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16 Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Humphrey v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2024To establish the necessity defense, a defendant must demonstrate “(1) a reasonable belief that the action was necessary to avoid an imminent threatened harm; (2) a lack of other adequate means to avoid the threatened harm; and (3) a direct causal relationship that may be reasonably anticipated between the action taken and the avoidance of the harm.” Id. at 45 (quoting Buckley v. City of Falls Church, 7 Va. App. 32, 33 (1988)). “[W]hether the danger is reasonably apparent is always to be determined from the viewpoint of the defendant at the time he acted.” Id. at 49 (alteration in original) (qu 2023Affirmed. 5 This Court has held that to use the defense of necessity, a defendant must show “(1) a reasonable belief that the action was necessary to avoid an imminent threatened harm; (2) a lack of other adequate means to avoid the threatened harm; and (3) a direct causal relationship that may be reasonably anticipated between the action taken and the avoidance of the harm.” Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 301, 306 (2016) (quoting Humphrey v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 36, 45 (2001)). 6 To the extent that Mohammad argues that arguing a necessity defense would create a new “scienter” or intent | 4 | 8 |
Buckley v. City of Falls Churchgreen2 sentences2024The necessity defense has three essential elements: “(1) a reasonable belief that the action was necessary to avoid an imminent threatened harm; (2) a lack of other adequate means to avoid the threatened harm; and (3) a direct causal relationship that may be reasonably anticipated between the action taken and the avoidance of the harm.” Id. (quoting Buckley, 7 Va. App. at 33 ). 2024The necessity defense has three essential elements: “(1) a reasonable belief that the action was necessary to avoid an imminent threatened harm; (2) a lack of other adequate means to avoid the threatened harm; and (3) a direct causal relationship that may be reasonably anticipated between the action taken and the avoidance of the harm.” Id. (quoting Buckley, 7 Va. App. at 33 ). | 3 | 5 |
Edmonds v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2023Affirmed. 5 This Court has held that to use the defense of necessity, a defendant must show “(1) a reasonable belief that the action was necessary to avoid an imminent threatened harm; (2) a lack of other adequate means to avoid the threatened harm; and (3) a direct causal relationship that may be reasonably anticipated between the action taken and the avoidance of the harm.” Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 301, 306 (2016) (quoting Humphrey v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 36, 45 (2001)). 6 To the extent that Mohammad argues that arguing a necessity defense would create a new “scienter” or intent 2022In the criminal context, the necessity defense requires “(1) a reasonable belief that the action was necessary to avoid an imminent threatened harm; (2) a lack of other adequate means to avoid the threatened harm; and (3) a direct causal relationship that may be reasonably anticipated between the action taken and the avoidance of the harm.” Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 301, 306 (2016) (quoting Humphrey v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 36, 45 (2001)). | 2 | 2 |
McGhee v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2024To establish the necessity defense, a defendant must demonstrate “(1) a reasonable belief that the action was necessary to avoid an imminent threatened harm; (2) a lack of other adequate means to avoid the threatened harm; and (3) a direct causal relationship that may be reasonably anticipated between the action taken and the avoidance of the harm.” Id. at 45 (quoting Buckley v. City of Falls Church, 7 Va. App. 32, 33 (1988)). “[W]hether the danger is reasonably apparent is always to be determined from the viewpoint of the defendant at the time he acted.” Id. at 49 (alteration in original) (qu 2001As set out above, the essential elements of the necessity defense, which allows a convicted felon to possess a firearm for self-defense, 4 include “(1) a reasonable belief that the action was necessary to avoid an imminent threatened harm; (2) a lack of other adequate means to avoid the threatened harm; and (3) a direct causal relationship that may be reasonably anticipated between the action taken and the avoidance of the harm.” Buckley, 7 Va.App. at 33 , 371 S.E.2d at 827-28 . “[W]hether the danger is reasonably apparent is always to be determined from the viewpoint of the defendant at the t | 1 | 2 |
Long v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2023Defense counsel had nothing more to offer, stating, “Everything that we could get in, I think, through testimony has been mentioned on the record.” 5 The Commonwealth argued at its motion in limine that a necessity defense cannot apply to a charge of DUI, because “there is no mens rea requirement for DUI.” Warren replied that the necessity defense is available to a DUI charge because in the DUI statute, Code § 18.2-266, there is no language abrogating the common law defense of necessity, citing Humphrey v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 36, 45 (2001), and Long, 23 Va. App. at 544 . 2003See Long v. Commonwealth, 23 Va.App. 537, 543-44 , 478 S.E.2d 324, 326-27 (1996). 2 . | 1 | 2 |
cluster 326888green2 sentences2016“The reasons given by the movant for ‘delaying’ assertion of his defenses by means 4 of an intervening guilty plea must be weighed according to the circumstances of his particular case.” United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 221 (D.C. 2016"The reasons given by the movant for 'delaying' assertion of his defenses by means of an intervening guilty plea must be weighed according to the circumstances of his particular case." United States v. Barker , 514 F.2d 208 , 221 (D.C. | 1 | 2 |
Small v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2025First, that he had “a reasonable belief” that his possession of the firearm “was necessary to avoid an imminent threatened harm,” second, “a lack of other adequate means to avoid the threatened harm,” and third, “a direct causal relationship that may be reasonably anticipated between the action taken and the avoidance of the harm.” Small v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 292, 299 (2016) (quoting Humphrey, 37 Va. App. at 45 ). | 1 | 1 |
Hughes v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2024“Self-defense is an affirmative defense which the accused must prove by introducing sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt about his guilt.” Hughes v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 448, 464 (2002) Code § 18.2-308.2(A) also provides that “any person who violates this section . . . and 6 who was previously convicted of a violent felony as defined in § 17.1-805 shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for five years.” (Emphasis added). -6- (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 68, 71 (1993)). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2024“Self-defense is an affirmative defense which the accused must prove by introducing sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt about his guilt.” Hughes v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 448, 464 (2002) Code § 18.2-308.2(A) also provides that “any person who violates this section . . . and 6 who was previously convicted of a violent felony as defined in § 17.1-805 shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for five years.” (Emphasis added). -6- (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 68, 71 (1993)). | 1 | 1 |
Tracy Wayne Claytor v. Commonwealth of Virginiagreen1 sentence2023His evidence was only relevant to the necessity defense, and such evidence became immaterial to the case when he failed to proffer minimal evidence as to each element of the defense.5 See, e.g., Claytor v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 644, 656 (2013) (“Because Claytor’s affirmative defense is without legal basis, the trial court did not err in granting the Commonwealth’s motion to suppress evidence related solely to that affirmative defense.”). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Whitegreen1 sentence2023See Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 419 (2017) (deciding case on the “best and narrowest grounds available”). - 15 - | 1 | 1 |
Avent v. Com.green1 sentence2023“Generally, we review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence using an abuse of discretion standard and, on appeal, will not disturb a trial court’s decision to admit evidence absent a finding of abuse of that discretion.” Avent v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 175, 197 (2010). | 1 | 1 |
White v. Com.green1 sentence2023See Morgan v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 120, 126 (2007) (“To present evidence of insanity to the fact finder, an accused must first make a prima facie showing that his evidence meets the requirements of the affirmative defense.” (citing White v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 619, 629 (2006))). | 1 | 1 |
Morgan v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2023See Morgan v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 120, 126 (2007) (“To present evidence of insanity to the fact finder, an accused must first make a prima facie showing that his evidence meets the requirements of the affirmative defense.” (citing White v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 619, 629 (2006))). | 1 | 1 |
Daung Sam v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2023See Sam, 13 Va. App. at 3 There is no distinction “between a threat of harm directed against the defendant and a threat of harm against members of the defendant’s family.” Sam, 13 Va. App. at 323 . - 13 - 327 (holding “jury could not have reasonably found” that appellant “reasonably believed his participation in the crime was the only reasonable opportunity he had to prevent his family from being harmed”). 2023See Sam, 13 Va. App. at 3 There is no distinction “between a threat of harm directed against the defendant and a threat of harm against members of the defendant’s family.” Sam, 13 Va. App. at 323 . - 13 - 327 (holding “jury could not have reasonably found” that appellant “reasonably believed his participation in the crime was the only reasonable opportunity he had to prevent his family from being harmed”). | 1 | 1 |
Aistrop v. Blue Diamond Coal Co.green1 sentence2019Although requiring such temporal proof may seem harsh in individual cases, the necessity of such a rule in a no-fault regime such as that established by the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act is apparent: “[I]f the time of the causative event cannot be fixed, the employer will be unable to investigate the claim and defend it[.]”5 Morris, 238 Va. at 586 ; see also Aistrop, 181 Va. at 293 (noting that “if the event cannot be fixed with reasonable certainty” there is an increased risk of “fraud”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Schoongreen1 sentence1996United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 196-97 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 990 , 112 S.Ct. 2980 , 119 L.Ed.2d 598 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rhodes v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2024The common law necessity defense “addresses the dilemma created when physical forces beyond the actor’s control render ‘illegal conduct the lesser of two evils.’” Humphrey v. 6 Appellant asserts that Rhodes requires reversal because in that case our Supreme Court reversed a first-degree murder charge for lack of evidence establishing premeditation where at least three of the Epperly factors were not present. 238 Va. at 487 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
United States v. Esther Cassidy, John Schuchardt
green
1 sentence2023“One principle remains constant in modern cases considering the defense of necessity: if there is ‘a reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law, “a chance both to refuse to do the criminal act and also to avoid the threatened harm,”’ the defense is not available.” Id. at 34 (quoting Bailey, 444 U.S. at 410 ).3 Assuming without deciding that Warren’s proffered evidence supports the first and third elements, the necessity defense fails because Warren proffered no evidence to support the second element: a lack of other adequate means to avoid the threatened harm. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
United States v. Bailey
green
1 sentence2023“One principle remains constant in modern cases considering the defense of necessity: if there is ‘a reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law, “a chance both to refuse to do the criminal act and also to avoid the threatened harm,”’ the defense is not available.” Id. at 34 (quoting Bailey, 444 U.S. at 410 ).3 Assuming without deciding that Warren’s proffered evidence supports the first and third elements, the necessity defense fails because Warren proffered no evidence to support the second element: a lack of other adequate means to avoid the threatened harm. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
McCullough v. McCullough
green
2 sentences2001As set out above, the essential elements of the necessity defense, which allows a convicted felon to possess a firearm for self-defense, 4 include “(1) a reasonable belief that the action was necessary to avoid an imminent threatened harm; (2) a lack of other adequate means to avoid the threatened harm; and (3) a direct causal relationship that may be reasonably anticipated between the action taken and the avoidance of the harm.” Buckley, 7 Va.App. at 33 , 371 S.E.2d at 827-28 . “[W]hether the danger is reasonably apparent is always to be determined from the viewpoint of the defendant at the t 2001“It is not essential to the right of self-defense that the danger should in fact exist.” Id. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Jenkins v. United States
green
1 sentence1996United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 196-97 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 990 , 112 S.Ct. 2980 , 119 L.Ed.2d 598 (1992). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Rosales v. United States
green
1 sentence1996United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 196-97 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 990 , 112 S.Ct. 2980 , 119 L.Ed.2d 598 (1992). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.