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13 Idaho opinions name it 2 courts 1892–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Fitzpatrickgreen1 sentence1983I realize that the language of the Constitution: ‘No part of this fund, principal or interest, shall ever be transferred to any other fund, or used or appropriated except as herein provided’ could be so construed, however, I do not believe that such a narrow construction of that clause is either necessary or desirable.” Id. at 201, 560 P.2d at 872 (Shepard, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
Moon v. Investment Boardgreen1 sentence1983I realize that the language of the Constitution: ‘No part of this fund, principal or interest, shall ever be transferred to any other fund, or used or appropriated except as herein provided’ could be so construed, however, I do not believe that such a narrow construction of that clause is either necessary or desirable.” Id. at 201, 560 P.2d at 872 (Shepard, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
Hubbell v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1974While not allowed to revive a rejected claim by a broad construction of the claim allowed, yet the patentee is entitled to a fair construction of the terms *409 of his claim as actually granted.” Hubbell v. United States, 179 U.S. 77 at 80 , 21 S.Ct. at 25 (1900). 1974While not allowed to revive a rejected claim by a broad construction of the claim allowed, yet the patentee is entitled to a fair construction of the terms *409 of his claim as actually granted.” Hubbell v. United States, 179 U.S. 77 at 80 , 21 S.Ct. at 25 (1900). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jimenez v. State
neutral
1 sentence2025Jimenez v. State, 170 Idaho 359 , 510 P.3d 1152 , 1158 (2022) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Quintero
green
2 sentences2006Subsequently, in State v. Quintero, 141 Idaho 619 , 115 P.3d 710 (2005), the Supreme Court applied the liberal construction standard where the defendant’s objection to the charging document was made during trial at the close of the State’s case-in-chief. 2006Subsequently, in State v. Quintero, 141 Idaho 619 , 115 P.3d 710 (2005), the Supreme Court applied the liberal construction standard where the defendant’s objection to the charging document was made during trial at the close of the State’s case-in-chief. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Indiana Ass'n of Seventh-Day Adventists v. State Board of Tax Commissioners
green
2 sentences1993The court applied the doctrine of strict construction, holding that, in order to qualify as a parsonage, “the minimum which must be shown is that individuals residing in the parsonage perform the pastoral duties of an ordained minister.” 512 N.E.2d at 939 . 1993The court applied the doctrine of strict construction, holding that, in order to qualify as a parsonage, "the minimum which must be shown is that individuals residing in the parsonage perform the pastoral duties of an ordained minister." 512 N.E.2d at 939 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Steinebach v. Hoff Lumber Co.
green
2 sentences1990In Steinebach v. Hoff Lumber Co., 98 Idaho 428 , 566 P.2d 377 (1977), we invoked the liberal construction rule in interpreting the statute allowing a claimant to whom compensation had been paid and then discontinued only a specified period from the date of the accident to request a hearing for further compensation. 1990In Steinebach v. Hoff Lumber Co., 98 Idaho 428 , 566 P.2d 377 (1977), we invoked the liberal construction rule in interpreting the statute allowing a claimant to whom compensation had been paid and then discontinued only a specified period from the date of the accident to request a hearing for further compensation. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Parsons v. Doctors for Emergency Services
green
2 sentences1981The court in Parsons v. Doctors for Emergency Services, 81 F.R.D. 660 (D.Del.1979), similarly noted that issues of law raised in pretrial orders constitute exceptions to the general rule that affirmative defenses not pleaded are waived. 1981The court in Parsons v. Doctors for Emergency Services, 81 F.R.D. 660 (D.Del. 1979), similarly noted that issues of law raised in pretrial orders constitute exceptions to the general rule that affirmative defenses not pleaded are waived. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Shepard v. Carrigan
green
2 sentences1974(Emphasis ours) Then, the U. S. Supreme Court went on to quote from Shepard v. Carrigan, 116 U.S. 593 , 6 S.Ct. 493 , 29 L.Ed. 723 (1886), when it stated: “ ‘If an applicant, in order to get his patent, accepts one with a narrower claim than that contained in his original application, he is bound by it. 1974(Emphasis ours) Then, the U. S. Supreme Court went on to quote from Shepard v. Carrigan, 116 U.S. 593 , 6 S.Ct. 493 , 29 L.Ed. 723 (1886), when it stated: “ ‘If an applicant, in order to get his patent, accepts one with a narrower claim than that contained in his original application, he is bound by it. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Sims v. Greene
green
1 sentence1965Though such presumption may not be' mandatory' in all cases, the federal construction of the rule will be regarded as m'ost persuasive.' In Sims v. Greene, 161 F.2d 87 (3rd Cir. 1947), the circuit court set aside a preliminary injunction on the ground that it had been granted upon the pleadings and affidavits filed by the parties and without opportunity to the adverse party to produce oral testimony. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Colson v. Steele
green
2 sentences1956Colson v. Steele, 73 Idaho 348 , 252 P.2d 1049 . *391 Applying the liberal construction rule, compensation should be allowed if the injury or death can reasonably be construed to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment. 1956Colson v. Steele, 73 Idaho 348 , 252 P.2d 1049 . *391 Applying the liberal construction rule, compensation should be allowed if the injury or death can reasonably be construed to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Salmon v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co. of Milwaukee
neutral
1 sentence1941Co. of Milwaukee, (La.) 161 So. 340 , and the reasoning therein, coupled with the doctrine of construction that a clause in an insurance policy is to be construed most strongly against the insurer, or liberally in favor of the insured. 1 Conceding such rule of construction prevails, nevertheless courts in states recognizing such rule (26 C. | 1 | 1941–1941 |
State v. City of Columbia
green
1 sentence1933All other writers and courts when dealing with the subject apply the general rule as so stated, but Mr. Cooley, on page 1414, sec. 673, of his same work, says that, while some jurisdictions apply such strict construction rule to exemptions of municipal property, ‘the better rule is that strict construction of exemptions statutes apply to exemptions of property held in private ownership, but not to exemptions of public property.’ “In support of the application of the strict construction rule to such property, the learned author cites the case of Board of Directors of Stinson Memorial Library v. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Commonwealth v. City of Richmond
green
1 sentence1933All other writers and courts when dealing with the subject apply the general rule as so stated, but Mr. Cooley, on page 1414, sec. 673, of his same work, says that, while some jurisdictions apply such strict construction rule to exemptions of municipal property, ‘the better rule is that strict construction of exemptions statutes apply to exemptions of property held in private ownership, but not to exemptions of public property.’ “In support of the application of the strict construction rule to such property, the learned author cites the case of Board of Directors of Stinson Memorial Library v. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
City of Pasadena v. County of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences1933All other writers and courts when dealing with the subject apply the general rule as so stated, but Mr. Cooley, on page 1414, sec. 673, of his same work, says that, while some jurisdictions apply such strict construction rule to exemptions of municipal property, ‘the better rule is that strict construction of exemptions statutes apply to exemptions of property held in private ownership, but not to exemptions of public property.’ “In support of the application of the strict construction rule to such property, the learned author cites the case of Board of Directors of Stinson Memorial Library v. 1933All other writers and courts when dealing with the subject apply the general rule as so stated, but Mr. Cooley, on page 1414, sec. 673, of his same work, says that, while some jurisdictions apply such strict construction rule to exemptions of municipal property, ‘the better rule is that strict construction of exemptions statutes apply to exemptions of property held in private ownership, but not to exemptions of public property.’ “In support of the application of the strict construction rule to such property, the learned author cites the case of Board of Directors of Stinson Memorial Library v. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Board of Directors of the Stinson Memorial Library v. Board of Review
neutral
2 sentences1933All other writers and courts when dealing with the subject apply the general rule as so stated, but Mr. Cooley, on page 1414, sec. 673, of his same work, says that, while some jurisdictions apply such strict construction rule to exemptions of municipal property, ‘the better rule is that strict construction of exemptions statutes apply to exemptions of property held in private ownership, but not to exemptions of public property.’ “In support of the application of the strict construction rule to such property, the learned author cites the case of Board of Directors of Stinson Memorial Library v. 1933All other writers and courts when dealing with the subject apply the general rule as so stated, but Mr. Cooley, on page 1414, sec. 673, of his same work, says that, while some jurisdictions apply such strict construction rule to exemptions of municipal property, ‘the better rule is that strict construction of exemptions statutes apply to exemptions of property held in private ownership, but not to exemptions of public property.’ “In support of the application of the strict construction rule to such property, the learned author cites the case of Board of Directors of Stinson Memorial Library v. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Ex parte Newman
green
1 sentence1904W., 48 Cal. 493 , we find this statement in the syllabus: “Stare Decisis. — -Even if property rights have grown up under an erroneous decision with regard to the construction of a clause in the constitution, it is better that inconvenience should be submitted to, rather than such decision should stand, and a valuable provision in the fundamental law be obliterated.” In Ex parte Koser, 60 Cal. 177 , at page 204, in discussing the application of the rule of stare decisis, the court saj's: “Nor can the doctrine stare decisis be invoked to prevent us front inquiring into the constitutionality of t | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Ex parte Andrews
green
1 sentence1904W., 48 Cal. 493 , we find this statement in the syllabus: “Stare Decisis. — -Even if property rights have grown up under an erroneous decision with regard to the construction of a clause in the constitution, it is better that inconvenience should be submitted to, rather than such decision should stand, and a valuable provision in the fundamental law be obliterated.” In Ex parte Koser, 60 Cal. 177 , at page 204, in discussing the application of the rule of stare decisis, the court saj's: “Nor can the doctrine stare decisis be invoked to prevent us front inquiring into the constitutionality of t | 1 | 1904–1904 |
City of San Francisco v. Spring Valley Water Works
neutral
1 sentence1904W., 48 Cal. 493 , we find this statement in the syllabus: “Stare Decisis. — -Even if property rights have grown up under an erroneous decision with regard to the construction of a clause in the constitution, it is better that inconvenience should be submitted to, rather than such decision should stand, and a valuable provision in the fundamental law be obliterated.” In Ex parte Koser, 60 Cal. 177 , at page 204, in discussing the application of the rule of stare decisis, the court saj's: “Nor can the doctrine stare decisis be invoked to prevent us front inquiring into the constitutionality of t | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Ex Parte Koser
green
1 sentence1904W., 48 Cal. 493 , we find this statement in the syllabus: “Stare Decisis. — -Even if property rights have grown up under an erroneous decision with regard to the construction of a clause in the constitution, it is better that inconvenience should be submitted to, rather than such decision should stand, and a valuable provision in the fundamental law be obliterated.” In Ex parte Koser, 60 Cal. 177 , at page 204, in discussing the application of the rule of stare decisis, the court saj's: “Nor can the doctrine stare decisis be invoked to prevent us front inquiring into the constitutionality of t | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Mahoney v. Marshall
neutral
1 sentence1892Our attention is called by counsel to the decision of this court in the case of Mahoney v. Marshall, ante, p. 343, 29 Pac. 110 . | 1 | 1892–1892 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.