construction rule in Pennsylvania

2025McCoy, 962 A.2d at 1166 ; Commonwealth v. Fithian, . . . 961 A.2d 66, 74 ([Pa.] 2008); see also 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b) (“When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”).

2024McCoy, 962 A.2d at 1166 ; Commonwealth v. Fithian, [ ] 961 A.2d 66, 74 ([Pa.] 2008); see also 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b) (“When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”). 2 Appellant filed a reply brief largely reiterating the arguments raised in her principal brief.

2017See Dorsey v. Redman, 626 Pa. 195, 209-10 , 96 A.3d 332, 341 (2014); Jones v. SEPTA, 565 Pa. 211, 220 , 772 A.2d 435 , [J-128-2016][M.O. - Donohue, J.] - 2 440 (2001) (citing Finn v. City of Phila., 541 Pa. 596, 601 , 664 A.2d 1342, 1344 (1995) ("Because the legislature's intent was to provide immunities [to political subdivisions], we have held that the exceptions to immunity must be strictly construed.")).

2017See Dorsey v. Redman, 626 Pa. 195, 209-10 , 96 A.3d 332, 341 (2014); Jones v. SEPTA, 565 Pa. 211, 220 , 772 A.2d 435 , [J-128-2016][M.O. - Donohue, J.] - 2 440 (2001) (citing Finn v. City of Phila., 541 Pa. 596, 601 , 664 A.2d 1342, 1344 (1995) ("Because the legislature's intent was to provide immunities [to political subdivisions], we have held that the exceptions to immunity must be strictly construed.")).

2017See Dorsey v. Redman, 626 Pa. 195, 209-10 , 96 A.3d 332, 341 (2014); Jones v. SEPTA, 565 Pa. 211, 220 , 772 A.2d 435 , [J-128-2016][M.O. - Donohue, J.] - 2 440 (2001) (citing Finn v. City of Phila., 541 Pa. 596, 601 , 664 A.2d 1342, 1344 (1995) ("Because the legislature's intent was to provide immunities [to political subdivisions], we have held that the exceptions to immunity must be strictly construed.")).

2017See Dorsey v. Redman, 626 Pa. 195, 209-10 , 96 A.3d 332, 341 (2014); Jones v. SEPTA, 565 Pa. 211, 220 , 772 A.2d 435 , [J-128-2016][M.O. - Donohue, J.] - 2 440 (2001) (citing Finn v. City of Phila., 541 Pa. 596, 601 , 664 A.2d 1342, 1344 (1995) ("Because the legislature's intent was to provide immunities [to political subdivisions], we have held that the exceptions to immunity must be strictly construed.")).

1972The case of DeBlasiis v. Bartell and Oliveto, 143 Pa. Superior Ct. 485 , holds that adjoining property owners who are, or will be, damaged by a construction in violation of a zoning ordinance have such a substantial interest in the enforcement of the zoning restrictions as to make them proper parties in a suit to compel their observance and for injunctive relief in equity.

1968The case of DeBlasiis v. Bartell and Oliveto, 143 Pa. Superior Ct. 485 , holds, among other things, that adjoining property owners, who are or will be damaged by a construction in violation of a zoning ordinance, have such a substantial interest in the enforcement of the zoning restrictions as to make them proper parties in a suit to compel their observance and for injunctive relief in equity.

2017See Dorsey v. Redman, 626 Pa. 195, 209-10 , 96 A.3d 332, 341 (2014); Jones v. SEPTA, 565 Pa. 211, 220 , 772 A.2d 435 , [J-128-2016][M.O. - Donohue, J.] - 2 440 (2001) (citing Finn v. City of Phila., 541 Pa. 596, 601 , 664 A.2d 1342, 1344 (1995) ("Because the legislature's intent was to provide immunities [to political subdivisions], we have held that the exceptions to immunity must be strictly construed.")).

2017See Dorsey v. Redman, 626 Pa. 195, 209-10 , 96 A.3d 332, 341 (2014); Jones v. SEPTA, 565 Pa. 211, 220 , 772 A.2d 435 , [J-128-2016][M.O. - Donohue, J.] - 2 440 (2001) (citing Finn v. City of Phila., 541 Pa. 596, 601 , 664 A.2d 1342, 1344 (1995) ("Because the legislature's intent was to provide immunities [to political subdivisions], we have held that the exceptions to immunity must be strictly construed.")).

2016See also McCutcheon v. State Ethics Comm’n, 71 Pa.Cmwlth. 529, 466 A.2d 283, 287 (1983) (observing that the legislature may establish a procedure whereby public officials with a dual interest can establish their own compensation, e.g. a pension, but noting that there must be .strict compliance with such legislation and that it must be strictly construed), and DeGeorge v. Young, 892 A.2d 48, 53 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006) (holding that a strict construction analysis applies when interpreting statutes where there is a potential for public officials to improperly discriminate in their own favor).

2006White Deer Twp. v. Napp, 874 A.2d 1258 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005); McCutcheon v. State Ethics Comm’n, 77 Pa.Cmwlth. 529 , 466 A.2d 283 (1983).

2026See, e.g., Section 1921 of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921; Commonwealth v. Gamby, 283 A.3d 298 , 306 (Pa. 2022) (“Only in instances where the words of a statute are not explicit, or are ambiguous, do we consider the construction factors enumerated in 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c).”); Commonwealth v. Cullen-Doyle, 164 A.3d 1239, 1242 (Pa. 2017) (“When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, they are presumed to be the best indication of legislative intent.”).

2024“A narrow construction of the doctrine not only avoids piecemeal determinations and protraction of litigation but also furthers judicial accuracy because an appellate court is more likely to decide an issue correctly in the context of a complete adjudication and a full development of record.” Northumberland County Children & Youth Services v. Department of Public Welfare, 2 A.3d 794, 797 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (Northumberland CYS); accord Rae, 977 A.2d at 1129. “[W]here a discovery order could shed light on the substantive allegations at issue but could be resolved without analysis of the merits o

2024“A narrow construction of the doctrine not only avoids piecemeal determinations and protraction of litigation but also furthers judicial accuracy because an appellate court is more likely to decide an issue correctly in the context of a complete adjudication and a full development of record.” Northumberland County Children & Youth Services v. Department of Public Welfare, 2 A.3d 794, 797 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (Northumberland CYS); accord Rae, 977 A.2d at 1129. “[W]here a discovery order could shed light on the substantive allegations at issue but could be resolved without analysis of the merits o

2024“A narrow construction of the doctrine not only avoids piecemeal determinations and protraction of litigation but also furthers judicial accuracy because an appellate court is more likely to decide an issue correctly in the context of a complete adjudication and a full development of record.” Northumberland County Children & Youth Services v. Department of Public Welfare, 2 A.3d 794, 797 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (Northumberland CYS); accord Rae, 977 A.2d at 1129. “[W]here a discovery order could shed light on the substantive allegations at issue but could be resolved without analysis of the merits o

2024“A narrow construction of the doctrine not only avoids piecemeal determinations and protraction of litigation but also furthers judicial accuracy because an appellate court is more likely to decide an issue correctly in the context of a complete adjudication and a full development of record.” Northumberland County Children & Youth Services v. Department of Public Welfare, 2 A.3d 794, 797 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (Northumberland CYS); accord Rae, 977 A.2d at 1129. “[W]here a discovery order could shed light on the substantive allegations at issue but could be resolved without analysis of the merits o

2021See Association of Settlement Companies v. Department of Banking, 977 A.2d 1257 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (analysis of impairment of contract issues under both U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions).

2018See Commonwealth v. Bebout, 186 A.3d 462, 469 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“[E]ven if Appellant had properly admitted into evidence the relevant life expectancy statistics that he now raises in his brief, it is not evident how helpful they would have been to the construction of a standard for what constitutes a de facto LWOP sentence, or how such data dictates a result in this case”). 6 In Batts II, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the decisions in Montgomery and Miller and held “there is a presumption against the imposition of a sentence of life without parole for a defendant convicted of first

2018See Commonwealth v. Bebout, 186 A.3d 462, 469 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“[E]ven if Appellant had properly admitted into evidence the relevant life expectancy statistics that he now raises in his brief, it is not evident how helpful they would have been to the construction of a standard for what constitutes a de facto LWOP sentence, or how such data dictates a result in this case”). 6 In Batts II, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the decisions in Montgomery and Miller and held “there is a presumption against the imposition of a sentence of life without parole for a defendant convicted of first

2016See also McCutcheon v. State Ethics Comm’n, 71 Pa.Cmwlth. 529, 466 A.2d 283, 287 (1983) (observing that the legislature may establish a procedure whereby public officials with a dual interest can establish their own compensation, e.g. a pension, but noting that there must be .strict compliance with such legislation and that it must be strictly construed), and DeGeorge v. Young, 892 A.2d 48, 53 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006) (holding that a strict construction analysis applies when interpreting statutes where there is a potential for public officials to improperly discriminate in their own favor).

2014Importantly, the provision of the Act which provides that local authorities “shall not have the authority” to levy certain described taxes, does not involve a tax exemption which would subject the critical statutory words to a strict construction test; rather, “the words ‘shall not have authority1 have been construed to be a limitation on the power to tax so that doubts relating to their construction are resolved in favor of the taxpayers.” Golden Triangle Broad., Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 31 Pa.Cmwlth. 547 , 377 A.2d 839, 842 (1977) (en banc), aff'd 483 Pa. 525 , 397 A.2d 1147 (1979) (citin

2014Importantly, the provision of the Act which provides that local authorities “shall not have the authority” to levy certain described taxes, does not involve a tax exemption which would subject the critical statutory words to a strict construction test; rather, “the words ‘shall not have authority1 have been construed to be a limitation on the power to tax so that doubts relating to their construction are resolved in favor of the taxpayers.” Golden Triangle Broad., Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 31 Pa.Cmwlth. 547 , 377 A.2d 839, 842 (1977) (en banc), aff'd 483 Pa. 525 , 397 A.2d 1147 (1979) (citin

2014Importantly, the provision of the Act which provides that local authorities “shall not have the authority” to levy certain described taxes, does not involve a tax exemption which would subject the critical statutory words to a strict construction test; rather, “the words ‘shall not have authority1 have been construed to be a limitation on the power to tax so that doubts relating to their construction are resolved in favor of the taxpayers.” Golden Triangle Broad., Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 31 Pa.Cmwlth. 547 , 377 A.2d 839, 842 (1977) (en banc), aff'd 483 Pa. 525 , 397 A.2d 1147 (1979) (citin

2014Importantly, the provision of the Act which provides that local authorities “shall not have the authority” to levy certain described taxes, does not involve a tax exemption which would subject the critical statutory words to a strict construction test; rather, “the words ‘shall not have authority1 have been construed to be a limitation on the power to tax so that doubts relating to their construction are resolved in favor of the taxpayers.” Golden Triangle Broad., Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 31 Pa.Cmwlth. 547 , 377 A.2d 839, 842 (1977) (en banc), aff'd 483 Pa. 525 , 397 A.2d 1147 (1979) (citin

2013The trial court reversed the Board of Tax Assessment Appeals of Erie County’s order, holding that “a good faith effort to commence developing [a] project for its intended use would entitle the applicant to the tax exemption” under the construction standard in Overmont Corp. v. Board of Tax Revision, 479 Pa. 249, 251 , 388 A.2d 311, 312 (1978) (holding that “when a charity is constructing facilities, that charity is ‘using’ its property for charitable purposes so as to come within the scope of the General County Assessment Law.”) Senior Citizen, 678 A.2d at 431 .

2013The trial court reversed the Board of Tax Assessment Appeals of Erie County’s order, holding that “a good faith effort to commence developing [a] project for its intended use would entitle the applicant to the tax exemption” under the construction standard in Overmont Corp. v. Board of Tax Revision, 479 Pa. 249, 251 , 388 A.2d 311, 312 (1978) (holding that “when a charity is constructing facilities, that charity is ‘using’ its property for charitable purposes so as to come within the scope of the General County Assessment Law.”) Senior Citizen, 678 A.2d at 431 .