immunity defense in Florida

1992The "objective reasonableness of an official's conduct" relating to the clearly established law is the proper standard, for "[i]f the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the *465 law governing his conduct." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19 , 102 S.Ct. at 2738 , 73 L.Ed.2d at 411 .

1992The "objective reasonableness of an official's conduct" relating to the clearly established law is the proper standard, for "[i]f the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the *465 law governing his conduct." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19 , 102 S.Ct. at 2738 , 73 L.Ed.2d at 411 .

2021In 2015, this Court held that “the defendant bears the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, to demonstrate entitlement to Stand Your Ground immunity at the pretrial evidentiary hearing.” Bretherick v. State, 170 So. 3d 766, 775 (Fla. 2015), superseded by statute as stated in Sparks v. State, 299 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020).

2019If the immunity hearing has already occurred, then there is no reason to reverse the conviction in order to provide the benefit of a new procedure. 8 To suggest 7 In making this argument, I am presuming that the burden- of-proof change enacted in section 776.032(4) is procedural, because that is what this Court ruled in Commander v. State, 246 So. 3d 1303 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018).

2017In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 , 111 S.Ct. 905 , 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991), the tribe.sued the state for ipjunc-tive relief prohibiting the state from collecting state cigarette taxes on tribe property.

2017In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 , 111 S.Ct. 905 , 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991), the tribe.sued the state for ipjunc-tive relief prohibiting the state from collecting state cigarette taxes on tribe property.

2017The trial court granted 3 Mr. Obando’s motion, which argued that Fist Construction’s words and actions had waived the immunity defense under such cases as Ocean Reef Club v. Wilczewski, 99 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012), and Timmeny v. Tropical Botanicals Corp., 615 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

2017The trial court granted 3 Mr. Obando’s motion, which argued that Fist Construction’s words and actions had waived the immunity defense under such cases as Ocean Reef Club v. Wilczewski, 99 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012), and Timmeny v. Tropical Botanicals Corp., 615 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

2015However, that case is distinguishable. ’ First; the trial court in O’Brien “deferred ruling” on the defendant’s immunity dató, id. at 955 , whereas the trial court in this Case expressly denied the motion for summary judgment in which FWCC asserted its claim of sovereign immunity. - Second, the immunity claim on which- the trial court deferred ruling in O’Brien was a claim of qualified immunity by an individual, id.,- not a claim of sovereign immunity by an agency as is the case with FWCC’s claim.

2015Motor Vehicle Claim The gist of Florida Carry’s motor vehicle claim is that the University’s changes to its firearms policy did not adequately comply with applicable statutes upheld in this Court’s decision in Florida Carry, Inc. v. UNF, 133 So.3d 966 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (en banc) (hereinafter UNF).

2013Before determining whether or not trial counsel’s decision to forgo an immunity hearing was a genuine strategic decision and whether the decision “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” as measured under prevailing professional norms, see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , the trial court should conduct an evidentiary hearing.

2013Before determining whether or not trial counsel’s decision to forgo an immunity hearing was a genuine strategic decision and whether the decision “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” as measured under prevailing professional norms, see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , the trial court should conduct an evidentiary hearing.

2010Similarly, in Crosby v. Regional Utility Bd., City of Gainesville, 400 So.2d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), the First District held that a claim under the Hazardous Occupations Act, chapter 769, Florida Statutes, was subject to a workers’ compensation immunity defense even though that statute made no reference to workers’ compensation, and was expressly enacted to provide a cause of action for injured workers employed in specifically identified industries.

2010As explained in Aravena , the “unrelated works” exception to an immunity defense “is an avoidance that must be plead and proved by the plaintiff.” Aravena, 928 So.2d at 1168 n. 1.

2006Pointing to a similar issue in which the Court overturned the application of a state notice of claim statute to section 1983 claims in Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 , 108 S.Ct. 2302 , 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988), the Court again bluntly declared: The decision to subject state subdivisions to liability for violations of federal rights ... was a choice that Congress, not the Wisconsin Legislature, made, and it is a decision that the State has no authority to override.

2006Pointing to a similar issue in which the Court overturned the application of a state notice of claim statute to section 1983 claims in Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 , 108 S.Ct. 2302 , 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988), the Court again bluntly declared: The decision to subject state subdivisions to liability for violations of federal rights ... was a choice that Congress, not the Wisconsin Legislature, made, and it is a decision that the State has no authority to override.

1997However, the court noted that it thought the Florida Supreme Court intended for a non-final appeal to lie for all summary judgment orders that deny the immunity defense, even in cases where the trial court viewed the issue of immunity as involving unresolved factual questions as well as legal questions, citing Ross v. Baker, 632 So.2d 224 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).

1981Co., 387 So.2d 932 (Fla. 1980), the supreme court emphatically reiterated this principle in a decision which was significantly rendered after it had similarly readhered to the immunity rule itself.

1981The dissent disposes of appellants' reliance on Murphy & Jordan, Inc. v. Insurance Company of North America, 278 So.2d 296 (Fla.3d DCA 1973), by pointing out that in that case there was no identity of parties.

1981Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So.2d 352 (Fla. 1979).

1979In a dissent to Doyle v. Doyle, 307 So.2d 862 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), Judge Mager wrote: The basic arguments for the abolition of the interspousal immunity doctrine, in certain instances, is extremely persuasive.