23 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1909–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Recardgreen2 sentences2013See State v. Recard, 97-754, pp. 5-7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/26/97), 704 So.2d 324, 327-29 , and authorities cited therein. 2000See State v. Recard, 97-754, pp. 5-7 (La.App. 3 Cir.11/26/97), 704 So.2d 324, 327-29 , writ denied, 97-3187 (La.5/1/98), ___ So.2d ___, 1998 WL 234688 , and authorities cited therein. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Recardgreen2 sentences2000See State v. Recard, 97-754, pp. 5-7 (La.App. 3 Cir.11/26/97), 704 So.2d 324, 327-29 , writ denied, 97-3187 (La.5/1/98), ___ So.2d ___, 1998 WL 234688 , and authorities cited therein. 1999See State v. Recard, 97-754, pp. 5-7 (La.App. 3d Cir.11/26/97), 704 So.2d 324, 327-29 , writ denied, 97-3187 (La.5/1/98), ___ So.2d ___, 1998 WL 234688 , and authorities cited therein. | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dawes v. Hale
green
2 sentences1999Dawes v. Hale, 421 So.2d 1208 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1982). 1992We further stated that public policy dictates the necessity of the principle of reasonable development to give effect to the parties' intent in confecting a mineral lease, to assure the reasonable development of Louisiana's natural resources, and to prevent the removal of property from commerce. 495 So.2d at 1014 ; Dawes v. Hale, 421 So.2d 1208 (La. | 3 | 1986–1999 |
Cain v. Employers Casualty Company
green
2 sentences1974Appellant’s complaint as to the evidence tendered in support of the reasonable value of the services rendered and the abuse of discretion by the district court in its awards affords no grounds for relief: In fixing attorney’s fees in quantum mer-uit where the legal services were rendered under the eye of the court, the trial judge is fully able to determine the value of the services without the necessity of hearing testimony by attorneys relative to that value: Cain v. Employers Casualty Co., 236 La. 1085 , 110 So.2d 108 ; Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206 , 91 So.2d 12 ; Massey v. Consumer’s Ic 1974Appellant’s complaint as to the evidence tendered in support of the reasonable value of the services rendered and the abuse of discretion by the district court in its awards affords no grounds for relief: In fixing attorney’s fees in quantum mer-uit where the legal services were rendered under the eye of the court, the trial judge is fully able to determine the value of the services without the necessity of hearing testimony by attorneys relative to that value: Cain v. Employers Casualty Co., 236 La. 1085 , 110 So.2d 108 ; Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206 , 91 So.2d 12 ; Massey v. Consumer’s Ic | 2 | 1967–1974 |
Thigpen v. Thigpen
green
2 sentences1974Appellant’s complaint as to the evidence tendered in support of the reasonable value of the services rendered and the abuse of discretion by the district court in its awards affords no grounds for relief: In fixing attorney’s fees in quantum mer-uit where the legal services were rendered under the eye of the court, the trial judge is fully able to determine the value of the services without the necessity of hearing testimony by attorneys relative to that value: Cain v. Employers Casualty Co., 236 La. 1085 , 110 So.2d 108 ; Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206 , 91 So.2d 12 ; Massey v. Consumer’s Ic 1974Appellant’s complaint as to the evidence tendered in support of the reasonable value of the services rendered and the abuse of discretion by the district court in its awards affords no grounds for relief: In fixing attorney’s fees in quantum mer-uit where the legal services were rendered under the eye of the court, the trial judge is fully able to determine the value of the services without the necessity of hearing testimony by attorneys relative to that value: Cain v. Employers Casualty Co., 236 La. 1085 , 110 So.2d 108 ; Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206 , 91 So.2d 12 ; Massey v. Consumer’s Ic | 2 | 1967–1974 |
Hunt v. Hill
neutral
2 sentences1974Appellant’s complaint as to the evidence tendered in support of the reasonable value of the services rendered and the abuse of discretion by the district court in its awards affords no grounds for relief: In fixing attorney’s fees in quantum mer-uit where the legal services were rendered under the eye of the court, the trial judge is fully able to determine the value of the services without the necessity of hearing testimony by attorneys relative to that value: Cain v. Employers Casualty Co., 236 La. 1085 , 110 So.2d 108 ; Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206 , 91 So.2d 12 ; Massey v. Consumer’s Ic 1974Appellant’s complaint as to the evidence tendered in support of the reasonable value of the services rendered and the abuse of discretion by the district court in its awards affords no grounds for relief: In fixing attorney’s fees in quantum mer-uit where the legal services were rendered under the eye of the court, the trial judge is fully able to determine the value of the services without the necessity of hearing testimony by attorneys relative to that value: Cain v. Employers Casualty Co., 236 La. 1085 , 110 So.2d 108 ; Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206 , 91 So.2d 12 ; Massey v. Consumer’s Ic | 2 | 1967–1974 |
Massey v. Consumer's Ice Co. of Shreveport, Inc.
green
2 sentences1974Appellant’s complaint as to the evidence tendered in support of the reasonable value of the services rendered and the abuse of discretion by the district court in its awards affords no grounds for relief: In fixing attorney’s fees in quantum mer-uit where the legal services were rendered under the eye of the court, the trial judge is fully able to determine the value of the services without the necessity of hearing testimony by attorneys relative to that value: Cain v. Employers Casualty Co., 236 La. 1085 , 110 So.2d 108 ; Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206 , 91 So.2d 12 ; Massey v. Consumer’s Ic 1974Appellant’s complaint as to the evidence tendered in support of the reasonable value of the services rendered and the abuse of discretion by the district court in its awards affords no grounds for relief: In fixing attorney’s fees in quantum mer-uit where the legal services were rendered under the eye of the court, the trial judge is fully able to determine the value of the services without the necessity of hearing testimony by attorneys relative to that value: Cain v. Employers Casualty Co., 236 La. 1085 , 110 So.2d 108 ; Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206 , 91 So.2d 12 ; Massey v. Consumer’s Ic | 2 | 1967–1974 |
Watkins v. Abshire
neutral
2 sentences1974Appellant’s complaint as to the evidence tendered in support of the reasonable value of the services rendered and the abuse of discretion by the district court in its awards affords no grounds for relief: In fixing attorney’s fees in quantum mer-uit where the legal services were rendered under the eye of the court, the trial judge is fully able to determine the value of the services without the necessity of hearing testimony by attorneys relative to that value: Cain v. Employers Casualty Co., 236 La. 1085 , 110 So.2d 108 ; Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206 , 91 So.2d 12 ; Massey v. Consumer’s Ic 1967Cain v. Employers Casualty Company, 236 La. 1085 , 110 So.2d 108 ; Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206 , 91 So.2d 12 ; Massey v. Consumer's Ice Co. of Shreveport, 223 La. 731 , 66 So.2d 789 ; Hunt v. Hill, 138 La. 583 , 70 So. 522 ; Watkins v. Abshire, La.App., 108 So.2d 666 . | 2 | 1967–1974 |
Superior Supply v. Assoc. Pipe & Supply
green
1 sentence2008Id. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Smith
green
1 sentence2006In State v. Smith, 00-0523 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/20/00) , 777 So.2d 584 , this Court discussed justification as a defense: The statutory defense of justification is a codification of the legal doctrine of necessity, which generally provides that the existence of extenuating circumstances will defeat criminal culpability. [T]his doctrine has been applied in circumstances other than those enumerated in La. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Taussig v. Goldking Properties Co.
green
1 sentence1992We further stated that public policy dictates the necessity of the principle of reasonable development to give effect to the parties' intent in confecting a mineral lease, to assure the reasonable development of Louisiana's natural resources, and to prevent the removal of property from commerce. 495 So.2d at 1014 ; Dawes v. Hale, 421 So.2d 1208 (La. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Reck v. Stevens
green
1 sentence1991Reck v. Stevens, supra. The several cases cited by each litigant illustrate the necessity for such a principle in cases where injury is intentionally inflicted on another. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Edwards v. Odom
neutral
1 sentence1991We affirmed an award of $500 plus medical expenses of $92.50 in Edwards v. Odom, 486 So.2d 1018 (La.App.2d Cir.1986), noting, however, that Edwards did not show that his injury affected his work. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Wright v. Hirsch
neutral
1 sentence1990The Montgomery language discussing the applicability of the doctrine refers to the jury's finding, not to the necessity for an instruction on the doctrine itself, which subject matter is now governed by Cangelosi. [4] We take note of the very recent case of Wright v. Hirsch, 556 So.2d 109 (La.App. 4th Cir.1990), but find the circumstances therein inapposite to those in the case sub judice. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Ingram v. Caterpillar Machinery Corp.
neutral
1 sentence1988We granted certiorari, particularly to consider the issue of the necessity of a warning in this case. 514 So.2d 117 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
State v. Sullivan
green
1 sentence1985State v. Sullivan, 352 So.2d 649 (La.1977). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Turner v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc.
green
1 sentence1985While this case was pending, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided Turner v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 476 So.2d 800 (La.1985) holding that C.C. art. 2323, the comparative negligence law, now eliminates the necessity for the exception created by Baumgartner for pedestrian cases, and that cases like Baumgartner will henceforth be governed by the comparative fault doctrine. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Doll v. Doll
green
1 sentence1978Rather it apparently arises from dicta in the cases of Francke v. His Wife, 29 La.Ann. 302 (1877) and Interdiction of Watson, 31 La.Ann. 757 (1879) and has been carried forward in other cases, most recently in In Re Adams, supra and Doll v. Doll, 156 So.2d 275 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1963). 2 The Supreme Court in Pons v. Pons, 137 La. 25 , 68 So. 201 (1914) expressly held that interdiction must be ordered where the dual test of inability to care for person and property is satisfied. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Pons v. Pons
green
2 sentences1978Rather it apparently arises from dicta in the cases of Francke v. His Wife, 29 La.Ann. 302 (1877) and Interdiction of Watson, 31 La.Ann. 757 (1879) and has been carried forward in other cases, most recently in In Re Adams, supra and Doll v. Doll, 156 So.2d 275 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1963). 2 The Supreme Court in Pons v. Pons, 137 La. 25 , 68 So. 201 (1914) expressly held that interdiction must be ordered where the dual test of inability to care for person and property is satisfied. 1978Rather it apparently arises from dicta in the cases of Francke v. His Wife, 29 La.Ann. 302 (1877) and Interdiction of Watson, 31 La.Ann. 757 (1879) and has been carried forward in other cases, most recently in In Re Adams, supra and Doll v. Doll, 156 So.2d 275 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1963). 2 The Supreme Court in Pons v. Pons, 137 La. 25 , 68 So. 201 (1914) expressly held that interdiction must be ordered where the dual test of inability to care for person and property is satisfied. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Francke v. His Wife
green
1 sentence1978Rather it apparently arises from dicta in the cases of Francke v. His Wife, 29 La.Ann. 302 (1877) and Interdiction of Watson, 31 La.Ann. 757 (1879) and has been carried forward in other cases, most recently in In Re Adams, supra and Doll v. Doll, 156 So.2d 275 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1963). 2 The Supreme Court in Pons v. Pons, 137 La. 25 , 68 So. 201 (1914) expressly held that interdiction must be ordered where the dual test of inability to care for person and property is satisfied. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
In Re Adams
green
1 sentence1978Rather it apparently arises from dicta in the cases of Francke v. His Wife, 29 La.Ann. 302 (1877) and Interdiction of Watson, 31 La.Ann. 757 (1879) and has been carried forward in other cases, most recently in In Re Adams, supra and Doll v. Doll, 156 So.2d 275 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1963). 2 The Supreme Court in Pons v. Pons, 137 La. 25 , 68 So. 201 (1914) expressly held that interdiction must be ordered where the dual test of inability to care for person and property is satisfied. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Lewing v. De Soto Parish School Board
green
2 sentences1977WARNING The contention on behalf of Ms. Cook concerning the necessity for a warning is based on Lewing v. DeSoto Parish School Board, 238 La. 43 , 113 So.2d 462 (1959) where it was held that a school board was arbitrary in discharging a teacher for tardiness without giving a warning and an opportunity to correct the situation. 1977WARNING The contention on behalf of Ms. Cook concerning the necessity for a warning is based on Lewing v. DeSoto Parish School Board, 238 La. 43 , 113 So.2d 462 (1959) where it was held that a school board was arbitrary in discharging a teacher for tardiness without giving a warning and an opportunity to correct the situation. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
State v. Corey
green
1 sentence1977In State v. Corey, supra, we applied the following objective criteria in determining the necessity of the warnings: "(1) whether, prior to interrogation, probable cause existed to arrest the accused; (2) statements or actions by the police indicating an intention to hold or restrain him; (3) statements or actions by the accused indicating his reasonable belief that he is in custody; and (4) the extent to which the investigation has focused on the accused." After receiving a police radio message that a shooting had taken place, Officer Giroir responded by driving to defendant's residence. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
United States v. Glenn W. Hall
green
1 sentence1976United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1969). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Herman v. Jambois
green
1 sentence1974Appellant’s complaint as to the evidence tendered in support of the reasonable value of the services rendered and the abuse of discretion by the district court in its awards affords no grounds for relief: In fixing attorney’s fees in quantum mer-uit where the legal services were rendered under the eye of the court, the trial judge is fully able to determine the value of the services without the necessity of hearing testimony by attorneys relative to that value: Cain v. Employers Casualty Co., 236 La. 1085 , 110 So.2d 108 ; Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206 , 91 So.2d 12 ; Massey v. Consumer’s Ic | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Brock v. Pan American Petroleum Corporation
green
2 sentences1940In Brock et al. v. Pan American Petroleum Corporation, 186 La. 607 , 173 So. 121, 123 , the court quotes from Intervention of Wainer, supra, to the effect that a provision in a note authorizing the application of the deposit to the payment of the note “is a mere waiver * * * ” of the obstacle of article 2210 of our Civil Code. 1940In Brock et al. v. Pan American Petroleum Corporation, 186 La. 607 , 173 So. 121, 123 , the court quotes from Intervention of Wainer, supra, to the effect that a provision in a note authorizing the application of the deposit to the payment of the note “is a mere waiver * * * ” of the obstacle of article 2210 of our Civil Code. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
State v. Ryan
neutral
2 sentences1923State v. Anderson, 136 La. 269 , 66 South. 966 ; State v. Ryan, 131 La. 1054 , 60 South. 681 . 1923State v. Anderson, 136 La. 269 , 66 South. 966 ; State v. Ryan, 131 La. 1054 , 60 South. 681 . | 1 | 1923–1923 |
State v. Anderson
green
1 sentence1923State v. Anderson, 136 La. 269 , 66 South. 966 ; State v. Ryan, 131 La. 1054 , 60 South. 681 . | 1 | 1923–1923 |
| Carter v. Fred W. Dubach Lumber Co. green | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Moses v. Grant Lumber Co.
green
2 sentences1911Parrenin v. Orescent City Stockyards, 120 La. 75 , 44 South. 990 ; Rossey v. Lawrence & Hamilton, 123 La. 1055 , 49 South. 704 ; Carter v. Dubach Lumber Co., 113 La. 239 , 36 South. 952 ; Burns v. Ruddock Cypress Co., 114 La. 247 , 38 South. 157 ; Moses v. Grant Lumber Co., 114 La. 933 , 38 South. 684 ; Brinkman v. St. 1911Parrenin v. Orescent City Stockyards, 120 La. 75 , 44 South. 990 ; Rossey v. Lawrence & Hamilton, 123 La. 1055 , 49 South. 704 ; Carter v. Dubach Lumber Co., 113 La. 239 , 36 South. 952 ; Burns v. Ruddock Cypress Co., 114 La. 247 , 38 South. 157 ; Moses v. Grant Lumber Co., 114 La. 933 , 38 South. 684 ; Brinkman v. St. | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Burns v. Ruddock-Orleans Cypress Co.
neutral
2 sentences1911Parrenin v. Orescent City Stockyards, 120 La. 75 , 44 South. 990 ; Rossey v. Lawrence & Hamilton, 123 La. 1055 , 49 South. 704 ; Carter v. Dubach Lumber Co., 113 La. 239 , 36 South. 952 ; Burns v. Ruddock Cypress Co., 114 La. 247 , 38 South. 157 ; Moses v. Grant Lumber Co., 114 La. 933 , 38 South. 684 ; Brinkman v. St. 1911Parrenin v. Orescent City Stockyards, 120 La. 75 , 44 South. 990 ; Rossey v. Lawrence & Hamilton, 123 La. 1055 , 49 South. 704 ; Carter v. Dubach Lumber Co., 113 La. 239 , 36 South. 952 ; Burns v. Ruddock Cypress Co., 114 La. 247 , 38 South. 157 ; Moses v. Grant Lumber Co., 114 La. 933 , 38 South. 684 ; Brinkman v. St. | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Parrenin v. Crescent City Stockyard & Slaughterhouse Co. neutral | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Rossey v. Lawrence neutral | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| State ex rel. Algiers Brewing Co. v. King green | 1 | 1909–1909 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.