construction rule in Kansas

2017In Board of Trustees of Butler Co. Comm. College v. Board of Sedgwick Co. Comm'rs, 257 Kan. 468, 476 , 893 P.2d 224 (1995), we said: 'The function of liberal construction is called into use where there is ambiguity in the language of the statute or, in other words, where there are one or more interpretations which may fairly be made.' It is also well established that the doctrine of liberal construction does not allow this court to delete vital provisions or supply vital omissions in a statute.

2017In Board of Trustees of Butler Co. Comm. College v. Board of Sedgwick Co. Comm'rs, 257 Kan. 468, 476 , 893 P.2d 224 (1995), we said: 'The function of liberal construction is called into use where there is ambiguity in the language of the statute or, in other words, where there are one or more interpretations which may fairly be made.' It is also well established that the doctrine of liberal construction does not allow this court to delete vital provisions or supply vital omissions in a statute.

2007However, this strict construction rule "`is subordinate to the rule that judicial interpretation must be reasonable and sensible to effect legislative design and intent.'" State v. McCurry, 279 Kan. 118, 121 , 105 P.3d 1247 (2005) (quoting State v. Cox, 258 Kan. 557 , Syl. ¶ 7, 908 P.2d 603 [1995]).

2007However, this strict construction rule "`is subordinate to the rule that judicial interpretation must be reasonable and sensible to effect legislative design and intent.'" State v. McCurry, 279 Kan. 118, 121 , 105 P.3d 1247 (2005) (quoting State v. Cox, 258 Kan. 557 , Syl. ¶ 7, 908 P.2d 603 [1995]).

2018Accordingly, where statutory terms are not defined therein, we ordinarily employ the construction rule of "giving common words their ordinary meanings." See, e.g., Cady v. Schroll , 298 Kan. 731 , 738, 317 P.3d 90 (2014).

2018Accordingly, where statutory terms are not defined therein, we ordinarily employ the construction rule of "giving common words their ordinary meanings." See, e.g., Cady v. Schroll , 298 Kan. 731 , 738, 317 P.3d 90 (2014).

2018Barlow , 303 Kan. at 813 , 368 P.3d 331 .

2018Barlow , 303 Kan. at 813 , 368 P.3d 331 .

2017In Eveleigh v. Conness, 261 Kan. 970, 977-78 , 933 P.2d 675 (1997), our Supreme Court explained the doctrine of liberal construction and its application as follows: "The true purpose of the liberal construction doctrine . . . is to carry out the intention of the legislature.

2017In Eveleigh v. Conness, 261 Kan. 970, 977-78 , 933 P.2d 675 (1997), our Supreme Court explained the doctrine of liberal construction and its application as follows: "The true purpose of the liberal construction doctrine . . . is to carry out the intention of the legislature.

2017The posting of a bond also eliminates the need for the strict construction rule we adhered to in mechanics' lien cases since the lien is thereby eliminated." 235 Kan. at 604 .

2016The second point to be made is that the majority has focused entirely on the deletion of the phrase, "additional testing shall not be given," in K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 8- 12 1001(m), while ignoring the repositioned provision in K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8-1001(p) that authorizes an officer to use the authority of K.S.A. 22-2502 to obtain a blood test if a person has operated a vehicle "in such a manner as to have caused the death of or serious injury to a person." That tack ignores the construction rule that "'courts are not permitted to consider only a certain isolated part or parts of an act, but are req

2016The second point to be made is that the majority has focused entirely on the deletion of the phrase, "additional testing shall not be given," in K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 8- 12 1001(m), while ignoring the repositioned provision in K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8-1001(p) that authorizes an officer to use the authority of K.S.A. 22-2502 to obtain a blood test if a person has operated a vehicle "in such a manner as to have caused the death of or serious injury to a person." That tack ignores the construction rule that "'courts are not permitted to consider only a certain isolated part or parts of an act, but are req

2016The second point to be made is that the majority has focused entirely on the deletion of the phrase, "additional testing shall not be given," in K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 8- 12 1001(m), while ignoring the repositioned provision in K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8-1001(p) that authorizes an officer to use the authority of K.S.A. 22-2502 to obtain a blood test if a person has operated a vehicle "in such a manner as to have caused the death of or serious injury to a person." That tack ignores the construction rule that "'courts are not permitted to consider only a certain isolated part or parts of an act, but are req

2016The second point to be made is that the majority has focused entirely on the deletion of the phrase, "additional testing shall not be given," in K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 8- 12 1001(m), while ignoring the repositioned provision in K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8-1001(p) that authorizes an officer to use the authority of K.S.A. 22-2502 to obtain a blood test if a person has operated a vehicle "in such a manner as to have caused the death of or serious injury to a person." That tack ignores the construction rule that "'courts are not permitted to consider only a certain isolated part or parts of an act, but are req

2007When several provisions apply to a topic, they "`must be construed together with a view of reconciling and bringing them into workable harmony if possible.'" Pieren-Abbott v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 279 Kan. 83, 89 , 106 P.3d 492 (2005) (quoting State v. Huff, 277 Kan. 195, 203 , 83 P.3d 206 [2004]).

2007When several provisions apply to a topic, they "`must be construed together with a view of reconciling and bringing them into workable harmony if possible.'" Pieren-Abbott v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 279 Kan. 83, 89 , 106 P.3d 492 (2005) (quoting State v. Huff, 277 Kan. 195, 203 , 83 P.3d 206 [2004]).

2007However, this strict construction rule "`is subordinate to the rule that judicial interpretation must be reasonable and sensible to effect legislative design and intent.'" State v. McCurry, 279 Kan. 118, 121 , 105 P.3d 1247 (2005) (quoting State v. Cox, 258 Kan. 557 , Syl. ¶ 7, 908 P.2d 603 [1995]).

2007However, this strict construction rule "`is subordinate to the rule that judicial interpretation must be reasonable and sensible to effect legislative design and intent.'" State v. McCurry, 279 Kan. 118, 121 , 105 P.3d 1247 (2005) (quoting State v. Cox, 258 Kan. 557 , Syl. ¶ 7, 908 P.2d 603 [1995]).

2007When several provisions apply to a topic, they "`must be construed together with a view of reconciling and bringing them into workable harmony if possible.'" Pieren-Abbott v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 279 Kan. 83, 89 , 106 P.3d 492 (2005) (quoting State v. Huff, 277 Kan. 195, 203 , 83 P.3d 206 [2004]).

2007When several provisions apply to a topic, they "`must be construed together with a view of reconciling and bringing them into workable harmony if possible.'" Pieren-Abbott v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 279 Kan. 83, 89 , 106 P.3d 492 (2005) (quoting State v. Huff, 277 Kan. 195, 203 , 83 P.3d 206 [2004]).

2002When the power of recall is a fundamental right, statutes governing the exercise of the power are to be liberally construed in favor of the ability to exercise it, and any Kmitations on that power must be strictly construed.’ Unger v. Horn, 240 Kan. 740, 741 , 732 P.2d 1275 (1987).” The true purpose of the liberal construction doctrine, as articulated in Unger and repeated by Eveleigh , is to carry out the intention of the legislature.

2002When the power of recall is a fundamental right, statutes governing the exercise of the power are to be liberally construed in favor of the ability to exercise it, and any Kmitations on that power must be strictly construed.’ Unger v. Horn, 240 Kan. 740, 741 , 732 P.2d 1275 (1987).” The true purpose of the liberal construction doctrine, as articulated in Unger and repeated by Eveleigh , is to carry out the intention of the legislature.

2001See State v. Bolin, 266 Kan. 18, 24 , 968 P.2d 1104 (1998); State v. Vega-Fuentes, 264 Kan. 10, 14 , 955 P.2d 1235 (1998).

2001See State v. Bolin, 266 Kan. 18, 24 , 968 P.2d 1104 (1998); State v. Vega-Fuentes, 264 Kan. 10, 14 , 955 P.2d 1235 (1998).

2000The Foulenfont court used the strict construction rule for interpreting the burglary statute, modified its prior rejection of the ejusdem generis rule of statutory construction, and noted that entry into a subunit of a building satisfies the statute but entry into a fenced enclosure outside the building does not. 119 N.M. at 791-92 .

1982State v. Howard, 221 Kan. 51 , 557 P.2d 1280 (1976).

1982State v. Howard, 221 Kan. 51 , 557 P.2d 1280 (1976).

1975C. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 437 Pa. 463 , 263 A. 2d 448 .) We can readily see that in states such as Pennsylvania where trust deeds are authorized, such a construction of the standard mortgage clause is justified.

1975C. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 437 Pa. 463 , 263 A. 2d 448 .) We can readily see that in states such as Pennsylvania where trust deeds are authorized, such a construction of the standard mortgage clause is justified.

1963This strict construction rule was reaffirmed in the case of In re Estate of Davis, 168 Kan. 314, 322 , 212 P. 2d 343 .

1963This strict construction rule was reaffirmed in the case of In re Estate of Davis, 168 Kan. 314, 322 , 212 P. 2d 343 .

1957In State v. Waite, 156 Kan. 143 , 131 P. 2d 708 , this court in explaining the strict construction rule regarding penal statutes said: “. . .

1957In State v. Waite, 156 Kan. 143 , 131 P. 2d 708 , this court in explaining the strict construction rule regarding penal statutes said: “. . .

1956The rule is set out in Leabo v. Willett, 162 Kan. 236 , 175 P. 2d 109 , *246 “The established rule in this jurisdiction is that contributory negligence is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded by the defendant in order'to be available to him unless such negligence appears- on the face of the -petition . / ,” (p. 240.) .and in Mason v. Banta, 166 Kan. 445 , 201 P. 2d 654 , it is said, “While ordinarily contributory negligence is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded and proved by the defendant, where the petition discloses the plaintiff’s failure to use due care for his own safety

1956The rule is set out in Leabo v. Willett, 162 Kan. 236 , 175 P. 2d 109 , *246 “The established rule in this jurisdiction is that contributory negligence is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded by the defendant in order'to be available to him unless such negligence appears- on the face of the -petition . / ,” (p. 240.) .and in Mason v. Banta, 166 Kan. 445 , 201 P. 2d 654 , it is said, “While ordinarily contributory negligence is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded and proved by the defendant, where the petition discloses the plaintiff’s failure to use due care for his own safety

1956The rule is set out in Leabo v. Willett, 162 Kan. 236 , 175 P. 2d 109 , *246 “The established rule in this jurisdiction is that contributory negligence is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded by the defendant in order'to be available to him unless such negligence appears- on the face of the -petition . / ,” (p. 240.) .and in Mason v. Banta, 166 Kan. 445 , 201 P. 2d 654 , it is said, “While ordinarily contributory negligence is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded and proved by the defendant, where the petition discloses the plaintiff’s failure to use due care for his own safety

1956The rule is set out in Leabo v. Willett, 162 Kan. 236 , 175 P. 2d 109 , *246 “The established rule in this jurisdiction is that contributory negligence is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded by the defendant in order'to be available to him unless such negligence appears- on the face of the -petition . / ,” (p. 240.) .and in Mason v. Banta, 166 Kan. 445 , 201 P. 2d 654 , it is said, “While ordinarily contributory negligence is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded and proved by the defendant, where the petition discloses the plaintiff’s failure to use due care for his own safety

1956We come next to an interesting, but futile contention of appellant that no motion was lodged against the amended petition and, therefore, it should fall under the liberal construction rule because our court said in Fullington v. Goodrich, 169 Kan. 11 , 216 P. 2d 817 , where the same contention was made, that, “. . . since the trial court had already overruled his motion filed against the original petition it would have been a futile and useless gesture to file an identical motion against the amended petition.” (p. 13.) In Donie v. Associated Co., Inc., 173 Kan. 753, 756 , 252 P. 2d 609 , where

1956We come next to an interesting, but futile contention of appellant that no motion was lodged against the amended petition and, therefore, it should fall under the liberal construction rule because our court said in Fullington v. Goodrich, 169 Kan. 11 , 216 P. 2d 817 , where the same contention was made, that, “. . . since the trial court had already overruled his motion filed against the original petition it would have been a futile and useless gesture to file an identical motion against the amended petition.” (p. 13.) In Donie v. Associated Co., Inc., 173 Kan. 753, 756 , 252 P. 2d 609 , where

1956We come next to an interesting, but futile contention of appellant that no motion was lodged against the amended petition and, therefore, it should fall under the liberal construction rule because our court said in Fullington v. Goodrich, 169 Kan. 11 , 216 P. 2d 817 , where the same contention was made, that, “. . . since the trial court had already overruled his motion filed against the original petition it would have been a futile and useless gesture to file an identical motion against the amended petition.” (p. 13.) In Donie v. Associated Co., Inc., 173 Kan. 753, 756 , 252 P. 2d 609 , where

1956We come next to an interesting, but futile contention of appellant that no motion was lodged against the amended petition and, therefore, it should fall under the liberal construction rule because our court said in Fullington v. Goodrich, 169 Kan. 11 , 216 P. 2d 817 , where the same contention was made, that, “. . . since the trial court had already overruled his motion filed against the original petition it would have been a futile and useless gesture to file an identical motion against the amended petition.” (p. 13.) In Donie v. Associated Co., Inc., 173 Kan. 753, 756 , 252 P. 2d 609 , where

1941In the case of Benson v. Altenburg, 124 Kan. 296 , 259 Pac. 791 , this court, although expressly recognizing the rule that a creditor must exhaust all process to secure a lien upon the debtor’s property before filing an action in the nature of a creditor’s bill to set aside a fraudulent conveyance, refused to set aside a judgment obtained by a creditor in such an action, although no execution had been issued on his prior judgment against the debtor.

1941In the case of Benson v. Altenburg, 124 Kan. 296 , 259 Pac. 791 , this court, although expressly recognizing the rule that a creditor must exhaust all process to secure a lien upon the debtor’s property before filing an action in the nature of a creditor’s bill to set aside a fraudulent conveyance, refused to set aside a judgment obtained by a creditor in such an action, although no execution had been issued on his prior judgment against the debtor.

1940In the case of Cloverdale Co. v. Littlefield, 240 Mass. 129 , 133 N. E. 565 , the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had under consideration a lease which contained this provision: “The party of the fir,st part agrees to give the Cloverdale Company, party of the second part, the first right to re-lease for a term of three more years at the expiration of the present lease on the same conditions and terms as herein mentioned.” In the construction of this clause, the court said: ' “The ruling that ‘the lessee was entitled to a renewal of the lease’ was plainly right if the word ‘first’ does not

1940In the case of Cloverdale Co. v. Littlefield, 240 Mass. 129 , 133 N. E. 565 , the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had under consideration a lease which contained this provision: “The party of the fir,st part agrees to give the Cloverdale Company, party of the second part, the first right to re-lease for a term of three more years at the expiration of the present lease on the same conditions and terms as herein mentioned.” In the construction of this clause, the court said: ' “The ruling that ‘the lessee was entitled to a renewal of the lease’ was plainly right if the word ‘first’ does not

1932It seems to me that the proper construction of this clause is that it contemplates the continuance in life of the assured during that year; else why except the nonpayment of premiums?” (p. 571.) This reasoning was disapproved by the circuit court of appeals in 294 Fed. 886 , on the assumption that the point was governed by the decision of the United States in the Hurni case cited above.