9 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1937–2009 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barker v. Wingogreen2 sentences1979This length of time, on its face, triggers the necessity for inquiry into the other three Barker factors, 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S. Ct. at 2192, 33 L. 1979This length of time, on its face, triggers the necessity for inquiry into the other three Barker factors, 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S. Ct. at 2192, 33 L. | 1 | 2 |
Nunes v. Meadowbrook Development Co., Inc.green1 sentence2009An easement by necessity “is limited to a factual scenario, in which a single owner partitions land and fails to reserve an express easement in favor of the parcel that has become landlocked as a result of the severance.” Ondis, 934 A.2d at 806 . “[T]he test of necessity is whether the easement is reasonably necessary for the convenient and comfortable enjoyment of the property as it existed when the severance was made.” Nunes v. Meadowbrook Development Co., 824 A.2d 421, 425 (R.I.2003) (quoting Wiesel v. Smira, 49 R.I. 246, 250 , 142 A. 148, 150 (1928)). | 1 | 1 |
Wiesel v. Smiragreen2 sentences2009An easement by necessity “is limited to a factual scenario, in which a single owner partitions land and fails to reserve an express easement in favor of the parcel that has become landlocked as a result of the severance.” Ondis, 934 A.2d at 806 . “[T]he test of necessity is whether the easement is reasonably necessary for the convenient and comfortable enjoyment of the property as it existed when the severance was made.” Nunes v. Meadowbrook Development Co., 824 A.2d 421, 425 (R.I.2003) (quoting Wiesel v. Smira, 49 R.I. 246, 250 , 142 A. 148, 150 (1928)). 2009An easement by necessity “is limited to a factual scenario, in which a single owner partitions land and fails to reserve an express easement in favor of the parcel that has become landlocked as a result of the severance.” Ondis, 934 A.2d at 806 . “[T]he test of necessity is whether the easement is reasonably necessary for the convenient and comfortable enjoyment of the property as it existed when the severance was made.” Nunes v. Meadowbrook Development Co., 824 A.2d 421, 425 (R.I.2003) (quoting Wiesel v. Smira, 49 R.I. 246, 250 , 142 A. 148, 150 (1928)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Melvin Ashleygreen1 sentence2004Compare Ahmadjian , 438 A.2d at 1083 -84 with United States v. Ashley , 876 F.2d 1069 , 1072 (1st Cir. 1989); see also United States v. Costello , 610 F. Supp. 1450 , 1467-68 (N.D. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ahmadjiangreen2 sentences2004It is possible, however, to glean from our Supreme Court's decision in State v. Ahmadjian , 438 A.2d 1070 , 1083-84 (1981), that the necessity requirement in the Rhode Island Wiretap Statute is consistent with generally accepted standards under the federal statute. 2004It is possible, however, to glean from our Supreme Court's decision in State v. Ahmadjian , 438 A.2d 1070 , 1083-84 (1981), that the necessity requirement in the Rhode Island Wiretap Statute is consistent with generally accepted standards under the federal statute. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Costellogreen1 sentence2004Compare Ahmadjian , 438 A.2d at 1083 -84 with United States v. Ashley , 876 F.2d 1069 , 1072 (1st Cir. 1989); see also United States v. Costello , 610 F. Supp. 1450 , 1467-68 (N.D. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ondis v. CITY OF WOONSOCKET EX REL. TREASURER
green
1 sentence2009An easement by necessity “is limited to a factual scenario, in which a single owner partitions land and fails to reserve an express easement in favor of the parcel that has become landlocked as a result of the severance.” Ondis, 934 A.2d at 806 . “[T]he test of necessity is whether the easement is reasonably necessary for the convenient and comfortable enjoyment of the property as it existed when the severance was made.” Nunes v. Meadowbrook Development Co., 824 A.2d 421, 425 (R.I.2003) (quoting Wiesel v. Smira, 49 R.I. 246, 250 , 142 A. 148, 150 (1928)). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
cluster 465443
green
1 sentence2004Id. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Fenner
green
1 sentence1986State v. Fenner, 503 A.2d 518 (R.I.1986). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State v. DeMasi
green
1 sentence1981However, “a delay of twenty-six months between indictment and trial [is] ‘presumptively prejudicial’, a finding that triggers the necessity for an inquiry into the other three factors.” Id. 419 A.2d at 289 . 1 The record indicates that the delay in reaching this case for trial was caused by the case backlog and the priority that is given to more serious felonies. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Ham v. South Carolina
green
1 sentence1974While the Court in Ham agreed as to the necessity of inquiry in this area, it did note that the trial court is “not required to put the question in any particular form, or to ask any particular number of questions on the subject, simply because requested to do so by petitioner.” Ham v. South Carolina, supra at 527 , 93 S.Ct. at 850 , 35 L.Ed.2d at 50 . | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Fuentes v. Shevin
green
2 sentences1974However, petitioner urges a change in the law, and relies on Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 , 92 S.Ct. 1983 , 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972), to demonstrate the necessity of a hearing before all property rights are affected. 1974However, petitioner urges a change in the law, and relies on Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 , 92 S.Ct. 1983 , 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972), to demonstrate the necessity of a hearing before all property rights are affected. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
State Ex Rel. Mueller v. District Court
green
1 sentence1937Mueller v. District Court, 87 Mont. 108 , and Montana Power Co. v. Public Service Commission of Montana, 12 Fed. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.