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30 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1888–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Buiegreen2 sentences2018See People v. Buie (On Remand) , 298 Mich. App. 50 , 61, 825 N.W.2d 361 (2012) ; People v. Williams , 244 Mich. App. 533 , 538, 624 N.W.2d 575 (2001). 2018See People v. Buie (On Remand) , 298 Mich. App. 50 , 61, 825 N.W.2d 361 (2012) ; People v. Williams , 244 Mich. App. 533 , 538, 624 N.W.2d 575 (2001). | 2 | 2 |
Goodwill Community Chapel v. General Motors Corp.green1 sentence2026See id. at 87 . -11- Second, whether completion or substantial completion of the assembly plant mooted Goodwill Community Chapel’s claims also was never at issue because challenges to the amount of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings generally survive completion of the condemnation project. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Padillagreen2 sentences2009See State v Padilla, 114 Hawaii 507, 513-514 ; 164 P3d 765 (Hawaii App, 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if the possession is immediately necessary to protect the defendant or another from serious physical harm); State v Parker, 127 Wash App 352, 354-355; 110 P3d 1152 (2005) (recognizing a necessity defense to felon-in-possession statute and listing elements); People v Jones, 4 Misc 3d 782, 787 ; 781 NYS2d 852 (NY Sup Ct, 2004) (recognizing justification defense for felon-in-possession); Humphrey v Commonwealth, 37 Va App 36, 47-48; 553 SE2d 546 (2001) 2009See State v Padilla, 114 Hawaii 507, 513-514 ; 164 P3d 765 (Hawaii App, 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if the possession is immediately necessary to protect the defendant or another from serious physical harm); State v Parker, 127 Wash App 352, 354-355; 110 P3d 1152 (2005) (recognizing a necessity defense to felon-in-possession statute and listing elements); People v Jones, 4 Misc 3d 782, 787 ; 781 NYS2d 852 (NY Sup Ct, 2004) (recognizing justification defense for felon-in-possession); Humphrey v Commonwealth, 37 Va App 36, 47-48; 553 SE2d 546 (2001) | 1 | 1 |
Ahrenberg Mechanical Contracting, Inc v Howlettgreen2 sentences1996See Ahrenberg Mechanical v Howlett, 451 Mich 74, 78-79, n 4 ; 545 NW2d 4 (1996). 1996See Ahrenberg Mechanical v Howlett, 451 Mich 74, 78-79, n 4 ; 545 NW2d 4 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
People ex rel. Trombley v. Humphreygreen2 sentences1994See, e.g., Humphrey, supra at 474-475 ; Paul, supra at 119 . 1994See, e.g., Humphrey, supra at 474-475 ; Paul, supra at 119 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Morrigangreen1 sentence1972Brennan concurring reiterated the necessity test for expert testimony quoting Justice Campbell in People v Morrigan, 29 Mich 4, 7 (1874): "The experience of courts with the testimony of experts has not been such as to impress them with the conviction that the scope of such proofs should be extended. | 1 | 1 |
| Stewart v. Department of Correctionsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State ex rel. Stearns v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Dicksongreen2 sentences2023See Walker v Commonwealth, 74 Va App 475, 502 & n 13; 870 SE2d 328 (2022) (noting that in-court identifications “have long been a routine part of criminal trials” and therefore holding that they are “necessary” and do not constitute an “improper” identification procedure under Perry); but see Dickson, 322 Conn at 440-442 (questioning whether the historical rationale for in-court identifications justifies the practice today). 2023See Walker v Commonwealth, 74 Va App 475, 502 & n 13; 870 SE2d 328 (2022) (noting that in-court identifications “have long been a routine part of criminal trials” and therefore holding that they are “necessary” and do not constitute an “improper” identification procedure under Perry); but see Dickson, 322 Conn at 440-442 (questioning whether the historical rationale for in-court identifications justifies the practice today). | 3 | 3 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Hubbard
green
2 sentences2024A threat of future injury is insufficient to support a necessity defense.” People v Walker, 167 Mich App 377, 381 ; 422 NW2d 8 (1988), overruled on other grounds 456 Mich 693 (1998).2 The difference between the defenses of duress and necessity is that "the source of compulsion for duress is the threatened conduct of another human being, while the source of compulsion for necessity is the presence of natural physical forces.” People v Hubbard, 115 Mich App 73, 77 ; 320 NW2d 294 (1982).3 Here, McKerchie presented nothing in his offer of proof to show that “COVID” posed a present, imminent, and i 2024A threat of future injury is insufficient to support a necessity defense.” People v Walker, 167 Mich App 377, 381 ; 422 NW2d 8 (1988), overruled on other grounds 456 Mich 693 (1998).2 The difference between the defenses of duress and necessity is that "the source of compulsion for duress is the threatened conduct of another human being, while the source of compulsion for necessity is the presence of natural physical forces.” People v Hubbard, 115 Mich App 73, 77 ; 320 NW2d 294 (1982).3 Here, McKerchie presented nothing in his offer of proof to show that “COVID” posed a present, imminent, and i | 2 | 1988–2024 |
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences2018See People v. Buie (On Remand) , 298 Mich. App. 50 , 61, 825 N.W.2d 361 (2012) ; People v. Williams , 244 Mich. App. 533 , 538, 624 N.W.2d 575 (2001). 2018See People v. Buie (On Remand) , 298 Mich. App. 50 , 61, 825 N.W.2d 361 (2012) ; People v. Williams , 244 Mich. App. 533 , 538, 624 N.W.2d 575 (2001). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
United States v. Richard Williams
green
2 sentences2009Id. at 405 . 2009Id. at 405 . | 2 | 2009–2009 |
People ex rel. Mackenzie v. Treasurer of Baraga Township
neutral
2 sentences1908The doctrine was applied, under the statute applying to townships, in Mackenzie v. Baraga Township Treasurer, 39 Mich. 554 . 1888The doctrine was applied under the statute applying to townships, in Mackenzie v. Treasurer, 39 Mich. 554 . | 2 | 1888–1908 |
People v. Walker
green
2 sentences2024A threat of future injury is insufficient to support a necessity defense.” People v Walker, 167 Mich App 377, 381 ; 422 NW2d 8 (1988), overruled on other grounds 456 Mich 693 (1998).2 The difference between the defenses of duress and necessity is that "the source of compulsion for duress is the threatened conduct of another human being, while the source of compulsion for necessity is the presence of natural physical forces.” People v Hubbard, 115 Mich App 73, 77 ; 320 NW2d 294 (1982).3 Here, McKerchie presented nothing in his offer of proof to show that “COVID” posed a present, imminent, and i 2024A threat of future injury is insufficient to support a necessity defense.” People v Walker, 167 Mich App 377, 381 ; 422 NW2d 8 (1988), overruled on other grounds 456 Mich 693 (1998).2 The difference between the defenses of duress and necessity is that "the source of compulsion for duress is the threatened conduct of another human being, while the source of compulsion for necessity is the presence of natural physical forces.” People v Hubbard, 115 Mich App 73, 77 ; 320 NW2d 294 (1982).3 Here, McKerchie presented nothing in his offer of proof to show that “COVID” posed a present, imminent, and i | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Mitchell
green
1 sentence2024A threat of future injury is insufficient to support a necessity defense.” People v Walker, 167 Mich App 377, 381 ; 422 NW2d 8 (1988), overruled on other grounds 456 Mich 693 (1998).2 The difference between the defenses of duress and necessity is that "the source of compulsion for duress is the threatened conduct of another human being, while the source of compulsion for necessity is the presence of natural physical forces.” People v Hubbard, 115 Mich App 73, 77 ; 320 NW2d 294 (1982).3 Here, McKerchie presented nothing in his offer of proof to show that “COVID” posed a present, imminent, and i | 1 | 2024–2024 |
United States v. Derrick Myran Frankson, (Two Cases)
green
1 sentence2018In contrast to decisions like Frankson, 83 F3d at 82 , we are simply not persuaded various courts regarding the necessity of warning a suspect about the right to the presence of counsel during interrogation, it is not clear to us that Miranda’s discussion of the FBI practices compels the conclusion that advising a suspect of the right to counsel is sufficient to convey the right to the presence of counsel during an interrogation. 8 In comparison to the right to counsel during custodial interrogation incident to the Fifth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at, or after, th | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Humphrey v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2009See State v Padilla, 114 Hawaii 507, 513-514 ; 164 P3d 765 (Hawaii App, 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if the possession is immediately necessary to protect the defendant or another from serious physical harm); State v Parker, 127 Wash App 352, 354-355; 110 P3d 1152 (2005) (recognizing a necessity defense to felon-in-possession statute and listing elements); People v Jones, 4 Misc 3d 782, 787 ; 781 NYS2d 852 (NY Sup Ct, 2004) (recognizing justification defense for felon-in-possession); Humphrey v Commonwealth, 37 Va App 36, 47-48; 553 SE2d 546 (2001) | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Parker
neutral
1 sentence2009See State v Padilla, 114 Hawaii 507, 513-514 ; 164 P3d 765 (Hawaii App, 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if the possession is immediately necessary to protect the defendant or another from serious physical harm); State v Parker, 127 Wash App 352, 354-355; 110 P3d 1152 (2005) (recognizing a necessity defense to felon-in-possession statute and listing elements); People v Jones, 4 Misc 3d 782, 787 ; 781 NYS2d 852 (NY Sup Ct, 2004) (recognizing justification defense for felon-in-possession); Humphrey v Commonwealth, 37 Va App 36, 47-48; 553 SE2d 546 (2001) | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Commonwealth v. McCambridge
green
1 sentence2009See State v Padilla, 114 Hawaii 507, 513-514 ; 164 P3d 765 (Hawaii App, 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if the possession is immediately necessary to protect the defendant or another from serious physical harm); State v Parker, 127 Wash App 352, 354-355; 110 P3d 1152 (2005) (recognizing a necessity defense to felon-in-possession statute and listing elements); People v Jones, 4 Misc 3d 782, 787 ; 781 NYS2d 852 (NY Sup Ct, 2004) (recognizing justification defense for felon-in-possession); Humphrey v Commonwealth, 37 Va App 36, 47-48; 553 SE2d 546 (2001) | 1 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Jones
neutral
2 sentences2009See State v Padilla, 114 Hawaii 507, 513-514 ; 164 P3d 765 (Hawaii App, 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if the possession is immediately necessary to protect the defendant or another from serious physical harm); State v Parker, 127 Wash App 352, 354-355; 110 P3d 1152 (2005) (recognizing a necessity defense to felon-in-possession statute and listing elements); People v Jones, 4 Misc 3d 782, 787 ; 781 NYS2d 852 (NY Sup Ct, 2004) (recognizing justification defense for felon-in-possession); Humphrey v Commonwealth, 37 Va App 36, 47-48; 553 SE2d 546 (2001) 2009See State v Padilla, 114 Hawaii 507, 513-514 ; 164 P3d 765 (Hawaii App, 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if the possession is immediately necessary to protect the defendant or another from serious physical harm); State v Parker, 127 Wash App 352, 354-355; 110 P3d 1152 (2005) (recognizing a necessity defense to felon-in-possession statute and listing elements); People v Jones, 4 Misc 3d 782, 787 ; 781 NYS2d 852 (NY Sup Ct, 2004) (recognizing justification defense for felon-in-possession); Humphrey v Commonwealth, 37 Va App 36, 47-48; 553 SE2d 546 (2001) | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Crawford
green
1 sentence2009See State v Padilla, 114 Hawaii 507, 513-514 ; 164 P3d 765 (Hawaii App, 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if the possession is immediately necessary to protect the defendant or another from serious physical harm); State v Parker, 127 Wash App 352, 354-355; 110 P3d 1152 (2005) (recognizing a necessity defense to felon-in-possession statute and listing elements); People v Jones, 4 Misc 3d 782, 787 ; 781 NYS2d 852 (NY Sup Ct, 2004) (recognizing justification defense for felon-in-possession); Humphrey v Commonwealth, 37 Va App 36, 47-48; 553 SE2d 546 (2001) | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Castrillo
green
1 sentence2009See State v Padilla, 114 Hawaii 507, 513-514 ; 164 P3d 765 (Hawaii App, 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if the possession is immediately necessary to protect the defendant or another from serious physical harm); State v Parker, 127 Wash App 352, 354-355; 110 P3d 1152 (2005) (recognizing a necessity defense to felon-in-possession statute and listing elements); People v Jones, 4 Misc 3d 782, 787 ; 781 NYS2d 852 (NY Sup Ct, 2004) (recognizing justification defense for felon-in-possession); Humphrey v Commonwealth, 37 Va App 36, 47-48; 553 SE2d 546 (2001) | 1 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Govan
green
1 sentence2009See State v Padilla, 114 Hawaii 507, 513-514 ; 164 P3d 765 (Hawaii App, 2007) (recognizing a justification defense to being a felon-in-possession if the possession is immediately necessary to protect the defendant or another from serious physical harm); State v Parker, 127 Wash App 352, 354-355; 110 P3d 1152 (2005) (recognizing a necessity defense to felon-in-possession statute and listing elements); People v Jones, 4 Misc 3d 782, 787 ; 781 NYS2d 852 (NY Sup Ct, 2004) (recognizing justification defense for felon-in-possession); Humphrey v Commonwealth, 37 Va App 36, 47-48; 553 SE2d 546 (2001) | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Quinto v. Cross and Peters Co.
green
1 sentence2005Quinto, supra. Consequently, defendants’ argument, that the necessity requirement was established, is without merit. 4 The statute uses the permissive term “may” with regard to adoption of transportation plans. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
People v. Babcock
green
2 sentences2005Where the trial court did not reach the issue of necessity, it is impossible to determine whether its nonexistent findings were clearly erroneous, despite whether the parties believe that the record is sufficient for us to do so. 7 In its next analytical error, rather than actually assessing whether the facts demonstrate that the city even undertook a necessity analysis, the majority concludes that even if there were other suitable locations for the spur, the decision to take defendants’ property was not outside the “ ‘principled range of outcomes.’ ” Ante at 254, quoting People v Babcock, 469 2005Where the trial court did not reach the issue of necessity, it is impossible to determine whether its nonexistent findings were clearly erroneous, despite whether the parties believe that the record is sufficient for us to do so. 7 In its next analytical error, rather than actually assessing whether the facts demonstrate that the city even undertook a necessity analysis, the majority concludes that even if there were other suitable locations for the spur, the decision to take defendants’ property was not outside the “ ‘principled range of outcomes.’ ” Ante at 254, quoting People v Babcock, 469 | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Paul v. City of Detroit
green
2 sentences1994See, e.g., Humphrey, supra at 474-475 ; Paul, supra at 119 . 1994See, e.g., Humphrey, supra at 474-475 ; Paul, supra at 119 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Holmes
green
2 sentences1986This case demonstrates the necessity for such a rule. [ Id., pp 514-515 (WILLIAMS and COLEMAN, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part).] [1] MCL 750.520b(1)(d); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(d). [2] The opinion was not reported. [3] See People v Holmes, 292 Mich 212, 215 ; 290 NW 384 (1940); People v Kelsey, 303 Mich 715, 719 ; 7 NW2d 120 (1942); People v Steeneck, 247 Mich 583, 586 ; 226 NW 231 (1929); People v Kelly, 423 Mich 261 ; 378 NW2d 365 (1985). [4] The argument in the opinion for reversal begins with an incorrect premise. 1986This case demonstrates the necessity for such a rule. [ Id., pp 514-515 (WILLIAMS and COLEMAN, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part).] [1] MCL 750.520b(1)(d); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(d). [2] The opinion was not reported. [3] See People v Holmes, 292 Mich 212, 215 ; 290 NW 384 (1940); People v Kelsey, 303 Mich 715, 719 ; 7 NW2d 120 (1942); People v Steeneck, 247 Mich 583, 586 ; 226 NW 231 (1929); People v Kelly, 423 Mich 261 ; 378 NW2d 365 (1985). [4] The argument in the opinion for reversal begins with an incorrect premise. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
People v. Steeneck
green
2 sentences1986This case demonstrates the necessity for such a rule. [ Id., pp 514-515 (WILLIAMS and COLEMAN, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part).] [1] MCL 750.520b(1)(d); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(d). [2] The opinion was not reported. [3] See People v Holmes, 292 Mich 212, 215 ; 290 NW 384 (1940); People v Kelsey, 303 Mich 715, 719 ; 7 NW2d 120 (1942); People v Steeneck, 247 Mich 583, 586 ; 226 NW 231 (1929); People v Kelly, 423 Mich 261 ; 378 NW2d 365 (1985). [4] The argument in the opinion for reversal begins with an incorrect premise. 1986This case demonstrates the necessity for such a rule. [ Id., pp 514-515 (WILLIAMS and COLEMAN, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part).] [1] MCL 750.520b(1)(d); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(d). [2] The opinion was not reported. [3] See People v Holmes, 292 Mich 212, 215 ; 290 NW 384 (1940); People v Kelsey, 303 Mich 715, 719 ; 7 NW2d 120 (1942); People v Steeneck, 247 Mich 583, 586 ; 226 NW 231 (1929); People v Kelly, 423 Mich 261 ; 378 NW2d 365 (1985). [4] The argument in the opinion for reversal begins with an incorrect premise. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
People v. Kelsey
green
2 sentences1986This case demonstrates the necessity for such a rule. [ Id., pp 514-515 (WILLIAMS and COLEMAN, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part).] [1] MCL 750.520b(1)(d); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(d). [2] The opinion was not reported. [3] See People v Holmes, 292 Mich 212, 215 ; 290 NW 384 (1940); People v Kelsey, 303 Mich 715, 719 ; 7 NW2d 120 (1942); People v Steeneck, 247 Mich 583, 586 ; 226 NW 231 (1929); People v Kelly, 423 Mich 261 ; 378 NW2d 365 (1985). [4] The argument in the opinion for reversal begins with an incorrect premise. 1986This case demonstrates the necessity for such a rule. [ Id., pp 514-515 (WILLIAMS and COLEMAN, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part).] [1] MCL 750.520b(1)(d); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(d). [2] The opinion was not reported. [3] See People v Holmes, 292 Mich 212, 215 ; 290 NW 384 (1940); People v Kelsey, 303 Mich 715, 719 ; 7 NW2d 120 (1942); People v Steeneck, 247 Mich 583, 586 ; 226 NW 231 (1929); People v Kelly, 423 Mich 261 ; 378 NW2d 365 (1985). [4] The argument in the opinion for reversal begins with an incorrect premise. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
People v. Kelly
green
2 sentences1986This case demonstrates the necessity for such a rule. [ Id., pp 514-515 (WILLIAMS and COLEMAN, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part).] [1] MCL 750.520b(1)(d); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(d). [2] The opinion was not reported. [3] See People v Holmes, 292 Mich 212, 215 ; 290 NW 384 (1940); People v Kelsey, 303 Mich 715, 719 ; 7 NW2d 120 (1942); People v Steeneck, 247 Mich 583, 586 ; 226 NW 231 (1929); People v Kelly, 423 Mich 261 ; 378 NW2d 365 (1985). [4] The argument in the opinion for reversal begins with an incorrect premise. 1986This case demonstrates the necessity for such a rule. [ Id., pp 514-515 (WILLIAMS and COLEMAN, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part).] [1] MCL 750.520b(1)(d); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(d). [2] The opinion was not reported. [3] See People v Holmes, 292 Mich 212, 215 ; 290 NW 384 (1940); People v Kelsey, 303 Mich 715, 719 ; 7 NW2d 120 (1942); People v Steeneck, 247 Mich 583, 586 ; 226 NW 231 (1929); People v Kelly, 423 Mich 261 ; 378 NW2d 365 (1985). [4] The argument in the opinion for reversal begins with an incorrect premise. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State v. Warshow
green
1 sentence1982This is not how o.ur system of government was meant to operate.” (Citations omitted.) State v Warshow, 138 Vt 22, 27-28; 410 A2d 1000 (1979) (concurring opinion by Justice Hill). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Ketchel v. Ketchel
green
2 sentences1976(Emphasis added.) We are of the opinion that the trial court’s reliance on Ketchel v Ketchel, 367 Mich 53 ; 116 NW2d 219 (1962), to the effect that the strict necessity requirement has been relaxed in Michigan was erroneous. 1976(Emphasis added.) We are of the opinion that the trial court’s reliance on Ketchel v Ketchel, 367 Mich 53 ; 116 NW2d 219 (1962), to the effect that the strict necessity requirement has been relaxed in Michigan was erroneous. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| People v. Dudley green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Miranda v. Arizona green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| People v. Delano green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
| Wells v. . Garbutt green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Runge v. Koch neutral | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Crosland v. Rogers green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Denman v. Johnston green | 1 | 1924–1924 |
| Ewing v. City of Minneapolis neutral | 1 | 1918–1918 |
| Farmer v. Stillwater Water Co. neutral | 1 | 1918–1918 |
| Chadwick v. . Insurance Co. green | 1 | 1918–1918 |
| Snyder v. Iowa City green | 1 | 1918–1918 |
| Covell v. Bright green | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Richmond v. Chicago & West Michigan Railway Co. green | 1 | 1899–1899 |
| Portman v. State Board of Fish Commissioners neutral | 1 | 1893–1893 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.