necessity test in New Mexico

2015Under the strict necessity test, where “any alternative was available to an easement claimant, no easement would be found.” Martinez v. Martinez, 1979-NMSC-104 , ¶ 29, 93 N.M. 673 , 604 P.2d 366 .

2015Under the strict necessity test, where “any alternative was available to an easement claimant, no easement would be found.” Martinez v. Martinez, 1979-NMSC-104 , ¶ 29, 93 N.M. 673 , 604 P.2d 366 .

2022We reject Defendant’s arguments. {18} The district court should instruct the jury on defense of another “if the evidence is sufficient to allow reasonable minds to differ as to all elements of the defense.” State v. Jernigan, 2006-NMSC-003, ¶ 3 , 139 N.M. 1 , 127 P.3d 537 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2022We reject Defendant’s arguments. {18} The district court should instruct the jury on defense of another “if the evidence is sufficient to allow reasonable minds to differ as to all elements of the defense.” State v. Jernigan, 2006-NMSC-003, ¶ 3 , 139 N.M. 1 , 127 P.3d 537 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2017We therefore 10 deem Defendant’s issue regarding a defense of property jury instruction abandoned. 11 See State v. Salenas, 1991-NMCA-056 , ¶ 2, 112 N.M. 268 , 814 P.2d 136 (holding 12 where a party has not responded to this Court’s proposed disposition of an issue, that 13 issue is deemed abandoned). 14 {2} Defendant instead moves this Court to amend his docketing statement pursuant 15 to Rule 12-208(F) NMRA to add three new issues: (1) this Court should overrule case 16 law holding specific intent is not an element of aggravated assault [MIO 2]; (2) the 17 evidence is insufficient to show De

2017We therefore 10 deem Defendant’s issue regarding a defense of property jury instruction abandoned. 11 See State v. Salenas, 1991-NMCA-056 , ¶ 2, 112 N.M. 268 , 814 P.2d 136 (holding 12 where a party has not responded to this Court’s proposed disposition of an issue, that 13 issue is deemed abandoned). 14 {2} Defendant instead moves this Court to amend his docketing statement pursuant 15 to Rule 12-208(F) NMRA to add three new issues: (1) this Court should overrule case 16 law holding specific intent is not an element of aggravated assault [MIO 2]; (2) the 17 evidence is insufficient to show De

2017See State v. 13 Guerra, 2012-NMSC-014, ¶ 21 , 278 P.3d 1031 (explaining that appellate courts are 14 under no obligation to review unclear or undeveloped arguments); State v. Fuentes, 15 2010-NMCA-027, ¶ 29 , 147 N.M. 761 , 228 P.3d 1181 (noting that we will “not 16 review unclear or undeveloped arguments [that] require us to guess at what [a party’s] 17 arguments might be”). 18 CONCLUSION 19 {22} For the reasons set forth herein, we vacate Defendant’s kidnapping conviction 20 and affirm the district court on all other matters. 13 1 {23} IT IS SO ORDERED. 2 __________________________________ 3

2017See State v. 13 Guerra, 2012-NMSC-014, ¶ 21 , 278 P.3d 1031 (explaining that appellate courts are 14 under no obligation to review unclear or undeveloped arguments); State v. Fuentes, 15 2010-NMCA-027, ¶ 29 , 147 N.M. 761 , 228 P.3d 1181 (noting that we will “not 16 review unclear or undeveloped arguments [that] require us to guess at what [a party’s] 17 arguments might be”). 18 CONCLUSION 19 {22} For the reasons set forth herein, we vacate Defendant’s kidnapping conviction 20 and affirm the district court on all other matters. 13 1 {23} IT IS SO ORDERED. 2 __________________________________ 3

2003Co., 2002-NMCA-041, ¶¶ 23-27 , 132 N.M. 73 , 43 P.3d 1083 (declining to excuse parties from jurisdictional consequences of failure to file timely notices of appeal). {16} Plaintiff has cross-appealed, seeking review of the trial court’s refusal to award Plaintiff prejudgment interest pursuant to NMSA 1978, § 56-8-4(B) (1851, as amended through 1993).

2003Co., 2002-NMCA-041, ¶¶ 23-27 , 132 N.M. 73 , 43 P.3d 1083 (declining to excuse parties from jurisdictional consequences of failure to file timely notices of appeal). {16} Plaintiff has cross-appealed, seeking review of the trial court’s refusal to award Plaintiff prejudgment interest pursuant to NMSA 1978, § 56-8-4(B) (1851, as amended through 1993).

1991In People v. Perez, 97 Ill.App.3d 278 , 52 IlI.Dec. 736, 422 N.E.2d 945 (1981), the court considered a necessity defense to the unlawful use of weapons because the appellant asserted he needed to arm himself to defend against gang members who had threatened his life.

1991In People v. Perez, 97 Ill.App.3d 278 , 52 IlI.Dec. 736, 422 N.E.2d 945 (1981), the court considered a necessity defense to the unlawful use of weapons because the appellant asserted he needed to arm himself to defend against gang members who had threatened his life.

1947Regarding the necessity for this instruction, it was said in McAfee v. United States, supra [ 70 App.D.C. 142 , 105 F.2d 31 ]: “It is thought that the jury, unless the reasonable doubt requirement is made specifically applicable to doubt as to the degree of the crime, may in confusion find the defendant guilty of a degree as to the existence of which they did have a reasonable doubt.” “But the weight of authority supports the view that in such circumstances the court should tell the jury that in case they have a reasonable doubt from the evidence between two degrees they should convict of the

1917We have no statute extending the control of a court over its judgments, after entry thereof, except in two instances, viz., in cases of defaults for a period of 60 days (section 4227, Code 1915), and in cases of irregularly enter'ed judgments for a period of one year (section 4230, Code 1915.) It follows, both on reason and according to precedent, and taking into consideration the necessity for a rule of certainty and finality, that final judgments of the district courts in cases tried without a jury become final when rendered, and then and there pass from the further control of the court, exc

1917Baca v. Board of County Commissioners of Guadalupe County, 162 Pac. 175 , not yet officially reported, we are compelled to hold that the court had no jurisdiction to set aside and vacate the judgment entered on December 15,' 1914.