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13 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1931–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Northland Insurance Co. v. Stategreen2 sentences2019Co. v. State, 33 S.W.3d 727, 731 (Tenn. 2000). “‘[G]eneral statutes do not apply to, or affect, the State, unless they expressly so provide[.]’” Lynn v. City of Jackson, 63 S.W.3d 332, 337 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting Automobile Sales Co. v. Johnson, 174 Tenn. 38 , 49–50, 122 S.W.2d 453, 458 (1938)). 2011Co. v. State, 33 S.W.3d 727, 731 (Tenn. 2000); accord Scates v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Union City, 265 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tenn. 1954). | 3 | 3 |
Parent v. Stategreen2 sentences2025In Parent v. State, 991 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1999), our Supreme Court articulated the following test for determining whether a recreational use defense applies: “(1) whether the activity alleged is a recreational activity as defined by the statute; and if so, (2) whether any of the statutory exceptions or limitations to the immunity defense are applicable.” Id. at 243 . 2025In Parent v. State, 991 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1999), our Supreme Court articulated the following test for determining whether a recreational use defense applies: “(1) whether the activity alleged is a recreational activity as defined by the statute; and if so, (2) whether any of the statutory exceptions or limitations to the immunity defense are applicable.” Id. at 243 . | 1 | 4 |
Wells v. Tennessee Board of Regentsgreen2 sentences2019As such, sovereign immunity prohibits actions against the State “unless the legislature has abrogated or waived immunity.” Id. “[A]ny abrogation of the immunity doctrine by the legislature must be set out in ‘plain, clear, and unmistakable terms.’” Wells v. Tenn. Bd. of Regents, 231 S.W.3d 912, 917 (Tenn. 2007) (quoting Northland Ins. 2011The doctrine of sovereign immunity generally prohibits suits against the State unless the legislature has abrogated or waived immunity. “[A]ny abrogation of the immunity doctrine by the legislature must be set out in ‘plain, clear, and unmistakable terms.’” Wells, -4- 231 S.W.3d at 917 (quoting Northland Ins. | 1 | 2 |
Automobile Sales Co. v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2019Co. v. State, 33 S.W.3d 727, 731 (Tenn. 2000). “‘[G]eneral statutes do not apply to, or affect, the State, unless they expressly so provide[.]’” Lynn v. City of Jackson, 63 S.W.3d 332, 337 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting Automobile Sales Co. v. Johnson, 174 Tenn. 38 , 49–50, 122 S.W.2d 453, 458 (1938)). 2019Co. v. State, 33 S.W.3d 727, 731 (Tenn. 2000). “‘[G]eneral statutes do not apply to, or affect, the State, unless they expressly so provide[.]’” Lynn v. City of Jackson, 63 S.W.3d 332, 337 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting Automobile Sales Co. v. Johnson, 174 Tenn. 38 , 49–50, 122 S.W.2d 453, 458 (1938)). | 1 | 1 |
Lynn v. City of Jacksongreen1 sentence2019Co. v. State, 33 S.W.3d 727, 731 (Tenn. 2000). “‘[G]eneral statutes do not apply to, or affect, the State, unless they expressly so provide[.]’” Lynn v. City of Jackson, 63 S.W.3d 332, 337 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting Automobile Sales Co. v. Johnson, 174 Tenn. 38 , 49–50, 122 S.W.2d 453, 458 (1938)). | 1 | 1 |
Sallee v. Barrettgreen1 sentence2018See Sallee v. Barrett, 171 S.W.3d 822, 829 (Tenn. 2005) (holding that intentional infliction of emotional distress is encompassed in “infliction of mental anguish”). | 1 | 1 |
Sherry Harper v. Bradley County, Tennesseegreen1 sentence2017Harper v. Bradley Cty., 464 S.W.3d 615, 622-23 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014). | 1 | 1 |
Scates v. Board of Com'rs of Union Citygreen1 sentence2011Co. v. State, 33 S.W.3d 727, 731 (Tenn. 2000); accord Scates v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Union City, 265 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tenn. 1954). | 1 | 1 |
Harlow v. Fitzgeraldgreen2 sentences1994Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19 , 102 S.Ct. at 2738 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 1994Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19 , 102 S.Ct. at 2738 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Harris v. Witt
green
1 sentence1999In Harris v. Witt, 552 S.W.2d 85 (Tenn. 1977), the Tennessee Supreme Court stated: It is generally recognized that a judge is immune from civil liability for bona fide acts done within the exercise of his judicial function while acting within the limits of his jurisdiction. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Tri-State Fair v. Rowton
green
1 sentence1947In connection with the immunity claim of the defendant the case of Tri-State Fair v. Rowton, 140 Tenn. 304 , 204 S. W. 761 , 763, L. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
City of Laredo v. Nalle
yellow
1 sentence1931So, in City of Laredo v. Nalle, 65 Texas, 359 , Chief Justice Willie, discussing this doctrine of immunity, says: “Public policy may demand that a fund set apart for erecting a public building, should not be taken for the debt of the person contracting to do the work during the progress of its construction, for this may prevent its completion. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.