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19 Iowa opinions name it 1 courts 1926–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sweetwine v. Stategreen2 sentences2007See Sweetwine, 421 A.2d at 65 n. 4. 2007See Sweetwine, 421 A.2d at 65 n.4. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Dale Joseph Martingreen2 sentences2010See United States v. Muriel, 418 F.3d 720, 724 (7th Cir.2005) (finding mistake by a police officer that the tailgating law utilized a two-car-length rule nevertheless supported probable cause because a law did exist prohibiting tailgating, and the facts supported a violation of the law); see also United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1001-02 (8th Cir.2005) (finding officer’s mistaken belief that operating a motor vehicle with one nonfunctioning brake light violated the law was objectively reasonable due to the statute’s ambiguous terms). 2010See United States v. Muriel, 418 F.3d 720, 724 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding mistake by a police officer that the tailgating law utilized a two-car-length rule nevertheless supported probable cause because a law did exist prohibiting tailgating, and the facts supported a violation of the law); see also United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998 , 1001–02 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding officer‘s mistaken belief that operating a motor vehicle with one nonfunctioning brake light violated the law was objectively reasonable due to the statute‘s ambiguous terms). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Oscar O. Murielgreen2 sentences2010See United States v. Muriel, 418 F.3d 720, 724 (7th Cir.2005) (finding mistake by a police officer that the tailgating law utilized a two-car-length rule nevertheless supported probable cause because a law did exist prohibiting tailgating, and the facts supported a violation of the law); see also United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1001-02 (8th Cir.2005) (finding officer’s mistaken belief that operating a motor vehicle with one nonfunctioning brake light violated the law was objectively reasonable due to the statute’s ambiguous terms). 2010See United States v. Muriel, 418 F.3d 720, 724 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding mistake by a police officer that the tailgating law utilized a two-car-length rule nevertheless supported probable cause because a law did exist prohibiting tailgating, and the facts supported a violation of the law); see also United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998 , 1001–02 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding officer‘s mistaken belief that operating a motor vehicle with one nonfunctioning brake light violated the law was objectively reasonable due to the statute‘s ambiguous terms). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Timothy W. Washingtongreen2 sentences2010See United States v. Washington, 455 F.3d 824, 827-28 (8th Cir.2006) (holding mistake of law is not objectively reasonable when the police officer believed a cracked windshield violated the law, but the actual law only prohibited physical objects on a windshield that obstructed the driver’s view). 2010See United States v. Washington, 455 F.3d 824 , 827–28 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding mistake of law is not objectively reasonable when the police officer believed a cracked windshield violated the law, but the actual law only prohibited physical objects on a windshield that obstructed the driver‘s view). | 1 | 1 |
Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis v. County of Tazewellgreen2 sentences1991Sisters of the Third Order v. County of Tazewell, 122 Ill.App.3d 605, 607 , 78 Ill.Dec. 230 , 232, 461 N.E.2d 1064, 1066 (1984); Cuyahoga County Hosp. v. City of Cleveland, 15 Ohio App.3d 70, 71 , 472 N.E.2d 757, 759 (1984). 1991Sisters of the Third Order v. County of Tazewell, 122 Ill.App.3d 605, 607 , 78 Ill.Dec. 230 , 232, 461 N.E.2d 1064, 1066 (1984); Cuyahoga County Hosp. v. City of Cleveland, 15 Ohio App.3d 70, 71 , 472 N.E.2d 757, 759 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
Cuyahoga County Hospital v. City of Clevelandgreen2 sentences1991Sisters of the Third Order v. County of Tazewell, 122 Ill.App.3d 605, 607 , 78 Ill.Dec. 230 , 232, 461 N.E.2d 1064, 1066 (1984); Cuyahoga County Hosp. v. City of Cleveland, 15 Ohio App.3d 70, 71 , 472 N.E.2d 757, 759 (1984). 1991Sisters of the Third Order v. County of Tazewell, 122 Ill.App.3d 605, 607 , 78 Ill.Dec. 230 , 232, 461 N.E.2d 1064, 1066 (1984); Cuyahoga County Hosp. v. City of Cleveland, 15 Ohio App.3d 70, 71 , 472 N.E.2d 757, 759 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
Weber Appealgreen2 sentences1978See In re Election of Supervisor in Springfield Twp., 399 Pa. 37 , 159 A.2d 901 (1960); State ex rel. 1978See In re Election of Supervisor in Springfield Twp., 399 Pa. 37 , 159 A.2d 901 (1960); State ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
| Lewis v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
Mattie M. Evans v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1977United States v. Burks, 152 U.S.App.D.C. 284, 289 , 470 F.2d 432, 437 (1972); Evans v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 324, 325-326 , 277 F.2d 354, 356 (1960); United States v. McIntire, 461 F.2d 1092, 1093 (5th Cir. 1972). 1977United States v. Burks, 152 U.S.App.D.C. 284, 289 , 470 F.2d 432, 437 (1972); Evans v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 324, 325-326 , 277 F.2d 354, 356 (1960); United States v. McIntire, 461 F.2d 1092, 1093 (5th Cir. 1972). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Ruth Louise McIntiregreen1 sentence1977United States v. Burks, 152 U.S.App.D.C. 284, 289 , 470 F.2d 432, 437 (1972); Evans v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 324, 325-326 , 277 F.2d 354, 356 (1960); United States v. McIntire, 461 F.2d 1092, 1093 (5th Cir. 1972). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. James H. Burksgreen2 sentences1977United States v. Burks, 152 U.S.App.D.C. 284, 289 , 470 F.2d 432, 437 (1972); Evans v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 324, 325-326 , 277 F.2d 354, 356 (1960); United States v. McIntire, 461 F.2d 1092, 1093 (5th Cir. 1972). 1977United States v. Burks, 152 U.S.App.D.C. 284, 289 , 470 F.2d 432, 437 (1972); Evans v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 324, 325-326 , 277 F.2d 354, 356 (1960); United States v. McIntire, 461 F.2d 1092, 1093 (5th Cir. 1972). | 1 | 1 |
Barnes v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1977The minority rule prevails in Texas, Lewis v. State, 463 S.W.2d 186, 187-188 (Ct.Crim.App.1971); in Virginia, Barnes v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 24, 25-26 , 197 S.E.2d 189, 190 (1973); and in California following a 1967 change in its Evidence Code, People v. Thomas, 269 Cal.App.2d 327, 328 , 74 Cal.Rptr. 617, 619 (1969). 1977The minority rule prevails in Texas, Lewis v. State, 463 S.W.2d 186, 187-188 (Ct.Crim.App.1971); in Virginia, Barnes v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 24, 25-26 , 197 S.E.2d 189, 190 (1973); and in California following a 1967 change in its Evidence Code, People v. Thomas, 269 Cal.App.2d 327, 328 , 74 Cal.Rptr. 617, 619 (1969). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Thomasgreen2 sentences1977The minority rule prevails in Texas, Lewis v. State, 463 S.W.2d 186, 187-188 (Ct.Crim.App.1971); in Virginia, Barnes v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 24, 25-26 , 197 S.E.2d 189, 190 (1973); and in California following a 1967 change in its Evidence Code, People v. Thomas, 269 Cal.App.2d 327, 328 , 74 Cal.Rptr. 617, 619 (1969). 1977The minority rule prevails in Texas, Lewis v. State, 463 S.W.2d 186, 187-188 (Ct.Crim.App.1971); in Virginia, Barnes v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 24, 25-26 , 197 S.E.2d 189, 190 (1973); and in California following a 1967 change in its Evidence Code, People v. Thomas, 269 Cal.App.2d 327, 328 , 74 Cal.Rptr. 617, 619 (1969). | 1 | 1 |
| Aboussie Ex Rel. Spell v. Aboussiegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kaesemeyer v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Andrews v. Harley Davidson, Inc.
green
2 sentences2009Andrews, 796 P.2d at 1095 . 2009Andrews, 796 P.2d at 1095 . | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Koehler Electric v. Wills
green
1 sentence2018Logically, whether the condition of a floor, just like any other workplace condition, posed an increased risk of injury should be determined factually, rather than predetermined by some legal "rule." Our Koehler Electric decision required only that "the employment must contribute to the hazard of the fall." 608 N.W.2d at 5 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Graf v. Taggert
green
2 sentences1981Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo.1976) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573 , 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303 , 204 A.2d 140 (1964) (“person” not construed; wrongful death action may not be maintained on behalf of fetus because determination of “pecuniary injuries resulting from death” too speculative); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478 , 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 , 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969) (“decedent” excludes seven-month old fetus); Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C.App. 390 , 213 S.E.2d 382 , cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464 , 215 1981Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo.1976) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573 , 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303 , 204 A.2d 140 (1964) (“person” not construed; wrongful death action may not be maintained on behalf of fetus because determination of “pecuniary injuries resulting from death” too speculative); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478 , 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 , 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969) (“decedent” excludes seven-month old fetus); Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C.App. 390 , 213 S.E.2d 382 , cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464 , 215 | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Egbert v. Wenzl
green
2 sentences1981Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo.1976) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573 , 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303 , 204 A.2d 140 (1964) (“person” not construed; wrongful death action may not be maintained on behalf of fetus because determination of “pecuniary injuries resulting from death” too speculative); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478 , 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 , 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969) (“decedent” excludes seven-month old fetus); Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C.App. 390 , 213 S.E.2d 382 , cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464 , 215 1981Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo.1976) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573 , 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303 , 204 A.2d 140 (1964) (“person” not construed; wrongful death action may not be maintained on behalf of fetus because determination of “pecuniary injuries resulting from death” too speculative); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478 , 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 , 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969) (“decedent” excludes seven-month old fetus); Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C.App. 390 , 213 S.E.2d 382 , cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464 , 215 | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Cardwell v. Welch
green
2 sentences1981Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo.1976) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573 , 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303 , 204 A.2d 140 (1964) (“person” not construed; wrongful death action may not be maintained on behalf of fetus because determination of “pecuniary injuries resulting from death” too speculative); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478 , 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 , 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969) (“decedent” excludes seven-month old fetus); Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C.App. 390 , 213 S.E.2d 382 , cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464 , 215 1981Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo.1976) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573 , 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303 , 204 A.2d 140 (1964) (“person” not construed; wrongful death action may not be maintained on behalf of fetus because determination of “pecuniary injuries resulting from death” too speculative); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478 , 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 , 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969) (“decedent” excludes seven-month old fetus); Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C.App. 390 , 213 S.E.2d 382 , cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464 , 215 | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Kilmer v. Hicks
green
2 sentences1981The minority rule, denying coverage for a viable fetus, is followed in these jurisdictions: Kilmer v. Hicks, 22 Ariz.App. 552 , 529 P.2d 706 (1975) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal.3d 564 , 565 P.2d 122 , 139 Cal.Rptr. 97 (1977) (“minor person” excludes viable fetus); Stern v. Miller, 348 So.2d 303 (Fla.1977) (“person” excludes seven-month old fetus); State ex rel. 1981The minority rule, denying coverage for a viable fetus, is followed in these jurisdictions: Kilmer v. Hicks, 22 Ariz.App. 552 , 529 P.2d 706 (1975) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal.3d 564 , 565 P.2d 122 , 139 Cal.Rptr. 97 (1977) (“minor person” excludes viable fetus); Stern v. Miller, 348 So.2d 303 (Fla.1977) (“person” excludes seven-month old fetus); State ex rel. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Scott v. Kopp
green
2 sentences1981Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo.1976) ("person" excludes viable fetus); Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573 , 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977) ("person" excludes viable fetus); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303 , 204 A.2d 140 (1964) ("person" not construed; wrongful death action may not be maintained on behalf of fetus because determination of "pecuniary injuries resulting from death" too speculative); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478 , 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 , 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969) ("decedent" excludes seven-month old fetus); Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C.App. 390 , 213 S.E.2d 382 , cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464 , 215 1981Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo.1976) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573 , 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303 , 204 A.2d 140 (1964) (“person” not construed; wrongful death action may not be maintained on behalf of fetus because determination of “pecuniary injuries resulting from death” too speculative); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478 , 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 , 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969) (“decedent” excludes seven-month old fetus); Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C.App. 390 , 213 S.E.2d 382 , cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464 , 215 | 1 | 1981–1981 |
State Ex Rel. Hardin v. Sanders
green
2 sentences1981Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo.1976) ("person" excludes viable fetus); Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573 , 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977) ("person" excludes viable fetus); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303 , 204 A.2d 140 (1964) ("person" not construed; wrongful death action may not be maintained on behalf of fetus because determination of "pecuniary injuries resulting from death" too speculative); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478 , 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 , 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969) ("decedent" excludes seven-month old fetus); Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C.App. 390 , 213 S.E.2d 382 , cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464 , 215 1981Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo.1976) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573 , 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303 , 204 A.2d 140 (1964) (“person” not construed; wrongful death action may not be maintained on behalf of fetus because determination of “pecuniary injuries resulting from death” too speculative); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478 , 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 , 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969) (“decedent” excludes seven-month old fetus); Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C.App. 390 , 213 S.E.2d 382 , cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464 , 215 | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Justus v. Atchison
green
2 sentences1981The minority rule, denying coverage for a viable fetus, is followed in these jurisdictions: Kilmer v. Hicks, 22 Ariz.App. 552 , 529 P.2d 706 (1975) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal.3d 564 , 565 P.2d 122 , 139 Cal.Rptr. 97 (1977) (“minor person” excludes viable fetus); Stern v. Miller, 348 So.2d 303 (Fla.1977) (“person” excludes seven-month old fetus); State ex rel. 1981The minority rule, denying coverage for a viable fetus, is followed in these jurisdictions: Kilmer v. Hicks, 22 Ariz.App. 552 , 529 P.2d 706 (1975) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal.3d 564 , 565 P.2d 122 , 139 Cal.Rptr. 97 (1977) (“minor person” excludes viable fetus); Stern v. Miller, 348 So.2d 303 (Fla.1977) (“person” excludes seven-month old fetus); State ex rel. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Stern v. Miller
green
2 sentences1981The minority rule, denying coverage for a viable fetus, is followed in these jurisdictions: Kilmer v. Hicks, 22 Ariz.App. 552 , 529 P.2d 706 (1975) ("person" excludes viable fetus); Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal.3d 564 , 565 P.2d 122 , 139 Cal.Rptr. 97 (1977) ("minor person" excludes viable fetus); Stern v. Miller, 348 So.2d 303 (Fla.1977) ("person" excludes seven-month old fetus); State ex rel. 1981The minority rule, denying coverage for a viable fetus, is followed in these jurisdictions: Kilmer v. Hicks, 22 Ariz.App. 552 , 529 P.2d 706 (1975) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal.3d 564 , 565 P.2d 122 , 139 Cal.Rptr. 97 (1977) (“minor person” excludes viable fetus); Stern v. Miller, 348 So.2d 303 (Fla.1977) (“person” excludes seven-month old fetus); State ex rel. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Hamby v. McDaniel
green
2 sentences1981Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo.1976) ("person" excludes viable fetus); Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573 , 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977) ("person" excludes viable fetus); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303 , 204 A.2d 140 (1964) ("person" not construed; wrongful death action may not be maintained on behalf of fetus because determination of "pecuniary injuries resulting from death" too speculative); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478 , 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 , 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969) ("decedent" excludes seven-month old fetus); Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C.App. 390 , 213 S.E.2d 382 , cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464 , 215 1981Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo.1976) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573 , 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303 , 204 A.2d 140 (1964) (“person” not construed; wrongful death action may not be maintained on behalf of fetus because determination of “pecuniary injuries resulting from death” too speculative); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478 , 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 , 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969) (“decedent” excludes seven-month old fetus); Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C.App. 390 , 213 S.E.2d 382 , cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464 , 215 | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co.
green
2 sentences1981Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo.1976) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573 , 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303 , 204 A.2d 140 (1964) (“person” not construed; wrongful death action may not be maintained on behalf of fetus because determination of “pecuniary injuries resulting from death” too speculative); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478 , 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 , 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969) (“decedent” excludes seven-month old fetus); Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C.App. 390 , 213 S.E.2d 382 , cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464 , 215 1981Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo.1976) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573 , 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303 , 204 A.2d 140 (1964) (“person” not construed; wrongful death action may not be maintained on behalf of fetus because determination of “pecuniary injuries resulting from death” too speculative); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478 , 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 , 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969) (“decedent” excludes seven-month old fetus); Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C.App. 390 , 213 S.E.2d 382 , cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464 , 215 | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Endresz v. Friedberg
green
2 sentences1981Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo.1976) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573 , 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303 , 204 A.2d 140 (1964) (“person” not construed; wrongful death action may not be maintained on behalf of fetus because determination of “pecuniary injuries resulting from death” too speculative); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478 , 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 , 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969) (“decedent” excludes seven-month old fetus); Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C.App. 390 , 213 S.E.2d 382 , cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464 , 215 1981Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo.1976) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573 , 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303 , 204 A.2d 140 (1964) (“person” not construed; wrongful death action may not be maintained on behalf of fetus because determination of “pecuniary injuries resulting from death” too speculative); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478 , 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 , 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969) (“decedent” excludes seven-month old fetus); Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C.App. 390 , 213 S.E.2d 382 , cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464 , 215 | 1 | 1981–1981 |
McKillip v. Zimmerman
green
2 sentences1981McKillip v. Zimmerman, 191 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1971). 1981McKillip v. Zimmerman, 191 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1971). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Carpenter v. Carpenter
neutral
2 sentences1981Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo.1976) ("person" excludes viable fetus); Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573 , 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977) ("person" excludes viable fetus); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303 , 204 A.2d 140 (1964) ("person" not construed; wrongful death action may not be maintained on behalf of fetus because determination of "pecuniary injuries resulting from death" too speculative); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478 , 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 , 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969) ("decedent" excludes seven-month old fetus); Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C.App. 390 , 213 S.E.2d 382 , cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464 , 215 1981Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo.1976) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573 , 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303 , 204 A.2d 140 (1964) (“person” not construed; wrongful death action may not be maintained on behalf of fetus because determination of “pecuniary injuries resulting from death” too speculative); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478 , 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 , 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969) (“decedent” excludes seven-month old fetus); Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C.App. 390 , 213 S.E.2d 382 , cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464 , 215 | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Cardwell v. Welch
neutral
2 sentences1981Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo.1976) ("person" excludes viable fetus); Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573 , 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977) ("person" excludes viable fetus); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303 , 204 A.2d 140 (1964) ("person" not construed; wrongful death action may not be maintained on behalf of fetus because determination of "pecuniary injuries resulting from death" too speculative); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478 , 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 , 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969) ("decedent" excludes seven-month old fetus); Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C.App. 390 , 213 S.E.2d 382 , cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464 , 215 1981Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo.1976) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573 , 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977) (“person” excludes viable fetus); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303 , 204 A.2d 140 (1964) (“person” not construed; wrongful death action may not be maintained on behalf of fetus because determination of “pecuniary injuries resulting from death” too speculative); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478 , 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 , 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969) (“decedent” excludes seven-month old fetus); Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C.App. 390 , 213 S.E.2d 382 , cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464 , 215 | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Delaney v. State
green
1 sentence1977“The reasons for the rule prohibiting proof of specific acts of violence appear to be at least threefold: (1) A single act may have been exceptional, unusual, and not characteristic and thus a specific act does not necessarily establish one’s general character; (2) although the state is bound to foresee that the general character of the deceased may be put in issue, it cannot anticipate and prepare to rebut each and every specific act of violence; and (3) permitting proof of specific acts would multiply the issues, prolong the trial and confuse the jury.” Henderson v. State, supra, 234 Ga. at | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Henderson v. State
green
1 sentence1977“The reasons for the rule prohibiting proof of specific acts of violence appear to be at least threefold: (1) A single act may have been exceptional, unusual, and not characteristic and thus a specific act does not necessarily establish one’s general character; (2) although the state is bound to foresee that the general character of the deceased may be put in issue, it cannot anticipate and prepare to rebut each and every specific act of violence; and (3) permitting proof of specific acts would multiply the issues, prolong the trial and confuse the jury.” Henderson v. State, supra, 234 Ga. at | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Wheat v. Carter green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Dickow v. Cookinham green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Selby v. Kuhns green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Daily v. Somberg green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Galloway v. Lawrence green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Clara Rudick v. Pioneer Memorial Hospital, Denison M. Thomas, M.D., and Charles E. Donley, M.D. neutral | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Hansen v. Collett green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Ash v. Mortensen green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Couillard v. Charles T. Miller Hospital, Inc. green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Derby v. Prewitt green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| DeNike v. Mowery green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Spear v. Robinson green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Halada v. Venice Lake Park, Inc. neutral | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Keller v. Keller green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Doon Township v. Cummins green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Reynolds v. Lyon County green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Hibbs v. Fenton neutral | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Heins v. Lincoln green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Fullerton v. Sherrill green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Peck neutral | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Clark v. Toronto Bank green | 1 | 1926–1926 |
| Roberts v. Austin Corbin & Co. green | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.