immunity doctrine (Indiana) · Go Syfert
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immunity doctrine in Indiana

22 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1964–2016 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (9)

CaseFollowedCited
Caesars Riverboat Casino, LLC v. Kephartgreen
ind · 2010 · cited in 3 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014Standard of Review This Court "review[s] de novo the trial court's grant or denial of a motion based on Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6)." Caesars Riverboat Casino, LLC v. Kephart, 934 N.E.2d 1120, 1122 (Ind.2010).

2014Standard of Review This Court “review[s] de novo the trial court’s grant or denial of a motion based on Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6).” Caesars Riverboat Casino, LLC v. Kephart, 934 N.E.2d 1120, 1122 (Ind.2010).

33
Leo MacHine & Tool, Inc. v. Poe Volunteer Fire Department, Inc.green
indctapp · 2010 · cited in 2 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014Here, the School District cites Leo Mach. & Tool, Inc. v. Poe Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 936 N.E.2d 855, 862 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) aff'd on reh'g, 940 N.E.2d 384 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (designated evidence that a different course of action would have been better does not alter the immunity analysis as long as the decision being challenged was in fact "undertaken after a conscious and informed risk/benefit analysis”). .

2014In his 8 Here, the School District cites Leo Mach. & Tool, Inc. v. Poe Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 936 N.E.2d 855, 862 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) aff’d on reh’g, 940 N.E.2d 384 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (designated evidence that a different course of action would have been better does not alter the immunity analysis as long as the decision being challenged was in fact “undertaken after a conscious and informed risk/benefit analysis”). 14 complaint, the plaintiff argued that the school district failed to spend all of the money it had available for security, that it did not have an adequate policy for brea

22
Peavler v. BD. OF COM'RS MONROE CTY.green
ind · 1988 · cited in 2 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1994–2015
2 sentences

2015Prior to our supreme court’s decision in Pearler v. Board of Commissioners of Monroe County, 528 N.E.2d 40, 46 (Ind.1988), this court distinguished between “ministerial” and “discretionary” acts to determine if certain conduct was included within the immunity exception.

2015Id. at 235-36 (some citations and internal quotations omitted). [7] Prior to our supreme court’s decision in Peavler v. Board of Commissioners of Monroe County, 528 N.E.2d 40, 46 (Ind. 1988), this court distinguished between “ministerial” and “discretionary” acts to determine if certain conduct was included within the immunity exception.

12
Farley v. Hammond Sanitary Districtgreen
indctapp · 2011 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016Farley, 956 N.E.2d at 83 (emphasis added). [25] Homeowners apparently believe that they were entitled to partial summary judgment on the immunity defense because the Boone County defendants did not show the absence of a factual dispute.

11
Giles v. Brown County ex rel. Board of Commissionersgreen
indctapp · 2005 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007Giles, 839 N.E.2d at 1266 (Sharpnack, J., dissenting) ( citing Burns v. City of Terre Haute, 744 N.E.2d 1038 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied, 761 N.E.2d 412 (Ind.2001) (table); Barnes v. Antich, 700 N.E.2d 262 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied, 714 N.E.2d 172 (Ind.1999) (table)).

2007Giles, 839 N.E.2d at 1266 (Sharpnack, J., dissenting) (citing Burns v. City of Terre Haute, 744 N.E.2d 1038 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied, 761 N.E.2d 412 (Ind.2001) (table); Barnes v. Antich, 700 N.E.2d 262 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied, 714 N.E.2d 172 (Ind.1999) (table)).

11
Franklin Fire Insurance v. Nollgreen
indctapp · 1945 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002
2 sentences

2002Id. at 951.

2002Id. at 951.

11
Meier v. Pearlmangreen
indctapp · 1980 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002
2 sentences

2002Mei- er set forth the immunity rule that "[alb-sent fraud, collusion, malicious or tortious conduct on the part of an attorney, the rule is equally well established that no liability to third parties arises from the attorney's conduct as an attorney for another." Id. at 40 (citing McDonald v. Stewart, 289 Minn. 35 , 182 N.W.2d 437 (1970)).

2002Meier set forth the immunity rule that "[a]bsent fraud, collusion, malicious or tortious conduct on the part of an attorney, the rule is equally well established that no liability to third parties arises from the attorney's conduct as an attorney for another." Id. at 40 ( citing McDonald v. Stewart, 289 Minn. 35 , 182 N.W.2d 437 (1970)).

11
Estate of Pickens v. Pickensgreen
ind · 1970 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984
2 sentences

1984The Pickens court quoted the Wrongful Death Act: “Action for wrongful death — When the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the personal representative of the former may maintain an action therefore against the latter, if the former might have maintained an action had he or she, as the case may be, lived, against the latter for an injury for the same act or omission. 255 Ind. at 125 , 263 N.E.2d at 155 (Emphasis supplied.) Despite the clarity of the language of the statute, the court stated: “From a literal reading of the statute it would appear that appellant wou

1984The Pickens court quoted the Wrongful Death Act: “Action for wrongful death — When the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the personal representative of the former may maintain an action therefore against the latter, if the former might have maintained an action had he or she, as the case may be, lived, against the latter for an injury for the same act or omission. 255 Ind. at 125 , 263 N.E.2d at 155 (Emphasis supplied.) Despite the clarity of the language of the statute, the court stated: “From a literal reading of the statute it would appear that appellant wou

11
Crater v. Cratergreen
ind · 1889 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1982–1982
2 sentences

1982See, Crater v. Crater (1889), 118 Ind. 521 , 21 N.E. 290 .

1982See, Crater v. Crater (1889), 118 Ind. 521 , 21 N.E. 290 .

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (14)

CaseCitedYears
Leo MacHine & Tool, Inc. v. Poe Volunteer Fire Department, Inc. neutral
indctapp · 2011
2 sentences

2014Here, the School District cites Leo Mach. & Tool, Inc. v. Poe Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 936 N.E.2d 855, 862 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) aff'd on reh'g, 940 N.E.2d 384 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (designated evidence that a different course of action would have been better does not alter the immunity analysis as long as the decision being challenged was in fact "undertaken after a conscious and informed risk/benefit analysis”). .

2014In his 8 Here, the School District cites Leo Mach. & Tool, Inc. v. Poe Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 936 N.E.2d 855, 862 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) aff’d on reh’g, 940 N.E.2d 384 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (designated evidence that a different course of action would have been better does not alter the immunity analysis as long as the decision being challenged was in fact “undertaken after a conscious and informed risk/benefit analysis”). 14 complaint, the plaintiff argued that the school district failed to spend all of the money it had available for security, that it did not have an adequate policy for brea

22014–2014
Wsk v. Mhsb green
indctapp · 2010
1 sentence

2015In addition, the immunity analysis under the Indiana Peer Review Act, I.C. § 34-30-15-1 to 34-30-15-23 is essentially the same as that under the HCQIA. [W.S.K., 922 N.E.2d at 690 ].

12015–2015
Barnes v. Antich green
indctapp · 1998
2 sentences

2007Giles, 839 N.E.2d at 1266 (Sharpnack, J., dissenting) ( citing Burns v. City of Terre Haute, 744 N.E.2d 1038 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied, 761 N.E.2d 412 (Ind.2001) (table); Barnes v. Antich, 700 N.E.2d 262 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied, 714 N.E.2d 172 (Ind.1999) (table)).

2007Giles, 839 N.E.2d at 1266 (Sharpnack, J., dissenting) (citing Burns v. City of Terre Haute, 744 N.E.2d 1038 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied, 761 N.E.2d 412 (Ind.2001) (table); Barnes v. Antich, 700 N.E.2d 262 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied, 714 N.E.2d 172 (Ind.1999) (table)).

12007–2007
Burns v. City of Terre Haute green
indctapp · 2001
2 sentences

2007Giles, 839 N.E.2d at 1266 (Sharpnack, J., dissenting) ( citing Burns v. City of Terre Haute, 744 N.E.2d 1038 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied, 761 N.E.2d 412 (Ind.2001) (table); Barnes v. Antich, 700 N.E.2d 262 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied, 714 N.E.2d 172 (Ind.1999) (table)).

2007Giles, 839 N.E.2d at 1266 (Sharpnack, J., dissenting) (citing Burns v. City of Terre Haute, 744 N.E.2d 1038 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied, 761 N.E.2d 412 (Ind.2001) (table); Barnes v. Antich, 700 N.E.2d 262 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied, 714 N.E.2d 172 (Ind.1999) (table)).

12007–2007
McDonald v. Stewart green
minn · 1970
2 sentences

2002Mei- er set forth the immunity rule that "[alb-sent fraud, collusion, malicious or tortious conduct on the part of an attorney, the rule is equally well established that no liability to third parties arises from the attorney's conduct as an attorney for another." Id. at 40 (citing McDonald v. Stewart, 289 Minn. 35 , 182 N.W.2d 437 (1970)).

2002Mei- er set forth the immunity rule that "[alb-sent fraud, collusion, malicious or tortious conduct on the part of an attorney, the rule is equally well established that no liability to third parties arises from the attorney's conduct as an attorney for another." Id. at 40 (citing McDonald v. Stewart, 289 Minn. 35 , 182 N.W.2d 437 (1970)).

12002–2002
M'culloch v. State of Maryland green
· 1819
2 sentences

2000Farm Credit Serv. of Mid-America v. Department of State Revenue, 705 N.E.2d 1089 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1999). 3 Early Tax Immunity Doctrine The doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity derives from M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 , 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), the landmark case holding that the State of Maryland could not impose a tax on the Bank of the United States.

2000Farm Credit Serv. of Mid-America v. Department of State Revenue, 705 N.E.2d 1089 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1999). 3 Early Tax Immunity Doctrine The doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity derives from M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 , 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), the landmark case holding that the State of Maryland could not impose a tax on the Bank of the United States.

12000–2000
Farm Credit Services of Mid-America v. Department of State Revenue green
indtc · 1999
2 sentences

2000Farm Credit Serv. of Mid-America v. Department of State Revenue, 705 N.E.2d 1089 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1999). 3 Early Tax Immunity Doctrine The doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity derives from M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 , 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), the landmark case holding that the State of Maryland could not impose a tax on the Bank of the United States.

2000Farm Credit Serv. of Mid-America v. Department of State Revenue, 705 N.E.2d 1089 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1999). [3] Early Tax Immunity Doctrine The doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity derives from M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 , 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), the landmark case holding that the State of Maryland could not impose a tax on the Bank of the United States.

12000–2000
Aubrey v. State green
ind · 1974
1 sentence

1996Id. at 694, 310 N.E.2d at 557 .

11996–1996
Simpson's Food Fair, Inc. v. City of Evansville green
indctapp · 1971
2 sentences

1994Indeed, in a discussion about exceptions to the governmental doctrine where a private duty exists, Judge Sullivan stated: "The presence of the amorphous and ill-defined duty owed by government to the public as a predominating factor which insulates government from tort responsibility is giving way to consideration of a more fundamental duty owed to private individuals." Simpson's Food Fair, 149 Ind.App. at 391 , 272 N.E.2d at 873-84 .

1994Indeed, in a discussion about exceptions to the governmental doctrine where a private duty exists, Judge Sullivan stated: "The presence of the amorphous and ill-defined duty owed by government to the public as a predominating factor which insulates government from tort responsibility is giving way to consideration of a more fundamental duty owed to private individuals." Simpson's Food Fair, 149 Ind.App. at 391 , 272 N.E.2d at 873-84 .

11994–1994
Buffalo v. Buffalo green
indctapp · 1982
1 sentence

1990As noted in By/ falo the original purpose of the parent-child immunity doctrine was to promote family harmony and where "[the domestic peace and tranquility of the family has already been broken" by divorce "[njlo logical reason grounded in public policy or common sense can be advanced for continued imposition of the immunity rule in favor of a noncustodial parent." Buffalo, 441 N.E.2d 711, 714 .

11990–1990
Brinkman v. City of Indianapolis green
indctapp · 1967
1 sentence

1971After careful consideration we are of the opinion that the doctrine of sovereign immunity has no proper place in the administration of a municipal corporation." 231 N.E.2d 169, 172 .

11971–1971
Henneger v. Lomas green
· 1896
2 sentences

1970Perhaps the first case to apply the immunity doctrine in a personal tort action was that of Henneger v. Lomas (1896), 145 Ind. 287 , 44 N. E. 462 .

1970Perhaps the first case to apply the immunity doctrine in a personal tort action was that of Henneger v. Lomas (1896), 145 Ind. 287 , 44 N. E. 462 .

11970–1970
President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes green
cadc · 1942
1 sentence

1968Since the decision by Judge Rutledge in President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, supra, the weight of authority has shifted sides and it is the immunity rule which is supported by the fewer jurisdictions.

11968–1968
Volk v. City of New York green
ny · 1940
2 sentences

1964See: Volk v. City of New York (1940), 284 N. Y. 279 , 30 N. E. 2d 596 ; Holtfoth v. Rochester Gen.

1964See: Volk v. City of New York (1940), 284 N. Y. 279 , 30 N. E. 2d 596 ; Holtfoth v. Rochester Gen.

11964–1964

Statutes the citing opinions construe

IN § Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3 (8) IN § Ind. Code § 34-13-2-1 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 181 (1958–2026) PA 136 (1912–2026) OH 96 (1922–2026) IL 70 (1900–2025) NJ 64 (1898–2022) NY 60 (1910–2025) GA 59 (1967–2026) CA 58 (1923–2026) MN 48 (1940–2026) NC 45 (1904–2025) WI 41 (1923–2022) MI 38 (1921–2024) FL 36 (1962–2026) AL 36 (1909–2024) AZ 33 (1888–2023) MD 32 (1979–2022) WV 30 (1949–2025) CO 26 (1963–2026) WA 26 (1934–2024) MA 24 (1917–2021) KY 23 (1916–2026) MO 23 (1908–2025) IN 22 (1964–2016) KS 22 (1933–2022) SC 18 (1952–2026) VA 17 (1956–2022) IA 17 (1939–2020) OR 16 (1955–2016) UT 16 (1916–2019) NM 15 (1941–2024) CT 14 (1955–2021) DC 14 (1960–2025) ID 13 (1966–2025) WY 11 (1965–2012) MS 11 (1936–2024) AR 11 (1973–2025) ME 11 (1989–2026) TN 11 (1931–2024) OK 10 (1915–2022) DE 10 (1960–2025) LA 7 (1955–2025) VT 7 (1981–2019) NV 6 (1966–2015) SD 6 (1982–2026) RI 6 (1978–2009) NH 5 (1985–2016) AK 4 (1967–2009) NE 4 (1967–2017) HI 4 (1939–1981) MT 3 (1991–2008) VI 3 (2016–2017) ND 2 (1965–1983)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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