14 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1960–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Moss v. Stockardgreen2 sentences1998See Moss v. Stockard, 580 A.2d 1011 , 1018 n. 12 (D.C.1990). 7 . 1995The court then said: "We conclude, however, exercising our own judgment as a division, that the immunity analysis in Thompson is sound and that we would adopt it even if the Thompson opinion were vacated.” Id. | 2 | 3 |
Barr v. Matteogreen2 sentences1993Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 , 79 S.Ct. 1335, 1341 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959). 1993Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 , 79 S.Ct. 1335, 1341 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959). | 1 | 2 |
Border City Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Moangreen1 sentence2025R.C. 2744.01(H); see also Bibler v. Stevenson, 2016-Ohio-8449, ¶ 15-17 (plurality opinion) (traffic-control devices that are required under the Revised Code, but not mandated by the traffic manual, fall within the definition of “public road”). {¶ 33} Although the commissioners complain that “the Third Amended Complaint makes no allegation that some traffic control device mandated by the Ohio manual of uniform traffic control devices was missing in this case[,]” Veller was not required to plead every element of her claims “‘with crystalline specificity.’” Bethel Oil & Gas, 2024-Ohio-5285, at ¶ | 1 | 1 |
Bethel Oil & Gas, L.L.C. v. Redbird Dev., L.L.C.green1 sentence2025R.C. 2744.01(H); see also Bibler v. Stevenson, 2016-Ohio-8449, ¶ 15-17 (plurality opinion) (traffic-control devices that are required under the Revised Code, but not mandated by the traffic manual, fall within the definition of “public road”). {¶ 33} Although the commissioners complain that “the Third Amended Complaint makes no allegation that some traffic control device mandated by the Ohio manual of uniform traffic control devices was missing in this case[,]” Veller was not required to plead every element of her claims “‘with crystalline specificity.’” Bethel Oil & Gas, 2024-Ohio-5285, at ¶ | 1 | 1 |
Bibler v. Stevenson (Slip Opinion)green1 sentence2025R.C. 2744.01(H); see also Bibler v. Stevenson, 2016-Ohio-8449, ¶ 15-17 (plurality opinion) (traffic-control devices that are required under the Revised Code, but not mandated by the traffic manual, fall within the definition of “public road”). {¶ 33} Although the commissioners complain that “the Third Amended Complaint makes no allegation that some traffic control device mandated by the Ohio manual of uniform traffic control devices was missing in this case[,]” Veller was not required to plead every element of her claims “‘with crystalline specificity.’” Bethel Oil & Gas, 2024-Ohio-5285, at ¶ | 1 | 1 |
Federal Deposit Insurance v. Meyergreen1 sentence2023In that case, the immunity claim could be asserted prior to trial by means of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief 29 FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature.”). 30 Matthews v. Automated Bus. | 1 | 1 |
Matthews v. Automated Business Systems & Services, Inc.green1 sentence2023Sys. & Servs., Inc., 558 A.2d 1175, 1179 (D.C. 1989). 25 can be granted, a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, or a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. | 1 | 1 |
Pearson v. Callahangreen1 sentence2020Airports Comm’n, 914 F.2d 1076, 1079 (8th Cir. 1990) (“If probable cause was indeed present, it is not necessary to consider an immunity defense.”); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (“[J]udges . . . should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified 27 immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”). | 1 | 1 |
Charles Wayne Foster and Dana Gay Foster v. Metropolitan Airports Commission, Officers A. Baetz, Bruce Griller, and J. Edblomgreen1 sentence2020Airports Comm’n, 914 F.2d 1076, 1079 (8th Cir. 1990) (“If probable cause was indeed present, it is not necessary to consider an immunity defense.”); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (“[J]udges . . . should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified 27 immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Clintongreen1 sentence2010The Court held that denial of the claim was appealable on an interlocutory basis. 457 U.S. at 742-43 , 102 S.Ct. 2690 ; see Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354 , 1357 n. 4 (8th Cir.1996) (noting that then-President Clinton's appeal came "under the immunity exception to the general rule that only final judgments are appealable”). 5 . | 1 | 1 |
Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manilagreen2 sentences2002See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 , 50 S.Ct. 5 , 74 L.Ed. 131 (1929) (defendant Archbishop’s assertion of immunity allowed); Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 683 A.2d 808 , 111 Md.App. 616 (Md.1996) (defendant Archbishop’s assertion of immunity allowed); Higgins v. Maher, 210 Cal.App.3d 1168 , 258 Cal.Rptr. 757 (Cal.Ct.App.1989) (defendant Bishop’s assertion of immunity allowed). 2002See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 , 50 S.Ct. 5 , 74 L.Ed. 131 (1929) (defendant Archbishop’s assertion of immunity allowed); Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 683 A.2d 808 , 111 Md.App. 616 (Md.1996) (defendant Archbishop’s assertion of immunity allowed); Higgins v. Maher, 210 Cal.App.3d 1168 , 258 Cal.Rptr. 757 (Cal.Ct.App.1989) (defendant Bishop’s assertion of immunity allowed). | 1 | 1 |
James R. Spencer v. General Hospital of the District of Columbiagreen2 sentences1972See also Spencer v. General Hospital, supra, 138 U.S.App.D.C. at 53 , 425 F.2d at 484 (regarding congressional inaction). 1972See also Spencer v. General Hospital, supra, 138 U.S.App.D.C. at 53 , 425 F.2d at 484 (regarding congressional inaction). | 1 | 1 |
Spellens v. Spellensgreen2 sentences1960See also the concurring and dissenting opinion in Spellens v. Spellens, 1957, 49 Cal.2d 210 , 317 P.2d 613 , suggesting that the majority rule should be re-examined. 1960See also the concurring and dissenting opinion in Spellens v. Spellens, 1957, 49 Cal.2d 210 , 317 P.2d 613 , suggesting that the majority rule should be re-examined. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
District of Columbia v. Thompson
green
2 sentences1998However, we adopted the immunity analysis in Thompson, supra, 570 A.2d 277 , as sound. 1995Accordingly, this court’s analysis in Part V of Thompson I, 570 A.2d at 291-98 , is the law of this jurisdiction. | 2 | 1995–1998 |
Bryan v. James Holmes Regional Medical Center
green
2 sentences2021Aug. 14, 2017) (declining to grant motion to dismiss where the plaintiff alleged detailed facts about only one of the immunity factors related to adequate notice and process and providing “[p]laintiff with an opportunity to conduct further discovery given that this matter is still in the early stages of litigation and immunity is often invoked on a motion for summary judgment, not a motion to dismiss” (internal quotation marks omitted)), aff’d, 747 F. App’x 982 (5th Cir. 2019)—and may even be delayed until after trial, see, e.g., Bryan, 33 F.3d at 1332 & n.25 (noting that the American Medical 2021We endorse this approach and conclude that where a plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts in his complaint to call into question whether standards for professional review actions set forth in the HCQIA were satisfied, the trial court should defer consideration of immunity to the evidentiary stage of the case. 8 We 8 We recognize that HCQIA immunity “may be resolved whenever the record in a particular case becomes sufficiently developed,” Bryan, 33 F.3d at 1332 , and 18 turn to examine whether Dr. Kalan alleged sufficient facts in his complaint to survive a motion to dismiss on HCQIA immunity g | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Henry v. Lake Charles American Press, L.L.C.
green
1 sentence2010In order to succeed in dismissing a complaint under the Louisiana statute, "the defendant must first make a prima facie showing that ... 'a cause of action against him arises from an act by him in furtherance of the exercise of his right of petition or free speech under the United States or Louisiana Constitution in connection with a public issue.' ” Henry, 566 F.3d at 170 . 6 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Nixon v. Fitzgerald
green
2 sentences2010The Court held that denial of the claim was appealable on an interlocutory basis. 457 U.S. at 742-43 , 102 S.Ct. 2690 ; see Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354 , 1357 n. 4 (8th Cir.1996) (noting that then-President Clinton's appeal came "under the immunity exception to the general rule that only final judgments are appealable”). 5 . 2010The Court held that denial of the claim was appealable on an interlocutory basis. 457 U.S. at 742-43 , 102 S.Ct. 2690 ; see Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354 , 1357 n. 4 (8th Cir.1996) (noting that then-President Clinton's appeal came "under the immunity exception to the general rule that only final judgments are appealable”). 5 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Donald Saucier v. Elliot M. Katz and in Defense of Animals
red
1 sentence2002If the officer’s mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable, however, the officer is entitled to the immunity defense.” Id. at 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Higgins v. Maher
green
2 sentences2002See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 , 50 S.Ct. 5 , 74 L.Ed. 131 (1929) (defendant Archbishop’s assertion of immunity allowed); Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 683 A.2d 808 , 111 Md.App. 616 (Md.1996) (defendant Archbishop’s assertion of immunity allowed); Higgins v. Maher, 210 Cal.App.3d 1168 , 258 Cal.Rptr. 757 (Cal.Ct.App.1989) (defendant Bishop’s assertion of immunity allowed). 2002See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 , 50 S.Ct. 5 , 74 L.Ed. 131 (1929) (defendant Archbishop’s assertion of immunity allowed); Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 683 A.2d 808 , 111 Md.App. 616 (Md.1996) (defendant Archbishop’s assertion of immunity allowed); Higgins v. Maher, 210 Cal.App.3d 1168 , 258 Cal.Rptr. 757 (Cal.Ct.App.1989) (defendant Bishop’s assertion of immunity allowed). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Downs v. ROMAN CATH. ARCHBISHOP OF BALT.
green
2 sentences2002See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 , 50 S.Ct. 5 , 74 L.Ed. 131 (1929) (defendant Archbishop’s assertion of immunity allowed); Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 683 A.2d 808 , 111 Md.App. 616 (Md.1996) (defendant Archbishop’s assertion of immunity allowed); Higgins v. Maher, 210 Cal.App.3d 1168 , 258 Cal.Rptr. 757 (Cal.Ct.App.1989) (defendant Bishop’s assertion of immunity allowed). 2002See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 , 50 S.Ct. 5 , 74 L.Ed. 131 (1929) (defendant Archbishop’s assertion of immunity allowed); Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 683 A.2d 808 , 111 Md.App. 616 (Md.1996) (defendant Archbishop’s assertion of immunity allowed); Higgins v. Maher, 210 Cal.App.3d 1168 , 258 Cal.Rptr. 757 (Cal.Ct.App.1989) (defendant Bishop’s assertion of immunity allowed). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Westfall v. Erwin
red
2 sentences1993We follow the immunity rule derived from Barr as explicated in Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 297-98 , 298 n. 4, 108 S.Ct. 580, 584-85 , 584 n. 4, 98 L.Ed.2d 619 (1988). 1993We follow the immunity rule derived from Barr as explicated in Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 297-98 , 298 n. 4, 108 S.Ct. 580, 584-85 , 584 n. 4, 98 L.Ed.2d 619 (1988). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
United States v. Agurs
green
2 sentences1990When the statement being sought by the defense as Jencks material is so closely intertwined with a prosecution arising out of an attempt to enforce WMATA regulations and protect a WMATA employee, cf. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), we conclude that production, upon request, is required. 1990When the statement being sought by the defense as Jencks material is so closely intertwined with a prosecution arising out of an attempt to enforce WMATA regulations and protect a WMATA employee, cf. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), we conclude that production, upon request, is required. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Koplik v. CP Trucking Corp.
green
2 sentences1960P. Trucking Corp., 1957, 47 N.J.Super. 196 , 135 A.2d 555 , the immunity rule was rejected, but this decision was reversed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in a four to three opinion. 1958, 27 N.J. 1 , 141 A.2d 34 . 1960P. Trucking Corp., 1957, 47 N.J.Super. 196 , 135 A.2d 555 , the immunity rule was rejected, but this decision was reversed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in a four to three opinion. 1958, 27 N.J. 1 , 141 A.2d 34 . | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Brown v. Gosser
green
2 sentences1960In Brown v. Gosser, Ky.1953, 262 S.W.2d 480 , 43 A.L.R.2d 626 , the immunity rule was rejected and prior cases overruled. 1960In Brown v. Gosser, Ky.1953, 262 S.W.2d 480 , 43 A.L.R.2d 626 , the immunity rule was rejected and prior cases overruled. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Hamilton v. Fulkerson
green
2 sentences1960In Hamilton v. Fulkerson, Mo.1955, 285 S.W.2d 642 , it was held that a wife could maintain an action against her husband for a personal tort committed by him prior to their marriage. 1960In Hamilton v. Fulkerson, Mo.1955, 285 S.W.2d 642 , it was held that a wife could maintain an action against her husband for a personal tort committed by him prior to their marriage. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp.
green
2 sentences1960P. Trucking Corp., 1957, 47 N.J.Super. 196 , 135 A.2d 555 , the immunity rule was rejected, but this decision was reversed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in a four to three opinion. 1958, 27 N.J. 1 , 141 A.2d 34 . 1960P. Trucking Corp., 1957, 47 N.J.Super. 196 , 135 A.2d 555 , the immunity rule was rejected, but this decision was reversed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in a four to three opinion. 1958, 27 N.J. 1 , 141 A.2d 34 . | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.