necessity hearing in Oklahoma

2014Also well settled is "the rule that an assignor cannot as against his assignee allege [the] nonassignability" of that which was assigned, "for a more perfect illustration of the necessity for the doctrine of estoppel could hardly be stated." Harris v. Tipton, 1939 OK 256, ¶ 17 , 90 P.2d 932, 935 .

2014Also well settled is "the rule that an assignor cannot as against his assignee allege [the] nonassignability" of that which was assigned, "for a more perfect illustration of the necessity for the doctrine of estoppel could hardly be stated." Harris v. Tipton, 1939 OK 256, ¶ 17 , 90 P.2d 932, 935 .

1993State v. Fee, 126 N.H. 78 , 489 A.2d 606 (1985).

1993State v. Fee, 126 N.H. 78 , 489 A.2d 606 (1985).

1987III In Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 , 102 S.Ct. 3368, 3376 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of the death penalty against one who "aids and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force be used." The jury in this case had a choice of finding appellant guilty of malice aforethought, or of felony murder.

1987III In Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 , 102 S.Ct. 3368, 3376 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of the death penalty against one who "aids and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force be used." The jury in this case had a choice of finding appellant guilty of malice aforethought, or of felony murder.

1986Totem Marine T. & B. v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., 584 P.2d 15, 21 , 9 A.L.R. 4th 928 (Alas.1978); Rich & Whitlock, Inc. v. Ashton Development Inc., note 2 supra; The necessity for the doctrine in the cases cited have been explained in Dalzell, "Duress by Economic Pressure”, 20 N.C.L.Rev. 341, 370 (1942): “Nowadays, a wait of even a few weeks in collecting on a contract claim is sometimes serious or fatal for an enterprise at a crisis in its ‘ history.

1986Totem Marine T. & B. v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., 584 P.2d 15, 21 , 9 A.L.R. 4th 928 (Alas.1978); Rich & Whitlock, Inc. v. Ashton Development Inc., note 2 supra; The necessity for the doctrine in the cases cited have been explained in Dalzell, "Duress by Economic Pressure”, 20 N.C.L.Rev. 341, 370 (1942): “Nowadays, a wait of even a few weeks in collecting on a contract claim is sometimes serious or fatal for an enterprise at a crisis in its ‘ history.

1985See, Stafford v. State, 669 P.2d 285 (Okl.Cr.1983); Stafford v. State, 665 P.2d 1205 (Okl.Cr.1983); Jones v. State, 660 P.2d 634 (Okl.Cr.1983); and Brewer v. State, 650 P.2d 54 (Okl.Cr.1982). *542 We see no reason to depart from that holding.

1985See, Stafford v. State, 669 P.2d 285 (Okl.Cr.1983); Stafford v. State, 665 P.2d 1205 (Okl.Cr.1983); Jones v. State, 660 P.2d 634 (Okl.Cr.1983); and Brewer v. State, 650 P.2d 54 (Okl.Cr.1982). *542 We see no reason to depart from that holding.

1985See, Stafford v. State, 669 P.2d 285 (Okl.Cr.1983); Stafford v. State, 665 P.2d 1205 (Okl.Cr.1983); Jones v. State, 660 P.2d 634 (Okl.Cr.1983); and Brewer v. State, 650 P.2d 54 (Okl.Cr.1982). *542 We see no reason to depart from that holding.

1970The only aspect of the Chase decision which was found to be wanting was the language: “Nor is it mandatory that a hearing always be held before a parole is revoked, as the circumstances in certain cases may clearly indicate the breach of a parole condition without the necessity of a hearing.” 456 P.2d at 595 .

1958The question has been touched upon in the case of Shirey v. State, Okl.Cr., 321 P.2d 981, 988 , wherein it was said: “The court by all means, should give an instruction as requested by the defendant, designated as instruction No. 5 or to the effect that defendant could be found guilty either of the principal offense or as a second offender, and the punishment provided by law for each offense should be clearly set forth in the instructions.” The court further said: “The necessity for such an instruction may be eliminated by a stipulation by defendant as to the previous conviction.

1956Cordonnier v. State, 86 Okl.Cr. 291 , 192 P.2d 298 ; It has further been held an omission of an instruction in the absence of a request will not constitute reversible error, Chapman v.. State, 84 Okl.Cr. 41 , 178 P.2d 638 , particularly unless the Criminal Court of Appeals believes in light of the entire record, and instructions, the defendant was deprived of substantial justice.

1956Cordonnier v. State, 86 Okl.Cr. 291 , 192 P.2d 298 ; It has further been held an omission of an instruction in the absence of a request will not constitute reversible error, Chapman v.. State, 84 Okl.Cr. 41 , 178 P.2d 638 , particularly unless the Criminal Court of Appeals believes in light of the entire record, and instructions, the defendant was deprived of substantial justice.

1956Cordonnier v. State, 86 Okl.Cr. 291 , 192 P.2d 298 ; It has further been held an omission of an instruction in the absence of a request will not constitute reversible error, Chapman v.. State, 84 Okl.Cr. 41 , 178 P.2d 638 , particularly unless the Criminal Court of Appeals believes in light of the entire record, and instructions, the defendant was deprived of substantial justice.

1956Cordonnier v. State, 86 Okl.Cr. 291 , 192 P.2d 298 ; It has further been held an omission of an instruction in the absence of a request will not constitute reversible error, Chapman v.. State, 84 Okl.Cr. 41 , 178 P.2d 638 , particularly unless the Criminal Court of Appeals believes in light of the entire record, and instructions, the defendant was deprived of substantial justice.

1954Tatlow v. Bacon, 101 Kan. 26 , 165 P. 835 , 14 A.L.R. 269 ; Shealey v. Seaboard Air Line Ry.

1954Tatlow v. Bacon, 101 Kan. 26 , 165 P. 835 , 14 A.L.R. 269 ; Shealey v. Seaboard Air Line Ry.

1954In the case of McManus v. Industrial Commission, 53 Ariz. 22 , 85 P.2d 54, 56 , it was stated: “It is, of course, true that notice and opportunity to defend must be a matter of right and not a matter of grace, but we think that such right may be implied from the terms of a statute without being expressly and explicitly set forth in detail therein. * * * This general principle of implied notice has been upheld in a number of cases where the statute was not as explicit in regard to the necessity of a hearing of some kind as is the law under consideration at the present time.

1954In the case of McManus v. Industrial Commission, 53 Ariz. 22 , 85 P.2d 54, 56 , it was stated: “It is, of course, true that notice and opportunity to defend must be a matter of right and not a matter of grace, but we think that such right may be implied from the terms of a statute without being expressly and explicitly set forth in detail therein. * * * This general principle of implied notice has been upheld in a number of cases where the statute was not as explicit in regard to the necessity of a hearing of some kind as is the law under consideration at the present time.

1942In the case of Holloway v. Hall, 79 Okla. 163 , 192 P. 219, 220 , the Supreme Court of this state says: “Since the adoption of sections 5812 and 5816, Rev.

1942While our determination of the adequacy of the pleading and proof in connection with abandonment dispenses with the necessity of analysis of the petition and evidence upon this point, a review of the record discloses that defendant’s initial departure, his continuance thereof, his subsequent cessation of support, and his declaration of intention not to continue or resume any further payments for that purpose, considered in conjunction with his ability to make such payments at least in a lesser amount, was pleaded and proved with sufficient clarity and exactness to have justified the trial cour

1942While our determination of the adequacy of the pleading and proof in connection with abandonment dispenses with the necessity of analysis of the petition and evidence upon this point, a review of the record discloses that defendant’s initial departure, his continuance thereof, his subsequent cessation of support, and his declaration of intention not to continue or resume any further payments for that purpose, considered in conjunction with his ability to make such payments at least in a lesser amount, was pleaded and proved with sufficient clarity and exactness to have justified the trial cour

1942In the case of Holloway v. Hall, 79 Okla. 163 , 192 P. 219, 220 , the Supreme Court of this state says: “Since the adoption of sections 5812 and 5816, Rev.

1942While our determination of the adequacy of the pleading and proof in connection with abandonment dispenses with the necessity of analysis of the petition and evidence upon this point, a review of the record discloses that defendant’s initial departure, his continuance thereof, his subsequent cessation of support, and his declaration of intention not to continue or resume any further payments for that purpose, considered in conjunction with his ability to make such payments at least in a lesser amount, was pleaded and proved with sufficient clarity and exactness to have justified the trial cour

1942While our determination of the adequacy of the pleading and proof in connection with abandonment dispenses with the necessity of analysis of the petition and evidence upon this point, a review of the record discloses that defendant’s initial departure, his continuance thereof, his subsequent cessation of support, and his declaration of intention not to continue or resume any further payments for that purpose, considered in conjunction with his ability to make such payments at least in a lesser amount, was pleaded and proved with sufficient clarity and exactness to have justified the trial cour

1942While our determination of the adequacy of the pleading and proof in connection with abandonment dispenses with the necessity of analysis of the petition and evidence upon this point, a review of the record discloses that defendant’s initial departure, his continuance thereof, his subsequent cessation of support, and his declaration of intention not to continue or resume any further payments for that purpose, considered in conjunction with his ability to make such payments at least in a lesser amount, was pleaded and proved with sufficient clarity and exactness to have justified the trial cour

1942While our determination of the adequacy of the pleading and proof in connection with abandonment dispenses with the necessity of analysis of the petition and evidence upon this point, a review of the record discloses that defendant’s initial departure, his continuance thereof, his subsequent cessation of support, and his declaration of intention not to continue or resume any further payments for that purpose, considered in conjunction with his ability to make such payments at least in a lesser amount, was pleaded and proved with sufficient clarity and exactness to have justified the trial cour