necessity defense in Florida

2009Williams v. State, 937 So.2d 771, 772 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (citing Bozeman v. State, 714 So.2d 570, 572 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)).

2006The elements of the necessity defense are "(1) that the defendant reasonably believed that his action was necessary to avoid an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to himself or others, (2) that the defendant did not intentionally or recklessly place himself in a situation in which it would be probable that he would be forced to choose the criminal conduct, (3) that there existed no other adequate means to avoid the threatened harm except the criminal conduct, (4) that the harm sought to be avoided was more egregious than the criminal conduct perpetrated to avoid it, and (5) that

2016The necessity defense, oftentimes referred to as the justification defense, recognizes “that there may be circumstances under which a convicted felon’s possession of a firearm would be justified and his conduct declared not criminal.” Marrero v. State, 516 So.2d 1052, 1054 (Fla. 3d DGA 1987) (footnotes omitted).

1999See Marrero v. State, 516 So.2d 1052 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (outlines the necessity defense in relation to a charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon).

2015P. 3.210(b), 3.212; Ross, 155 So.3d at 1260 ; Maxwell v. State, 974 So.2d 505, 510-11 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); Cochran v. State, 925 So.2d 370, 372-73 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); see also Dougherty, 149 So.3d at 677 (“ ‘[T]he framers of the rule ... obviously did not regard lightly the necessity for a hearing’ by their use of the terms ‘shall’ and ‘immediately.’ ”) (quoting Fowler v. State, 255 So.2d 513, 515 (Fla. 1971)).

2014As we stated in Fowler when addressing the proper procedures to rule on the question of competency, albeit interpreting an earlier version of the rule referring to insanity, “[t]he framers of the rule ... obviously did not regard lightly the necessity for a hearing” by their use of the terms “shall” and “immediately.” Fowler v. State, 255 So.2d 513, 515 (Fla.1971).

1992This danger would seem to us to be especially acute in criminal cases like the present where the prosecutrix is a minor whose previous out-of-court statement is repeated before the jury by adult law enforcement officers. 162 So.2d 922, 924 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964) (emphasis added).

1992This danger would seem to us to be especially acute in criminal cases like the present where the prosecutrix is a minor whose previous out-of-court statement is repeated before the jury by adult law enforcement officers. 162 So.2d 922, 924 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964) (emphasis added).

2014See Butler v. State, 14 So.3d 269, 270-71 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (quoting Williams v. State, 937 So.2d 771, 772 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (explaining that to be entitled to a necessity instruction, appellant must show “(1) the defendant reasonably believed that his action was necessary to avoid an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to himself or others; (2) the defendant did not intentionally or recklessly place himself in a situation in which it would be probable that he would be forced to choose the criminal conduct; (3) there existed no other adequate means to avoid the threatened har

2014See Butler v. State, 14 So. 3d 269, 270-71 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (quoting Williams v. State, 937 So. 2d 771, 772 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (explaining that to be entitled to a necessity instruction, appellant must show “(1) the defendant reasonably believed that his action was necessary to avoid an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to himself or others; (2) the defendant did not intentionally or recklessly place himself in a situation in which it would be probable that he would be forced to choose the criminal conduct; (3) there existed no other adequate means to avoid the threatened h

2006Concerns of this kind may account at least in part for our supreme court’s statement in M.W. v. Davis, 756 So.2d 90, 109 (Fla.2000), 12 that “we cannot eschew the necessity for a hearing before a dependent child is placed in residential treatment against his ■wishes.” The M.W. court also noted: Ironically, our rules provide more procedural protections in this situation for children in the custody of the state because they are delinquent than for those children who are in the custody of the state because they have been adjudicated dependent through no fault of their own.

2001Id. at 109 (emphasis added).

2019If a party has knowledge such that a reasonably prudent person would make a further inquiry but no further investigation is made, the party "must suffer the consequence of his neglect." Flanigan's Enters., 954 So. 2d at 764 (first citing Chatlos v. McPherson, 95 So. 2d 506, 509 (Fla. 1957); then quoting Rafkind v. Beer, 426 So. 2d 1097, 1099 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)).

2003Rafkind v. Beer, 426 So.2d 1097 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).

2011See Pittman v. Volusia County, 380 So.2d 1192 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); see also Aaron v. Palatka Mall, 908 So.2d 574 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); St.

1983Pittman v. Volusia County, 380 So.2d 1192 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).

1996Id. at 626 (quoting United States v. Cassidy, 616 F.2d 101, 102 (4th Cir.1979)). [5] Numerous courts have considered whether the necessity defense applies to abortion trespass cases and concluded that it does not.

1984The language of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Cassidy, 616 F.2d 101 (4th Cir.1979), reflects our conclusions in the case at hand: [E]ven if possession of nuclear weapons is illegal as defendants contend — an issue that we do not address — the necessity defense is inapplicable.

2026Enters., LLC, 99 So. 3d 450 (Fla. 2012) (“There is no rule of procedure or law that requires the trial court to have oral argument as to such [discovery] objections; rather, the trial court may simply review the discovery sought, the objections thereto, and rule on said objections without the necessity of a hearing [i.e., oral argument].”); Gaspar, Inc. v. Naples Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 546 So. 2d 764, 766 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (“Judicial consideration and determination of a non-evidentiary motion on the basis of memoranda of law rather than oral argument by counsel at a noticed hearing does not

2026In one, Mannella v. Mannella, 363 So. 3d 236 , 240-41 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023), we did not rely on the necessity test exclusively, viewing the proposition at issue to be not only unnecessary to a prior supreme court decision, but also to have “no bearing on its decision.” Thus, the proposition would not have satisfied the Pedroza holding requirement that a proposition lie “along the chosen decisional path . . . of reasoning that . . . lead to the judgment.” 291 So. 3d at 547.

2026And if we 15 The supreme court also alluded to the necessity test for dicta, post-Pedroza, in Davis v. State, 332 So. 3d 970 , 975 (Fla. 2021), but did not rely on it, viewing the “broad, unqualified” proposition at issue to be not only unnecessary to its prior decision, but also “far beyond the facts.” Thus, the proposition would not have satisfied the Pedroza holding requirement that a proposition be “based upon the facts of the case.” 291 So. 3d at 547.

2026Enters., LLC, 99 So. 3d 450 (Fla. 2012) (“There is no rule of procedure or law that requires the trial court to have oral argument as to such [discovery] objections; rather, the trial court may simply review the discovery sought, the objections thereto, and rule on said objections without the necessity of a hearing [i.e., oral argument].”); Gaspar, Inc. v. Naples Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 546 So. 2d 764, 766 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (“Judicial consideration and determination of a non-evidentiary motion on the basis of memoranda of law rather than oral argument by counsel at a noticed hearing does not

2026The court then quoted a necessity principle for identifying dicta: “There is nothing authoritative in a case, except what is required to be decided to reach the final judgment . . . .” Id. (quoting Love v. Miller, 53 Ind. 294, 299 (1876)).

2024In Shore Mariner, the Second District issued a writ of prohibition because a trial judge suggested that a party amend its pleadings to assert a necessity defense. 722 So. 2d at 248 ; see also Cammarata v. Jones, 763 So. 2d 552, 552 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (granting prohibition where trial judge denied party’s motion but then proposed three different options to obtain party’s requested relief); Chastine v. Broome, 629 So. 2d 293 , 294–95 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (granting prohibition where trial judge passed note to prosecutor that read “sometimes it is better not to cross- examine witnesses”).

2019If a party has knowledge such that a reasonably prudent person would make a further inquiry but no further investigation is made, the party "must suffer the consequence of his neglect." Flanigan's Enters., 954 So. 2d at 764 (first citing Chatlos v. McPherson, 95 So. 2d 506, 509 (Fla. 1957); then quoting Rafkind v. Beer, 426 So. 2d 1097, 1099 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)).

2019If a party has knowledge such that a reasonably prudent person would make a further inquiry but no further investigation is made, the party "must suffer the consequence of his neglect." Flanigan's Enters., 954 So. 2d at 764 (first citing Chatlos v. McPherson, 95 So. 2d 506, 509 (Fla. 1957); then quoting Rafkind v. Beer, 426 So. 2d 1097, 1099 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)).

2019Stores, Inc. v. Ultra Meat Market, Inc., 843 So. 2d 287, 290 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (rejecting argument that "information giving rise to inquiry notice" had to be precise, noting that such information does not have to "lead the purchaser to a recorded document evidencing the" claimed interest, and further explaining that "[t]he circumstances may reasonably suggest the necessity of inquiry").

2015P. 3.210(b), 3.212; Ross, 155 So.3d at 1260 ; Maxwell v. State, 974 So.2d 505, 510-11 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); Cochran v. State, 925 So.2d 370, 372-73 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); see also Dougherty, 149 So.3d at 677 (“ ‘[T]he framers of the rule ... obviously did not regard lightly the necessity for a hearing’ by their use of the terms ‘shall’ and ‘immediately.’ ”) (quoting Fowler v. State, 255 So.2d 513, 515 (Fla. 1971)).

2015P. 3.210(b), 3.212; Ross, 155 So.3d at 1260 ; Maxwell v. State, 974 So.2d 505, 510-11 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); Cochran v. State, 925 So.2d 370, 372-73 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); see also Dougherty, 149 So.3d at 677 (“ ‘[T]he framers of the rule ... obviously did not regard lightly the necessity for a hearing’ by their use of the terms ‘shall’ and ‘immediately.’ ”) (quoting Fowler v. State, 255 So.2d 513, 515 (Fla. 1971)).

2015P. 3.210(b), 3.212; Ross, 155 So.3d at 1260 ; Maxwell v. State, 974 So.2d 505, 510-11 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); Cochran v. State, 925 So.2d 370, 372-73 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); see also Dougherty, 149 So.3d at 677 (“ ‘[T]he framers of the rule ... obviously did not regard lightly the necessity for a hearing’ by their use of the terms ‘shall’ and ‘immediately.’ ”) (quoting Fowler v. State, 255 So.2d 513, 515 (Fla. 1971)).

2014As the State notes, there is an exception to the necessity of a hearing when “it is so obvious from the face of the record that trial counsel’s strategy not to present a [particular] defense is very clearly a tactical decision well within the discretion of counsel.... ” Hannon v. State, 941 So.2d 1109, 1138 (Fla.2006).

2014See Butler v. State, 14 So.3d 269, 270-71 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (quoting Williams v. State, 937 So.2d 771, 772 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (explaining that to be entitled to a necessity instruction, appellant must show “(1) the defendant reasonably believed that his action was necessary to avoid an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to himself or others; (2) the defendant did not intentionally or recklessly place himself in a situation in which it would be probable that he would be forced to choose the criminal conduct; (3) there existed no other adequate means to avoid the threatened har

2014See Butler v. State, 14 So. 3d 269, 270-71 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (quoting Williams v. State, 937 So. 2d 771, 772 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (explaining that to be entitled to a necessity instruction, appellant must show “(1) the defendant reasonably believed that his action was necessary to avoid an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to himself or others; (2) the defendant did not intentionally or recklessly place himself in a situation in which it would be probable that he would be forced to choose the criminal conduct; (3) there existed no other adequate means to avoid the threatened h