immunity defense in Mississippi

2009This Court noted that, instead of filing a motion to dismiss based on the immunity defense, the defendant "proceeded substantially to engage the litigation process by consenting to a scheduling order, participating in written discovery, and conducting depositions." Id.

2009This Court noted that, instead of filing a motion to dismiss based on the immunity defense, the defendant “proceeded substantially to engage the litigation process by consenting to a scheduling order, participating in written discovery, and conducting depositions.” Id.

1992All previous opinions of this Court upholding immunity of the sovereign are hereby abolished. 421 So.2d at 1052 .

1984First, in Pruett v. City of Rosedale, 421 So.2d 1046 (Miss. 1982), this Court abolished the doctrine of the immunity of the "sovereign," including the state and its local subdivisions.

2010Id. second, because the immunity defense at issue did not meet the federal standard for collateral review.

1979As stated by the Alabama Supreme Court in Jackson v. City of Florence, 294 Ala. 592 , 320 So.2d 68 (1975): That this occurred in America, given the historical background which led to the Revolutionary War, is "one of the mysteries of legal evolution." Before proceeding further, I point out a constitutional provision that evolved from the Convention of 1890 long after the immunity doctrine crossed the Atlantic.

1979As stated by the Alabama Supreme Court in Jackson v. City of Florence, 294 Ala. 592 , 320 So.2d 68 (1975): That this occurred in America, given the historical background which led to the Revolutionary War, is "one of the mysteries of legal evolution." Before proceeding further, I point out a constitutional provision that evolved from the Convention of 1890 long after the immunity doctrine crossed the Atlantic.

1952It is true that there are at least as many decisions to the contrary, which are in point on the immunity doctrine in favor of charitable institutions, among which is the case of Ettinger v. Randolph-Macon College, 31 F.(2d) 869 , wherein the opinion was written by the eminent jurist Judge Parker of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, but in that case it was pointed out that the tuition paid by the injured student was sufficient only to pay a part of the cost of affording the student the facilities of the college, and he was to that' extent a recipient of charitable benefits; that is to say, t

1952The opinions in the two pay patient cases from Alabama and Florida, respectively, Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n and Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hospital, together with those in the cases of Georgetown College v. Hughes, Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass’n, supra, and Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Vermont, 116 Vt. 124 , 70 A. (2d) 230, have clearly demonstrated that the four grounds herein-before mentioned as the sole foundation upon which the immunity doctrine in favor of charitable institutions is based are altogether illogical, and that the reasons gi

1936Co. v. Hood, 124 Miss. 548 , 87 So. 115 , 15 A.L.R. 605 , it was vigorously contended by counsel that by the introduction of one physician employed by the plaintiff, *Page 121 who testified to the nature and extent of the injuries, he thereby waived the immunity of the privilege afforded him by the privileged communication statute, section 1536, Code 1930, but the court again held that the introducing of one physician did not waive the right to object to another physician testifying.

1936Co. v. Hood, 124 Miss. 548 , 87 So. 115 , 15 A.L.R. 605 , it was vigorously contended by counsel that by the introduction of one physician employed by the plaintiff, *Page 121 who testified to the nature and extent of the injuries, he thereby waived the immunity of the privilege afforded him by the privileged communication statute, section 1536, Code 1930, but the court again held that the introducing of one physician did not waive the right to object to another physician testifying.