immunity doctrine in Illinois

2000A child may attempt to sue a parent alleging that the child fell on a wet, freshly mopped floor in the home, but the immunity would bar such an action because the parent was exercising his discretion in providing and maintaining housing for the child.” Cates, 156 Ill. 2d at 105 .

2000A child may attempt to sue a parent alleging that the child fell on a wet, freshly mopped floor in the home, but the immunity would bar such an action because the parent was exercising his discretion in providing and maintaining housing for the child." Cates, 156 Ill.2d at 105 , 189 Ill.Dec. 14 , 619 N.E.2d 715 .

1993In Hartigan , a third-party contribution action was allowed against a parent even though the action was based on negligent supervision of the child, a realm of conduct clearly within the "scope of the parental relationship." ( Nudd, 7 Ill.2d at 619 , 131 N.E.2d 525 ; Schenk v. Schenk (1968), 100 Ill.App.2d 199, 203 , 241 N.E.2d 12 .) Hartigan reasoned that the right of contribution prevailed over application of the immunity as a bar to actions by parties outside the family.

1993Referring to the parent’s and child’s individual rights to be on the street, the court stated, “It seems thus clear to us that reason and justice require that the immunity rule should not. stand as an insuperable bar to redress for injuries occasioned by the exercise of those rights.” (Schenk, 100 Ill.

2001Balsys, 524 U.S. at 692-93 , 141 L.

2001Balsys, 524 U.S. at 692-93 , 141 L.

1997In Nudd, this court `modif[ied]' the immunity doctrine by recognizing an exception in an automobile accident case where willful and wanton misconduct was alleged. ( Nudd, 7 Ill.2d at 619 [, 131 N.E.2d at 531 ].) Nudd implicitly viewed the defendant father's conduct, speeding on wet pavement and running a red light, as beyond `the scope of the parental relationship.' ( Nudd, 7 Ill.2d at 619 [, 131 N.E.2d at 531 ].) Nudd considered that the `only' policy justifying parental immunity, a reluctance to create litigation and family strife, was not served by upholding the immunity where the conduct w

1997In Nudd, this court `modif[ied]' the immunity doctrine by recognizing an exception in an automobile accident case where willful and wanton misconduct was alleged. ( Nudd, 7 Ill.2d at 619 [, 131 N.E.2d at 531 ].) Nudd implicitly viewed the defendant father's conduct, speeding on wet pavement and running a red light, as beyond `the scope of the parental relationship.' ( Nudd, 7 Ill.2d at 619 [, 131 N.E.2d at 531 ].) Nudd considered that the `only' policy justifying parental immunity, a reluctance to create litigation and family strife, was not served by upholding the immunity where the conduct w

2012Similarly, our supreme court held in the 1996 case of Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d at 391-92 , that since the plain language of section 3-108 did not, at that time, contain an immunity exception for willful and wanton misconduct, the legislature must have intended to grant immunity for such misconduct. ¶ 54 Nor does Kobylanski, 63 Ill. 2d at 173 , require a contrary result.

2011Where the legislature has chosen to limit an immunity to cover only negligence, it has unambiguously done so. [Citation.] Since the legislature omitted such a limitation from the plain language of section 3—108, then the legislature must have intended to immunize liability for both negligence and willful and wanton misconduct. [Citations.]” Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d at 391-92 .

1998App. 3d 940 , 605 N.E.2d 618 (1992)(holding that the public policy considerations supporting public officials' immunity required that the immunity be applied to bar contribution actions as well as direct actions); Stephens v. Cozadd , 159 Ill.

1998App. 3d 940 , 605 N.E.2d 618 (1992) (holding that the public policy considerations supporting public officials’ immunity required that the immunity be applied to bar contribution actions as well as direct actions); Stephens v. Cozadd, 159 Ill.

2016We now examine the origins and history of local governmental tort immunity in Illinois. ¶ 29 Local Governmental Tort Immunity ¶ 30 Local governmental tort immunity in Illinois was first recognized in 1844, in Hedges v. County of Madison, 6 Ill. 567 (1844), adopting the immunity doctrine of Russell v. Men Dwelling in the County of Devon, 2 Term Rep. 671, 100 Eng.

2016Local governmental tort immunity of a county was first recognized in Hedges, 6 Ill. 567 , adopting the immunity doctrine of Russell, 2 Term Rep. 671, 100 Eng.

2014The court in Kavanaugh rejected a similar assertion that section 2-202 applied in that case, even at the pleading stage, because "there is no evidence of what law the Oak Brook police were executing or enforcing to support this immunity defense." Kavanaugh, 164 Ill.

2014The court in Kavanaugh rejected a similar assertion that section 2-202 applied in that case, even at the pleading stage, because “there is no evidence of what law the Oak Brook police were executing or enforcing to support this immunity defense.” Kavanaugh, 164 Ill.

2004Department of Labor v. Tri State Tours, Inc. , 342 Ill.

2004Department of Labor v. Tri State Tours, Inc., 342 Ill.

2003App. 3d 940 (1992); Martin v. Lion Uniform Co. , 180 Ill.

2003App. 3d 940 (1992); Martin v. Lion Uniform Co., 180 Ill.

2003Finally, in Arteman v. Clinton Community Unit School District No. 15, 198 Ill.2d 475 , 261 Ill.Dec. 507 , 763 N.E.2d 756 (2002), our most recent pronouncement on discretionary policy immunity, we briefly referred to the allegations of the plaintiffs' *288 complaint, but only in the background of the opinion, and concluded the school district's activities were discretionary.

2003Finally, in Arteman v. Clinton Community Unit School District No. 15, 198 Ill. 2d 475 (2002), our most recent pronouncement on discretionary policy immunity, we briefly referred to the allegations of the plaintiffs’ complaint, but only in the background of the opinion, and concluded the school district’s activities were discretionary.

2000Courts in other states are divided on this question, with some jurisdictions allowing the assertion of parental immunity by foster parents (Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So. 2d 801 (Ala. 1992); Brown v. Phillips, 178 Ga. App. 316 , 342 S.E.2d 786 (1986)), and other jurisdictions denying it (Mayberry v. Pryor, 422 Mich. 579 , 374 N.W.2d 683 (1985)).

2000Courts in other states are divided on this question, with some jurisdictions allowing the assertion of parental immunity by foster parents ( Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So.2d 801 (Ala.1992); Brown v. Phillips, 178 Ga.App. 316 , 342 S.E.2d 786 (1986)), and other jurisdictions denying it ( Mayberry v. Pryor, 422 Mich. 579 , 374 N.W.2d 683 (1985)).

2000Courts in other states are divided on this question, with some jurisdictions allowing the assertion of parental immunity by foster parents (Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So. 2d 801 (Ala. 1992); Brown v. Phillips, 178 Ga. App. 316 , 342 S.E.2d 786 (1986)), and other jurisdictions denying it (Mayberry v. Pryor, 422 Mich. 579 , 374 N.W.2d 683 (1985)).

2000Courts in other states are divided on this question, with some jurisdictions allowing the assertion of parental immunity by foster parents (Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So. 2d 801 (Ala. 1992); Brown v. Phillips, 178 Ga. App. 316 , 342 S.E.2d 786 (1986)), and other jurisdictions denying it (Mayberry v. Pryor, 422 Mich. 579 , 374 N.W.2d 683 (1985)).

2000Courts in other states are divided on this question, with some jurisdictions allowing the assertion of parental immunity by foster parents (Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So. 2d 801 (Ala. 1992); Brown v. Phillips, 178 Ga. App. 316 , 342 S.E.2d 786 (1986)), and other jurisdictions denying it (Mayberry v. Pryor, 422 Mich. 579 , 374 N.W.2d 683 (1985)).

2000Courts in other states are divided on this question, with some jurisdictions allowing the assertion of parental immunity by foster parents (Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So. 2d 801 (Ala. 1992); Brown v. Phillips, 178 Ga. App. 316 , 342 S.E.2d 786 (1986)), and other jurisdictions denying it (Mayberry v. Pryor, 422 Mich. 579 , 374 N.W.2d 683 (1985)).

1998App. 3d 452 , 512 N.E.2d 812 (1987); Lietsch v. Allen , 173 Ill.

1998App. 3d 452 , 512 N.E.2d 812 (1987); Lietsch v. Allen, 173 Ill.

1993Defendant argues summary judgment was proper because the family purpose exception to the immunity doctrine is no longer available since the Illinois Supreme Court decision in Stallman v. Youngquist (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 267 , 531 N.E.2d 355 (hereinafter Stallman Ill).

1993Defendant argues summary judgment was proper because the family purpose exception to the immunity doctrine is no longer available since the Illinois Supreme Court decision in Stallman v. Youngquist (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 267 , 531 N.E.2d 355 (hereinafter Stallman Ill).

1993(See, e.g., Gerrity v. Beatty (1978), 71 Ill.2d 47 , 15 Ill.Dec. 639 , 373 N.E.2d 1323 ; Mroczynski v. McGrath (1966), 34 Ill.2d 451 , 216 N.E.2d 137 ; Nudd v. Matsoukas (1956), 7 Ill.2d 608 , 131 N.E.2d 525 .) More recently, in Stallman v. Youngquist (1988), 125 Ill.2d 267 , 126 Ill.Dec. 60 , 531 N.E.2d 355 , this court vacated the portions of a lower court's judgments partially abrogating the immunity doctrine, concluding that an examination of the rule was unnecessary in that case.

1993(See, e.g., Gerrity v. Beatty (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 47 ; Mroczynski v. McGrath (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 451 ; Nudd v. Matsoukas (1956), 7 Ill. 2d 608 .) More recently, in Stallman v. Youngquist (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 267 , this court vacated the portions of a lower court’s judgments partially abrogating the immunity doctrine, concluding that an examination of the rule was unnecessary in that case.

1992Ed. 2d at 410 , 102 S. Ct. at 2738 .) If the law was clearly established, the immunity defense should fail, barring extraordinary circumstances and proof that the official neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard, because a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct.

1985Plaintiffs respond that the immunity doctrine therein stated does not here apply because defendant violated Department of Labor policy as set forth in exhibit No. 10, to which we have referred, and defendant cannot thus be said to have acted in “good faith.” In Harlow v. Fitzgerald the court held that “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ( 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 73 L.

1989App.3d 151, 153 , 438 N.E.2d 1260, 1261 , the court held that the interspousal tort immunity was procedural in nature, a personal defense that "does not inure to the benefit of third parties." Nudi cited Allstate Insurance Co. v. Elkins (1979), 77 Ill.2d 384 , 396 N.E.2d 528 , which held that the immunity is a defense that can be waived by a defendant spouse, not a substantive bar that would prevent the cause of action from accruing in the first place.

1989App. 3d 151, 153 , 438 N.E.2d 1260, 1261 , the court held that the interspousal tort immunity was procedural in nature, a personal defense that “does not inure to the benefit of third parties.” Nudi cited Allstate Insurance Co. v. Elkins (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 384 , 396 N.E.2d 528 , which held that the immunity is a defense that can be waived by a defendant spouse, not a substantive bar that would prevent the cause of action from accruing in the first place.

2024App. 3d at 775-76 (the prosecutor was absolutely immune for directing the investigations post-arrest and indictment and allowing the plaintiffs to remain in custody). ¶ 41 Further, our outcome is supported by public policy justifications underlying the immunity doctrine, which include “both the interest in protecting the prosecutor from harassing litigation that would divert [their] time and attention from [their] official duties and the interest in enabling [them] to exercise independent judgment when deciding which prosecutions to bring.” Frank, 2013 IL App (5th) 120321 , ¶ 20 (citing Kalina