construction doctrine in New Jersey

2016"The strict construction doctrine, and its corollary, the doctrine of lenity, mean[] that words are given their ordinary meaning and that any reasonable doubt . . . is decided in favor of [the defendant]." Ibid. (quotation omitted). [State v. Olivero, 221 N.J. 632, 638-39 (2015) (fifth and sixth alterations in original).] Applying these principles to the matter under review, we conclude the language of N.J.S.A. 2C:30-3 is not ambiguous and, when read in a "common sense manner[,]" Olivero, supra, 221 N.J. at 639 , penalizes a person for conduct taken in reliance on information revealed during a

2015“The strict construction doctrine, and its corollary, the doctrine of lenity, mean[] that words are given their ordinary meaning and that any reasonable doubt ... is decided in favor of [the defendant].” Ibid. (quotation omitted).

2011Moreover, even if the Code commentary, see, e.g., infra at 547, 20 A.3d at 1149 (quoting 2 Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission, commentary to § 2C:44-5, at 336 (1971) (“Subsection (b) is addressed to the problem of a sentence of imprisonment imposed upon a person who is already serving a term under a sentence imposed for an earlier offense.”)), could be considered to support another interpretation, our rules of statutory construction require the application of lenity, a corollary to the doctrine of strict construction, which dictates that criminal statutes must be i

2011Moreover, even if the Code commentary, see, e.g., infra at 547, 20 A.3d at 1149 (quoting 2 Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission, commentary to § 2C:44-5, at 336 (1971) (“Subsection (b) is addressed to the problem of a sentence of imprisonment imposed upon a person who is already serving a term under a sentence imposed for an earlier offense.”)), could be considered to support another interpretation, our rules of statutory construction require the application of lenity, a corollary to the doctrine of strict construction, which dictates that criminal statutes must be i

2007For example, it "does not prevent a court from reading the statute in relation to the mischief and evil sought to be suppressed or prevent a court from giving effect to the terms of the statute in accordance with their fair and natural acceptation." State v. Meinken, 10 N.J. 348, 352 , 91 A. 2d 721 (1952).

2007For example, it "does not prevent a court from reading the statute in relation to the mischief and evil sought to be suppressed or prevent a court from giving effect to the terms of the statute in accordance with their fair and natural acceptation." State v. Meinken, 10 N.J. 348, 352 , 91 A. 2d 721 (1952).

2020Ibid.

2015Id. at 592 , 85 A.3d 1015 .

2015Id. at 592 , 85 A.3d 1015 .

2010We found that, in establishing the categories, the Borough was attempting to conform to applicable collective negotiation agreements, Fair Lawn, supra, 299 N.J.Super. at 605 , 691 A. 2d 859 , and we found that it was proper to consider separately employees who worked and retired under different compensation/benefit conditions, id. at 605-06, 691 A. 2d 859 .

2010We found that, in establishing the categories, the Borough was attempting to conform to applicable collective negotiation agreements, Fair Lawn, supra, 299 N.J.Super. at 605 , 691 A. 2d 859 , and we found that it was proper to consider separately employees who worked and retired under different compensation/benefit conditions, id. at 605-06, 691 A. 2d 859 .

2009Thus, "the term `educational' has been broadly interpreted and not limited to purely scholastic activities." Bloom v. Seton Hall Univ., 307 N.J.Super. 487, 492 , 704 A. 2d 1334 (App.Div.) (citing Morales v. N.J.

2009Thus, "the term `educational' has been broadly interpreted and not limited to purely scholastic activities." Bloom v. Seton Hall Univ., 307 N.J.Super. 487, 492 , 704 A. 2d 1334 (App.Div.) (citing Morales v. N.J.

2005Importantly, as one court has said in finding that a row of trees could constitute a fence notwithstanding the strict construction rule, “it is well settled that a covenant should not be read in such a way that defeats the plain and obvious meaning of the restriction.” Lakes, supra, 810 P.2d at 29 (emphasis added); Homann, supra, 296 N.J.Super. at 335 , 686 A.2d 1226 .

2005Importantly, as one court has said in finding that a row of trees could constitute a fence notwithstanding the strict construction rule, “it is well settled that a covenant should not be read in such a way that defeats the plain and obvious meaning of the restriction.” Lakes, supra, 810 P.2d at 29 (emphasis added); Homann, supra, 296 N.J.Super. at 335 , 686 A.2d 1226 .

1999In Rochinsky v. New Jersey Dep't of Transp., 110 N.J. 399 , 541 A. 2d 1029 (1988), the Court, quoting from the legislative declaration that forms part of the Tort Claims Act, noted that the "`basic statutory approach of the [Act] shall be that immunity of all governmental bodies in New Jersey is re-established.'" Id. at 407 , 541 A .2d 1029 .

1999In Rochinsky v. New Jersey Dep't of Transp., 110 N.J. 399 , 541 A. 2d 1029 (1988), the Court, quoting from the legislative declaration that forms part of the Tort Claims Act, noted that the "`basic statutory approach of the [Act] shall be that immunity of all governmental bodies in New Jersey is re-established.'" Id. at 407 , 541 A .2d 1029 .

1997This construction of the rule is supported implicitly by Saginario v. Attorney General, 87 N.J. 480 , 435 A.2d 1134 (1981), which appears to hold that a public employee dissatisfied with the outcome of a public-sector arbitration is required to challenge the result by an action under the Arbitration Act.

1997This construction of the rule is supported implicitly by Saginario v. Attorney General, 87 N.J. 480 , 435 A.2d 1134 (1981), which appears to hold that a public employee dissatisfied with the outcome of a public-sector arbitration is required to challenge the result by an action under the Arbitration Act.

1995Should he have understood that his conduct was proscribed, should he have understood that the penalty about to be imposed was the sanction intended by the legislature? [ DeMarco, supra, 83 N.J. at 37 , 414 A. 2d 1339 .] The strict construction rule also guards against imposition, by judicial construction, of punishment not intended by the legislature.

1995Should he have understood that his conduct was proscribed, should he have understood that the penalty about to be imposed was the sanction intended by the legislature? [ DeMarco, supra, 83 N.J. at 37 , 414 A. 2d 1339 .] The strict construction rule also guards against imposition, by judicial construction, of punishment not intended by the legislature.

1994In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 7:7A-1.4, supra, 118 N.J. at 555 , 573 A. 2d 143 (intent overrides alleged "plain meaning"); Morich, supra, 269 N.J.

1994In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 7:7A-1.4, supra, 118 N.J. at 555 , 573 A. 2d 143 (intent overrides alleged "plain meaning"); Morich, supra, 269 N.J.

1992Brick Township v. Vannell, 55 N.J.Super. 583 , 151 A.2d 404 (App.Div.1959), although bearing some resemblance to the facts being considered in this motion, also is distinguishable.

1992Brick Township v. Vannell, 55 N.J.Super. 583 , 151 A.2d 404 (App.Div.1959), although bearing some resemblance to the facts being considered in this motion, also is distinguishable.

1989That opinion, which was quoted by the majority as supportive of a strict construction principle, held that “family,” as used in the statute, should be given its primary dictionary definition, i.e., a “collective body of persons living together in one home, in a permanent and domestic character under one head or management.” Id. at 530 , 197 A.2d 673 .

1989That opinion, which was quoted by the majority as supportive of a strict construction principle, held that “family,” as used in the statute, should be given its primary dictionary definition, i.e., a “collective body of persons living together in one home, in a permanent and domestic character under one head or management.” Id. at 530 , 197 A.2d 673 .

1984Id. 221 P.2d at 40 .

1984Id. 221 P.2d at 40 .

1982See, e.g., Salsman v. National Community Bank of Rutherford, supra, 102 N.J.Super. 482 ; Continental Bank v. Wa-Ho Truck Brokerage, 122 Ariz. 414 , 595 P.2d 206 (Ct.App.1979); Berkheimers, Inc. v. Citizens Valley Bank, 270 Or. 807 , 529 P.2d 903 (Ore.Sup.Ct.1974); Tette v. Marine Midland Bank, 78 App.Div.2d 383, 435 N.Y.S.2d 413 (App.Div.1981); Aetna Cas. & Sur.

1982See, e.g., Salsman v. National Community Bank of Rutherford, supra, 102 N.J.Super. 482 ; Continental Bank v. Wa-Ho Truck Brokerage, 122 Ariz. 414 , 595 P.2d 206 (Ct.App.1979); Berkheimers, Inc. v. Citizens Valley Bank, 270 Or. 807 , 529 P.2d 903 (Ore.Sup.Ct.1974); Tette v. Marine Midland Bank, 78 App.Div.2d 383, 435 N.Y.S.2d 413 (App.Div.1981); Aetna Cas. & Sur.

1982See, e.g., Salsman v. National Community Bank of Rutherford, supra, 102 N.J.Super. 482 ; Continental Bank v. Wa-Ho Truck Brokerage, 122 Ariz. 414 , 595 P.2d 206 (Ct.App.1979); Berkheimers, Inc. v. Citizens Valley Bank, 270 Or. 807 , 529 P.2d 903 (Ore.Sup.Ct.1974); Tette v. Marine Midland Bank, 78 App.Div.2d 383, 435 N.Y.S.2d 413 (App.Div.1981); Aetna Cas. & Sur.

1982See, e.g., Salsman v. National Community Bank of Rutherford, supra, 102 N.J.Super. 482 ; Continental Bank v. Wa-Ho Truck Brokerage, 122 Ariz. 414 , 595 P.2d 206 (Ct.App.1979); Berkheimers, Inc. v. Citizens Valley Bank, 270 Or. 807 , 529 P.2d 903 (Ore.Sup.Ct.1974); Tette v. Marine Midland Bank, 78 App.Div.2d 383, 435 N.Y.S.2d 413 (App.Div.1981); Aetna Cas. & Sur.

1982See, e.g., Salsman v. National Community Bank of Rutherford, supra, 102 N.J.Super. 482 ; Continental Bank v. Wa-Ho Truck Brokerage, 122 Ariz. 414 , 595 P.2d 206 (Ct.App.1979); Berkheimers, Inc. v. Citizens Valley Bank, 270 Or. 807 , 529 P.2d 903 (Ore.Sup.Ct.1974); Tette v. Marine Midland Bank, 78 App.Div.2d 383, 435 N.Y.S.2d 413 (App.Div.1981); Aetna Cas. & Sur.