minority rule in Missouri

1982Our courts joined the majority in adopting the principle that discretionary matters are reviewable because “the ultimate responsibility for every judgment rests upon the court of final resort.” Feurt v. Caster, 174 Mo. 289 , 73 S.W. 576 [2], See Bowers, The Judicial Discretion of Trial Courts, § 16, p. 29. *622 . . .

1982Our courts joined the majority in adopting the principle that discretionary matters are reviewable because “the ultimate responsibility for every judgment rests upon the court of final resort.” Feurt v. Caster, 174 Mo. 289 , 73 S.W. 576 [2], See Bowers, The Judicial Discretion of Trial Courts, § 16, p. 29. *622 . . .

2018In contrast, the minority rule states that "the unambiguous language of an anti-assignment clause, like the one present in this case, should be enforced as written." Id.

2008Additionally, People v. Hutner, 209 Mich.App. 280 , 530 N.W.2d 174 (1995), followed the minority rule, but a different panel of the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected Hutner and opted instead to follow the majority ongoing criminal assault rule.

2008Additionally, People v. Hutner, 209 Mich.App. 280 , 530 N.W.2d 174 (1995), followed the minority rule, but a different panel of the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected Hutner and opted instead to follow the majority ongoing criminal assault rule.

2008Alfone v. Sarno, 87 N.J. 99 , 432 A.2d 857, 867 (1981), overruled on other grounds by LaFage v. Jani, 166 N.J. 412 , 766 A.2d 1066 (2001).

2008Alfone v. Sarno, 87 N.J. 99 , 432 A.2d 857, 867 (1981), overruled on other grounds by LaFage v. Jani, 166 N.J. 412 , 766 A.2d 1066 (2001).

1993Id. at [5].

1993This is made abundantly clear in Strahler, supra. Therein, this Court determined that the twelve year limitation on the minority exception limited access to the courts to minors who would not reach majority within that period and was, therefore, unconstitutional.

1980Moore’s Federal Practice, Vol. 1.” In Ennis v. Truhitte, 306 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Mo.banc 1957), overruled on other grounds, Ebel v. Ferguson, 478 S.W.2d 334 (Mo.banc 1972), the court stated that “[i]n the contribution cases, where the judgment creditor is the spouse of one of the tortfeasors against whom contribution is sought, liability is denied because the injured person ‘had no enforceable right of action against the latter.’ Annotation 19 A.L.R.2d 1003 .” In support of her position defendant cites four cases of other jurisdictions which adhere to the minority rule that a joinder is allowable

1980In two of these cases, Puller v. Puller, 380 Pa. 219 , 110 A.2d 175 (1955), and Perchell v. District of Columbia, 444 F.2d 997 (D.C.Cir.1971), the courts based their ruling on the family member’s equitable duty to *319 share in his relative liability.

1980In two of these cases, Puller v. Puller, 380 Pa. 219 , 110 A.2d 175 (1955), and Perchell v. District of Columbia, 444 F.2d 997 (D.C.Cir.1971), the courts based their ruling on the family member’s equitable duty to *319 share in his relative liability.

1980In two of these cases, Puller v. Puller, 380 Pa. 219 , 110 A.2d 175 (1955), and Perchell v. District of Columbia, 444 F.2d 997 (D.C.Cir.1971), the courts based their ruling on the family member’s equitable duty to *319 share in his relative liability.

1972People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill.2d 510 , 268 N.E.2d 695 ; Luck v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 151 , 348 F.2d 763 ; Gordon v. United States, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 343 , 383 F.2d 936 .

1972People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill.2d 510 , 268 N.E.2d 695 ; Luck v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 151 , 348 F.2d 763 ; Gordon v. United States, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 343 , 383 F.2d 936 .

1972People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill.2d 510 , 268 N.E.2d 695 ; Luck v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 151 , 348 F.2d 763 ; Gordon v. United States, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 343 , 383 F.2d 936 .

1972People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill.2d 510 , 268 N.E.2d 695 ; Luck v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 151 , 348 F.2d 763 ; Gordon v. United States, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 343 , 383 F.2d 936 .

1971He is not required to make any demand of the state or the court for a speedy trial. * * * A contrary statement made by this court in Chelf v. State, 1944, 223 Ind. 70 , 58 N.E.2d 353 is hereby overruled.” In my view, the minority rule is the correct one.

1971He is not required to make any demand of the state or the court for a speedy trial. * * * A contrary statement made by this court in Chelf v. State, 1944, 223 Ind. 70 , 58 N.E.2d 353 is hereby overruled.” In my view, the minority rule is the correct one.

1966But Missouri has not adopted any of these alternatives ( 59 Yale L.J. 1177 , 1183), in this jurisdiction general business corporations have, subject to certain restrictions, power “to purchase, take, receive, or otherwise acquire, hold, own, * * * its own shares; provided, that it shall not purchase, either directly or indirectly, its own shares when its net assets are less than its stated capital, or when by so doing its net assets would be reduced below its stated capital.” RSMo 1959, § 351.390, V.A.M.S.; Burg v. Bonne Terre Foundry Co.., Mo.App., 354 S.W.2d 303, 306 .

1961Before the Downey case was decided, the Supreme Court in Glencoe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Hudson Brothers Comm. Co., 138 Mo. 439 , 40 S.W. 93, 94 , 36 L.R.A. 804 , followed the minority rule in the historic case of Lumley v. Gye (1853), 2 El. & Bl. 216, 118 Eng.Reprint 749, in which the dissenting opinion stated, that “merely to induce or procure a free contracting party to break his covenant, whether done maliciously or not, to the damage of another * * * is not actionable”.

1961Before the Downey case was decided, the Supreme Court in Glencoe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Hudson Brothers Comm. Co., 138 Mo. 439 , 40 S.W. 93, 94 , 36 L.R.A. 804 , followed the minority rule in the historic case of Lumley v. Gye (1853), 2 El. & Bl. 216, 118 Eng.Reprint 749, in which the dissenting opinion stated, that “merely to induce or procure a free contracting party to break his covenant, whether done maliciously or not, to the damage of another * * * is not actionable”.

1955The minority rule appears to be embodied in the decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in the case of Board of Review v. Mid-Continent Petro *627 leum Corp., 193 Okl. 36 , 141 P.2d 69 .

1955The minority rule appears to be embodied in the decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in the case of Board of Review v. Mid-Continent Petro *627 leum Corp., 193 Okl. 36 , 141 P.2d 69 .

1955In the case of Campbell v. Dotson, 111 Ky. 125 , 63 S.W. 480, 481 , the facts and applicable constitutional provisions were similar to the facts and statutory provisions herein-above set forth.

1955In the case of Campbell v. Dotson, 111 Ky. 125 , 63 S.W. 480, 481 , the facts and applicable constitutional provisions were similar to the facts and statutory provisions herein-above set forth.

1945Clyburn v. Reynolds, 31 S.C. 91 , 9 S.E. 973 ; Green v. Green, 50 S.C. 514 , 27 S.E. 952 ; Crook v. Hartford Fire Ins.

1945Clyburn v. Reynolds, 31 S.C. 91 , 9 S.E. 973 ; Green v. Green, 50 S.C. 514 , 27 S.E. 952 ; Crook v. Hartford Fire Ins.

1945Clyburn v. Reynolds, 31 S.C. 91 , 9 S.E. 973 ; Green v. Green, 50 S.C. 514 , 27 S.E. 952 ; Crook v. Hartford Fire Ins.

1945Clyburn v. Reynolds, 31 S.C. 91 , 9 S.E. 973 ; Green v. Green, 50 S.C. 514 , 27 S.E. 952 ; Crook v. Hartford Fire Ins.

1939The case which precedes the annotations is Albuquerque v. Water Supply Co., 24 N.M. 368 , 174 P. 217 , 5 A.L.R. 519 .

1939The case which precedes the annotations is Albuquerque v. Water Supply Co., 24 N.M. 368 , 174 P. 217 , 5 A.L.R. 519 .

1932Missouri - is given as supporting the minority rule in Younger v. Hoge, 211 Mo. 444 , 18 L.

1930In Wright v. Salisbury, 46 Mo. 26 , a bill in equity was brought to set off a claim and enjoin the collection of a judgment.

1930App. 522 , 72 S.W. 1025 ; Hughes v. M'Coun's Adm'r, 3 Bibb (Ky.), 254.] The Supreme Court of Missouri seems to have acquiesced in the minority rule.

1928The court, l. c. 509, said— “The legislative intent in the enactment of sections 127 and 189 of the original act was to remove the conflict between the majority and the minority holdings in this particular, and to make clear that thereafter the drawee should not be deemed liable to a holder, as had theretofore been held under the minority rule, at least in those situations where the holder’s claim to be an assignee rested upon the instrument alone. ’ ’ - And at l. c. 511 — “Upon a review of the decision in various jurisdictions since the adoption of the uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, it m

1928The court, l. c. 509, said— “The legislative intent in the enactment of sections 127 and 189 of the original act was to remove the conflict between the majority and the minority holdings in this particular, and to make clear that thereafter the drawee should not be deemed liable to a holder, as had theretofore been held under the minority rule, at least in those situations where the holder’s claim to be an assignee rested upon the instrument alone. ’ ’ - And at l. c. 511 — “Upon a review of the decision in various jurisdictions since the adoption of the uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, it m

1928Bank, 211 N. W. 506 (Iowa), the court stated that the State of Iowa, before the adoption of the negotiable instrument law, had adhered to the minority rule and that the purpose of the adoption of the negotiable instrument law in reference to the question now before us, was to prescribe a rule in accordance with the majority holding, that is, that a check or draft of itself does not operate pro tanto as an assignment of the fund on deposit and that the drawee, the bank, is not liable to the payee until it has accepted or certified the instrument.