necessity hearing in Pennsylvania

2022Inc. Co., 431 A.2d 966, 970 (Pa. 1981), where our Supreme Court declined to recognize a private cause of action against an insurer for bad faith under UIPA. - 67 - J-A12017-21 explained that like “all other rules of statutory construction, the necessity of applying the rule as to the construction of statutes in pari materia exists only where the terms of the statute to be construed are ambiguous.” Oliver v. City of Pittsburgh, 11 A.3d 960 , 965 (Pa. 2010) (citation omitted).

2022Inc. Co., 431 A.2d 966, 970 (Pa. 1981), where our Supreme Court declined to recognize a private cause of action against an insurer for bad faith under UIPA. - 67 - J-A12017-21 explained that like “all other rules of statutory construction, the necessity of applying the rule as to the construction of statutes in pari materia exists only where the terms of the statute to be construed are ambiguous.” Oliver v. City of Pittsburgh, 11 A.3d 960 , 965 (Pa. 2010) (citation omitted).

2019Id. ; see also Speers Boro , 11 A.3d at 906 (holding a board of view's necessity analysis must "consider other available means of access to the property"). *1014 In this case, we conclude that a determination of necessity must be based on the present use of the property, where such a present use exists.

2017In both cases, the prohibitive cost of. transforming the geographical features into “realistic access” satisfies the necessity standard enunciated in Little, 119 A.2d at 589 . 12 The Board’s decision is consistent with our precedent on necessity.

2021In concluding an alibi instruction was not required, the Fromal Court explained: - 14 - J-S34043-21 The following passage from United States v. Booz, 451 F.2d 719 (3rd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820 . . . (1973), summarizes the rationale for the necessity of an instruction on alibi when the defense pursues it, and illustrates why such an instruction is not needed when the Commonwealth introduces alibi: [A] [d]efendant is entitled to a specific instruction on burden of proof on alibi issues because the jury is likely to become confused about the burden of proof when an appellant offers

1990The following passage from United States v. Booz, 451 F.2d 719 (3rd Cir.1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820 , 94 S.Ct. 45 , 38 L.Ed.2d 52 (1973), summarizes the rationale for the necessity of an instruction on alibi when the defense pursues it, and illustrates why such an instruction is not needed when the Commonwealth introduces alibi: [A] [defendant is entitled to a specific instruction on burden of proof on alibi issues because the jury is likely to become confused about the burden of proof when an appellant offers this type of evidence.

2021In concluding an alibi instruction was not required, the Fromal Court explained: - 14 - J-S34043-21 The following passage from United States v. Booz, 451 F.2d 719 (3rd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820 . . . (1973), summarizes the rationale for the necessity of an instruction on alibi when the defense pursues it, and illustrates why such an instruction is not needed when the Commonwealth introduces alibi: [A] [d]efendant is entitled to a specific instruction on burden of proof on alibi issues because the jury is likely to become confused about the burden of proof when an appellant offers

1990The following passage from United States v. Booz, 451 F.2d 719 (3rd Cir.1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820 , 94 S.Ct. 45 , 38 L.Ed.2d 52 (1973), summarizes the rationale for the necessity of an instruction on alibi when the defense pursues it, and illustrates why such an instruction is not needed when the Commonwealth introduces alibi: [A] [defendant is entitled to a specific instruction on burden of proof on alibi issues because the jury is likely to become confused about the burden of proof when an appellant offers this type of evidence.

1988If the product is one customarily used by children, the danger must be one which children would be likely to recognize and appreciate in order to prevent them from recovering for a product related injury on the grounds that the danger was open and obvious.” 10 Without further elaboration, it is evident that under § 402(A) the necessity of a warning by the manufacturer depends in part upon the knowledge of the “ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community” as to the characteristics of the product. 11 Appellee in its brief contends that the perceptions

1988If the product is one customarily used by children, the danger must be one which children would be likely to recognize and appreciate in order to prevent them from recovering for a product related injury on the grounds that the danger was open and obvious.” 10 Without further elaboration, it is evident that under § 402(A) the necessity of a warning by the manufacturer depends in part upon the knowledge of the “ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community” as to the characteristics of the product. 11 Appellee in its brief contends that the perceptions

2026The object of the statute’s necessity requirement is a level playing field in housing for the disabled.” Id. (quotations omitted).

2026As such, the Court cautioned, one cannot read the term “necessity” to mean “loose, colloquial phrasing,” or to “confus[e] our wants with our needs.” Id. at 106 .

2024This Court stated that “[a] mere averment of indigency and inability to pay is not sufficient to trigger the necessity for a hearing under Cannon, [supra].

2022Commonwealth v. Hoopes, 722 A.2d 172 , 174 n.1 (Pa. Super. 1998); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(A) (providing that a suppression motion may be filed “to suppress any evidence alleged to have been obtained in violation of the defendant’s rights”).

2022Co., 273 A.3d 1133 , 1146 n.10 (Apr. 11, 2022) (en banc). - 10 - J-S18035-22 memoranda filed by both parties and formed the basis of the necessity for the hearing.

2021A “mere averment of indigency and inability to pay is not sufficient to trigger the necessity for a hearing[.]” Id. at 1021 .

2019Additionally, in In re Packard, 926 A.2d 557 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007), the Commonwealth Court applied Little’s principle that a necessity analysis must be based on existing conditions.

2019Additionally, in In re Packard , 926 A.2d 557 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007), the Commonwealth Court applied Little 's principle that a necessity analysis must be based on existing conditions.

2018Separating the threshold issue of negligence, and presenting damages evidence separately, avoided both jury confusion and possible sympathy from learning the extent of Esterly's injury and treatment Pascale, supra; Coleman, 391 Pa. Super. at 147 , 570 5 The only expert testimony scheduled for trial pertained to the issue of damages from the impact, as did that of many of the other anticipated witnesses and all medical records and invoices listed as exhibits. 5 From:PROTHONOTARY OFFICE 18143375416 06/28/2017 16:17 # 207 P. 006 / 015 AD 2014 - 88 A.2d at 555-56 ("bifurcation minimized the possib

2017On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that a necessity defense to this possession charge is available “only in rare situations” and contains five conjunctive requirements: The defendant must have (1) reasonably feared death or serious injury from an imminent threat, (2) not recklessly placed himself in the path of that threat, (3) had no reasonable alternative to possession, (4) reasonably believed that possession would avert the threat and weapon … appears to be an issue of first impression.” In that case, the appellant was a prisoner “charged with a violation of … possession of a weapon or imple

2017This Court concluded that the trial court properly disallowed the appellant to pursue a defense of duress because “there was no immediate threat of serious bodily injury.” Id. (emphasis in original).

2016Specifically, the Superior Court in MO. v. J.T.R., 85 A.3d 1058 (Pa. Super. 2014) held that the trial court need not discuss or delineate the 16 factors in determining what is in the "best interest of the child" or provide 12 Mother's "Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a)(2)(i)" 1s l and 3. 8 reasons on the record for its decision as stated under section 5323(d) of the Child Custody Act (relating to an award of custody), when the court is not making an award of custody.

2014However, our Supreme Court has noted that like “all other rules of statutory construction, the necessity of applying the rule as to the construction of statutes in pari materia exists only where the terms of the statute to be construed are ambiguous.” Oliver v. City of Pittsburgh, 608 Pa. 386 , 11 A.3d 960 , 965 (2010) (citing AM.

2014Initially, while I agree that our Court has jurisdiction over the work product privilege issue, I, like Justice Saylor, question the necessity of an analysis of the requirements of the collateral order doctrine with respect to privileged material after our decision in Commonwealth v. Harris, 612 Pa. 576 , 32 A.3d 243 (Pa.2011).

2014Initially, while I agree that our Court has jurisdiction over the work product privilege issue, I, like Justice Saylor, question the necessity of an analysis of the requirements of the collateral order doctrine with respect to privileged material after our decision in Commonwealth v. Harris, 612 Pa. 576 , 32 A.3d 243 (Pa.2011).

2013In B.S., we explained the necessity of this rule as follows: In Grant , the Supreme Court held that as a general rule, ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be held for collateral review. [ 813 A.2d at 728 ].

2007A more direct statement of the necessity of a hearing on a motion for return of property is found in Commonwealth v. Crosby, 390 Pa.Super. 140 , 568 A.2d 233 (1990).

2007A more direct statement of the necessity of a hearing on a motion for return of property is found in Commonwealth v. Crosby, 390 Pa.Super. 140 , 568 A.2d 233 (1990).

2005“It must be emphasized that the test of the necessity of warnings or instructions is not to be governed by the reasonable man standard . . . [or] what the ‘reasonable’ consumer could be expected to know, or what the ‘reasonable’ manufacturer could be expected to ‘foresee’ about the consumers who use his product.” Berkebile, 462 Pa. at 101 , 337 A.2d at 902 . (citations omitted) As a guarantor of its product, the duty to warn of any defects extends to the ultimate users and notice to a third party of such warnings will not serve to make the user aware of the defect in the product.

2005“It must be emphasized that the test of the necessity of warnings or instructions is not to be governed by the reasonable man standard . . . [or] what the ‘reasonable’ consumer could be expected to know, or what the ‘reasonable’ manufacturer could be expected to ‘foresee’ about the consumers who use his product.” Berkebile, 462 Pa. at 101 , 337 A.2d at 902 . (citations omitted) As a guarantor of its product, the duty to warn of any defects extends to the ultimate users and notice to a third party of such warnings will not serve to make the user aware of the defect in the product.