural aspect of the adoption statute.

1943It is a general rule that when the testator has expressed his intention so ambiguously as to create a difficulty, which makes it necessary to go into a court of chancery to get a construction of the will and to remove the difficulty, the costs of litigation must be borne by the estate, and the general residue is the primary fund for the payment of such costs.’ ” (To the same effect are Kendall v. Taylor, 245 Ill. 617 ; Board of Administration v. Stead, 259 Ill. 194 ; Dean v. Northern Trust Co., 266 Ill. 205 ; McCormick v. Hall, 337 Ill. 232 ; Schneller v. Schneller, 356 Ill. 89 .) While we hav

1915It is a general rule that when the testator has expressed his intention so ambiguously as to create a difficulty, which makes it necessary to go into a court of chancery to. get a construction of the will and to remove the difficulty, the costs of litigation must be borne by the estate, and the general residue is the primary fund for the payment of such costs.” In Kendall v. Taylor, 245 Ill. 617 , the court say, on page 621: “Counsel for appellants further insist that the trial court erred in taxing the solicitor’s fees of appellees’ counsel as costs.

1914A case more nearly in point, and one which presents a more proper basis for the determination of the meaning of the words as used in this will, is Kellett v. Shepard, 139 Ill. 433 , where the life tenant, although an heir of the testator, was not the only heir, as was the case in Johnson v. Askey and Bond v. Moore, supra. In that case the testator gave a life estate to his daughter in one-half of the residue of his estate, with remainder to her child or children should she have any, and in case she died leaving no issue, to the testator’s heirs-at-law.

1902(Kellett v. Shepard, 139 Ill. 433 .) The true construction of the clause in this respect is, that at the death of the testator any and all real estate of which the testator should die seized, other than that which, under the will, the widow, Ruth, had power to manage, rent or sell during her lifetime, should go to the heirs of the testator in like equal portions as he had disposed of his personal property, and that after the death of the said Ruth lots Nos. 193 and 195, if the same had not been disposed of by her, should go to the same persons to whom the land and the out-lot would pass under

1902This depends on whether the deceased received the moneys of appellants “ in trust for any purpose.” In reference to this phrase as used in section 70 of the administration act, the Supreme Court in the case of Svanoe v. Jurgens, 144 Ill. 507 , says : “ We gave a construction to this clause in Wilson v. Kirby, Ex’r, 88 Ill. 566 , where it was held that the expression ‘ in trust for any purpose ’ was not intended to embrace all kinds of trusts in the broadest meaning of the term as including factors, agents, etc., but that the word ‘ trust ’ is here used in the more restricted sense of the term,

1893We gave a construction to this clause in Wilson et al. v. Kirby, Ex'r, 88 Ill. 566 , where it was held that the expression, “ in trust for any purpose,” was not intended to embrace all kinds of trusts in the broadest meaning of the term, as including factors, agents, &c., but that the word, “ trust,” is here used in the more restricted sense of the term, as referring to special or technical trusts “ and not those which the law implies from the contract.” The same distinction is noted and pointed out in the following cases: Weer v. Gand, 88 Ill. 490 ; Kirby v. Wilson, 98 Ill. 240 ; Pierce v. Sh

1902This depends on whether the deceased received the moneys of appellants “ in trust for any purpose.” In reference to this phrase as used in section 70 of the administration act, the Supreme Court in the case of Svanoe v. Jurgens, 144 Ill. 507 , says : “ We gave a construction to this clause in Wilson v. Kirby, Ex’r, 88 Ill. 566 , where it was held that the expression ‘ in trust for any purpose ’ was not intended to embrace all kinds of trusts in the broadest meaning of the term as including factors, agents, etc., but that the word ‘ trust ’ is here used in the more restricted sense of the term,

1893We gave a construction to this clause in Wilson et al. v. Kirby, Ex'r, 88 Ill. 566 , where it was held that the expression, “ in trust for any purpose,” was not intended to embrace all kinds of trusts in the broadest meaning of the term, as including factors, agents, &c., but that the word, “ trust,” is here used in the more restricted sense of the term, as referring to special or technical trusts “ and not those which the law implies from the contract.” The same distinction is noted and pointed out in the following cases: Weer v. Gand, 88 Ill. 490 ; Kirby v. Wilson, 98 Ill. 240 ; Pierce v. Sh

2024Id. ¶ 30 The Illinois Rules of Evidence were adopted in 2010.

2023Applied to a first-stage postconviction petition, “a petition alleging ineffective assistance may not be summarily dismissed if (i) it is arguable that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (ii) it is arguable that the defendant was prejudiced.” (Emphases added.) Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 17 . ¶ 44 Before reaching the merits of defendant’s appeal, we first address the State’s argument that defendant has forfeited his claims because his present arguments are “distinct from the claims in his petition” and that appellate counsel’s “reshaping [of defendant’s pro

2023However, as stated above, our supreme court expressed concern that pro se petitions should be given a liberal construction and should be reviewed “ ‘with a lenient eye, allowing borderline cases to proceed.’ ” Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 21 (quoting Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983)).

2020Seymour v. Collins, 2015 IL 118432, ¶ 41 . ¶ 19 Here, the construction of the rule's language is not at issue and to any extent construction is required, the plain meaning is clear in that the rule unambiguously requires parties “to exercise reasonable diligence” in serving opposing parties.

2018Such a construction of the rule is consistent with and promotes the rule's objective to provide a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy. * * * We determine the clarification to establish the terminal limit to bring the motion rather than the initial opportunity." (Emphases added.) Id. at 171 , 213 Ill.Dec. 26 , 658 N.E.2d 496 . ¶ 43 We also find readily distinguishable (as did the trial court) Berkin v. Orland Park Plaza Bank , 191 Ill.

2018Such a construction of the rule is consistent with and promotes the rule's objective to provide a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy. * * * We determine the clarification to establish the terminal limit to bring the motion rather than the initial opportunity." (Emphases added.) Id. at 171 , 213 Ill.Dec. 26 , 658 N.E.2d 496 . ¶ 43 We also find readily distinguishable (as did the trial court) Berkin v. Orland Park Plaza Bank , 191 Ill.

2018Such a construction of the rule is consistent with and promotes the rule's objective to provide a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy. * * * We determine the clarification to establish the terminal limit to bring the motion rather than the initial opportunity." (Emphases added.) Id. at 171 , 213 Ill.Dec. 26 , 658 N.E.2d 496 . ¶ 43 We also find readily distinguishable (as did the trial court) Berkin v. Orland Park Plaza Bank , 191 Ill.

2018App. 3d 1056 , 139 Ill.Dec. 149 , 548 N.E.2d 534 (1989).