immunity waiver in Utah

2018Id. ¶64 As the majority recognizes, supra ¶ 16, both parties acknowledge that the first two steps are met here, because the activity undertaken is a governmental function, and because the Trues accuse UDOT of negligent conduct, a category of conduct for which governmental immunity is generally waived.

2018Id. ¶ 64 As the majority recognizes, supra ¶ 16, both parties acknowledge that the first two steps are met here, because the activity undertaken is a governmental function, and because the Trues accuse UDOT of negligent conduct, a category of conduct for which governmental immunity is generally waived.

2012Furthermore, "[iJmmunity is an affirmative defense which the defendant bears the burden of proving." Trujillo v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 1999 UT App 227, ¶ 27 , 986 P.2d 752 . 150 The Utah Supreme Court has identified a four-part test (the Little test or the Little factors) to decide whether the dis-eretionary function exception to the immunity waiver applies: (1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily involve a basic governmental policy program or objective? (2) Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the realization or accomplishment of that policy, progr

2012Furthermore, "[iJmmunity is an affirmative defense which the defendant bears the burden of proving." Trujillo v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 1999 UT App 227, ¶ 27 , 986 P.2d 752 . 150 The Utah Supreme Court has identified a four-part test (the Little test or the Little factors) to decide whether the dis-eretionary function exception to the immunity waiver applies: (1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily involve a basic governmental policy program or objective? (2) Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the realization or accomplishment of that policy, progr

2018The operative question in the case, then, is whether immunity has been reinstated by way of a statutory exception to the immunity waiver for negligent conduct. ¶65 UDOT asserts that the permit exception applies here, pursuant to which immunity from suit is not waived—or, is reinstated—“if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or (…continued) this case would have been different under the current version of the Act. 20160704-CA 33 2018 UT App 86 True v. Utah Department of Transportation results from . . . the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of . . . any permit, license, certi

2018The operative question in the case, then, is whether immunity has been reinstated by way of a statutory exception to the immunity waiver for negligent conduct. ¶65 UDOT asserts that the permit exception applies here, pursuant to which immunity from suit is not waived—or, is reinstated—“if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or (…continued) this case would have been different under the current version of the Act. 20160704-CA 33 2018 UT App 86 True v. Utah Department of Transportation results from . . . the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of . . . any permit, license, certi

2006To do otherwise would allow the exception to swallow the rule.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); Kearns-Tribune, 2001 UT 55 at ¶ 15 , 28 P.3d 686 (“Because we construe the [Utah Open and Public Meetings] Act broadly, it therefore follows that the exceptions be strictly construed.”). ¶ 10 Upon review of the statutory language, we determine that the legislative intent on this point is not apparent.

2006To do otherwise would allow the exception to swallow the rule.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); Kearns-Tribune, 2001 UT 55 at ¶ 15 , 28 P.3d 686 (“Because we construe the [Utah Open and Public Meetings] Act broadly, it therefore follows that the exceptions be strictly construed.”). ¶ 10 Upon review of the statutory language, we determine that the legislative intent on this point is not apparent.

2006Id. ¶ 34 The policy decision in the present case was whether or not to perform the construction on 1-15.

2006The decision to use plastic barrels was thus so inconsequential in the overall construction project that Topham was not even included in the decision; this epitomizes the kind of operational decision that does not qualify for immunity within the narrow scope of the discretionary exception to the immunity waiver. 12 ¶36 While we explained in Laney that “at a minimum, a basic cost-benefit anal ysis and exercise of financial expertise and judgment by the City ... is sufficient under part three of the Little test,” 2002 UT 79, ¶ 19 , 57 P.3d 1007 , we did not intend to create blanket immunity for

2006The decision to use plastic barrels was thus so inconsequential in the overall construction project that Topham was not even included in the decision; this epitomizes the kind of operational decision that does not qualify for immunity within the narrow scope of the discretionary exception to the immunity waiver. 12 ¶36 While we explained in Laney that “at a minimum, a basic cost-benefit anal ysis and exercise of financial expertise and judgment by the City ... is sufficient under part three of the Little test,” 2002 UT 79, ¶ 19 , 57 P.3d 1007 , we did not intend to create blanket immunity for

2005Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 420 , 112 S.Ct. 2538 , 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992), to “protect ... political activity against tort claims as well as antitrust claims,” Searle v. Johnson, 646 P.2d 682, 684 (Utah 1982). ¶ 27 An exception to this immunity doctrine exists for actions constituting a “sham.” See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adven, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 , 111 S.Ct. 1344 , 113 L.Ed.2d 382 (1991).

2005Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 420 , 112 S.Ct. 2538 , 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992), to “protect ... political activity against tort claims as well as antitrust claims,” Searle v. Johnson, 646 P.2d 682, 684 (Utah 1982). ¶ 27 An exception to this immunity doctrine exists for actions constituting a “sham.” See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adven, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 , 111 S.Ct. 1344 , 113 L.Ed.2d 382 (1991).

2005Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 420 , 112 S.Ct. 2538 , 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992), to “protect ... political activity against tort claims as well as antitrust claims,” Searle v. Johnson, 646 P.2d 682, 684 (Utah 1982). ¶ 27 An exception to this immunity doctrine exists for actions constituting a “sham.” See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adven, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 , 111 S.Ct. 1344 , 113 L.Ed.2d 382 (1991).

2005Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 420 , 112 S.Ct. 2538 , 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992), to “protect ... political activity against tort claims as well as antitrust claims,” Searle v. Johnson, 646 P.2d 682, 684 (Utah 1982). ¶ 27 An exception to this immunity doctrine exists for actions constituting a “sham.” See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adven, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 , 111 S.Ct. 1344 , 113 L.Ed.2d 382 (1991).

2005The court held that the attacker’s mental capacity was irrelevant to the question of whether the actor committed a battery for two reasons. ¶ 43 First, the government’s fault in the attack “does not change depending upon whether the aggressor was sane or insane at the time.” Id. at 52 .

2005The court held that the attacker's mental capacity was irrelevant to the question of whether the actor committed a battery for two reasons. ¶ 43 First, the government's fault in the attack "does not change depending upon whether the aggressor was sane or insane at the time." Id. at 52 .

1993See, e.g., Hilton v. Borthick, 791 P.2d 504 (Utah 1989); Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1059 (Utah 1989); Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985); Connell v. Tooele City, 572 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977); Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242, 244 (Utah 1976).

1993See, e.g., Hilton v. Borthick, 791 P.2d 504 (Utah 1989); Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1059 (Utah 1989); Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985); Connell v. Tooele City, 572 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977); Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242, 244 (Utah 1976).

1993See, e.g., Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1162 (Utah 1991); Owens, 784 P.2d at 1189 n. 2; Ferree, 784 P.2d at 152 ; see also Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986).

1993See, e.g., Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1162 (Utah 1991); Owens, 784 P.2d at 1189 n. 2; Ferree, 784 P.2d at 152 ; see also Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986).