necessity defense in North Dakota

2019See State v. Sahr , 470 N.W.2d 185 , 191 (N.D. 1991) (concluding it was not necessary to determine the precise scope of the necessity defense available in this state when the defendants' conduct "may not be justified under any reasonable formulation of the necessity defense"); State v. Manning , 2006 ND 125 , ¶ 10, 716 N.W.2d 466 (considering *392 a district court's admission of evidence on the necessity defense at trial but declining to decide whether necessity is a valid defense in North Dakota).

2019See State v. Sahr, 470 N.W.2d 185, 191 (N.D. 1991) (concluding it was not necessary to determine the precise scope of the necessity defense available in this state when the defendants’ conduct “may not be justified under any reasonable formulation of the necessity defense”); State v. Manning, 2006 ND 125, ¶ 10 , 716 N.W.2d 466 (considering a district court’s admission of evidence on the necessity defense at trial but declining to decide whether necessity is a valid defense in North Dakota).

1989We noted in Mauch, supra, that “ ‘[i]t is the adequacy of the warning which is given, or the necessity of such a warning, which must command the jury’s attention, not the defendant’s conduct.’ ” Mauch, supra, 345 N.W.2d at 346 (quoting Little v. PPG Industries, Inc., 92 Wash.2d 118 , 594 P.2d 911, 914 (1979) (en banc)).

1989We noted in Mauch, supra, that “ ‘[i]t is the adequacy of the warning which is given, or the necessity of such a warning, which must command the jury’s attention, not the defendant’s conduct.’ ” Mauch, supra, 345 N.W.2d at 346 (quoting Little v. PPG Industries, Inc., 92 Wash.2d 118 , 594 P.2d 911, 914 (1979) (en banc)).

1991State v. Clowes, 310 Or. 686 , 801 P.2d 789, 797 (1990) (Because “termination of pregnancies are legal, nontor-tious activity, ... their occurrence cannot be a ‘public or private injury’ ” and “defendants are foreclosed from asserting the defense of choice of evils.”); State v. O’Brien, 784 S.W.2d at 192 (“In short, the defense of necessity asserted here cannot be utilized when the harm sought to be avoided [abortion] remains a constitutionally protected activity and the harm incurred [trespass] is in violation of the law.”); People v. Crowley, 142 Misc.2d 663 , 538 N.Y.S.2d 146, 149-151 (Just

1991State v. Clowes, 310 Or. 686 , 801 P.2d 789, 797 (1990) (Because “termination of pregnancies are legal, nontor-tious activity, ... their occurrence cannot be a ‘public or private injury’ ” and “defendants are foreclosed from asserting the defense of choice of evils.”); State v. O’Brien, 784 S.W.2d at 192 (“In short, the defense of necessity asserted here cannot be utilized when the harm sought to be avoided [abortion] remains a constitutionally protected activity and the harm incurred [trespass] is in violation of the law.”); People v. Crowley, 142 Misc.2d 663 , 538 N.Y.S.2d 146, 149-151 (Just

1991Given these principles, appellants' argument must fail since the alleged harm sought to be avoided did not arise from a natural source and was not unlawful."); People v. Stiso, 93 Ill.App.3d 101 , 48 Ill.Dec. 687, 689 , 416 N.E.2d 1209, 1211 (1981) ("[T]he very activity labelled an injury [abortion] by defendants and sought to be prevented has been afforded legal protection by the United States Supreme Court."); People v. Krizka, 92 Ill.App.3d 288 , 48 Ill.Dec. 141, 142 , 416 N.E.2d 36, 37 (1980) ("Under Roe, an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy is not a legally recognizable inj

1991Given these principles, appellants' argument must fail since the alleged harm sought to be avoided did not arise from a natural source and was not unlawful."); People v. Stiso, 93 Ill.App.3d 101 , 48 Ill.Dec. 687, 689 , 416 N.E.2d 1209, 1211 (1981) ("[T]he very activity labelled an injury [abortion] by defendants and sought to be prevented has been afforded legal protection by the United States Supreme Court."); People v. Krizka, 92 Ill.App.3d 288 , 48 Ill.Dec. 141, 142 , 416 N.E.2d 36, 37 (1980) ("Under Roe, an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy is not a legally recognizable inj

1991Given these principles, appellants' argument must fail since the alleged harm sought to be avoided did not arise from a natural source and was not unlawful."); People v. Stiso, 93 Ill.App.3d 101 , 48 Ill.Dec. 687, 689 , 416 N.E.2d 1209, 1211 (1981) ("[T]he very activity labelled an injury [abortion] by defendants and sought to be prevented has been afforded legal protection by the United States Supreme Court."); People v. Krizka, 92 Ill.App.3d 288 , 48 Ill.Dec. 141, 142 , 416 N.E.2d 36, 37 (1980) ("Under Roe, an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy is not a legally recognizable inj

1991Given these principles, appellants' argument must fail since the alleged harm sought to be avoided did not arise from a natural source and was not unlawful."); People v. Stiso, 93 Ill.App.3d 101 , 48 Ill.Dec. 687, 689 , 416 N.E.2d 1209, 1211 (1981) ("[T]he very activity labelled an injury [abortion] by defendants and sought to be prevented has been afforded legal protection by the United States Supreme Court."); People v. Krizka, 92 Ill.App.3d 288 , 48 Ill.Dec. 141, 142 , 416 N.E.2d 36, 37 (1980) ("Under Roe, an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy is not a legally recognizable inj

1991The court in State v. O'Brien, 784 S.W.2d at 192 , pointed out that "every court which has considered the defense of necessity has for various reasons, rejected it when asserted in trespass-abortion proceedings." *193 These defendants have not identified any reported appellate opinion in which abortion protesters have been allowed to use the necessity defense to justify a criminal trespass, and we find none.

1991The court in State v. O’Brien, 784 S.W.2d at 192 , pointed out that “every court which has considered the defense of necessity has for various reasons, rejected it when asserted in trespass-abortion pro ceedings.” These defendants have not identified any reported appellate opinion in which abortion protesters have been allowed to use the necessity defense to justify a criminal trespass, and we find none.

1991State v. Clowes, 310 Or. 686 , 801 P.2d 789, 797 (1990) (Because “termination of pregnancies are legal, nontor-tious activity, ... their occurrence cannot be a ‘public or private injury’ ” and “defendants are foreclosed from asserting the defense of choice of evils.”); State v. O’Brien, 784 S.W.2d at 192 (“In short, the defense of necessity asserted here cannot be utilized when the harm sought to be avoided [abortion] remains a constitutionally protected activity and the harm incurred [trespass] is in violation of the law.”); People v. Crowley, 142 Misc.2d 663 , 538 N.Y.S.2d 146, 149-151 (Just

1991State v. Clowes, 310 Or. 686 , 801 P.2d 789, 797 (1990) (Because “termination of pregnancies are legal, nontor-tious activity, ... their occurrence cannot be a ‘public or private injury’ ” and “defendants are foreclosed from asserting the defense of choice of evils.”); State v. O’Brien, 784 S.W.2d at 192 (“In short, the defense of necessity asserted here cannot be utilized when the harm sought to be avoided [abortion] remains a constitutionally protected activity and the harm incurred [trespass] is in violation of the law.”); People v. Crowley, 142 Misc.2d 663 , 538 N.Y.S.2d 146, 149-151 (Just

1991S.2d 146, 149-151 (Just.Ct.1989) ("In this case, the very activity labelled an injury by Defendants and sought to be prevented has been afforded legal protection by the New York Legislature and by the Supreme Court ... [A]t least with regard to criminal cases arising from attempts to disrupt medical procedures that are within the parameters of the law, the necessity defense must fail as a matter of law."); Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1073, 1079 (Alaska 1981) ("Abortion ... is not unlawful in this state, as appellants concede.

1991State v. Clowes, 310 Or. 686 , 801 P.2d 789, 797 (1990) (Because “termination of pregnancies are legal, nontor-tious activity, ... their occurrence cannot be a ‘public or private injury’ ” and “defendants are foreclosed from asserting the defense of choice of evils.”); State v. O’Brien, 784 S.W.2d at 192 (“In short, the defense of necessity asserted here cannot be utilized when the harm sought to be avoided [abortion] remains a constitutionally protected activity and the harm incurred [trespass] is in violation of the law.”); People v. Crowley, 142 Misc.2d 663 , 538 N.Y.S.2d 146, 149-151 (Just

1989In Stillwell v. Cincinnati Inc., 336 N.W.2d 618, 622 (N.D.1983), a strict liability action based on both design defect and failure to warn, we stated that "whether or not a manufacturer fits within the parameters of strict liability in tort is essentially a factual question for the trier of fact." Cass and World assert that there was no duty to warn in this case because the dangers of using the Super Tube were open and obvious.

1989In Stillwell v. Cincinnati Inc., 336 N.W.2d 618, 622 (N.D.1983), a strict liability action based on both design defect and failure to warn, we stated that “whether or not a manufacturer fits within the parameters of strict liability in tort is essentially a factual question for the trier of fact.” Cass and World assert that there was no duty to warn in this case because the dangers of using the Super Tube were open and obvious.

1980We find persuasive the reasoning in the somewhat analogous case of Cromer v. Cromer, 222 Ga. 365 , 149 S.E.2d 804, 807 (1966), a case where charges of fraud were brought against the administrators of an estate.

1980We find persuasive the reasoning in the somewhat analogous case of Cromer v. Cromer, 222 Ga. 365 , 149 S.E.2d 804, 807 (1966), a case where charges of fraud were brought against the administrators of an estate.