11 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Carroll v. City of Portlandgreen2 sentences2008We disagreed, stating that " section 8104-B(3) provides a governmental entity with discretionary function immunity despite section 8104-A " Norton, 2003 ME 118, ¶ 11 , 834 A.2d at 932 (emphasis added); see also Carroll v. City of Portland, 1999 ME 131 , ¶ 6 n. 3, 736 A.2d 279, 282 ("Notwithstanding the immunity waiver provisions of section 8104-A, section 8104-B expressly retains certain types of immunity for governmental entities, including discretionary function immunity."). 2008We disagreed, stating that " section 8104-B(3) provides a governmental entity with discretionary function immunity despite section 8104-A " Norton, 2003 ME 118, ¶ 11 , 834 A.2d at 932 (emphasis added); see also Carroll v. City of Portland, 1999 ME 131 , ¶ 6 n. 3, 736 A.2d 279, 282 ("Notwithstanding the immunity waiver provisions of section 8104-A, section 8104-B expressly retains certain types of immunity for governmental entities, including discretionary function immunity."). | 2 | 3 |
Robidoux v. Muhollandgreen1 sentence2026Id. at 22, 28 . [¶13] The First Circuit determined that Massachusetts had a significant interest in the extent to which its residents were compensated for workplace injuries, as well as in allocating liability for that compensation—specifically, in permitting insurers to recoup benefits from third parties, thereby decreasing the cost of workers’ compensation insurance. | 1 | 1 |
Picard v. Brennangreen1 sentence2018See Picard v. Brennan , 307 A.2d 833 , 834-35 (Me. 1973) (explaining that because a defendant can claim truth as a defense against a claim for defamation, the "defendant is ... entitled to know precisely what statement is attributed to him" both in the pleadings and in the evidence presented at trial). 6 We are not persuaded by Argereow's assertion that Weisberg waived the immunity defense by not having included it in his responses to earlier iterations of her complaint. | 1 | 1 |
Norton v. Hallgreen2 sentences2008We disagreed, stating that " section 8104-B(3) provides a governmental entity with discretionary function immunity despite section 8104-A " Norton, 2003 ME 118, ¶ 11 , 834 A.2d at 932 (emphasis added); see also Carroll v. City of Portland, 1999 ME 131 , ¶ 6 n. 3, 736 A.2d 279, 282 ("Notwithstanding the immunity waiver provisions of section 8104-A, section 8104-B expressly retains certain types of immunity for governmental entities, including discretionary function immunity."). 2008We disagreed, stating that " section 8104-B(3) provides a governmental entity with discretionary function immunity despite section 8104-A " Norton, 2003 ME 118, ¶ 11 , 834 A.2d at 932 (emphasis added); see also Carroll v. City of Portland, 1999 ME 131 , ¶ 6 n. 3, 736 A.2d 279, 282 ("Notwithstanding the immunity waiver provisions of section 8104-A, section 8104-B expressly retains certain types of immunity for governmental entities, including discretionary function immunity."). | 1 | 1 |
Hawkes v. Commercial Union Insurancegreen2 sentences2005Co., 2001 ME 8, ¶ 6 , 764 A.2d 258, 263 (holding "that the denial of an employer’s motion for summary judgment, based on a claim of immunity pursuant to the exclusivity portion of the Workers’ Compensation Act, is immediately reviewable”); but see Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20 , 115 S.Ct. 2151 , 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995) (stating that a defendant who is entitled to an immunity defense may not immediately appeal the denial of a summary judgment motion “insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a 'genuine' issue of fact for trial”). 2 . 2005Co., 2001 ME 8, ¶ 6 , 764 A.2d 258, 263 (holding "that the denial of an employer’s motion for summary judgment, based on a claim of immunity pursuant to the exclusivity portion of the Workers’ Compensation Act, is immediately reviewable”); but see Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20 , 115 S.Ct. 2151 , 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995) (stating that a defendant who is entitled to an immunity defense may not immediately appeal the denial of a summary judgment motion “insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a 'genuine' issue of fact for trial”). 2 . | 1 | 1 |
Shirley Campbell and Lauren Campbell v. Washington County Technical College, James P. Morrell, and Maurice E. Mardengreen1 sentence2002Therefore, the court does not address the procedural issue noted in Campbell v. Washington County Technical College, 219 F.3d 3, 8 (1* Cir. 2000) — an issue not raised or addressed by the parties at bar — of whether a judge or a jury is the proper decision- maker of an immunity claim based on an undisputed record. | 1 | 1 |
Grossman v. Richardsgreen2 sentences1999See 14 M.R.S.A. § 8104-B (Supp.1998). [4] Discretionary function immunity "preserve[s] independence of action without deterrence or intimidation by the fear of personal liability and vexatious suits." Grossman, 1999 ME 9 , ¶ 6, 722 A.2d at 373 (quotations omitted). "[T]ort liability should not be imposed for conduct of a type for which the imposition of liability would substantially impair the effective performance of a discretionary function." Id. (quotations omitted). 1999See 14 M.R.S.A. § 8104-B (Supp.1998). [4] Discretionary function immunity "preserve[s] independence of action without deterrence or intimidation by the fear of personal liability and vexatious suits." Grossman, 1999 ME 9 , ¶ 6, 722 A.2d at 373 (quotations omitted). "[T]ort liability should not be imposed for conduct of a type for which the imposition of liability would substantially impair the effective performance of a discretionary function." Id. (quotations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Musso v. Hourigangreen2 sentences1989See Musso v. Hourigan, 836 F.2d 736 , 741 (2d Cir.1988); see also Craft v. Wipf, 810 F.2d 170 , 173 (8th Cir.1987); Helton v. Clements, 787 F.2d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir. 1986). 1989See Musso v. Hourigan, 836 F.2d 736, 741 (2d Cir.1988); see also Craft v. Wipf 810 F.2d 170, 173 (8th Cir.1987); Helton v. Clements, 787 F.2d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir.1986). | 1 | 1 |
John J. Helton v. William P. Clements, Jr., Governor of Texasgreen2 sentences1989See Musso v. Hourigan, 836 F.2d 736 , 741 (2d Cir.1988); see also Craft v. Wipf, 810 F.2d 170 , 173 (8th Cir.1987); Helton v. Clements, 787 F.2d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir. 1986). 1989See Musso v. Hourigan, 836 F.2d 736, 741 (2d Cir.1988); see also Craft v. Wipf 810 F.2d 170, 173 (8th Cir.1987); Helton v. Clements, 787 F.2d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir.1986). | 1 | 1 |
Craft v. Wipfgreen2 sentences1989See Musso v. Hourigan, 836 F.2d 736 , 741 (2d Cir.1988); see also Craft v. Wipf, 810 F.2d 170 , 173 (8th Cir.1987); Helton v. Clements, 787 F.2d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir. 1986). 1989See Musso v. Hourigan, 836 F.2d 736, 741 (2d Cir.1988); see also Craft v. Wipf 810 F.2d 170, 173 (8th Cir.1987); Helton v. Clements, 787 F.2d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir.1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2005Co., 2001 ME 8, ¶ 6 , 764 A.2d 258, 263 (holding "that the denial of an employer’s motion for summary judgment, based on a claim of immunity pursuant to the exclusivity portion of the Workers’ Compensation Act, is immediately reviewable”); but see Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20 , 115 S.Ct. 2151 , 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995) (stating that a defendant who is entitled to an immunity defense may not immediately appeal the denial of a summary judgment motion “insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a 'genuine' issue of fact for trial”). 2 . 2005Co., 2001 ME 8, ¶ 6 , 764 A.2d 258, 263 (holding "that the denial of an employer’s motion for summary judgment, based on a claim of immunity pursuant to the exclusivity portion of the Workers’ Compensation Act, is immediately reviewable”); but see Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20 , 115 S.Ct. 2151 , 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995) (stating that a defendant who is entitled to an immunity defense may not immediately appeal the denial of a summary judgment motion “insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a 'genuine' issue of fact for trial”). 2 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Munjoy Sporting & Athletic Club v. Dow
green
2 sentences2011Munjoy Sporting & Athletic Club v. Dow, 2000 ME 141 , ~ 17, 755 A.2d 531 . 2011Munjoy Sporting & Athletic Club v. Dow, 2000 ME 141 , ~ 17, 755 A.2d 531 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Donald Saucier v. Elliot M. Katz and in Defense of Animals
red
1 sentence2001A. Violation of the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment Rights 1 The United States Supreme Court has written that “[a]n officer might correctly perceive all of the relevant facts but have a mistaken understanding as to whether a particular amount of force is legal in those circumstances]; i]f the officer’s mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable, however, the officer is entitled to the immunity defense.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.