necessity inquiry in Ohio

2008Id. at 467. {¶ 22} "The first [Barker] factor, the length of delay, is a `triggering mechanism,' determining the necessity of inquiry into the other factors." Doggett v. United States (1992), 505 U.S. 647 , 652 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 , 2691 , 120 L.Ed.2d 520 , 528 , fn. 1; State v. Triplett (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 556 , 558 .

2008Id. at 467. {¶ 22} "The first [Barker] factor, the length of delay, is a `triggering mechanism,' determining the necessity of inquiry into the other factors." Doggett v. United States (1992), 505 U.S. 647 , 652 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 , 2691 , 120 L.Ed.2d 520 , 528 , fn. 1; State v. Triplett (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 556 , 558 .

1895In Roosa v. The Boston Loan Company, 132 Mass., 439 , it was held: “The statement by a patient to his physician of the cause of an injury from which he is suffering is inadmissible as evidence of that cause in an action for the injury.” Endicott, J., in the opinion says: “ When the bodily or mental feelings of a party are to be proved, his exclamations or expressions indicating present pain or malady are competent evidence, and in Bacon v. Charlton, 7 Cush., 581 and 586, where this rule is stated, it was said by the court: ‘Such evidence, however, is not to be extended bejmnd the necessity on

1895In Roosa v. The Boston Loan Company, 132 Mass. 439 , it was held; “The statement by a patient to his physician of the cause of an injury from which he is suffering is inadmissible as evidence of that cause in an action for the injury.” Endicott, J., in the opinion says: “When the bodily or mental feelings of a party are to be proved, his exclamations or expressions indicating present pain or malady are competent evidence, and in Bacon v. Charlton, 7 Cush. 581 and 586, where this rule is stated, it was said by the court: ‘Such evidence, however, is not to be extended beyond the necessity on whi

2004Thus, "[t]he burden of going forward with the evidence of an affirmative defense, and the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, for an affirmative defense, is upon the accused." R.C. 2901.05 (A). {¶ 32} The necessity defense contains the following elements: {¶ 33} "(1) the harm must be committed under the pressure of physical or natural force, rather than human force; (2) the harm sought to be avoided is greater than (or at least equal to) that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; (3) the actor reasonably believes at the moment that his act is necessar

1990Therefore, pursuant to the holding and the rationale of Berry (id. at 67-69, 567 N.E.2d at 319-320 ), appellant’s second, third and fourth assignments of error are overruled.

1999The Ohio Supreme Court interpreted R.C. 2953.21 and the necessity for a hearing in State v. Lester (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 51 : "`R.C. 2953.21 requires the trial court to consider the allegations of the petition for post-conviction relief and the particular facts upon which the petitioner bases his claim; if, upon such consideration, the trial court finds no grounds for a hearing, the court is required to make and file findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the reasons for dismissal and as to the grounds for relief relied upon in the petition.' Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.

1999The Ohio Supreme Court interpreted R.C. 2953.21 and the necessity for a hearing in State v. Lester (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 51 : "`R.C. 2953.21 requires the trial court to consider the allegations of the petition for post-conviction relief and the particular facts upon which the petitioner bases his claim; if, upon such consideration, the trial court finds no grounds for a hearing, the court is required to make and file findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the reasons for dismissal and as to the grounds for relief relied upon in the petition.' Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.

1919Any thing in the nature of narration or statement is to be carefully excluded, and the testimony is to be confined strictly to such complaints, exclamations and expressions as usually and naturally accompany, and furnish evidence of, a present existing pain or malady.” In the case of Inhabitants of Ashland v. Inhabitants of Marlborough, 99 Mass., 47, the court say: “A physician’s testimony can not include a recital of past events which his patient made to him.” In Roosa v. Boston Loan Co., 132 Mass., 439 , it was held: “The statement by a patient to his physician of the cause of an injury from

1895Anything in the nature of narration or statement, is to be carefully excluded,and the testimony is to be confined strictly to such complaints, exclamations and expressions as usually and naturally accompany and furnish evidence of present existing pain or malady.’ The defendants are entitled to a new trial in consequence of the admission of the plaintiff’s statement,” The Inhabitants of Ashland v. The Inhabitants of Marborough, 99 Mass. 47 , was an action to recover money expened in supporting William H.

2024Ohio Power Company v. Burns, 2022-Ohio-4713, ¶ 42 . {¶3} Upon remand, the trial court issued a post-remand order in which it reviewed the transcript of the necessity hearing and found that Ohio Power had presented evidence that all the challenged easement terms were necessary, except the distribution lines term, which it found to be a moot issue.

2024Ohio Power Company v. Burns, 2022-Ohio-4713, ¶ 42 . {¶3} Upon remand, the trial court issued a post-remand order in which it reviewed the transcript of the necessity hearing and found that Ohio Power had presented evidence that all the challenged easement terms were necessary, except the distribution lines term, which it found to be a moot issue.

2021However, Evid.R. 608(B) clearly prohibits this type of testimony: “Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the 23. witness’s character for truthfulness, other than conviction of crime as provided in Evid.R. 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.” (Emphasis added.) The purpose of this rule is to protect “a legitimate state interest in preventing criminal trials from bogging down in matters collateral to the crime with which the defendant was charged,” State v. Boggs, 63 Ohio St.3d 418, 422-423 , 588 N.E.2d 813 (1992), and the necessity o

2021However, Evid.R. 608(B) clearly prohibits this type of testimony: “Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the 23. witness’s character for truthfulness, other than conviction of crime as provided in Evid.R. 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.” (Emphasis added.) The purpose of this rule is to protect “a legitimate state interest in preventing criminal trials from bogging down in matters collateral to the crime with which the defendant was charged,” State v. Boggs, 63 Ohio St.3d 418, 422-423 , 588 N.E.2d 813 (1992), and the necessity o

2021While this court is the ultimate arbiter of attorney-discipline matters, see Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Reid, 85 Ohio St.3d 327 , 708 N.E.2d 193 (1999), paragraph one of the syllabus, I cannot support the board’s recommendation in this case, because the disciplinary panel did not render procedural fairness—with its “surprise,” late-hour rejection of the parties’ efforts to resolve the matter without the necessity of a hearing.

2021While this court is the ultimate arbiter of attorney-discipline matters, see Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Reid, 85 Ohio St.3d 327 , 708 N.E.2d 193 (1999), paragraph one of the syllabus, I cannot support the board’s recommendation in this case, because the disciplinary panel did not render procedural fairness—with its “surprise,” late-hour rejection of the parties’ efforts to resolve the matter without the necessity of a hearing.

2018Clermont No. CA2013-10-077, 2014-Ohio-2474 , wherein I dissented.

2017Cuyahoga No. 84938, 2005-Ohio-2178 , 2005 WL 1048237 , ¶ 15. {¶ 12} Civ.R. 55(A) governs the entry of default judgment and the necessity of a hearing on damages: If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper and shall when applicable accord a right of trial by jury to the parties. {¶ 13} Under Ci

2017Lake No. 2013-L-085, 2014-Ohio-3276 , the court noted that the entry referring Cebula for an ILC assessment stated “ ‘it appears that defendant may be eligible’ for ILC.” Cebula, ¶ 18.

2017Lake No. 2013-L-085, 2014-Ohio-3276 , 2014 WL 3734173 , the court noted that the entry referring Cebula for an ILC assessment stated " 'it appears that defendant may be eligible' for ILC." Cebula , ¶ 18.

2011In State of Ohio v. Bodyke, 2010 Ohio 2424 , the Ohio Supreme Court found that the reclassification of offenders was unconstitutional and that the three-tier registration scheme of the Adam Walsh Act ‘* * * may not be applied to offenders previously adjudicated by judges under Megan’s Law, and the classifications and community-notification and registration orders imposed previously by judges are reinstated.’ Undoubtedly, the recent Bodyke decision prompted the Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea.” The trial court noted in a footnote that there was no evidence that Pritchett had been classi

2008State v. Bush, 96 Ohio St.3d 235 , 2002-Ohio-3993 , 773 N.E.2d 522 ; State v. Smith (1977), 49 Ohio St.2d 261 , 3 O.O.3d 402 , 361 N.E.2d 1324 .

2008State v. Bush, 96 Ohio St.3d 235 , 2002-Ohio-3993 , 773 N.E.2d 522 ; State v. Smith (1977), 49 Ohio St.2d 261 , 3 O.O.3d 402 , 361 N.E.2d 1324 .

2008State v. Bush, 96 Ohio St.3d 235 , 2002-Ohio-3993 , 773 N.E.2d 522 ; State v. Smith (1977), 49 Ohio St.2d 261 , 3 O.O.3d 402 , 361 N.E.2d 1324 .

2008State v. Bush, 96 Ohio St.3d 235 , 2002-Ohio-3993 , 773 N.E.2d 522 ; State v. Smith (1977), 49 Ohio St.2d 261 , 3 O.O.3d 402 , 361 N.E.2d 1324 .

2008State v. Bush, 96 Ohio St.3d 235 , 2002-Ohio-3993 , 773 N.E.2d 522 ; State v. Smith (1977), 49 Ohio St.2d 261 , 3 O.O.3d 402 , 361 N.E.2d 1324 .

2007Id.