construction rule in Washington

2018But this provision applies only when doubts or ambiguities exist that must be resolved, and we will not use the liberal construction requirement to support a "'strained or unrealistic interpretation'"of the statute. .Birgen, 186 Wn.

2017This section states that the IIA “shall be liberally construed for the purpose of reducing to a minimum the suffering and economic loss arising from injuries and/or death occurring in the course of employment.” However, we “cannot use the liberal construction requirement to support a ‘strained or unrealistic interpretation’ of statutory language.” Birgen, 186 Wn.

2008See [State v.] Davis, 119 Wn.2d[ 657,] 661-64[, 835 P.2d 1039 (1991)]; State v. Hopper, 118 Wn.2d 151, 156-57 , 822 P.2d 775 (1992).

2008See [State v.] Davis, 119 Wn.2d[ 657,] 661-64[, 835 P.2d 1039 (1991)]; State v. Hopper, 118 Wn.2d 151, 156-57 , 822 P.2d 775 (1992).

2018Williams, 162 Wn.2d at 185 .

2016Williams, 162 Wn.2d at 185 ; Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d at 109 .

2001See, e.g., Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d at 106; Hopper, 118 Wn.2d at 155-56 ; Brooke, 119 Wn.2d at 635 ; Valdobinos, 122 Wn.2d at 285 ; State v. Tunney, 129 Wn.2d 336, 340 , 917 P.2d 95 (1996); McCarty, 140 Wn.2d at 425 .

2001See, e.g., Kjorsvik, 117 Wash.2d at 106 , 812 P.2d 86 ; Hopper, 118 Wash.2d at 155-56 , 822 P.2d 775 ; Brooke, 119 Wash.2d at 635 , 836 P.2d 212 ; Valdobinos, 122 Wash.2d at 285 , 858 P.2d 199 ; State v. Tunney, 129 Wash.2d 336, 340 , 917 P.2d 95 (1996); McCarty, 140 Wash.2d at 425 , 998 P.2d 296 .

2000In justifying the strict construction standard, the Johnson court noted that the prosecution could move under CrR 2.1 to amend the information “at any time prior to the final verdict, as long as substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.” 119 Wn.2d at 150 .

2000Although Divisions One and Three of this court recently criticized Morgan , both conceded that Morgan , combined with the strict construction standard set forth in Johnson, 119 Wn.2d at 150 , mandated reversal in cases with similar defects. 3 Instruction 14 is based on WPIC 37.02.

2024State v. Brown, 169 Wn.2d 195, 197 , 234 P.3d 212 (2010) (citing Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d at 102 ).

2023State v. Brown, 169 Wn.2d 195, 197 , 234 P.3d 212 (2010) (citing Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d at 102 ).

2020RCW 51.12.010; Cockle, 142 Wn.2d at 811 ; Birgen v. Dept of Labor & Indus., 186 Wn.

2014We find the canon invoked by Crabb to be dispositive, especially in light of the differing roles of the monthly cap and the COLA. 1 ¶20 The legislature has declared that the provisions of Title 51 RCW “shall be liberally construed for the purpose of reducing to a minimum the suffering and economic loss arising from injuries and/or death occurring in the course of employment.” RCW 51.12.010; Cockle, 142 Wn.2d at 811 .

2014McCartv, 140 Wn.2d at 425 .

2001See, e.g., Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d at 106; Hopper, 118 Wn.2d at 155-56 ; Brooke, 119 Wn.2d at 635 ; Valdobinos, 122 Wn.2d at 285 ; State v. Tunney, 129 Wn.2d 336, 340 , 917 P.2d 95 (1996); McCarty, 140 Wn.2d at 425 .

2020“Defendants have a right to present only relevant evidence, with no constitutional right to present irrelevant evidence.” Jones, 168 Wn.2d at 720 . 6 Additionally, under the liberal construction test, Kinley is required to demonstrate that he was actually prejudiced, which he has failed to do so here. 15 No. 79179-6-I/16 Assertions that evidentiary rulings violate a defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense are reviewed pursuant to a two-step process.

2020“Defendants have a right to present only relevant evidence, with no constitutional right to present irrelevant evidence.” Jones, 168 Wn.2d at 720 . 6 Additionally, under the liberal construction test, Kinley is required to demonstrate that he was actually prejudiced, which he has failed to do so here. 15 No. 79179-6-I/16 Assertions that evidentiary rulings violate a defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense are reviewed pursuant to a two-step process.

2020State v. Arndt, 194 Wn.2d 784, 797-98 , 453 P.3d 696 (2019).

2020State v. Arndt, 194 Wn.2d 784, 797-98 , 453 P.3d 696 (2019).

2019State v. Nonog, 169 Wn.2d 220, 227 , 237 P.3d 250 (2010).

2012Nonog, 169 Wash.2d at 227 , 237 P.3d 250 .

2019State v. Nonog, 169 Wn.2d 220, 227 , 237 P.3d 250 (2010).

2012Nonog, 169 Wash.2d at 227 , 237 P.3d 250 .

2015Doty v. Town of South Prairie, 155 Wn.2d 527, 533 , 120 P.3d 941 (2005).

2015Doty v. Town of South Prairie, 155 Wn.2d 527, 533 , 120 P. 3d 941 ( 2005).

2015Doty v. Town of South Prairie, 155 Wn.2d 527, 533 , 120 P.3d 941 (2005).

2015Doty v. Town of South Prairie, 155 Wn.2d 527, 533 , 120 P. 3d 941 ( 2005).

2013It based its decision primarily on its construction of “the person threatened” in both RCW 9A.46.020(l)(a)(i) and in the definition of “threat” at former RCW 9A.04.110(27)(a) as meaning A, the person to whom the threat is communicated. ¶17 Later the same year, the statute was examined by our Supreme Court in State v. J.M., 144 Wn.2d 472, 482 , 28 P.3d 720 (2001), in which the principal issue presented for decision was the proper construction of the requirement that the threat be made “knowingly.” The parties disputed whether the crime is committed if a perpetrator communicates to A a threat to

2013Later the same year, the statute was examined by our Supreme Court in State v. J.M, 144 Wn.2d 472, 482 , 28 P.3d 720 (2001), in which the principal issue presented for decision was the proper construction of the requirement that the threat be made "knowingly." The parties disputed whether the crime is committed if a perpetrator communicates to A a threat to harm B, with no knowledge that A will tell B about the threat.

2013It based its decision primarily on its construction of “the person threatened” in both RCW 9A.46.020(l)(a)(i) and in the definition of “threat” at former RCW 9A.04.110(27)(a) as meaning A, the person to whom the threat is communicated. ¶17 Later the same year, the statute was examined by our Supreme Court in State v. J.M., 144 Wn.2d 472, 482 , 28 P.3d 720 (2001), in which the principal issue presented for decision was the proper construction of the requirement that the threat be made “knowingly.” The parties disputed whether the crime is committed if a perpetrator communicates to A a threat to

2013Later the same year, the statute was examined by our Supreme Court in State v. J.M, 144 Wn.2d 472, 482 , 28 P.3d 720 (2001), in which the principal issue presented for decision was the proper construction of the requirement that the threat be made "knowingly." The parties disputed whether the crime is committed if a perpetrator communicates to A a threat to harm B, with no knowledge that A will tell B about the threat.

2010Cf. 29 Wash.2d at 586-89 , 188 P.2d 104 .

2010Cf. 29 Wn.2d at 586-89 .

2008Dawejko emphasizes the “ ‘social policies underlying strict products liability’ ” in holding that the exception should not be phrased “too tightly,” but rather in general terms “so that in any particular case the court may consider whether it is just to impose liability on the successor corporation.” Dawejko, 434 A.2d at 111 (quoting Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 825 ).

2008Dawejko emphasizes the "social policies underlying strict products liability" in holding that the exception should not be phrased "too tightly," but rather in general terms "so that in any particular case the court may consider whether it is just to impose liability on the successor corporation." Dawejko, 434 A.2d at 111 .

2007The court relied on its earlier decision in State v. Gill, 103 Wash.App. 435 , 13 P.3d 646 (2000), which concluded, without citation, that the liberal construction rule of Kjorsvik "provides no basis for the proposition that elements can be plucked out of one count in a charging document and dropped into another." Gill, 103 Wash.App. at 442 , 13 P.3d 646 .

2007App. 435 , 13 P.3d 646 (2000), which concluded, without citation, that the liberal construction rule of Kjorsvik “provides no basis for the proposition that elements can be plucked out of one count in a charging document and dropped into another.” Gill, 103 Wn.

2007The court relied on its earlier decision in State v. Gill, 103 Wash.App. 435 , 13 P.3d 646 (2000), which concluded, without citation, that the liberal construction rule of Kjorsvik "provides no basis for the proposition that elements can be plucked out of one count in a charging document and dropped into another." Gill, 103 Wash.App. at 442 , 13 P.3d 646 .

2007App. 435 , 13 P.3d 646 (2000), which concluded, without citation, that the liberal construction rule of Kjorsvik “provides no basis for the proposition that elements can be plucked out of one count in a charging document and dropped into another.” Gill, 103 Wn.

2005Tresenriter, 101 Wn.

2005Tresenriter, 101 Wash.App. at 491 , 4 P.3d 145 .

2002State v. Rhode, 63 Wash.App. 630, 633-37 , 821 P.2d 492 (1991).

2002State v. Rhode, 63 Wn.

2001See, e.g., Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d at 106; Hopper, 118 Wn.2d at 155-56 ; Brooke, 119 Wn.2d at 635 ; Valdobinos, 122 Wn.2d at 285 ; State v. Tunney, 129 Wn.2d 336, 340 , 917 P.2d 95 (1996); McCarty, 140 Wn.2d at 425 .

2001See, e.g., Kjorsvik, 117 Wash.2d at 106 , 812 P.2d 86 ; Hopper, 118 Wash.2d at 155-56 , 822 P.2d 775 ; Brooke, 119 Wash.2d at 635 , 836 P.2d 212 ; Valdobinos, 122 Wash.2d at 285 , 858 P.2d 199 ; State v. Tunney, 129 Wash.2d 336, 340 , 917 P.2d 95 (1996); McCarty, 140 Wash.2d at 425 , 998 P.2d 296 .