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26 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1934–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Comergreen2 sentences2006Stat. Ann. 60/21.02 (2005). [3] State v. Southard, 49 Wash.App. 59 , 63 n. 3, 741 P.2d 78 (1987) (quoting Smith v. Fitch, 25 Wash.2d 619, 626-27 , 171 P.2d 682 (1946)). [4] (Emphasis added). [5] (Emphasis added). [6] (Emphasis added). [7] Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 179, cmt. f (1965). [8] State v. Comer, 176 Wash. 257, 263 , 28 P.2d 1027 (1934). [9] See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 222 (1965). [10] See Comer, 176 Wash. at 265 , 28 P.2d 1027 (1934) ("We hold that the proper construction of the trust deed is that the immunity clause does not destroy the trust created by the deed . . . 2006See Comer, 176 Wash. at 265 (‘We hold that the proper construction of the trust deed is that the immunity clause does not destroy the trust created by the deed . .. .”). | 2 | 2 |
Borst v. Borstgreen2 sentences2006No. 1, 105 Wash.2d 99, 104 , 713 P.2d 79 (1986)). [4] Borst, 41 Wash.2d at 656 , 251 P.2d 149 (cited with approval in Merrick, 93 Wash.2d at 413 , 610 P.2d 891 ("In an exhaustive opinion, ... this court examined and renounced most of the policy considerations advanced by the cases to justify the doctrine of immunity. 2006Borst, 41 Wn.2d at 656 (cited with approval in Merrick, 93 Wn.2d at 413 (“In an exhaustive opinion,. .. this court examined and renounced most of the policy considerations advanced by the cases to justify the doctrine of immunity. | 1 | 3 |
Merrick v. Sutterlingreen2 sentences2006No. 1, 105 Wash.2d 99, 104 , 713 P.2d 79 (1986)). [4] Borst, 41 Wash.2d at 656 , 251 P.2d 149 (cited with approval in Merrick, 93 Wash.2d at 413 , 610 P.2d 891 ("In an exhaustive opinion, ... this court examined and renounced most of the policy considerations advanced by the cases to justify the doctrine of immunity. 2006Borst, 41 Wn.2d at 656 (cited with approval in Merrick, 93 Wn.2d at 413 (“In an exhaustive opinion,. .. this court examined and renounced most of the policy considerations advanced by the cases to justify the doctrine of immunity. | 1 | 2 |
Wesche v. Martingreen1 sentence2004See, e.g., Wesche v. Martin, 64 Wn. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Runionsgreen2 sentences1987Jaime T., 408 N.Y.S.2d at 905 ; Steinberger, 596 P.2d at 757 ; cf. Runions, 100 Wn.2d at 58 (defendant's testimony cannot incriminate him with respect to a crime for which he has already been convicted and sentenced.) Therefore, since the "function and utility" of the immunity rule exist "so long as defendant's testimony might incriminate him or tend to subject him to additional penalties", Runions, 100 Wn.2d at 57-58 , the rule must be applicable to a defendant such as McCullough whose testimony is compelled before he is sentenced. 1987Jaime T., 408 N.Y.S.2d at 905 ; Steinberger, 596 P.2d at 757 ; cf. Runions, 100 Wn.2d at 58 (defendant's testimony cannot incriminate him with respect to a crime for which he has already been convicted and sentenced.) Therefore, since the "function and utility" of the immunity rule exist "so long as defendant's testimony might incriminate him or tend to subject him to additional penalties", Runions, 100 Wn.2d at 57-58 , the rule must be applicable to a defendant such as McCullough whose testimony is compelled before he is sentenced. | 1 | 1 |
| Moats v. Sisters of Charity of Providencegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ray v. Tucson Medical Centergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jankelson v. Sisters of Charity of the House of Providencegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Upchurch v. Hubbardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Taylor v. Tauggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Tribe of Okla.
green
2 sentences2024“Congress has consistently reiterated its approval of the immunity doctrine.” Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 510 , 111 S. Ct. 905 , 112 L. 2024“Congress has consistently reiterated its approval of the immunity doctrine.” Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 510 , 111 S. Ct. 905 , 112 L. | 3 | 2006–2024 |
McGee v. McGee
green
2 sentences2008McGee, 936 S.W.2d at 369 . ¶40 The Court of Appeals held “stepparents who are obligated to support stepchildren under the family support statute are protected by the immunity doctrine to the same extent as legal parents.” Zellmer, 132 Wn. 2008McGee, 936 S.W.2d at 369 . ¶ 40 The Court of Appeals held "stepparents who are obligated to support stepchildren under the family support statute are protected by the immunity doctrine to the same extent as legal parents." Zellmer, 132 Wash.App. at 683 , 133 P.3d 948 . | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Zellmer v. Zellmer
neutral
2 sentences2008McGee, 936 S.W.2d at 369 . ¶40 The Court of Appeals held “stepparents who are obligated to support stepchildren under the family support statute are protected by the immunity doctrine to the same extent as legal parents.” Zellmer, 132 Wn. 2008McGee, 936 S.W.2d at 369 . ¶ 40 The Court of Appeals held "stepparents who are obligated to support stepchildren under the family support statute are protected by the immunity doctrine to the same extent as legal parents." Zellmer, 132 Wash.App. at 683 , 133 P.3d 948 . | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Nauroth v. Spokane County
neutral
1 sentence2023Nauroth v. Spokane County, 121 Wn. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Taggart v. State
green
2 sentences2019Taggart v. State, 118 Wn.2d 195, 214 , 822 P.2d 243 (1992). 2019Taggart v. State, 118 Wn.2d 195, 214 , 822 P.2d 243 (1992). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Trueblood ex rel. Badayos v. Washington State Department of Social & Health Services
green
1 sentence2017Wash. 2015) (Trueblood II), rev’d in part, 822 F.3d 1037 . 5 ¶27 More recently, another Washington federal district court ruled for purposes of an immunity defense in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 damages action that it was “clearly established” that “indefinitely incarcerating incompetent defendants while they awaited competency restoration, because there was not room in the state hospital, violated their constitutional due process rights.” Willis v. Wash. State *897 Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., No. C16-5113 RBL, 2017 WL 1064390 , at *6, 2017 U.S. Dist. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Zellmer v. Zellmer
neutral
1 sentence2008McGee, 936 S.W.2d at 369 . ¶ 40 The Court of Appeals held "stepparents who are obligated to support stepchildren under the family support statute are protected by the immunity doctrine to the same extent as legal parents." Zellmer, 132 Wash.App. at 683 , 133 P.3d 948 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Smith
green
2 sentences2006We approve of that analysis.")). [5] See Merrick, 93 Wash.2d at 416 , 610 P.2d 891 . [6] London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Smith, 242 Minn. 211, 215-16 , 64 N.W.2d 781 (1954). 2006We approve of that analysis.")). [5] See Merrick, 93 Wash.2d at 416 , 610 P.2d 891 . [6] London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Smith, 242 Minn. 211, 215-16 , 64 N.W.2d 781 (1954). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Southard
neutral
2 sentences2006Stat. Ann. 60/21.02 (2005). [3] State v. Southard, 49 Wash.App. 59 , 63 n. 3, 741 P.2d 78 (1987) (quoting Smith v. Fitch, 25 Wash.2d 619, 626-27 , 171 P.2d 682 (1946)). [4] (Emphasis added). [5] (Emphasis added). [6] (Emphasis added). [7] Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 179, cmt. f (1965). [8] State v. Comer, 176 Wash. 257, 263 , 28 P.2d 1027 (1934). [9] See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 222 (1965). [10] See Comer, 176 Wash. at 265 , 28 P.2d 1027 (1934) ("We hold that the proper construction of the trust deed is that the immunity clause does not destroy the trust created by the deed . . . 2006Stat. Ann. 60/21.02 (2005). [3] State v. Southard, 49 Wash.App. 59 , 63 n. 3, 741 P.2d 78 (1987) (quoting Smith v. Fitch, 25 Wash.2d 619, 626-27 , 171 P.2d 682 (1946)). [4] (Emphasis added). [5] (Emphasis added). [6] (Emphasis added). [7] Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 179, cmt. f (1965). [8] State v. Comer, 176 Wash. 257, 263 , 28 P.2d 1027 (1934). [9] See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 222 (1965). [10] See Comer, 176 Wash. at 265 , 28 P.2d 1027 (1934) ("We hold that the proper construction of the trust deed is that the immunity clause does not destroy the trust created by the deed . . . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Jenkins v. Snohomish County Public Utility District No. 1
green
2 sentences2006No. 1, 105 Wash.2d 99, 104 , 713 P.2d 79 (1986)). [4] Borst, 41 Wash.2d at 656 , 251 P.2d 149 (cited with approval in Merrick, 93 Wash.2d at 413 , 610 P.2d 891 ("In an exhaustive opinion, ... this court examined and renounced most of the policy considerations advanced by the cases to justify the doctrine of immunity. 2006No. 1, 105 Wash.2d 99, 104 , 713 P.2d 79 (1986)). [4] Borst, 41 Wash.2d at 656 , 251 P.2d 149 (cited with approval in Merrick, 93 Wash.2d at 413 , 610 P.2d 891 ("In an exhaustive opinion, ... this court examined and renounced most of the policy considerations advanced by the cases to justify the doctrine of immunity. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Smith v. Fitch
green
2 sentences2006Stat. Ann. 60/21.02 (2005). [3] State v. Southard, 49 Wash.App. 59 , 63 n. 3, 741 P.2d 78 (1987) (quoting Smith v. Fitch, 25 Wash.2d 619, 626-27 , 171 P.2d 682 (1946)). [4] (Emphasis added). [5] (Emphasis added). [6] (Emphasis added). [7] Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 179, cmt. f (1965). [8] State v. Comer, 176 Wash. 257, 263 , 28 P.2d 1027 (1934). [9] See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 222 (1965). [10] See Comer, 176 Wash. at 265 , 28 P.2d 1027 (1934) ("We hold that the proper construction of the trust deed is that the immunity clause does not destroy the trust created by the deed . . . 2006Stat. Ann. 60/21.02 (2005). [3] State v. Southard, 49 Wash.App. 59 , 63 n. 3, 741 P.2d 78 (1987) (quoting Smith v. Fitch, 25 Wash.2d 619, 626-27 , 171 P.2d 682 (1946)). [4] (Emphasis added). [5] (Emphasis added). [6] (Emphasis added). [7] Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 179, cmt. f (1965). [8] State v. Comer, 176 Wash. 257, 263 , 28 P.2d 1027 (1934). [9] See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 222 (1965). [10] See Comer, 176 Wash. at 265 , 28 P.2d 1027 (1934) ("We hold that the proper construction of the trust deed is that the immunity clause does not destroy the trust created by the deed . . . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Port of Longview v. International Raw Materials, Ltd.
green
1 sentence2004App. 431, 435-36 , 979 P.2d 917 (1999) (also reasoning that an immunity claim under former ROW 4.24.510 was an affirmative defense); CR 8(c). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Harlow v. Fitzgerald
green
1 sentence1992Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 819 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Steinberger v. DIST. CT. IN & FOR TENTH JUD.
green
1 sentence1987Jaime T., 408 N.Y.S.2d at 905 ; Steinberger, 596 P.2d at 757 ; cf. Runions, 100 Wn.2d at 58 (defendant's testimony cannot incriminate him with respect to a crime for which he has already been convicted and sentenced.) Therefore, since the "function and utility" of the immunity rule exist "so long as defendant's testimony might incriminate him or tend to subject him to additional penalties", Runions, 100 Wn.2d at 57-58 , the rule must be applicable to a defendant such as McCullough whose testimony is compelled before he is sentenced. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
In re Jaime T.
green
1 sentence1987Jaime T., 408 N.Y.S.2d at 905 ; Steinberger, 596 P.2d at 757 ; cf. Runions, 100 Wn.2d at 58 (defendant's testimony cannot incriminate him with respect to a crime for which he has already been convicted and sentenced.) Therefore, since the "function and utility" of the immunity rule exist "so long as defendant's testimony might incriminate him or tend to subject him to additional penalties", Runions, 100 Wn.2d at 57-58 , the rule must be applicable to a defendant such as McCullough whose testimony is compelled before he is sentenced. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Kenneth O. Ashelman v. Hon. Gary Pope, Judge Division I, Mohave County Superior Court Mohave County Attorney's Office
green
1 sentence1987However, in Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986), the Court of Appeals concluded that its prior decisions construed the immunity doctrine too narrowly by focusing on the underlying actions instead of looking to the ultimate acts. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Parks v. Parks
green
2 sentences1979Super. 294 , 176 A.2d 818 (1962); Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287 , 135 A.2d 65 (1957); and Johnson v. Myers, 2 Ill. 1979Super. 294 , 176 A.2d 818 (1962); Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287 , 135 A.2d 65 (1957); and Johnson v. Myers, 2 Ill. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Hoffman v. Tracy
green
2 sentences1979While no Washington case is directly on point, Johnson v. Ottomeier, 45 Wn.2d 419 , 275 P.2d 723 (1954); and Hoffman v. Tracy, 67 Wn.2d 31 , 406 P.2d 323 (1965), provide support by analogy for this additional exception to the immunity rule. 1979While no Washington case is directly on point, Johnson v. Ottomeier, 45 Wn.2d 419 , 275 P.2d 723 (1954); and Hoffman v. Tracy, 67 Wn.2d 31 , 406 P.2d 323 (1965), provide support by analogy for this additional exception to the immunity rule. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Johnson v. Myers
green
2 sentences1979Super. 294 , 176 A.2d 818 (1962); Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287 , 135 A.2d 65 (1957); and Johnson v. Myers, 2 Ill. 1979Super. 294 , 176 A.2d 818 (1962); Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287 , 135 A.2d 65 (1957); and Johnson v. Myers, 2 Ill. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Brennecke Ex Rel. Brennecke v. Kilpatrick
green
2 sentences1979Where only the parent is deceased, see, e.g., Union Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 362 F.2d 311 (1966), later appealed, 396 F.2d 795 (5th Cir.1968) (applying Georgia law and holding that the immunity doctrine is abrogated to the extent of insurance coverage); Thurman v. Etherton, 459 S.W.2d 402 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970); Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960); Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314 , 211 A.2d 410 (1965) (decided before abrogation of the parental immunity doctrine in Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432 , 224 A.2d 588 (1966)); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J. 1979Where only the parent is deceased, see, e.g., Union Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 362 F.2d 311 (1966), later appealed, 396 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1968) (applying Georgia law and holding that the immunity doctrine is abrogated to the extent of insurance coverage); Thurman v. Etherton, 459 S.W.2d 402 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970); Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960); Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314 , 211 A.2d 410 (1965) (decided before abrogation of the parental immunity doctrine in Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432 , 224 A.2d 588 (1966) ); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Thurman v. Etherton
green
2 sentences1979Where only the parent is deceased, see, e.g., Union Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 362 F.2d 311 (1966), later appealed, 396 F.2d 795 (5th Cir.1968) (applying Georgia law and holding that the immunity doctrine is abrogated to the extent of insurance coverage); Thurman v. Etherton, 459 S.W.2d 402 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970); Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960); Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314 , 211 A.2d 410 (1965) (decided before abrogation of the parental immunity doctrine in Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432 , 224 A.2d 588 (1966)); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J. 1979Where only the parent is deceased, see, e.g., Union Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 362 F.2d 311 (1966), later appealed, 396 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1968) (applying Georgia law and holding that the immunity doctrine is abrogated to the extent of insurance coverage); Thurman v. Etherton, 459 S.W.2d 402 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970); Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960); Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314 , 211 A.2d 410 (1965) (decided before abrogation of the parental immunity doctrine in Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432 , 224 A.2d 588 (1966) ); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| cluster 272198 green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| The First National Bank And Trust Company Of Waynesboro, Pennsylvania v. Union Bank And Trust Company Of Mt. Holly, New Jersey neutral | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Johnson v. Ottomeier
green
2 sentences1979While no Washington case is directly on point, Johnson v. Ottomeier, 45 Wn.2d 419 , 275 P.2d 723 (1954); and Hoffman v. Tracy, 67 Wn.2d 31 , 406 P.2d 323 (1965), provide support by analogy for this additional exception to the immunity rule. 1979While no Washington case is directly on point, Johnson v. Ottomeier, 45 Wn.2d 419 , 275 P.2d 723 (1954); and Hoffman v. Tracy, 67 Wn.2d 31 , 406 P.2d 323 (1965), provide support by analogy for this additional exception to the immunity rule. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Dean v. Smith
green
2 sentences1979Where only the parent is deceased, see, e.g., Union Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 362 F.2d 311 (1966), later appealed, 396 F.2d 795 (5th Cir.1968) (applying Georgia law and holding that the immunity doctrine is abrogated to the extent of insurance coverage); Thurman v. Etherton, 459 S.W.2d 402 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970); Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960); Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314 , 211 A.2d 410 (1965) (decided before abrogation of the parental immunity doctrine in Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432 , 224 A.2d 588 (1966)); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J. 1979Where only the parent is deceased, see, e.g., Union Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 362 F.2d 311 (1966), later appealed, 396 F.2d 795 (5th Cir.1968) (applying Georgia law and holding that the immunity doctrine is abrogated to the extent of insurance coverage); Thurman v. Etherton, 459 S.W.2d 402 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970); Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960); Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314 , 211 A.2d 410 (1965) (decided before abrogation of the parental immunity doctrine in Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432 , 224 A.2d 588 (1966)); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Freehe v. Freehe green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Palcsey v. Tepper
green
2 sentences1979Where only the parent is deceased, see, e.g., Union Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 362 F.2d 311 (1966), later appealed, 396 F.2d 795 (5th Cir.1968) (applying Georgia law and holding that the immunity doctrine is abrogated to the extent of insurance coverage); Thurman v. Etherton, 459 S.W.2d 402 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970); Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960); Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314 , 211 A.2d 410 (1965) (decided before abrogation of the parental immunity doctrine in Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432 , 224 A.2d 588 (1966)); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J. 1979Where only the parent is deceased, see, e.g., Union Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 362 F.2d 311 (1966), later appealed, 396 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1968) (applying Georgia law and holding that the immunity doctrine is abrogated to the extent of insurance coverage); Thurman v. Etherton, 459 S.W.2d 402 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970); Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960); Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314 , 211 A.2d 410 (1965) (decided before abrogation of the parental immunity doctrine in Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432 , 224 A.2d 588 (1966) ); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Briere v. Briere
green
2 sentences1979Where only the parent is deceased, see, e.g., Union Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 362 F.2d 311 (1966), later appealed, 396 F.2d 795 (5th Cir.1968) (applying Georgia law and holding that the immunity doctrine is abrogated to the extent of insurance coverage); Thurman v. Etherton, 459 S.W.2d 402 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970); Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960); Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314 , 211 A.2d 410 (1965) (decided before abrogation of the parental immunity doctrine in Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432 , 224 A.2d 588 (1966)); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J. 1979Where only the parent is deceased, see, e.g., Union Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 362 F.2d 311 (1966), later appealed, 396 F.2d 795 (5th Cir.1968) (applying Georgia law and holding that the immunity doctrine is abrogated to the extent of insurance coverage); Thurman v. Etherton, 459 S.W.2d 402 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970); Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960); Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314 , 211 A.2d 410 (1965) (decided before abrogation of the parental immunity doctrine in Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432 , 224 A.2d 588 (1966)); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Holytz v. City of Milwaukee red | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Hammack v. Monroe Street Lumber Co. neutral | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Weiss v. Swedish Hospital neutral | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hospital green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Taubert v. Taubert green | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Luster v. Luster green | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Dunlap v. Dunlap green | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Casey v. Shane green | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| People v. Russo green | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.