construction rule in Missouri

1980The intermediate view, apparently adopted by Missouri, is that the test for recovery is the inability of the insured “to perform, in the usual and customary way, substantially all of the material acts of any occupation which his age, training, experience, education and physical condition would fit him for except for the infirmity.” Stout v. Central National Life Insurance Company, 522 S.W.2d 124, 129 (Mo.App.1975), which contains an excellent review of the cases. 1 The second category is the occupational disability clause which insures against disability to engage in a particular occupation.

1980The intermediate view, apparently adopted by Missouri, is that the test for recovery is the inability of the insured "to perform, in the usual and customary way, substantially all of the material acts of any occupation which his age, training, experience, education and physical condition would fit him for except for the infirmity." Stout v. Central National Life Insurance Company, 522 S.W.2d 124, 129 (Mo.App.1975), which contains an excellent review of the cases. [1] The second category is the occupational disability clause which insures against disability to engage in a particular occupation.

2015Eason v. Treasurer of State —Custodian of Second Injury Fund, 371 S.W.3d 886, 889-90 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012).

2015As we noted in Eason , “because strict versus liberal statutory construction may affect substantive issues, the liberal construction standard set forth in section 287.800, RSMo 2000, prior to amendment, is the applicable standard for [the claimant’s] case.” Id.

1980Louis, 363 Mo. 842 , 253 S.W.2d 832, 835 , [2-4], and thereby attain the object and purpose of the statute, Kansas City v. Travelers Ins.

1980Louis, 363 Mo. 842 , 253 S.W.2d 832, 835 , [2-4], and thereby attain the object and purpose of the statute, Kansas City v. Travelers Ins.

2021Tart derives the liberal construction rule from Cobb v. Stringer, 850 F.2d 356, 359 (8th Cir. 1988), and other federal cases involving claims filed under Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964.

2016Finally, in Ash v. ll/Iillenrzizmi Restoration & Const., 408 S.W.3d 257, 258-61 (l\/Io.App.S.D. 2013), the court found that even though section 287.240 was not amended in 2005, in light of the new strict construction requirement, the statute must be interpreted to require a worker’s spouse’s remarriage benefit to be calculated using his or her entire death benefit_not just the portion allocated to the spouse.

2015We further observed that this liberal standard “requires a broad interpretation of the workers’ compensation laws such that benefits are extended to the largest possible class, and any doubts as to the right of compensation are resolved in favor of the employee.” Id. at 890 , See also Bass v. Nat’l Super Mkts., Inc., 911 S.W.2d 617, 621 (Mo. banc 1905) (stating, “until directed by the legislature to embark on another course, courts must continue to give the Act a liberal reading, deciding close cases in favor of workers’ compensation coverage”); Page v. Green, 686, S.W.2d 528, 530-31 (Mo. App.

2015We further observed that this liberal standard “requires a broad interpretation of the workers’ compensation laws such that benefits are extended to the largest possible class, and any doubts as to the right of compensation are resolved in favor of the employee.” Id. at 890 , See also Bass v. Nat’l Super Mkts., Inc., 911 S.W.2d 617, 621 (Mo. banc 1905) (stating, “until directed by the legislature to embark on another course, courts must continue to give the Act a liberal reading, deciding close cases in favor of workers’ compensation coverage”); Page v. Green, 686, S.W.2d 528, 530-31 (Mo. App.

2012Our Supreme Court in UtiliCorp United, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, 785 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Mo. banc 1990), stated that “[a] legislative provision for the allowance of interest when the same is forbidden in the absence of legislation is a law of substance rather than procedure.” This suggests that, if strict construction of the workers’ compensation statutes might prevent interest otherwise recoverable under a liberal construction, then the 2005 amendment imposing a strict construction standard is substantive and, therefore, retrospective application is prohibited. 1 Consequently, because strict

2011See 323 S.W.2d at 424-25.

2011See 323 S.W.2d at 424-25.

2010See Casey v. Chung, 989 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Mo.App.

2001State v. Meggs, 950 S.W.2d 608, 613 [5] (Mo.App.1997).

1995Logan v. Ellison, 267 Mo. 321 , 184 S.W. 963, 964 (Banc 1916), since it is the best judge of its own rules.

1995Logan v. Ellison, 267 Mo. 321 , 184 S.W. 963, 964 (Banc 1916), since it is the best judge of its own rules.

1994Muchisky v. Kornegay, 741 S.W.2d 43, 46 (Mo.App.1987).

1989The scope of review in this court-tried action is subject to the provisions of Rule 73.01 and the construction of that rule in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976); the decree or judgment will be sustained by an appellate court unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, unless it erroneously declares the law, or unless it erroneously applies the law.

1987Gillenwaters Building Co. v. Lipscomb, 482 S.W.2d 409, 411 (Mo.1972); Frisella v. Reserve Life Insurance Co., 583 S.W. 2d 728, 731 (Mo.App.1979).

1987Gillenwaters Building Co. v. Lipscomb, 482 S.W.2d 409, 411 (Mo.1972); Frisella v. Reserve Life Insurance Co., 583 S.W. 2d 728, 731 (Mo.App.1979).

1986Louis Housing Authority, 655 S.W.2d 792, 793-94 (Mo.App.1983).

1975See, generally, United Air Lines, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 377 S.W.2d 444 (Mo. banc 1964); Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55 , 51 S.Ct. 49 , 75 L.Ed. 156 (1930); State ex rel.