immunity doctrine in Kentucky

1987It meets the conventional descriptions or definitions of a “municipality.” Relying on Haney, supra, we held in Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District v. Kirk, Ky., 390 S.W.2d 182 (1965): Metropolitan next asserts the trial judge erred in overruling its motion for a directed verdict for the reason that this action was essentially one based upon negligence and that, since Metropolitan has been held to be a governmental functionary, Gnau v. Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District, Ky., 346 S.W.2d 754 [(1961)] it is protected from liability for its torts by t

1987Dist. v. Kirk, Ky., 390 S.W.2d 182 (1965), also makes the point that MSD, as a municipal corporation was and is liable under Haney : “Metropolitan [MSD] next asserts the trial judge erred in overruling its motion for a directed verdict for the reason that this action was essentially one based upon negligence and that, since Metropolitan has been held to be a governmental functionary, Gnau v. Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District, Ky., 346 S.W.2d 754 [(1961)] it is protected from liability for its torts by the doctrine of immunity.

1987It meets the conventional descriptions or definitions of a "municipality." Relying on Haney, supra , we held in Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District v. Kirk, Ky., 390 S.W.2d 182 (1965): Metropolitan next asserts the trial judge erred in overruling its motion for a directed verdict for the reason that this action was essentially one based upon negligence and that, since Metropolitan has been held to be a governmental functionary, Gnau v. Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District, Ky., 346 S.W.2d 754 [(1961)] it is protected from liability for its torts by

1987It meets the conventional descriptions or definitions of a “municipality.” Relying on Haney, supra, we held in Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District v. Kirk, Ky., 390 S.W.2d 182 (1965): Metropolitan next asserts the trial judge erred in overruling its motion for a directed verdict for the reason that this action was essentially one based upon negligence and that, since Metropolitan has been held to be a governmental functionary, Gnau v. Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District, Ky., 346 S.W.2d 754 [(1961)] it is protected from liability for its torts by t

2019Granted, such a statement cannot be a broad, vague declaration without proof in the actual record; otherwise, the immunity doctrine would 4 We note that “the judiciary has the sole ability to determine whether an entity is entitled to sovereign immunity[.]” Rothstein, 532 S.W.3d at 648 (citing Withers v. University of Kentucky, 939 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Ky. 1997)).

2019Since the fees can only be ‘reasonable’ and are subject to judicial review, much like an administrative agency’s decisions.” Comair, 295 S.W.3d at 102 (citing KRS 183.133(2)).

2019It is based in the concept that “sovereign immunity should ‘extend ... to departments, boards or agencies that are such integral parts of state government as to come within regular patterns of administration organization and structure.’” Id. at 99 (quoting Kentucky Center for the Arts v. Bems, 801 S.W.2d 327, 332 (Ky. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2017In denying summary judgment, the circuit court explained its ruling as follows: Safely driving a police vehicle in' a pursuit is a ministerial act. [Mattingly v. Mitchell, 425 S.W.3d 85, 90 (Ky. App. 2013)] citing Jones v. Lathram, 150 S.W.3d 50 (Ky. 2004).

2015Three years later, Hammond v. Commonwealth, 366 S.W.3d 425 , 433 n.8 (Ky. 2012), reiterated that an immunity claim “could be defeated by the Commonwealth upon a showing of probable cause based upon ‘witness statements, investigative letters prepared by law enforcement officers, photographs and other documents of record’ because one claiming self-defense immunity from prosecution has no right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue.” 7 Most recently, Commonwealth v. Lemons, 437 S.W.3d 708 (Ky. 2014), a case involving a conditional guilty plea, we held that the appellate standard of review follow

2015Three years later, Hammond v. Commonwealth, 366 S.W.3d 425 , 433 n.8 (Ky. 2012), reiterated that an immunity claim “could be defeated by the Commonwealth upon a showing of probable cause based upon ‘witness statements, investigative letters prepared by law enforcement officers, photographs and other documents of record’ because one claiming self-defense immunity from prosecution has no right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue.” 7 Most recently, Commonwealth v. Lemons, 437 S.W.3d 708 (Ky. 2014), a case involving a conditional guilty plea, we held that the appellate standard of review follow

2014Similarly, once the matter is before a judge, if the defendant claims immunity the court must dismiss the case unless there is probable cause to conclude that the force used was not legally justified. 285 S.W.3d at 754 .

2010This exception was first expressed over a century ago in the United States Supreme Court case of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 , 28 S.Ct. 441 , 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), and has since enjoyed wide-spread contemporary acceptance. 4 The Kentucky Supreme Court has also approvingly recognized the Ex parte Young exception.

2010This exception was first expressed over a century ago in the United States Supreme Court case of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 , 28 S.Ct. 441 , 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), and has since enjoyed wide-spread contemporary acceptance. 4 The Kentucky Supreme Court has also approvingly recognized the Ex parte Young exception.

2001The questions presented are whether the decision of the Court of Appeals abrogates the special relationship doctrine based on the events of this case; whether the application of Fryman v. Harrison, Ky., 896 S.W.2d 908 (1995), was *389 proper; whether there was a special relationship between the officers and Black creating a duty to protect her from harm; whether the actions of the officers became ministerial once they allegedly took Black into custody; whether there is an immunity defense; whether there was a superseding or intervening cause for the death, and whether principles of official im

2000Thereafter, in Cullinan v. Jefferson County, Ky., 418 S.W.2d 407 (1967), the court held that “[w]hen the people of this Commonwealth want sovereign immunity waived as to counties or county boards of education, their elected legislative representatives will be charged with this responsibility.” Id. at 409 .

2000Thereafter, in Cullinan v. Jefferson County, Ky., 418 S.W.2d 407 (1967), the court held that “[w]hen the people of this Commonwealth want sovereign immunity waived as to counties or county boards of education, their elected legislative representatives will be charged with this responsibility.” Id. at 409 .

1987It meets the conventional descriptions or definitions of a “municipality.” Relying on Haney, supra, we held in Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District v. Kirk, Ky., 390 S.W.2d 182 (1965): Metropolitan next asserts the trial judge erred in overruling its motion for a directed verdict for the reason that this action was essentially one based upon negligence and that, since Metropolitan has been held to be a governmental functionary, Gnau v. Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District, Ky., 346 S.W.2d 754 [(1961)] it is protected from liability for its torts by t

1987Dist. v. Kirk, Ky., 390 S.W.2d 182 (1965), also makes the point that MSD, as a municipal corporation was and is liable under Haney : “Metropolitan [MSD] next asserts the trial judge erred in overruling its motion for a directed verdict for the reason that this action was essentially one based upon negligence and that, since Metropolitan has been held to be a governmental functionary, Gnau v. Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District, Ky., 346 S.W.2d 754 [(1961)] it is protected from liability for its torts by the doctrine of immunity.

1966In Kindt v. Murphy, Judge, 312 Ky. 395 , 227 S.W.2d 895 , this rule was quoted with approval from Jones on Evidence: “Accordingly, it was early declared, and has since been universally held, that the privilege against self-incrimination may be asserted as of right in any ordinary civil case.

1966In Kindt v. Murphy, Judge, 312 Ky. 395 , 227 S.W.2d 895 , this rule was quoted with approval from Jones on Evidence: “Accordingly, it was early declared, and has since been universally held, that the privilege against self-incrimination may be asserted as of right in any ordinary civil case.

1965We had theretofore in Mullikin v. Jewish Hospital Ass’n of Louisville, Ky., 348 S.W.2d 930 , abandoned the immunity doctrine as it applied to charitable institutions.

1961The Parker case followed generally the holding in President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 123 , 130 F2d 810, 812.

1916Deposit Bank of Owensboro v. Daviess County, 102 Ky., 174 ; City of Newport v. Masonic Temple Association, 103 Ky., 592 ; Citizens’ Saving Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S., 644 ; Central University of Kentucky v. Walters’ Executors, 122 Ky., 65 .

1916Deposit Bank of Owensboro v. Daviess County, 102 Ky., 174 ; City of Newport v. Masonic Temple Association, 103 Ky., 592 ; Citizens’ Saving Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S., 644 ; Central University of Kentucky v. Walters’ Executors, 122 Ky., 65 .

1916Deposit Bank of Owensboro v. Daviess County, 102 Ky., 174 ; City of Newport v. Masonic Temple Association, 103 Ky., 592 ; Citizens’ Saving Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S., 644 ; Central University of Kentucky v. Walters’ Executors, 122 Ky., 65 .