construction rule in Oregon

2016Lederer v. Viking Freight, Inc., 193 Or App 226 , 236 n 6, 89 P3d 1199 , adh’d to as modified on recons, 195 Or App 94 , 96 P3d 882 (2004).

2016Lederer v. Viking Freight, Inc., 193 Or App 226 , 236 n 6, 89 P3d 1199 , adh’d to as modified on recons, 195 Or App 94 , 96 P3d 882 (2004).

2016Lederer v. Viking Freight, Inc., 193 Or App 226 , 236 n 6, 89 P3d 1199 , adh’d to as modified on recons, 195 Or App 94 , 96 P3d 882 (2004).

2016Lederer v. Viking Freight, Inc., 193 Or App 226 , 236 n 6, 89 P3d 1199 , adh’d to as modified on recons, 195 Or App 94 , 96 P3d 882 (2004).

2014Although we are bound by the court’s factual findings on a motion brought under ORCP 71 B(l) if they are supported by any evidence, Or Const, Art VII (Amended), § 3, one aspect of the liberal construction of the rule is that we view “the facts in the light most favorable to the party seeking relief from the default.” Saldivar v. Roberts, 240 Or App 371, 375 , 246 P3d 91 (2011).

2014Although we are bound by the court’s factual findings on a motion brought under ORCP 71 B(l) if they are supported by any evidence, Or Const, Art VII (Amended), § 3, one aspect of the liberal construction of the rule is that we view “the facts in the light most favorable to the party seeking relief from the default.” Saldivar v. Roberts, 240 Or App 371, 375 , 246 P3d 91 (2011).

1997Plourd, 125 Or App at 242 .

1987It is the legislative intent and purpose that this court strives to determine when faced with ambiguous statutory language, and tax statutes should not be construed in favor of either the taxpayer or the state.” 276 Or 113, at 117 . 2 The parties have stipulated that plaintiff is an accrual basis taxpayer.

1981Raines v. Hines Lbr Co., supra, 36 Or App at 719 .

1979Because of the doctrine of liberal construction of the Workers’ Compensation statutes and because "[i]n determining legislative intent, the court should consider the object to be accomplished * * James v. Carnation Co., 278 Or 65, 72 , 562 P2d 1192 (1977), we conclude that the legislature intended that persons in the situation of these beneficiaries would receive benefits while attending college on a full-time basis.

1979Because of the doctrine of liberal construction of the Workers’ Compensation statutes and because "[i]n determining legislative intent, the court should consider the object to be accomplished * * James v. Carnation Co., 278 Or 65, 72 , 562 P2d 1192 (1977), we conclude that the legislature intended that persons in the situation of these beneficiaries would receive benefits while attending college on a full-time basis.

1975I concur in the court’s construction of the rule just announced in State v. Hammang, 271 Or 749 , 534 P2d 501 (1975), as applied to this case, and thus concur in the result now announced affirming the ruling of the trial court.

1975I concur in the court’s construction of the rule just announced in State v. Hammang, 271 Or 749 , 534 P2d 501 (1975), as applied to this case, and thus concur in the result now announced affirming the ruling of the trial court.

1962Pacific Supply Coop. v. State Tax Com., supra ( 224 Or at 561 ).

1934In permitting recovery, the court said: “The defendant conceded that if the plaintiff had been compelled to remove by reason of fire, by the termination of his tenancy, by order of the board of health or if he was removed by superior force, the actual continuity of confinement would have been broken within the meaning of the provision for continuous confinement within the house. * * * There is no break in the continuity of the insured’s sickness of the required degree in the cases covered by the defendant’s concession because, by the true construction of this clause of the policy, what is requ

1934In permitting recovery, the court said: “The defendant conceded that if the plaintiff had been compelled to remove by reason of fire, by the termination of his tenancy, by order of the board of health or if he was removed by superior force, the actual continuity of confinement would have been broken within the meaning of the provision for continuous confinement within the house. * * * There is no break in the continuity of the insured’s sickness of the required degree in the cases covered by the defendant’s concession because, by the true construction of this clause of the policy, what is requ

1930The contributory negligence of the person injured shall not be a defense, but may be taken into account by the jury in fixing the amount of the damage.” In the construction of this clause of the statute, this court has uniformly construed the word “may” in this section to import a duty on the part of the jury to take into consideration any evidence importing contributory negligence, if such contributory negligence was found to reduce plaintiff’s damages to such sum as in their judgment the circumstances might justify: Filkins v. Portland Lumber Co., 71 Or. 249 ( 142 P. 578 ); Sonniken v. Hood

1930The contributory negligence of the person injured shall not be a defense, but may be taken into account by the jury in fixing the amount of the damage.” In the construction of this clause of the statute, this court has uniformly construed the word “may” in this section to import a duty on the part of the jury to take into consideration any evidence importing contributory negligence, if such contributory negligence was found to reduce plaintiff’s damages to such sum as in their judgment the circumstances might justify: Filkins v. Portland Lumber Co., 71 Or. 249 ( 142 P. 578 ); Sonniken v. Hood

1930The contributory negligence of the person injured shall not be a defense, but may be taken into account by the jury in fixing the amount of the damage.” In the construction of this clause of the statute, this court has uniformly construed the word “may” in this section to import a duty on the part of the jury to take into consideration any evidence importing contributory negligence, if such contributory negligence was found to reduce plaintiff’s damages to such sum as in their judgment the circumstances might justify: Filkins v. Portland Lumber Co., 71 Or. 249 ( 142 P. 578 ); Sonniken v. Hood

1930Machine Co., 85 Or. 194 ( 166 P. 529 ).

1930Machine Co., 85 Or. 194 ( 166 P. 529 ).

1929The Iowa court, in speaking of city charters, in the case of City of Des Moines v. Gilchrist et al., 67 Iowa, 210 ( 25 N. W. 136 , 56 Am.

1929The Iowa court, in speaking of city charters, in the case of City of Des Moines v. Gilchrist et al., 67 Iowa, 210 ( 25 N. W. 136 , 56 Am.

1912The contrary view is indicated in the following cases: Bristol v. Johnson, 34 Mich, 123 ; People v. Supervisors of Onondaga, 16 Mich, 254 ; McClelland, Trustee, v. State, 138 Irid. 322 ( 37 N. E. 1089 ) ; Johnson v. Board, etc. 140 Ind. 152 ( 39 N. E. 311 .) The Michigan cases turn upon the construction of a clause in the constitution of that state, which is not found in ours, namely, “the legislature shall not audit nor allow any private claim or account.” The numerous decisions of other states not having this clause in their fundamental law are not referred to or distinguished.

1912The contrary view is indicated in the following cases: Bristol v. Johnson, 34 Mich, 123 ; People v. Supervisors of Onondaga, 16 Mich, 254 ; McClelland, Trustee, v. State, 138 Irid. 322 ( 37 N. E. 1089 ) ; Johnson v. Board, etc. 140 Ind. 152 ( 39 N. E. 311 .) The Michigan cases turn upon the construction of a clause in the constitution of that state, which is not found in ours, namely, “the legislature shall not audit nor allow any private claim or account.” The numerous decisions of other states not having this clause in their fundamental law are not referred to or distinguished.

1912The contrary view is indicated in the following cases: Bristol v. Johnson, 34 Mich, 123 ; People v. Supervisors of Onondaga, 16 Mich, 254 ; McClelland, Trustee, v. State, 138 Irid. 322 ( 37 N. E. 1089 ) ; Johnson v. Board, etc. 140 Ind. 152 ( 39 N. E. 311 .) The Michigan cases turn upon the construction of a clause in the constitution of that state, which is not found in ours, namely, “the legislature shall not audit nor allow any private claim or account.” The numerous decisions of other states not having this clause in their fundamental law are not referred to or distinguished.

1912The contrary view is indicated in the following cases: Bristol v. Johnson, 34 Mich, 123 ; People v. Supervisors of Onondaga, 16 Mich, 254 ; McClelland, Trustee, v. State, 138 Irid. 322 ( 37 N. E. 1089 ) ; Johnson v. Board, etc. 140 Ind. 152 ( 39 N. E. 311 .) The Michigan cases turn upon the construction of a clause in the constitution of that state, which is not found in ours, namely, “the legislature shall not audit nor allow any private claim or account.” The numerous decisions of other states not having this clause in their fundamental law are not referred to or distinguished.

1912The contrary view is indicated in the following cases: Bristol v. Johnson, 34 Mich, 123 ; People v. Supervisors of Onondaga, 16 Mich, 254 ; McClelland, Trustee, v. State, 138 Irid. 322 ( 37 N. E. 1089 ) ; Johnson v. Board, etc. 140 Ind. 152 ( 39 N. E. 311 .) The Michigan cases turn upon the construction of a clause in the constitution of that state, which is not found in ours, namely, “the legislature shall not audit nor allow any private claim or account.” The numerous decisions of other states not having this clause in their fundamental law are not referred to or distinguished.

1895And this is the trend of subsequent decisions of the national courts touching the construction of this clause of the constitution: See United States v. Norton, 91 U. S. 569 ; United States v. Hill, 123 U. S. 684 (8 Sup. Ct. 308); United States v. Broadhead, 127 U. S. 212 (8 Sup. Ct. 1194); The Nashville, 4 Biss. 188 (Fed.

1895And this is the trend of subsequent decisions of the national courts touching the construction of this clause of the constitution: See United States v. Norton, 91 U. S. 569 ; United States v. Hill, 123 U. S. 684 (8 Sup. Ct. 308); United States v. Broadhead, 127 U. S. 212 (8 Sup. Ct. 1194); The Nashville, 4 Biss. 188 (Fed.