necessity hearing in West Virginia

2022As to the necessity of the instruction where the accomplice testimony is uncorroborated, the Court has elaborated on what the term “uncorroborated” contemplates: “Where the testimony of an accomplice is corroborated in material facts which tend to connect the accused with the crime, sufficient to warrant the jury in crediting the truth of the accomplice’s testimony, it is not error to refuse a cautionary instruction.” Id., syl. pt. 6 3, in part (emphasis added).

2021As to the necessity of the instruction where the accomplice testimony is uncorroborated, the Court has elaborated on what the term “uncorroborated” contemplates: “Where the testimony of an accomplice is corroborated in material facts which tend to connect the accused with the crime, sufficient to warrant the jury in crediting the truth of the accomplice’s testimony, it is not error to refuse a cautionary instruction.” Id., syl. pt. 6 3, in part (emphasis added).

2021However, as explained herein, this is not one of those instances. 27 As this Court previously has observed, “[j]ust as an appellate court must determine the merits of an appeal after examining the underlying proceedings, a habeas court has a duty to fully examine the record before deciding whether any basis exists to afford relief to a habeas petitioner.” Watts v. Ballard, 238 W.

2010Coal Co., 72 W.Va. at 72-73 , 78 S.E. at 235 , we said there is “a clear [] ease of necessity” only when “it is practically impossible to get out over the grantor’s own land,” and noted that in most cases landowners sought to obtain a way of necessity “on the ground of convenience and economy only.” 11 *445 On several occasions, we have noted that “[i]f one has a reasonable outlet over his own property, he cannot exact a more convenient way as of necessity over the premises of another.” Syllabus point 2, Dorsey v. Dorsey, 109 W.Va. 111 , 153 S.E. 146 (1930). 12 One reason courts have required

2010Coal Co., 72 W.Va. at 72-73 , 78 S.E. at 235 , we said there is “a clear [] ease of necessity” only when “it is practically impossible to get out over the grantor’s own land,” and noted that in most cases landowners sought to obtain a way of necessity “on the ground of convenience and economy only.” 11 *445 On several occasions, we have noted that “[i]f one has a reasonable outlet over his own property, he cannot exact a more convenient way as of necessity over the premises of another.” Syllabus point 2, Dorsey v. Dorsey, 109 W.Va. 111 , 153 S.E. 146 (1930). 12 One reason courts have required

2010For instance, in Derifield v. Maynard, 126 W.Va. at 755, 30 S.E.2d at 13, we indicated that the strictly necessary requirement could be met by showing a “real necessity” and a “reasonable necessity as distinguished from mere convenience,” but not an “absolute necessity.” 10 In syllabus point 1 of Post v. Wallace, 119 W.Va. 132 , 192 S.E. 112 (1937), we found the strict necessity requirement met when there was a showing that the right of way was “reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the property to which such right is sought to be attached.” But, in Crotty v. New River & Pocahontas Consol.

2010For instance, in Derifield v. Maynard, 126 W.Va. at 755, 30 S.E.2d at 13, we indicated that the strictly necessary requirement could be met by showing a “real necessity” and a “reasonable necessity as distinguished from mere convenience,” but not an “absolute necessity.” 10 In syllabus point 1 of Post v. Wallace, 119 W.Va. 132 , 192 S.E. 112 (1937), we found the strict necessity requirement met when there was a showing that the right of way was “reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the property to which such right is sought to be attached.” But, in Crotty v. New River & Pocahontas Consol.

2010Coal Co., 72 W.Va. at 72-73 , 78 S.E. at 235 , we said there is “a clear [] ease of necessity” only when “it is practically impossible to get out over the grantor’s own land,” and noted that in most cases landowners sought to obtain a way of necessity “on the ground of convenience and economy only.” 11 *445 On several occasions, we have noted that “[i]f one has a reasonable outlet over his own property, he cannot exact a more convenient way as of necessity over the premises of another.” Syllabus point 2, Dorsey v. Dorsey, 109 W.Va. 111 , 153 S.E. 146 (1930). 12 One reason courts have required

1998While Rules 33 and 35 obviously contemplate the use of stipulations in connection with child abuse and neglect proceedings, these rules nonetheless require a disposition hearing even where a parent has signed a stipulation of facts which, if proven, would support a termination of parental rights under West Virginia Code § 49-6-5. 8 Parties cannot by stipulation negate the necessity for a hearing which comports with the provisions of Rules 33 and 35. *429 State v. T.C., 172 W.Va. 47 , 303 S.E.2d 685 (1983), was procedurally analogous to this case in that the adjudicatory hearing under West Virg

1998While Rules 33 and 35 obviously contemplate the use of stipulations in connection with child abuse and neglect proceedings, these rules nonetheless require a disposition hearing even where a parent has signed a stipulation of facts which, if proven, would support a termination of parental rights under West Virginia Code § 49-6-5. 8 Parties cannot by stipulation negate the necessity for a hearing which comports with the provisions of Rules 33 and 35. *429 State v. T.C., 172 W.Va. 47 , 303 S.E.2d 685 (1983), was procedurally analogous to this case in that the adjudicatory hearing under West Virg

1986A similar result was reached in United States v. Burruezo, 704 F.2d 33 (2d Cir.1983), where the court pointed out that the reason behind the 1979 amendment requiring the defendant to be advised that if the sentencing recommendation was not accepted, he still could not withdraw his guilty plea was to settle a difference of interpretation that had arisen in the federal circuits. 5 Finally, it should be noted that the Supreme Court of Michigan in People v. Killebrew, 416 Mich. 189, 208 , 330 N.W.2d 834, 842 (1982), adopted the same approach to its Rule 11 and gave this practical insight as to the

1984See also Febre v. United States, 396 U.S. 1225 , 90 S.Ct. 19 , 24 L.Ed.2d 48 (1969), under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, reasons for the denial of post-conviction bail should have been stated in writing by the district court; State v. Steele, 173 W.Va. 248 , 314 S.E.2d 412 (1984), defendant not precluded from developing record in circuit court concerning request for post-conviction bail; State ex rel.

1984See also Febre v. United States, 396 U.S. 1225 , 90 S.Ct. 19 , 24 L.Ed.2d 48 (1969), under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, reasons for the denial of post-conviction bail should have been stated in writing by the district court; State v. Steele, 173 W.Va. 248 , 314 S.E.2d 412 (1984), defendant not precluded from developing record in circuit court concerning request for post-conviction bail; State ex rel.

1980Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952), (Black, J., dissenting), Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958), (Black, J., dissenting).

1980Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 , 72 S.Ct. 451 , 96 L.Ed. 717 (1952), (Black, J., dissenting), Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 , 78 S.Ct. 632 , 2 L.Ed.2d 672 (1958), (Black, J., dissenting).

1980Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952), (Black, J., dissenting), Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958), (Black, J., dissenting).

1980Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 , 72 S.Ct. 451 , 96 L.Ed. 717 (1952), (Black, J., dissenting), Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 , 78 S.Ct. 632 , 2 L.Ed.2d 672 (1958), (Black, J., dissenting).

1979When a gift is of income, “coupled with a provision that the principal may be invaded in case of need, the private income of the beneficiary must be considered in determining whether such need exists.” Id. at 241 , quoting Re Martin’s Will, 269 N.Y. 305 , 199 N.E. 491 (1936).

1979When a gift is of income, “coupled with a provision that the principal may be invaded in case of need, the private income of the beneficiary must be considered in determining whether such need exists.” Id. at 241 , quoting Re Martin’s Will, 269 N.Y. 305 , 199 N.E. 491 (1936).

1979When a gift is of income, “coupled with a provision that the principal may be invaded in case of need, the private income of the beneficiary must be considered in determining whether such need exists.” Id. at 241 , quoting Re Martin’s Will, 269 N.Y. 305 , 199 N.E. 491 (1936).

1929My opinion is that unless this were so, the functions of this court in matters of consent would be paralyzed.” The necessity of the rule is also well presented in Stump v. Long, 84 N. C. 616, 619-620 .

1904In Arnold, Abney & Co. v. Slaughter, 36 W.