minority rule in Rhode Island

2013In O’Coin v. Woonsocket Institution Trust Co., 535 A.2d 1263, 1267 (R.I.1988), we stated that, under a rule adopted by ¿ majority of jurisdictions, the testimonial privilege protects a witness's testimony if the statements are both material and relevant, whereas the minority rule grants "a witness an unconditional privilege regarding testimony given." While in O'Coin, we recognized that a testimonial privilege exists in Rhode Island, we declined to address the scope of that privilege because the testimony at issue in that case was protected under both the broad minority rule and the narrower m

2013Id.

2001In LaFreniere v. Sprague, 108 R.I. 43, 50-51 , 271 A.2d 819, 823 (1970) and Paquin v. Guiorguiev, 117 R.I. 239, 243 , 366 A.2d 169, 171 (1976) this Court rejected the minority rule that an adverse possessor must have entered upon a private landowner’s property with a specific, self-conscious knowledge that such possessor's own conduct was adverse to another’s ownership interest.

2001In LaFreniere v. Sprague, 108 R.I. 43, 50-51 , 271 A.2d 819, 823 (1970) and Paquin v. Guiorguiev, 117 R.I. 239, 243 , 366 A.2d 169, 171 (1976) this Court rejected the minority rule that an adverse possessor must have entered upon a private landowner’s property with a specific, self-conscious knowledge that such possessor's own conduct was adverse to another’s ownership interest.

2001See G.L. 1956 § 34-7-1; see also Burke-Tarr Co. v. Ferland Corp., 724 A.2d 1014, 1020 (R.I.1999); Jerry Brown Farm Association, Inc. v. Kenyon, 119 R.I. 43, 48-49 , 375 A.2d 964, 967 (1977). [4] In LaFreniere v. Sprague, 108 R.I. 43, 50-51 , 271 A.2d 819, 823 (1970) and Paquin v. Guiorguiev, 117 R.I. 239, 243 , 366 A.2d 169, 171 (1976) this Court rejected the minority rule that an adverse possessor must have entered upon a private landowner's property with a specific, self-conscious knowledge that such possessor's own conduct was adverse to another's ownership interest. [5] This situation may

2001See G.L. 1956 § 34-7-1; see also Burke-Tarr Co. v. Ferland Corp., 724 A.2d 1014, 1020 (R.I.1999); Jerry Brown Farm Association, Inc. v. Kenyon, 119 R.I. 43, 48-49 , 375 A.2d 964, 967 (1977). [4] In LaFreniere v. Sprague, 108 R.I. 43, 50-51 , 271 A.2d 819, 823 (1970) and Paquin v. Guiorguiev, 117 R.I. 239, 243 , 366 A.2d 169, 171 (1976) this Court rejected the minority rule that an adverse possessor must have entered upon a private landowner's property with a specific, self-conscious knowledge that such possessor's own conduct was adverse to another's ownership interest. [5] This situation may

2001See G.L. 1956 § 34-7-1; see also Burke-Tarr Co. v. Ferland Corp., 724 A.2d 1014, 1020 (R.I.1999); Jerry Brown Farm Association, Inc. v. Kenyon, 119 R.I. 43, 48-49 , 375 A.2d 964, 967 (1977). [4] In LaFreniere v. Sprague, 108 R.I. 43, 50-51 , 271 A.2d 819, 823 (1970) and Paquin v. Guiorguiev, 117 R.I. 239, 243 , 366 A.2d 169, 171 (1976) this Court rejected the minority rule that an adverse possessor must have entered upon a private landowner's property with a specific, self-conscious knowledge that such possessor's own conduct was adverse to another's ownership interest. [5] This situation may

2001In LaFreniere v. Sprague, 108 R.I. 43, 50-51 , 271 A.2d 819, 823 (1970) and Paquin v. Guiorguiev, 117 R.I. 239, 243 , 366 A.2d 169, 171 (1976) this Court rejected the minority rule that an adverse possessor must have entered upon a private landowner’s property with a specific, self-conscious knowledge that such possessor's own conduct was adverse to another’s ownership interest.

2001In LaFreniere v. Sprague, 108 R.I. 43, 50-51 , 271 A.2d 819, 823 (1970) and Paquin v. Guiorguiev, 117 R.I. 239, 243 , 366 A.2d 169, 171 (1976) this Court rejected the minority rule that an adverse possessor must have entered upon a private landowner’s property with a specific, self-conscious knowledge that such possessor's own conduct was adverse to another’s ownership interest.

1998See, e.g., Lopez v. Lopez, 90 So.2d 456, 458-59 (Fla.1956) (holding that surviving spouse was not entitled to contribution from deceased spouse’s estate of sum equal to one-half of balance due on two purchase money mortgages and notes executed by both parties on land held by them as tenants by the entirety; emphasizing that because interest of decedent in property ceases at death, it would be “unconscionable and inequitable” to hold decedent responsible for part of purchase price thereof that was unpaid at death); Ratte v. Ratte, 260 Mass. 165 , 156 N.E. 870, 871 (1927) .(holding that survivin

1998See, e.g., Lopez v. Lopez, 90 So.2d 456, 458-59 (Fla.1956) (holding that surviving spouse was not entitled to contribution from deceased spouse’s estate of sum equal to one-half of balance due on two purchase money mortgages and notes executed by both parties on land held by them as tenants by the entirety; emphasizing that because interest of decedent in property ceases at death, it would be “unconscionable and inequitable” to hold decedent responsible for part of purchase price thereof that was unpaid at death); Ratte v. Ratte, 260 Mass. 165 , 156 N.E. 870, 871 (1927) .(holding that survivin

1998See, e.g., Lopez v. Lopez, 90 So.2d 456, 458-59 (Fla.1956) (holding that surviving spouse was not entitled to contribution from deceased spouse’s estate of sum equal to one-half of balance due on two purchase money mortgages and notes executed by both parties on land held by them as tenants by the entirety; emphasizing that because interest of decedent in property ceases at death, it would be “unconscionable and inequitable” to hold decedent responsible for part of purchase price thereof that was unpaid at death); Ratte v. Ratte, 260 Mass. 165 , 156 N.E. 870, 871 (1927) .(holding that survivin