construction rule in Arkansas

1930To support the holding, the court quoted from Bank of Commerce v. Goolsby, 129 Ark. 416 , 196 S. W. 803 , the following: “'"When notes are taken in exchange for stock, it is a palpable violation of the constitutional provision, because notes are merely evidences of indebtedness, and such a transaction shows upon its face that the stock has not been paid for.

1930To support the holding, the court quoted from Bank of Commerce v. Goolsby, 129 Ark. 416 , 196 S. W. 803 , the following: “'"When notes are taken in exchange for stock, it is a palpable violation of the constitutional provision, because notes are merely evidences of indebtedness, and such a transaction shows upon its face that the stock has not been paid for.

2021In re Adoption of Tompkins, 341 Ark. 949, 951 , 20 S.W.3d 385 , 386 (2000).

2021In re Adoption of Tompkins, 341 Ark. 949, 951 , 20 S.W.3d 385 , 386 (2000).

2006Wallace v. West Fraser South, Inc., 365 Ark. 68 , 225 S.W.3d 361 (2006) (citing Matlock v. Arkansas Blue Cross Blue Shield, 74 Ark.

2006Wallace v. West Fraser South, Inc., 365 Ark. 68 , 225 S.W.3d 361 (2006)(citing Matlock v. Arkansas Blue Cross Blue Shield, 74 Ark.App. 322 , 49 S.W.3d 126 (2001)).

2006Wallace v. West Fraser South, Inc., 365 Ark. 68 , 225 S.W.3d 361 (2006) (citing Matlock v. Arkansas Blue Cross Blue Shield, 74 Ark.

2006Wallace v. West Fraser South, Inc., 365 Ark. 68 , 225 S.W.3d 361 (2006) (citing Matlock v. Arkansas Blue Cross Blue Shield, 74 Ark.

2005Edens v. Superior Marble & Glass, 346 Ark. 487 , 58 S.W.3d 369 (2001); Wheeler Constr.

2005Edens v. Superior Marble & Glass, 346 Ark. 487 , 58 S.W.3d 369 (2001); Wheeler Constr.

2003This arguably follows from the plain language of the statute ( see generally Wilcox v. Safley, 298 Ark. 159 , 766 S.W.2d 12 (1989), stating the well-established rule that legislative intent must be discerned from the language employed if a statute is clear and unambiguous on its face), particularly when read in light of the aforementioned liberal construction rule.

2003This arguably follows from the plain language of the statute ( see generally Wilcox v. Safley, 298 Ark. 159 , 766 S.W.2d 12 (1989), stating the well-established rule that legislative intent must be discerned from the language employed if a statute is clear and unambiguous on its face), particularly when read in light of the aforementioned liberal construction rule.

1998Hays, 250 Ark. at 595 .

1998Hays, 250 Ark. at 595 , 466 S.W.2d 272 .

1997We said that this construction of the rule is the “most certain mode of conveying actual notice to an absent defendant.” Id. at 23-24, 688 S.W.2d at 744 .

1979Appellant’s reliance upon Application of Payne, 430 P. 2d 566 (1967) is misplaced.

1979Purdy v. Livingston, 262 Ark. 575 , 559 S.W.2d 24 (1977).

1979Purdy v. Livingston, 262 Ark. 575 , 559 S.W.2d 24 (1977).

1978Our recognition there that the legislature intended that the section be given a liberal construction under the rule of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 , 67 S. Ct. 385 , 91 L.

1978Our recognition there that the legislature intended that the section be given a liberal construction under the rule of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 , 67 S. Ct. 385 , 91 L.

1976Actually the Habitual Criminal Act imposes collateral consequences just as did the statutes involved in State Medical Board v. Rodgers, 190 Ark. 266 , 79 S.W. 2d 83 ; Tucker v. State, 248 Ark. 979 , 455 S.W. 2d 888 ; and Sutherland v. Arkansas Department of Insurance, 250 Ark. 903 , 467 S.W. 2d 724 .

1976Actually the Habitual Criminal Act imposes collateral consequences just as did the statutes involved in State Medical Board v. Rodgers, 190 Ark. 266 , 79 S.W. 2d 83 ; Tucker v. State, 248 Ark. 979 , 455 S.W. 2d 888 ; and Sutherland v. Arkansas Department of Insurance, 250 Ark. 903 , 467 S.W. 2d 724 .

1976Actually the Habitual Criminal Act imposes collateral consequences just as did the statutes involved in State Medical Board v. Rodgers, 190 Ark. 266 , 79 S.W. 2d 83 ; Tucker v. State, 248 Ark. 979 , 455 S.W. 2d 888 ; and Sutherland v. Arkansas Department of Insurance, 250 Ark. 903 , 467 S.W. 2d 724 .

1976Actually the Habitual Criminal Act imposes collateral consequences just as did the statutes involved in State Medical Board v. Rodgers, 190 Ark. 266 , 79 S.W. 2d 83 ; Tucker v. State, 248 Ark. 979 , 455 S.W. 2d 888 ; and Sutherland v. Arkansas Department of Insurance, 250 Ark. 903 , 467 S.W. 2d 724 .

1976Actually the Habitual Criminal Act imposes collateral consequences just as did the statutes involved in State Medical Board v. Rodgers, 190 Ark. 266 , 79 S.W. 2d 83 ; Tucker v. State, 248 Ark. 979 , 455 S.W. 2d 888 ; and Sutherland v. Arkansas Department of Insurance, 250 Ark. 903 , 467 S.W. 2d 724 .

1976Actually the Habitual Criminal Act imposes collateral consequences just as did the statutes involved in State Medical Board v. Rodgers, 190 Ark. 266 , 79 S.W. 2d 83 ; Tucker v. State, 248 Ark. 979 , 455 S.W. 2d 888 ; and Sutherland v. Arkansas Department of Insurance, 250 Ark. 903 , 467 S.W. 2d 724 .

1971The latest reported Arkansas case squarely in point is Casebeer v. Beacon Realty, 248 Ark. 22 , where, after stating the strict construction rule, it is said, at page 26: ‘This doctrine was recognized by this court in Faust v. Little Rock School Dist., 224 Ark. 761 , 276 S. W. 2d 59 , wherein we said that where there is uncertainty in the language by which a grantor in a deed attempts to restrict the use of realty, freedom from restraint would be decreed.

1971The latest reported Arkansas case squarely in point is Casebeer v. Beacon Realty, 248 Ark. 22 , where, after stating the strict construction rule, it is said, at page 26: ‘This doctrine was recognized by this court in Faust v. Little Rock School Dist., 224 Ark. 761 , 276 S. W. 2d 59 , wherein we said that where there is uncertainty in the language by which a grantor in a deed attempts to restrict the use of realty, freedom from restraint would be decreed.

1971The latest reported Arkansas case squarely in point is Casebeer v. Beacon Realty, 248 Ark. 22 , where, after stating the strict construction rule, it is said, at page 26: ‘This doctrine was recognized by this court in Faust v. Little Rock School Dist., 224 Ark. 761 , 276 S. W. 2d 59 , wherein we said that where there is uncertainty in the language by which a grantor in a deed attempts to restrict the use of realty, freedom from restraint would be decreed.

1968Co., 187 Ark. 893 , 63 S. W. 2d 347 .

1968Co., 187 Ark. 893 , 63 S. W. 2d 347 .

1968Among the cases which applied to the liberal construction rule or hold a substantial compliance with the statute is sufficient, are: Anderson v. Seamans, 49 Ark. 475 , 5 S. W. 799 ; Buckley v. Taylor, 51 Ark. 302 , 11 S. W. 281 ; Speer Hardware Co. v. Bruce, 105 Ark. 146 , 150 S. W. 403 ; Bruce Brown, v. Turnage Hardware, Inc., 181 Ark. 606 , 26 S. W. 2d 1114 ; and, Geisreiter v. Standard Lbr.

1968Among the cases which applied to the liberal construction rule or hold a substantial compliance with the statute is sufficient, are: Anderson v. Seamans, 49 Ark. 475 , 5 S. W. 799 ; Buckley v. Taylor, 51 Ark. 302 , 11 S. W. 281 ; Speer Hardware Co. v. Bruce, 105 Ark. 146 , 150 S. W. 403 ; Bruce Brown, v. Turnage Hardware, Inc., 181 Ark. 606 , 26 S. W. 2d 1114 ; and, Geisreiter v. Standard Lbr.

1968Among the cases which applied to the liberal construction rule or hold a substantial compliance with the statute is sufficient, are: Anderson v. Seamans, 49 Ark. 475 , 5 S. W. 799 ; Buckley v. Taylor, 51 Ark. 302 , 11 S. W. 281 ; Speer Hardware Co. v. Bruce, 105 Ark. 146 , 150 S. W. 403 ; Bruce Brown, v. Turnage Hardware, Inc., 181 Ark. 606 , 26 S. W. 2d 1114 ; and, Geisreiter v. Standard Lbr.

1968Among the cases which applied to the liberal construction rule or hold a substantial compliance with the statute is sufficient, are: Anderson v. Seamans, 49 Ark. 475 , 5 S. W. 799 ; Buckley v. Taylor, 51 Ark. 302 , 11 S. W. 281 ; Speer Hardware Co. v. Bruce, 105 Ark. 146 , 150 S. W. 403 ; Bruce Brown, v. Turnage Hardware, Inc., 181 Ark. 606 , 26 S. W. 2d 1114 ; and, Geisreiter v. Standard Lbr.

1968Among the cases which applied to the liberal construction rule or hold a substantial compliance with the statute is sufficient, are: Anderson v. Seamans, 49 Ark. 475 , 5 S. W. 799 ; Buckley v. Taylor, 51 Ark. 302 , 11 S. W. 281 ; Speer Hardware Co. v. Bruce, 105 Ark. 146 , 150 S. W. 403 ; Bruce Brown, v. Turnage Hardware, Inc., 181 Ark. 606 , 26 S. W. 2d 1114 ; and, Geisreiter v. Standard Lbr.

1968Among the cases which applied to the liberal construction rule or hold a substantial compliance with the statute is sufficient, are: Anderson v. Seamans, 49 Ark. 475 , 5 S. W. 799 ; Buckley v. Taylor, 51 Ark. 302 , 11 S. W. 281 ; Speer Hardware Co. v. Bruce, 105 Ark. 146 , 150 S. W. 403 ; Bruce Brown, v. Turnage Hardware, Inc., 181 Ark. 606 , 26 S. W. 2d 1114 ; and, Geisreiter v. Standard Lbr.

1960Westbrook v. McDonald, 184 Ark. 740, 746 , 43 S. W. (2d) 356 , 43 S. W. (2d) 331 .” In this particular case there are sound reasons for applying the liberal construction rule.

1960Westbrook v. McDonald, 184 Ark. 740, 746 , 43 S.W.(2d) 356 , 43 S.W.(2d) 331 ." In this particular case there are sound reasons for applying the liberal construction rule.

1960Westbrook v. McDonald, 184 Ark. 740, 746 , 43 S. W. (2d) 356 , 43 S. W. (2d) 331 .” In this particular case there are sound reasons for applying the liberal construction rule.

1960Westbrook v. McDonald, 184 Ark. 740, 746 , 43 S.W.(2d) 356 , 43 S.W.(2d) 331 ." In this particular case there are sound reasons for applying the liberal construction rule.

1960Westbrook v. McDonald, 184 Ark. 740, 746 , 43 S. W. (2d) 356 , 43 S. W. (2d) 331 .” In this particular case there are sound reasons for applying the liberal construction rule.

1960Westbrook v. McDonald, 184 Ark. 740, 746 , 43 S.W.(2d) 356 , 43 S.W.(2d) 331 ." In this particular case there are sound reasons for applying the liberal construction rule.

1930In the construction of this clause of the Constitution in Bank of Dermott v. Measel, 172 Ark. 193 , 287 S. W. 1017 , it was held that a note given to a private corporation for the purchase of stock in it is void.

1930In the construction of this clause of the Constitution in Bank of Dermott v. Measel, 172 Ark. 193 , 287 S. W. 1017 , it was held that a note given to a private corporation for the purchase of stock in it is void.

1929In the construction of this clause of the Constitution in State v. Pitts. 160 Ala. 133 , 49 So. 441 , 135 A.S.R. 79, it was held that a prohibition law which, in some of its major parts, applies to all of the State, does not lose its character as a general law because it retains in force local prohibition laws already in operation in some parts of the State.

1926Bank of Commerce v. Goolsby, 129 Ark. 116 , 196 S. W. 803 .

1922The clause under construction was as follows: “Shaving notes, accounts, judgments, or evidences of indebtedness is hereby classed and held to be dealing in securities.” In interpreting the clause as being applicable only to a business, in the case of Trentham v. Moore, 111 Tenn. 346 , Mr. Justice Weil said: “The words attempting to tax the exercise of a privilege where a business is not made of it are nugatory.

1913The' limited liability bill of lading shows that the freight charge made was based upon a valuation of not to exceed $100 for each animal and although our decisions before the construction of such a clause, after the passage of the Carmack amendment to the Hepburn Act, by the Supreme Court of the United States, held it invalid, as an attempt to restrict and limit the liability of the carrier in case of an injury caused by it to live stock in transportation and prohibited by the terms of said amendment to the Hepburn Act, we now hold in conformity with the opinion of the Supreme Court of the Un