necessity defense in Connecticut

1996As our Appellate Court has recognized, “[t]o maintain order in state correctional facilities and court lockups, and to avoid an invitation for facile excuses to attempt escapes from custody, the application of the necessity defense to criminal escapes must be strictly interpreted.” State v. Woods, 23 Conn. App. 615, 620 , 583 A.2d 639 (1990).

1996As our Appellate Court has recognized, “[t]o maintain order in state correctional facilities and court lockups, and to avoid an invitation for facile excuses to attempt escapes from custody, the application of the necessity defense to criminal escapes must be strictly interpreted.” State v. Woods, 23 Conn. App. 615, 620 , 583 A.2d 639 (1990).

1995In Reitzer v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges, 2 Conn. App. 196 , 203 , (1984), the Appellate Court held "that if an opportunity for a hearing is required (only) by the constitution, it is not `required by statute' under General Statutes § 4-166 (2)." The court noted, however, that "the result might well be different if a statute had been read or were required to be read to include the necessity of a hearing in order to save its constitutionality," citing Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).

1995CT Page 12984 In Reitzer v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges, 2 Conn. App. 196 , 203 (1984), the Appellate Court held "that if an opportunity for a hearing is required (only) by the constitution, it is not `required by statute' under General Statutes § 4-166 (2)." The court noted, however, that "the result might well be different if a statute had been read or were required to be read to include the necessity of a hearing in order to save its constitutionality," citing Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).

2002State v. Cruz, 41 Conn. App. 809, 814-15 , 678 A.2d 506 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 908 , 682 A.2d 1008 (1996).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cator, supra, 795 .

2001“The scope of a court’s inquiiy, or the necessity for such inquiry, however, depends on the circumstances, and a court need not necessarily elicit a waiver." State v. Cruz, 41 Conn. App. 809, 814-15 , 678 A.2d 506 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 908 , 682 A.2d 1008 (1996).

2002State v. Cruz, 41 Conn. App. 809, 814-15 , 678 A.2d 506 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 908 , 682 A.2d 1008 (1996).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cator, supra, 795 .

2001“The scope of a court’s inquiiy, or the necessity for such inquiry, however, depends on the circumstances, and a court need not necessarily elicit a waiver." State v. Cruz, 41 Conn. App. 809, 814-15 , 678 A.2d 506 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 908 , 682 A.2d 1008 (1996).

2001“The scope of a court’s inquiiy, or the necessity for such inquiry, however, depends on the circumstances, and a court need not necessarily elicit a waiver." State v. Cruz, 41 Conn. App. 809, 814-15 , 678 A.2d 506 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 908 , 682 A.2d 1008 (1996).

2001“The scope of a court’s inquiiy, or the necessity for such inquiry, however, depends on the circumstances, and a court need not necessarily elicit a waiver." State v. Cruz, 41 Conn. App. 809, 814-15 , 678 A.2d 506 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 908 , 682 A.2d 1008 (1996).

1998We have stated that ‘the necessity requirement is met when, unless the hearsay statement is admitted, the facts it contains may be lost, either because the declarant is dead or otherwise unavailable, or because the assertion is of such a nature that evidence of the same value cannot be obtained from the same or other sources.’ ” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 664-65 , 613 A.2d 1300 (1992).

1998We have stated that ‘the necessity requirement is met when, unless the hearsay statement is admitted, the facts it contains may be lost, either because the declarant is dead or otherwise unavailable, or because the assertion is of such a nature that evidence of the same value cannot be obtained from the same or other sources.’ ” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 664-65 , 613 A.2d 1300 (1992).

1996Our courts have held that “[although nine months is not an overwhelming period of time [to be incarcerated before trial], it is of such length that there is a necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.” State v. Brown, 172 Conn. 531, 536 , 375 A.2d 1024 , cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847 , 98 S. Ct. 153 , 54 L.

1996Our courts have held that “[although nine months is not an overwhelming period of time [to be incarcerated before trial], it is of such length that there is a necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.” State v. Brown, 172 Conn. 531, 536 , 375 A.2d 1024 , cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847 , 98 S. Ct. 153 , 54 L.

1996“Although [fourteen] months is not an overwhelming period of time, it is of such length that there is a necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.” State v. Brown, 172 Conn. 531, 536 , 375 A.2d 1024 , cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847 , 98 S. Ct. 153 , 54 L.

1996Our courts have held that “[although nine months is not an overwhelming period of time [to be incarcerated before trial], it is of such length that there is a necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.” State v. Brown, 172 Conn. 531, 536 , 375 A.2d 1024 , cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847 , 98 S. Ct. 153 , 54 L.

1996“Although [fourteen] months is not an overwhelming period of time, it is of such length that there is a necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.” State v. Brown, 172 Conn. 531, 536 , 375 A.2d 1024 , cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847 , 98 S. Ct. 153 , 54 L.

1996Our courts have held that “[although nine months is not an overwhelming period of time [to be incarcerated before trial], it is of such length that there is a necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.” State v. Brown, 172 Conn. 531, 536 , 375 A.2d 1024 , cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847 , 98 S. Ct. 153 , 54 L.

1995"We are bound to assume that the legislature intended, in enacting a particular law, to achieve its purpose in a manner which is both effective and constitutional." (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted.) Beccia v. Waterbury, 192 Conn. 127 , 135 ." The court holds, for the reasons set forth above, that if a statute must be read to include the necessity of a hearing in order to save its constitutionality, such hearing is deemed "required by statute" within the meaning of General Statutes § 4-166 (2) and may qualify the proceeding as a contested case under the administrative procedure a

1995"We are bound to assume that the legislature intended, in enacting a particular law, to achieve its purpose in a manner which is both effective and constitutional." (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted.) Beccia v. Waterbury, 192 Conn. 127 , 135 ." The court holds, for the reasons set forth above, CT Page 12985 that if a statute must be read to include the necessity of a hearing in order to save its constitutionality, such hearing is deemed "required by statute" within the meaning of General Statutes § 4-166 (2) and may qualify the proceeding as a contested case under the administrati

1995In Reitzer v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges, 2 Conn. App. 196 , 203 , (1984), the Appellate Court held "that if an opportunity for a hearing is required (only) by the constitution, it is not `required by statute' under General Statutes § 4-166 (2)." The court noted, however, that "the result might well be different if a statute had been read or were required to be read to include the necessity of a hearing in order to save its constitutionality," citing Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).

1995CT Page 12984 In Reitzer v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges, 2 Conn. App. 196 , 203 (1984), the Appellate Court held "that if an opportunity for a hearing is required (only) by the constitution, it is not `required by statute' under General Statutes § 4-166 (2)." The court noted, however, that "the result might well be different if a statute had been read or were required to be read to include the necessity of a hearing in order to save its constitutionality," citing Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).

2025The defendant cannot benefit from both necessity and self-defense under the same theory, consid- ering that the defense of self-defense is codified into law and is therefore the ‘‘subject of legislation and government regulation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

2017The court acknowledged that the necessity of the doctrine is to counter the 'unwarranted, but nonetheless persistent, view that a sexual assault victim who does not report the crime cannot be trusted to testify truthfully about the incident.' Id., at 303 , 677 A.2d 917 .

2015Because the condition of his plea, that is the right to appeal the denial of his motion to present a necessity defense, cannot be fulfilled under our law; see State v. Kelley, 206 Conn. 323, 337 , 537 A.2d 483 (1988); State v. Madera, 198 Conn. 92 , 107–108, 503 A.2d 136 (1985); a condi- tional plea of nolo contendere should not have been accepted in this case.

2015Because the condition of his plea, that is the right to appeal the denial of his motion to present a necessity defense, cannot be fulfilled under our law; see State v. Kelley, 206 Conn. 323, 337 , 537 A.2d 483 (1988); State v. Madera, 198 Conn. 92 , 107–108, 503 A.2d 136 (1985); a condi- tional plea of nolo contendere should not have been accepted in this case.

2010The court relied on this court's dictum, in Peruccio v. Commissioner of Correction, 107 Conn.App. 66, 76 , 943 A.2d 1148 , cert. denied, 287 Conn. 920 , 951 A.2d 569 (2008), that, under certain circumstances, such as those involving the sexual abuse of children, the failure to use any expert can result in a determination that a criminal defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel.

2010The court relied on this court's dictum, in Peruccio v. Commissioner of Correction, 107 Conn.App. 66, 76 , 943 A.2d 1148 , cert. denied, 287 Conn. 920 , 951 A.2d 569 (2008), that, under certain circumstances, such as those involving the sexual abuse of children, the failure to use any expert can result in a determination that a criminal defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel.

2010The court relied on this court's dictum, in Peruccio v. Commissioner of Correction, 107 Conn.App. 66, 76 , 943 A.2d 1148 , cert. denied, 287 Conn. 920 , 951 A.2d 569 (2008), that, under certain circumstances, such as those involving the sexual abuse of children, the failure to use any expert can result in a determination that a criminal defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel.

2010The court relied on this court’s dictum, in Peruccio v. Commissioner of Correction, 107 Conn. App. 66, 76 , 943 A.2d 1148 , cert. denied, 287 Conn. 920 , 951 A.2d 569 (2008), that, under certain circumstances, such as those involving the sexual abuse of children, the failure to use any expert can result in a determination that a criminal defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel.

2010The court relied on this court's dictum, in Peruccio v. Commissioner of Correction, 107 Conn.App. 66, 76 , 943 A.2d 1148 , cert. denied, 287 Conn. 920 , 951 A.2d 569 (2008), that, under certain circumstances, such as those involving the sexual abuse of children, the failure to use any expert can result in a determination that a criminal defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel.

2010The court relied on this court’s dictum, in Peruccio v. Commissioner of Correction, 107 Conn. App. 66, 76 , 943 A.2d 1148 , cert. denied, 287 Conn. 920 , 951 A.2d 569 (2008), that, under certain circumstances, such as those involving the sexual abuse of children, the failure to use any expert can result in a determination that a criminal defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel.

2004Our courts have held that [although nine months is not an overwhelming period of time [to be incarcerated before trial], it is of such length that there is a necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, 40 Conn. App. 483, 488-89 , 671 A.2d 1316 (1996), aff'd, 242 Conn. 389 , 699 A.2d 943 (1997).

2004Our courts have held that [although nine months is not an overwhelming period of time [to be incarcerated before trial], it is of such length that there is a necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, 40 Conn. App. 483, 488-89 , 671 A.2d 1316 (1996), aff'd, 242 Conn. 389 , 699 A.2d 943 (1997).

2004Our courts have held that [although nine months is not an overwhelming period of time [to be incarcerated before trial], it is of such length that there is a necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, 40 Conn. App. 483, 488-89 , 671 A.2d 1316 (1996), aff'd, 242 Conn. 389 , 699 A.2d 943 (1997).

2004Our courts have held that [although nine months is not an overwhelming period of time [to be incarcerated before trial], it is of such length that there is a necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, 40 Conn. App. 483, 488-89 , 671 A.2d 1316 (1996), aff'd, 242 Conn. 389 , 699 A.2d 943 (1997).

2002But in road infrastructure cases, as in other taking cases, there can be no finding of necessity if the taking is made in bad faith, or is arbitrary or unreasonable, State ex rel Highway Commission v. Curtis , 222 S.W.2d 64 , 69 (Mo., 1949).

2002The statute says a redevelopment area may include structures . . . "not in themselves substandard or unsanitary which are found to be essential to complete an adequate unit of development." Pequonnock goes on to hold in interpreting this language that "property that is not substandard and that is the subject of a taking within a redevelopment area must be essential to the redevelopment plan in order for the agency to justify its taking." The court cites language from Pet Care Products, Inc. v. Burnett , 150 Conn. 42 , 52 (1962), and deduces its operative principle therefrom. . . . "we also hav

2000State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 664-65 , 613 A.2d 1300 (1992).” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lewis, 245 Conn. 779, 805 , 717 A.2d 1140 (1998).

2000State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 664-65 , 613 A.2d 1300 (1992).” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lewis, 245 Conn. 779, 805 , 717 A.2d 1140 (1998).

1999State v. Ortiz, 217 Conn. 648 , 670 (1991).

1999The necessity defense is an affirmative defense, State v. Brelsford , 24 Conn. App. 287 , 288 (1991); thus, the defendant is obliged to prove each criterion under Lovercamp by a preponderance of the evidence.

1996See, e.g., State v. Mulalley, 126 Ariz. 278, 282-83 , 614 P.2d 820 (1980); State v. Palmer, 45 Del. 308, 310 , 72 A.2d 442 (1950); State v. Cahill, 196 Iowa 486, 490 , 194 N.W. 191 (1923); State v. Moore, 621 S.W.2d 107, 109 (Mo. App. 1981); State v. Cross, 58 Ohio St. 2d 482, 487 , 391 N.E.2d 319 (1979); Davis v. State, 763 P.2d 109, 110 (Okla.

1996See, e.g., State v. Mulalley, 126 Ariz. 278, 282-83 , 614 P.2d 820 (1980); State v. Palmer, 45 Del. 308, 310 , 72 A.2d 442 (1950); State v. Cahill, 196 Iowa 486, 490 , 194 N.W. 191 (1923); State v. Moore, 621 S.W.2d 107, 109 (Mo. App. 1981); State v. Cross, 58 Ohio St. 2d 482, 487 , 391 N.E.2d 319 (1979); Davis v. State, 763 P.2d 109, 110 (Okla.