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38 Iowa opinions name it 2 courts 1862–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Waltongreen2 sentences2025Assuming without deciding the necessity defense was available, Erickson had to put forward evidence sufficient to generate a fact question that he faced an “emergency situation[] where the threatened harm is immediate and the threatened 4 disaster imminent.” Walton, 311 N.W.2d at 115 . 2021Suggested factors to consider in deciding whether the necessity defense applies include: “(1) the harm avoided, (2) the harm done, (3) the defendant’s intention to avoid the greater harm, (4) the relative value of the harm avoided and the harm done, and (5) optional courses of action and the 15 imminence of disaster.” Id. | 6 | 9 |
United States v. Robert Seaman Drabeck, Jr.green2 sentences2024Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 644 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying identically worded federal rule) (“By requiring that ‘the statement [be] more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts,’ . . . [the necessity requirement in the identically worded federal rule] essentially creates a ‘best evidence’ requirement.” (first alteration in original)). 2024Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 644 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying identically worded federal rule) (“By requiring that ‘the statement [be] more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts,’ . . . [the necessity requirement in the identically worded federal rule] essentially creates a ‘best evidence’ requirement.” (first alteration in original)). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2017See id.; see also State v. Clark, 258 Iowa 254, 257 , 138 N.W.2d 120, 122 (1965) (“As to the complaint that no preliminary hearing was provided, none was necessary. 2017See id.; see also State v. Clark, 258 Iowa 254, 257 , 138 N.W.2d 120, 122 (1965) (“As to the complaint that no preliminary hearing was provided, none was necessary. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Rojasgreen2 sentences2024We decided the necessity requirement was satisfied because “the [video] was the best direct evidence implicating Rojas as [the child’s] abuser, it was the most probative evidence linking Rojas to the crime.” Id. at 663 . 2021We decided the necessity requirement was satisfied because “the [video] was the best direct evidence implicating Rojas as [the child’s] abuser, 19 it was the most probative evidence linking Rojas to the crime.” Id. at 663 . | 1 | 3 |
State v. Reesegreen2 sentences1998In State v. Reese, 272 N.W.2d 863, 866-67 (Iowa 1978), this court adopted a necessity defense to an escape charge. 1998As one of the conditions of this defense, an escapee must “ ‘immediately report[ ] to the proper authorities when he has attained a position of safety *420 from the immediate threat.’” Reese, 272 N.W.2d at 866 (quoting People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal.App.3d 823, 831-32 , 118 Cal.Rptr. 110, 115 (1974)). | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Frank Gallardogreen1 sentence2021Because of this, the court held that hearsay statements the child made to adults were admissible under the residual exception because “the statements were . . . more probative 24 than [the child’s] hesitant trial testimony.” Id. at 893 ; see also United States v. Gallardo, 970 F.3d 1042, 1046 (8th Cir. 2020) (stating that the necessity issue was a “close call because [the child] testified to some details of the sexual contact but was also unresponsive to many questions”); United States v. Gabe, 237 F.3d 954 , 957 n.2 (8th Cir. 2001) (noting that the teenage victim’s “cumulative hearsay stateme | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Bruce Thunder Horsegreen1 sentence2021See, e.g., United States v. Thunder Horse, 370 F.3d 745, 748 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that use of the residual exception to admit a child’s out-of-court statements did not abuse discretion but only considering whether there were circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, not the relative probative value). 21 the child-victim testified without reservation at trial. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. W.B.green1 sentence2021Id.; accord United States v. W.B., 452 F.3d 1002 , 1005–06 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[W]hen a child is unable or unwilling to testify in a courtroom setting, a child’s out-of-court statements may be the most probative evidence on an issue.”). 4Sometimes courts seem to overlook the necessity requirement and solely focus on trustworthiness. | 1 | 1 |
IOWA SUPREME COURT DISCIPLINARY BOARD, Appellee, v. ATTORNEY DOE NO. 819, Appellantgreen2 sentences2019Moreover, our supreme court has recently recognized “the ambiguity inherent in the word ‘shall.’” Iowa Supreme Ct. Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Attorney Doe No. 819, 894 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 2016). “[T]he use of the word ‘shall’ in legal rules has fallen into disfavor because it may indicate a mandatory or permissive rule.” Id. at 5 . 2019Moreover, our supreme court has recently recognized “the ambiguity inherent in the word ‘shall.’” Iowa Supreme Ct. Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Attorney Doe No. 819, 894 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 2016). “[T]he use of the word ‘shall’ in legal rules has fallen into disfavor because it may indicate a mandatory or permissive rule.” Id. at 5 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Muregreen1 sentence2019We have previously considered the following factors when determining whether a necessity defense applies: “(1) the harm avoided, (2) the harm done, (3) the defendant’s intention to avoid the greater harm, (4) the relative value of the harm avoided and the harm done, and (5) optional courses of action and the imminence of disaster.” State v. Mure, No. 16-1169, 2017 WL 1735886, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 3, 2017) (quoting Walton, 311 N.W.2d at 115 )). | 1 | 1 |
State of Iowa v. Andrew William Schlachtergreen1 sentence2019See Schlachter, 884 N.W.2d at 785 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Konegreen1 sentence2018See, e.g., State v. Kone, 562 N.W.2d 637, 638 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hamanngreen2 sentences2012See State v. Oppelt, 329 N.W.2d 17, 21 (Iowa 1983); 35 State v. Hamann, 285 N.W.2d 180 , 185–86 (Iowa 1979); State v. Fetters, 562 N.W.2d 770 , 775–76 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). 2012See State v. Oppelt, 329 N.W.2d 17, 21 (Iowa 1983); State v. Hamann, 285 N.W.2d 180, 185-86 (Iowa 1979); State v. Fetters, 562 N.W.2d 770, 775-76 (Iowa Ct.App.1997). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fettersgreen2 sentences2012See State v. Oppelt, 329 N.W.2d 17, 21 (Iowa 1983); 35 State v. Hamann, 285 N.W.2d 180 , 185–86 (Iowa 1979); State v. Fetters, 562 N.W.2d 770 , 775–76 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). 2012See State v. Oppelt, 329 N.W.2d 17, 21 (Iowa 1983); State v. Hamann, 285 N.W.2d 180, 185-86 (Iowa 1979); State v. Fetters, 562 N.W.2d 770, 775-76 (Iowa Ct.App.1997). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Oppeltgreen2 sentences2012See State v. Oppelt, 329 N.W.2d 17, 21 (Iowa 1983); 35 State v. Hamann, 285 N.W.2d 180 , 185–86 (Iowa 1979); State v. Fetters, 562 N.W.2d 770 , 775–76 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). 2012See State v. Oppelt, 329 N.W.2d 17, 21 (Iowa 1983); State v. Hamann, 285 N.W.2d 180, 185-86 (Iowa 1979); State v. Fetters, 562 N.W.2d 770, 775-76 (Iowa Ct.App.1997). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Harrisongreen1 sentence2003State v. Mattly, 513 N.W.2d 739, 741 (Iowa 1994); Planned Parenthood of Mid-Iowa v. Maki, 478 N.W.2d 637, 640 (Iowa 1991); State v. Harrison, 473 N.W.2d 242, 243-44 (Iowa Ct.App.1991). 3 . | 1 | 1 |
PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF MID-IOWA. v. Makigreen1 sentence2003State v. Mattly, 513 N.W.2d 739, 741 (Iowa 1994); Planned Parenthood of Mid-Iowa v. Maki, 478 N.W.2d 637, 640 (Iowa 1991); State v. Harrison, 473 N.W.2d 242, 243-44 (Iowa Ct.App.1991). 3 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mattlygreen1 sentence2003State v. Mattly, 513 N.W.2d 739, 741 (Iowa 1994); Planned Parenthood of Mid-Iowa v. Maki, 478 N.W.2d 637, 640 (Iowa 1991); State v. Harrison, 473 N.W.2d 242, 243-44 (Iowa Ct.App.1991). 3 . | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Burnsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lovercampgreen | 1 | 1 |
Ray v. Stategreen2 sentences1998See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 413 , 100 S.Ct. 624, 636 , 62 L.Ed.2d 575, 592 (1980) (“[W]e think it clear beyond peradventure that escape from federal custody ... is a continuing offense and that an escapee can be held liable for failure to return to custody as well as for his initial departure.”); Wells v. State, 687 P.2d 346, 350 (Alaska Ct.App.1984) (holding that because the necessity defense requires a defendant to turn himself in, escape is a continuing offense); Harbin v. State, 581 So.2d 1263, 1266 (Ala.Crim.App.1991) (same); People v. Miller, 157 Ill.App.3d 43 , 109 Ill.De 1998See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 413 , 100 S.Ct. 624, 636 , 62 L.Ed.2d 575, 592 (1980) (“[W]e think it clear beyond peradventure that escape from federal custody ... is a continuing offense and that an escapee can be held liable for failure to return to custody as well as for his initial departure.”); Wells v. State, 687 P.2d 346, 350 (Alaska Ct.App.1984) (holding that because the necessity defense requires a defendant to turn himself in, escape is a continuing offense); Harbin v. State, 581 So.2d 1263, 1266 (Ala.Crim.App.1991) (same); People v. Miller, 157 Ill.App.3d 43 , 109 Ill.De | 1 | 1 |
| Wells v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Mendozagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Campbell v. Griffin in and for Carson Citygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Martinezgreen | 1 | 1 |
State v. Burnettgreen2 sentences1998See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 413 , 100 S.Ct. 624, 636 , 62 L.Ed.2d 575, 592 (1980) (“[W]e think it clear beyond peradventure that escape from federal custody ... is a continuing offense and that an escapee can be held liable for failure to return to custody as well as for his initial departure.”); Wells v. State, 687 P.2d 346, 350 (Alaska Ct.App.1984) (holding that because the necessity defense requires a defendant to turn himself in, escape is a continuing offense); Harbin v. State, 581 So.2d 1263, 1266 (Ala.Crim.App.1991) (same); People v. Miller, 157 Ill.App.3d 43 , 109 Ill.De 1998See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 413 , 100 S.Ct. 624, 636 , 62 L.Ed.2d 575, 592 (1980) (“[W]e think it clear beyond peradventure that escape from federal custody ... is a continuing offense and that an escapee can be held liable for failure to return to custody as well as for his initial departure.”); Wells v. State, 687 P.2d 346, 350 (Alaska Ct.App.1984) (holding that because the necessity defense requires a defendant to turn himself in, escape is a continuing offense); Harbin v. State, 581 So.2d 1263, 1266 (Ala.Crim.App.1991) (same); People v. Miller, 157 Ill.App.3d 43 , 109 Ill.De | 1 | 1 |
| Harbin v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Baileygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Millergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Whitegreen | 1 | 1 |
| cluster 474283green | 1 | 1 |
| Now v. Operation Rescuegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institutegreen | 1 | 1 |
| William R. McKee v. The New York Central Railroad Companygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Augspurger v. Western Auto Supply Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Bavero v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dickman v. Truck Transport, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Neitzel
green
2 sentences2023The Skahill court specifically noted State v. Neitzel, 801 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011), was one of “[t]he two Iowa cases most directly on point” as to “when admission of a hearsay video interview was a necessity.”6 Skahill, 966 N.W.2d at 11–12. 2021On the necessity requirement, the court reasoned, “The admission of the evidence was necessary because [the victim] was of a young age when the abuse occurred and unable to testify to the abuse at trial years later, making the close-in-time video recitation from [the victim], the most probative evidence of the abuse that occurred.” Id. at 623 . | 2 | 2021–2023 |
Atkinson v. City of Webster City
neutral
2 sentences1962In Atkinson v. City of Webster City, 177 Iowa 659, 677 , 158 N.W. 473 , 479, we said: “The city council, in providing improvements of this kind, acts as an agent of the taxpayer and abutting owners, but without consulting them; hence the necessity of the rule that the statute empowering them must be strictly construed.” Again, in Cardell v. City of Perry, 201 Iowa 628, 634 , 207 N.W. 775, 777 , it is stated: “The city is but the agent for the property owners, and it is true that the property owners have little, if anything, to say during the progress of the work.” The city represents the publi 1936The contract expressly provides that the “bond shall be for the benefit of said city, and all persons injured by the breach of any of the terms and provisions thereof. ’ ’ In the case of Atkinson v. City, 177 Iowa 659 , at page 677, 158 N. W. 473 , 479, we find this language: “The city council, in providing improvements of this kind, acts as an agent of the taxpayer and abutting owners, but without consulting them; hence the necessity of the rule that the statute empowering them must be strictly construed.” And again in the same case:" The city is the agent for the property owners. | 2 | 1936–1962 |
State v. Metz
green
1 sentence2021Id. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
United States of America v. Wilbur Gabe, Also Known as Charles Gabe
green
1 sentence2021Because of this, the court held that hearsay statements the child made to adults were admissible under the residual exception because “the statements were . . . more probative 24 than [the child’s] hesitant trial testimony.” Id. at 893 ; see also United States v. Gallardo, 970 F.3d 1042, 1046 (8th Cir. 2020) (stating that the necessity issue was a “close call because [the child] testified to some details of the sexual contact but was also unresponsive to many questions”); United States v. Gabe, 237 F.3d 954 , 957 n.2 (8th Cir. 2001) (noting that the teenage victim’s “cumulative hearsay stateme | 1 | 2021–2021 |
United States v. Sherman T. Peneaux
green
1 sentence2021Because of this, the court held that hearsay statements the child made to adults were admissible under the residual exception because “the statements were . . . more probative 24 than [the child’s] hesitant trial testimony.” Id. at 893 ; see also United States v. Gallardo, 970 F.3d 1042, 1046 (8th Cir. 2020) (stating that the necessity issue was a “close call because [the child] testified to some details of the sexual contact but was also unresponsive to many questions”); United States v. Gabe, 237 F.3d 954 , 957 n.2 (8th Cir. 2001) (noting that the teenage victim’s “cumulative hearsay stateme | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Ross
green
1 sentence2018"Ordinarily, the district court must instruct on a defendant's theory of defense provided the defendant makes a timely request, the requested theory of the defense instruction is supported by the evidence, and the requested instruction is a correct statement of the law." State v. Ross , 573 N.W.2d 906 , 913 (Iowa 1998). "[T]he defendant has the burden of generating a fact question on the defense." State v. Walton , 311 N.W.2d 113 , 115 (Iowa 1981). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
United States v. Holmes
green
2 sentences2015Perhaps the best known case discussing the contour and application of the necessity defense is United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. 2015Perhaps the best known case discussing the contour and application of the necessity defense is United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Bradshaw v. Frazier
green
1 sentence2014The appellees claim Bradshaw v. Frazier, 113 Iowa 579 , 85 N.W. 752 (1901), was the first instance of the necessity defense in Iowa. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Burnett green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Spakes v. State
green
1 sentence1998See People v. Mendoza, 108 Mich.App. 733 , 310 N.W.2d 860, 862-64 (1981) (holding that necessity defense to escape did not require defendant to turn herself in, and that escape is not a continuing offense); Spokes v. State, 913 S.W.2d 597 , 598 n. * (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (same). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State v. White
neutral
2 sentences1998See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 413 , 100 S.Ct. 624, 636 , 62 L.Ed.2d 575, 592 (1980) (“[W]e think it clear beyond peradventure that escape from federal custody ... is a continuing offense and that an escapee can be held liable for failure to return to custody as well as for his initial departure.”); Wells v. State, 687 P.2d 346, 350 (Alaska Ct.App.1984) (holding that because the necessity defense requires a defendant to turn himself in, escape is a continuing offense); Harbin v. State, 581 So.2d 1263, 1266 (Ala.Crim.App.1991) (same); People v. Miller, 157 Ill.App.3d 43 , 109 Ill.De 1998See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 413 , 100 S.Ct. 624, 636 , 62 L.Ed.2d 575, 592 (1980) (“[W]e think it clear beyond peradventure that escape from federal custody ... is a continuing offense and that an escapee can be held liable for failure to return to custody as well as for his initial departure.”); Wells v. State, 687 P.2d 346, 350 (Alaska Ct.App.1984) (holding that because the necessity defense requires a defendant to turn himself in, escape is a continuing offense); Harbin v. State, 581 So.2d 1263, 1266 (Ala.Crim.App.1991) (same); People v. Miller, 157 Ill.App.3d 43 , 109 Ill.De | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. Watson neutral | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Woody v. MacHin green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Lewis v. State green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Hill v. State green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Pittman v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Syck v. State green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| State v. Davis green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| People v. Unger green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Rice v. McDonald green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Yost v. Miner green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Schmitt v. Jenkins Truck Lines, Inc. green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| State v. Johnson green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| State v. Baker green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| State v. Rourick green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| State v. Schultz green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Cardell v. City of Perry neutral | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| State v. Bradley neutral | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Pixler v. Clemens neutral | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| State v. Hoaglin green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| State v. Shepherd green | 1 | 1923–1923 |
| Freeman v. Fleming green | 1 | 1862–1862 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.