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34 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1963–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Crawfordgreen2 sentences2003Quoting Crawford, 308 Md. at 698-99 , 521 A.2d 1193 , the comments set out the five elements of a necessity defense *473 listed by the Crawford Court, which are the same factors that defense counsel listed in her opening statement. 2003Quoting Crawford, 308 Md. at 698-99 , 521 A.2d 1193 , the comments set out the five elements of a necessity defense *473 listed by the Crawford Court, which are the same factors that defense counsel listed in her opening statement. | 2 | 2 |
Luery v. Stategreen2 sentences1985See, Luery v. State, supra, 116 Md. [284] at 293, 81 A. 681 [(1911)]. 1982See, Luery v. State, supra, 116 Md. at 293 . | 2 | 2 |
Sigma Reproductive Health Center v. Stategreen2 sentences1987We begin our analysis by reviewing the defense of necessity. 1 In Sigma Reproductive Health Center v. State, 297 Md. 660 , 467 A.2d 483 (1983), we thoroughly examined the necessity defense and found that it arises when an individual is faced with a choice of two evils, and one is the commission of an illegal act. 1987We begin our analysis by reviewing the defense of necessity. 1 In Sigma Reproductive Health Center v. State, 297 Md. 660 , 467 A.2d 483 (1983), we thoroughly examined the necessity defense and found that it arises when an individual is faced with a choice of two evils, and one is the commission of an illegal act. | 1 | 3 |
Watson v. Stategreen2 sentences2005The necessity for the rule was later explained and emphasized in Watson v. State, 208 Md. 210 , 117 A.2d 549 (1955), in the following terms: The reason for the rule requiring the testimony of an accomplice to be corroborated is that it is the testimony of a person admittedly contaminated with guilt, who admits his participation in the crime for which he particularly blames the defendant and it should be regarded with great suspicion and caution, because otherwise the life or liberty of an innocent person might be taken away by a witness who makes the accusation either to gratify his malice or 2005The necessity for the rule was later explained and emphasized in Watson v. State, 208 Md. 210 , 117 A.2d 549 (1955), in the following terms: The reason for the rule requiring the testimony of an accomplice to be corroborated is that it is the testimony of a person admittedly contaminated with guilt, who admits his participation in the crime for which he particularly blames the defendant and it should be regarded with great suspicion and caution, because otherwise the life or liberty of an innocent person might be taken away by a witness who makes the accusation either to gratify his malice or | 1 | 3 |
State v. Kannehgreen1 sentence2020See Kanneh, 403 Md. at 688 . | 1 | 1 |
Gowan v. Crawfordgreen2 sentences2006Ms. Stansbury, in her brief, examines numerous out-of-state cases, in which she asserts that the courts “applied a strict necessity standard applicable for a[n] easement by necessity and have rejected the creation of an easement by necessity to a portion of a property where any part of the property abuts or has direct access to a public road.” All of these cases, however, are distinguishable, based on their particular facts, from the case sub judice. *494 In Gowan v. Crawford, 599 So.2d 619, 620-21 (Ala.1992), the Supreme Court of Alabama found there to be no easement by necessity across a nei 2006Ms. Stansbury, in her brief, examines numerous out-of-state cases, in which she asserts that the courts “applied a strict necessity standard applicable for a[n] easement by necessity and have rejected the creation of an easement by necessity to a portion of a property where any part of the property abuts or has direct access to a public road.” All of these cases, however, are distinguishable, based on their particular facts, from the case sub judice. *494 In Gowan v. Crawford, 599 So.2d 619, 620-21 (Ala.1992), the Supreme Court of Alabama found there to be no easement by necessity across a nei | 1 | 1 |
State v. Harrisongreen1 sentence2005See, e.g., United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697, 701 (8th Cir.1972) (stating that the “defense of necessity applied only in emergency situations where the peril is instant and overwhelming” and was not a defense to interfering with *138 the Selective Service Act); People v. Galambos, 104 Cal.App.4th 1147 , 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 855 (2002) (citations omitted) (holding that a “defendant is ‘not entitled to a claim of duress or necessity [for harvesting marijuana] unless and until he demonstrates that, given the imminence of the threat, violation of [the law] was the only reasonable alternative’ | 1 | 1 |
People v. Galambosgreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697, 701 (8th Cir.1972) (stating that the “defense of necessity applied only in emergency situations where the peril is instant and overwhelming” and was not a defense to interfering with *138 the Selective Service Act); People v. Galambos, 104 Cal.App.4th 1147 , 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 855 (2002) (citations omitted) (holding that a “defendant is ‘not entitled to a claim of duress or necessity [for harvesting marijuana] unless and until he demonstrates that, given the imminence of the threat, violation of [the law] was the only reasonable alternative’ 2005See, e.g., United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697, 701 (8th Cir.1972) (stating that the “defense of necessity applied only in emergency situations where the peril is instant and overwhelming” and was not a defense to interfering with *138 the Selective Service Act); People v. Galambos, 104 Cal.App.4th 1147 , 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 855 (2002) (citations omitted) (holding that a “defendant is ‘not entitled to a claim of duress or necessity [for harvesting marijuana] unless and until he demonstrates that, given the imminence of the threat, violation of [the law] was the only reasonable alternative’ | 1 | 1 |
State v. Polinggreen2 sentences2005In State v. Poling, 207 W.Va. 299 , 531 S.E.2d 678, 685 (2000) (citing W. 2005In State v. Poling, 207 W.Va. 299 , 531 S.E.2d 678, 685 (2000) (citing W. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Francis X. Kroncke and Michael D. Therriaultgreen1 sentence2005See, e.g., United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697, 701 (8th Cir.1972) (stating that the “defense of necessity applied only in emergency situations where the peril is instant and overwhelming” and was not a defense to interfering with *138 the Selective Service Act); People v. Galambos, 104 Cal.App.4th 1147 , 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 855 (2002) (citations omitted) (holding that a “defendant is ‘not entitled to a claim of duress or necessity [for harvesting marijuana] unless and until he demonstrates that, given the imminence of the threat, violation of [the law] was the only reasonable alternative’ | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hensongreen2 sentences2005The State did not seek a postponement of the trial before entering the nolle pros and the defendant, conceding the necessity of the test results and that a postponement most probably would have been granted, had one been requested, argued only the nolle pros’s effect on the requirements of the statute and the rule, and the Court confined its decision to that issue. 9 Denying the defen *272 dant’s motion to dismiss for violation of § 591 and Rule 4-271, after reviewing Curley and Glenn , the Court concluded: “a nol pros will have the ‘necessary effect’ of an attempt to evade the requirements of 2005The State did not seek a postponement of the trial before entering the nolle pros and the defendant, conceding the necessity of the test results and that a postponement most probably would have been granted, had one been requested, argued only the nolle pros’s effect on the requirements of the statute and the rule, and the Court confined its decision to that issue. 9 Denying the defen *272 dant’s motion to dismiss for violation of § 591 and Rule 4-271, after reviewing Curley and Glenn , the Court concluded: “a nol pros will have the ‘necessary effect’ of an attempt to evade the requirements of | 1 | 1 |
State v. Tategreen2 sentences2005In State v. Tate, 102 N.J. 64 , 505 A.2d 941, 944-45 (1986), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the necessity defense was not available to a defendant charged with possession of marijuana because its classification as a Schedule I substance indicated that the legislature had determined that marijuana has "high potential for abuse” and "no accepted medial use in treatment * * * or lacks accepted safety for use in treatment under medical supervision.” The Court concluded that the legislature had considered a medical necessity defense and determined that medically necessary use should be perm 2005In State v. Tate, 102 N.J. 64 , 505 A.2d 941, 944-45 (1986), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the necessity defense was not available to a defendant charged with possession of marijuana because its classification as a Schedule I substance indicated that the legislature had determined that marijuana has "high potential for abuse” and "no accepted medial use in treatment * * * or lacks accepted safety for use in treatment under medical supervision.” The Court concluded that the legislature had considered a medical necessity defense and determined that medically necessary use should be perm | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hansongreen2 sentences2005In State v. Hanson, 468 N.W.2d 77, 78-79 (Minn.App.1991), the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the necessity defense was not available to a charge of possession of marijuana because the existence of the THC Therapeutic Research Act ("the Act”) indicated that the legislature had considered the possible medical uses of marijuana were only those recognized in the Act. 2005In State v. Hanson, 468 N.W.2d 77, 78-79 (Minn.App.1991), the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the necessity defense was not available to a charge of possession of marijuana because the existence of the THC Therapeutic Research Act ("the Act”) indicated that the legislature had considered the possible medical uses of marijuana were only those recognized in the Act. | 1 | 1 |
| Jenkins v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Lonnie Dwain Clark, A/K/A Chick Clarkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mann v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Maynard John Verdoorngreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Glen Hermangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Greenawalt v. Pawlakgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tinari v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ciaffoni v. Cowdengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Prince George's County v. Blumberggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Frasher v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hocquardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Davisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Roy v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| Johnson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Albert v. Public Service Commission
green
2 sentences1985Article 41, § 255 of the Administrative Procedure Act grants the right to judicial review to any party “aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case.” A “contested case” was defined in Art. 41, § 244(d) as “a proceeding before an agency in which the legal rights, duties, statutory entitlements, or privileges of specific parties are required by law or constitutional right to be determined after an agency hearing.” 5 Unless otherwise required by statute, “the necessity of a hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the nature of the interest of t 1985Article 41, § 255 of the Administrative Procedure Act grants the right to judicial review to any party “aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case.” A “contested case” was defined in Art. 41, § 244(d) as “a proceeding before an agency in which the legal rights, duties, statutory entitlements, or privileges of specific parties are required by law or constitutional right to be determined after an agency hearing.” 5 Unless otherwise required by statute, “the necessity of a hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the nature of the interest of t | 3 | 1963–1985 |
United States v. Bailey
green
2 sentences2010In United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 413 , 100 S.Ct. 624 , 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980), the case on which the appellant relies heavily, the Supreme Court pointed out that “a defendant accused of escape is not entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of necessity unless he proffered testimony of a bona fide effort to surrender or return to custody as soon as the claimed duress or necessity had lost its coercive force.” In Craddock v. State, 47 Md.App. 513, 516 , 424 A.2d 168 (1981), this Court upheld a trial court’s refusal to provide a necessity instruction where the appellant had testifie 2010In United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 413 , 100 S.Ct. 624 , 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980), the case on which the appellant relies heavily, the Supreme Court pointed out that “a defendant accused of escape is not entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of necessity unless he proffered testimony of a bona fide effort to surrender or return to custody as soon as the claimed duress or necessity had lost its coercive force.” In Craddock v. State, 47 Md.App. 513, 516 , 424 A.2d 168 (1981), this Court upheld a trial court’s refusal to provide a necessity instruction where the appellant had testifie | 2 | 1983–2010 |
Eliason v. State Roads Commission
green
2 sentences1985Article 41, § 255 of the Administrative Procedure Act grants the right to judicial review to any party “aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case.” A “contested case” was defined in Art. 41, § 244(d) as “a proceeding before an agency in which the legal rights, duties, statutory entitlements, or privileges of specific parties are required by law or constitutional right to be determined after an agency hearing.” 5 Unless otherwise required by statute, “the necessity of a hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the nature of the interest of t 1985Article 41, § 255 of the Administrative Procedure Act grants the right to judicial review to any party “aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case.” A “contested case” was defined in Art. 41, § 244(d) as “a proceeding before an agency in which the legal rights, duties, statutory entitlements, or privileges of specific parties are required by law or constitutional right to be determined after an agency hearing.” 5 Unless otherwise required by statute, “the necessity of a hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the nature of the interest of t | 2 | 1980–1985 |
Buyalos v. Cox
green
2 sentences1985Article 41, § 255 of the Administrative Procedure Act grants the right to judicial review to any party “aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case.” A “contested case” was defined in Art. 41, § 244(d) as “a proceeding before an agency in which the legal rights, duties, statutory entitlements, or privileges of specific parties are required by law or constitutional right to be determined after an agency hearing.” 5 Unless otherwise required by statute, “the necessity of a hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the nature of the interest of t 1980A "contested case” is defined in the APA as "a proceeding before an agency in which the legal rights, duties, statutory entitlements, or privileges of specific parties are required by law or constitutional right to be determined after an agency hearing.” Ordinarily, unless otherwise required by statute, "the necessity of a hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the nature of the interest of the person seeking relief.” Eliason v. State Roads Comm., 231 Md. 257, 260 , 189 A.2d 649, 651 , cert. denied, 375 U.S. 914 (1963). "[W]here a public administ | 2 | 1980–1985 |
Hill v. State
green
1 sentence2023The Hernandez Court explained 16 that this decision rested on “the necessity of inquiry into racial bias, not on the notion that the factual circumstances of the case generate the issue[.]” Id. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Barker v. Wingo
green
2 sentences2020This delay is both a factor in the Barker balancing formula and “a triggering mechanism[,]” because it is only when a delay is long enough to be “presumptively prejudicial” that it creates “the necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 530–31, 92 S. Ct. at 2192 . 2020This delay is both a factor in the Barker balancing formula and “a triggering mechanism[,]” because it is only when a delay is long enough to be “presumptively prejudicial” that it creates “the necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 530–31, 92 S. Ct. at 2192 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
McMillan v. State
green
2 sentences2018"Necessity is similar to duress, except that the compulsion to act comes from the physical forces of nature (storms, privations) rather than from human beings." McMillan , supra , 428 Md. at 361 , 51 A.3d 623 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 2018"Necessity is similar to duress, except that the compulsion to act comes from the physical forces of nature (storms, privations) rather than from human beings." McMillan , supra , 428 Md. at 361 , 51 A.3d 623 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Graham v. State
green
2 sentences2017In Graham v. State, 146 Md.App. at 362 , 807 A.2d 75 , this Court spoke to the same enhanced danger/enhanced protection totality: “From the beginning in 1968, the Supreme Court made it clear that there is a necessity principle behind permitting the police to execute a frisk on a predicate less substantial than probable cause. 2017In Graham v. State, 146 Md.App. at 362 , 807 A.2d 75 , this Court spoke to the same enhanced danger/enhanced protection totality: “From the beginning in 1968, the Supreme Court made it clear that there is a necessity principle behind permitting the police to execute a frisk on a predicate less substantial than probable cause. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
In Re Taka C.
green
2 sentences2010Appellant next points out: In addition, in order for the court to find willfulness, “ ‘it is not sufficient that the defendant merely intended to do the act which led to the damage to property; it is necessary that the defendant actually intended to cause the harm to the property of another.’ ” Marquardt, 164 Md.App. at 152 , 882 A.2d 900 (quoting In re Taka C., 331 Md. 80, 84 , 626 A.2d 366 (1993)). 2010Appellant next points out: In addition, in order for the court to find willfulness, “ ‘it is not sufficient that the defendant merely intended to do the act which led to the damage to property; it is necessary that the defendant actually intended to cause the harm to the property of another.’ ” Marquardt, 164 Md.App. at 152 , 882 A.2d 900 (quoting In re Taka C., 331 Md. 80, 84 , 626 A.2d 366 (1993)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Craddock v. State
green
2 sentences2010In United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 413 , 100 S.Ct. 624 , 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980), the case on which the appellant relies heavily, the Supreme Court pointed out that “a defendant accused of escape is not entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of necessity unless he proffered testimony of a bona fide effort to surrender or return to custody as soon as the claimed duress or necessity had lost its coercive force.” In Craddock v. State, 47 Md.App. 513, 516 , 424 A.2d 168 (1981), this Court upheld a trial court’s refusal to provide a necessity instruction where the appellant had testifie 2010In United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 413 , 100 S.Ct. 624 , 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980), the case on which the appellant relies heavily, the Supreme Court pointed out that “a defendant accused of escape is not entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of necessity unless he proffered testimony of a bona fide effort to surrender or return to custody as soon as the claimed duress or necessity had lost its coercive force.” In Craddock v. State, 47 Md.App. 513, 516 , 424 A.2d 168 (1981), this Court upheld a trial court’s refusal to provide a necessity instruction where the appellant had testifie | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Maryland Reclamation Associates, Inc. v. Harford County
green
1 sentence2010Thus, I disagree with the Majority opinion and would hold, in reversing the judgment of the Circuit Court for Harford County, that (1) the doctrine of zoning estoppel ... is viable in Maryland; and (2) under the principles of zoning estoppel, [the petitioner should prevail].” Id. at 87-88, 994 A.2d at 893-94 , 2010 WL 1904818 at *45 (Harrell, J., dissenting). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Marquardt v. State
green
2 sentences2010In Marquardt v. State, 164 Md.App. 95, 135-36 , 882 A.2d 900 (2005), we set forth the five elements that all must be present in order for a defendant to avail himself of the necessity defense. 2010In Marquardt v. State, 164 Md.App. 95, 135-36 , 882 A.2d 900 (2005), we set forth the five elements that all must be present in order for a defendant to avail himself of the necessity defense. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences2005The State did not seek a postponement of the trial before entering the nolle pros and the defendant, conceding the necessity of the test results and that a postponement most probably would have been granted, had one been requested, argued only the nolle pros’s effect on the requirements of the statute and the rule, and the Court confined its decision to that issue. 9 Denying the defen *272 dant’s motion to dismiss for violation of § 591 and Rule 4-271, after reviewing Curley and Glenn , the Court concluded: “a nol pros will have the ‘necessary effect’ of an attempt to evade the requirements of 2005The State did not seek a postponement of the trial before entering the nolle pros and the defendant, conceding the necessity of the test results and that a postponement most probably would have been granted, had one been requested, argued only the nolle pros’s effect on the requirements of the statute and the rule, and the Court confined its decision to that issue. 9 Denying the defen *272 dant’s motion to dismiss for violation of § 591 and Rule 4-271, after reviewing Curley and Glenn , the Court concluded: “a nol pros will have the ‘necessary effect’ of an attempt to evade the requirements of | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Phillips
green
2 sentences2005The State did not seek a postponement of the trial before entering the nolle pros and the defendant, conceding the necessity of the test results and that a postponement most probably would have been granted, had one been requested, argued only the nolle pros’s effect on the requirements of the statute and the rule, and the Court confined its decision to that issue. 9 Denying the defen *272 dant’s motion to dismiss for violation of § 591 and Rule 4-271, after reviewing Curley and Glenn , the Court concluded: “a nol pros will have the ‘necessary effect’ of an attempt to evade the requirements of 2005The State did not seek a postponement of the trial before entering the nolle pros and the defendant, conceding the necessity of the test results and that a postponement most probably would have been granted, had one been requested, argued only the nolle pros’s effect on the requirements of the statute and the rule, and the Court confined its decision to that issue. 9 Denying the defen *272 dant’s motion to dismiss for violation of § 591 and Rule 4-271, after reviewing Curley and Glenn , the Court concluded: “a nol pros will have the ‘necessary effect’ of an attempt to evade the requirements of | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Brower Ex Rel. Estate of Caldwell v. County of Inyo
green
2 sentences2000Id. at 651 (citing Brower, 884 F.2d at 1318 ). 2000Id. at 651 (citing Brower, 884 F.2d at 1318 ). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Brower v. County of Inyo
green
2 sentences2000Id. at 651 (citing Brower, 884 F.2d at 1318 ). 2000Id. at 651 (citing Brower, 884 F.2d at 1318 ). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Davis v. State
green
2 sentences2000It also noted the necessity that the inquiry be directed toward determining “the venire person’s ability to render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence presented.” Id. 2000It also noted the necessity that the inquiry be directed toward determining "the venire person's ability to render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence presented." Id. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Baltimore Gas and Electric Company v. BALTIMORE STEAM COMPANY green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Shoemaker v. Smith green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Bunting v. State green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Aldridge v. United States green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Harvey v. State green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Poe v. State green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. Coy green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| United States v. Edgar Cherry Gant green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Turner v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Bruce v. State green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| State v. Tull green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Epps v. State green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.