immunity doctrine in Massachusetts

2013Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527-529 (1985).

2002As to whether the immunity defense was “collateral to the rest of the controversy as required by the doctrine of present execution,” Kent v. Commonwealth, supra at 33, we conclude, as did the United States Supreme Court, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527-529 (1985), that the denial of a motion to dismiss on immunity grounds is always collateral to the rights asserted in the underlying action because it “is conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff’s claim that his rights have been violated . . . even though a reviewing court must consider the plaintiff’s factual allegations i

2004There, the court noted that the Supreme Judicial Court has also recognized that “[w]hile physicians exercise independent judgment, a physician can still be deemed a servant where the principal controls the details of the physician’s activities.” McNamara v. Honeyman, 406 Mass. 43, 48 (1989), relying on Kelly v. Rossi, 395 Mass. 659, 662 (1985) . . . [T]he central question is whether the public employer “directs and controls the physician’s treatment of the patient.” Williams, 413 Mass. at 400 . . . [I]n order for the immunity doctrine to apply, it is not necessary that the public employer supe

2004The central question is whether the public employer “directs and controls the physician’s treatment of the patient.” Williams v. Hartman, 413 Mass. 398, 400 (1992).

1999Maddocks, supra. In Breault v. Chairman of the Bd. of Fire Comm’rs of Springfield, supra at 31, which dealt with an immunity defense under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , this court distinguished between immunity from liability and immunity from suit, holding that only orders denying immunity from suit enjoy the benefit of the present execution rule.

1988Gildea sets the immunity standard only for State law claims asserted against public officials performing “discretionary functions.” Breault v. Chairman of the Bd. of Fire Comm’rs of Springfield, 401 Mass. 26 (1987), cert. denied, U.S. (1988) ( 108 S. Ct. 1078 [1988]).

1996As stated by the Supreme Court and reiterated by the Supreme Judicial Court in Dobos, “The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. . . . [T]he unlawfulness must be apparent.” 404 Mass. at 647 , quoting from Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-640 (1987).

1993Dobos v. Driscoll, 404 Mass. 634, 646 (1989).

2014Maxwell v. AIG Domestic Claims, Inc., 460 Mass. 91 , 106 n.12 (2011), citing E lles v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Quincy, 450 Mass. 671, 673-674 (2008).

2007See Correllas, 410 Mass. at 324 .

2005Phillips v. Montgomery County, 24 F.3d 736, 738 (5th Cir. 1994) (defendants “cannot fail to appeal [rejection of an immunity defense] and then restart the appellate [thirty-day] day clock by refiling substantially the same motion”).

2005See Weir v. Propst, 915 F.2d 283, 286 (7th Cir. 1990) (rule 4 [a] deadline for appeals in civil cases applies to “all appealable orders, including collateral orders, specifically orders denying immunity”).

2004There, the court noted that the Supreme Judicial Court has also recognized that “[w]hile physicians exercise independent judgment, a physician can still be deemed a servant where the principal controls the details of the physician’s activities.” McNamara v. Honeyman, 406 Mass. 43, 48 (1989), relying on Kelly v. Rossi, 395 Mass. 659, 662 (1985) . . . [T]he central question is whether the public employer “directs and controls the physician’s treatment of the patient.” Williams, 413 Mass. at 400 . . . [I]n order for the immunity doctrine to apply, it is not necessary that the public employer supe

2004There, the court noted that the Supreme Judicial Court has also recognized that “[w]hile physicians exercise independent judgment, a physician can still be deemed a servant where the principal controls the details of the physician’s activities.” McNamara v. Honeyman, 406 Mass. 43, 48 (1989), relying on Kelly v. Rossi, 395 Mass. 659, 662 (1985) . . . [T]he central question is whether the public employer “directs and controls the physician’s treatment of the patient.” Williams, 413 Mass. at 400 . . . [I]n order for the immunity doctrine to apply, it is not necessary that the public employer supe

2003After an immunity claim has been asserted, the court must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a “clearly established” constitutional right. 19 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. at 201.

2003If such a violation is found, the court then assesses whether the defendant’s conduct was “objectively reasonable,” Thompson v. Upshur County, Tex., 245 F.3d at 457, in light of the clearly established law at the time of the constitutional deprivation.

2002The questioning was as follows: The prosecutor: “And by the way, you went up to the Supreme Judicial Court in Boston for an immunity hearing with a justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, didn’t you?” The witness: “Yes, I did.” The prosecutor: “And at that point, did [the single justice] indicate to you as part of your immunity what you could be prosecuted for?” The witness: “Yes, he did.” The prosecutor: “And what’s your understanding, as part of the immunity, what you can be prosecuted for?” The witness: “Perjury.” The prosecutor: “And what else?” The witness: “Contempt of court.” In Commonwe

2002In his closing argument the prosecutor again reminded the jury that Rice had been granted immunity, which he described as a “license to tell... the truth.” In Commonwealth v. Ciampa, 406 Mass. 257, 262-264 (1989), we concluded that prosecutorial references to the obligation of an immunized witness to tell the truth or risk a heavy sanction should be placed in evidence by a prosecutor, if at all, only on redirect examination in response to impeachment of the immunized witness.

1999See Hopper v. Callahan, 408 Mass. 621, 624 (1990) (interlocutory appeal of denial of summary judgment motion asserting immunity); Matthews v. Rakiey, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 490, 493 (1995).

1999See Hopper v. Callahan, 408 Mass. 621, 624 (1990) (interlocutory appeal of denial of summary judgment motion asserting immunity); Matthews v. Rakiey, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 490, 493 (1995).

1996As stated by the Supreme Court and reiterated by the Supreme Judicial Court in Dobos, “The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. . . . [T]he unlawfulness must be apparent.” 404 Mass. at 647 , quoting from Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-640 (1987).

1995Maldonado Santiago, 821 F.2d at 830 (citations omitted).

1988The immunity standard in Gildea v. Ellershaw, 363 Mass. 800 (1973), cited by the dissent, is not clearly relevant to the Federal jury verdict.

1988See Smith v. Wade, supra at 53 & n. 16. [16] The immunity standard in Gildea v. Ellershaw, 363 Mass. 800 (1973), cited by the dissent, is not clearly relevant to the Federal jury verdict.

1988See Smith v. Wade, supra at 53 & n. 16. [16] The immunity standard in Gildea v. Ellershaw, 363 Mass. 800 (1973), cited by the dissent, is not clearly relevant to the Federal jury verdict.