minority rule in Ohio

2015Evid.R. 616 states that ‘bias, prejudice, interest, or any motive to misrepresent may be shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by extrinsic evidence.’ In State v. Williams (1988), 61 Ohio App. 3d 594, 597 , * * *, quoting from 3 Weinstein, Evidence (1988), Section 607(03), at 607-27, the court stated: {¶85} “‘Because the possible bias of a witness is always significant in assessing credibility, the trier of fact must be sufficiently informed of the underlying relationships, circumstances, and influences operating on the witness “so that, in the light of his exper

2015Evid.R. 616 states that ‘bias, prejudice, interest, or any motive to misrepresent may be shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by extrinsic evidence.’ In State v. Williams (1988), 61 Ohio App. 3d 594, 597 , * * *, quoting from 3 Weinstein, Evidence (1988), Section 607(03), at 607-27, the court stated: {¶85} “‘Because the possible bias of a witness is always significant in assessing credibility, the trier of fact must be sufficiently informed of the underlying relationships, circumstances, and influences operating on the witness “so that, in the light of his exper

2014Such a statutory construction results in an unlawful taking by operation of law, proscribed by Ohio Constitution, Article I, Sections 1 and 9, as construed by the Ohio Supreme Court in City of Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St.3d 353 , 2006-Ohio-3799 , 853 N.E.2d 1115 . {¶80} Given Ohio constitutional principles and the minority analysis in Eisenbarth, the majority has incorrectly validated the trial court's resolution of the parties' interests to the severed mineral rights pursuant to the 1989 ODMA when the -24- 2006 ODMA controls.

2014Such a statutory construction results in an unlawful taking by operation of law, proscribed by Ohio Constitution, Article I, Sections 1 and 9, as construed by the Ohio Supreme Court in City of Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St.3d 353 , 2006-Ohio-3799 , 853 N.E.2d 1115 . {¶80} Given Ohio constitutional principles and the minority analysis in Eisenbarth, the majority has incorrectly validated the trial court's resolution of the parties' interests to the severed mineral rights pursuant to the 1989 ODMA when the -24- 2006 ODMA controls.

2010(Wainwright, J., dissenting). {¶ 42} Although a divided panel from the Fifth District implicitly favored the minority rule in Dever v. Lucas, 174 Ohio App.3d 725 , 2008-Ohio-332 , 884 N.E.2d 641 , there was a dissent in that case as well.

2010(Wainwright, J., dissenting). {¶ 42} Although a divided panel from the Fifth District implicitly favored the minority rule in Dever v. Lucas, 174 Ohio App.3d 725 , 2008-Ohio-332 , 884 N.E.2d 641 , there was a dissent in that case as well.

2006Co. v. Steinemer (C.A.11, 1984), 723 F.2d 873, 875 . {¶ 29} The minority rule with respect to intentional injury exclusions “ ‘follows the classic tort doctrine of looking to the natural and probable consequences of the insured’s act.’ ” Altena, 422 N.W.2d at 488 , quoting Pachucki, 89 Wis.2d at 708 , 278 N.W.2d 898 . “ ‘A third view is that the insured must have had the specific intent to cause the type of injury suffered.’ ” Id.

2006Co. v. Steinemer (C.A.11, 1984), 723 F.2d 873, 875 . {¶ 29} The minority rule with respect to intentional injury exclusions “ ‘follows the classic tort doctrine of looking to the natural and probable consequences of the insured’s act.’ ” Altena, 422 N.W.2d at 488 , quoting Pachucki, 89 Wis.2d at 708 , 278 N.W.2d 898 . “ ‘A third view is that the insured must have had the specific intent to cause the type of injury suffered.’ ” Id.

2006Co. v. Steinemer (C.A.11, 1984), 723 F.2d 873, 875 . {¶ 29} The minority rule with respect to intentional injury exclusions “ ‘follows the classic tort doctrine of looking to the natural and probable consequences of the insured’s act.’ ” Altena, 422 N.W.2d at 488 , quoting Pachucki, 89 Wis.2d at 708 , 278 N.W.2d 898 . “ ‘A third view is that the insured must have had the specific intent to cause the type of injury suffered.’ ” Id.

2006Co. v. Steinemer (C.A.11, 1984), 723 F.2d 873, 875 . {¶ 29} The minority rule with respect to intentional injury exclusions “ ‘follows the classic tort doctrine of looking to the natural and probable consequences of the insured’s act.’ ” Altena, 422 N.W.2d at 488 , quoting Pachucki, 89 Wis.2d at 708 , 278 N.W.2d 898 . “ ‘A third view is that the insured must have had the specific intent to cause the type of injury suffered.’ ” Id.

2003Some jurisdictions that have applied the minority rule are North Carolina, Hatcher v. Rose (1991), 329 N.C. 626 , 407 S.E.2d 172 ; Missouri, Skyles v. Burge (Mo.App.1990), 789 S.W.2d 116 ; Louisiana, Spillman v. Spillman (La.App.1987), 509 So.2d 442 ; and Pennsylvania, Mahoney v. Furches (1983), 503 Pa. 60 , 468 A.2d 458 .

2003Some jurisdictions that have applied the minority rule are North Carolina, Hatcher v. Rose (1991), 329 N.C. 626 , 407 S.E.2d 172 ; Missouri, Skyles v. Burge (Mo.App.1990), 789 S.W.2d 116 ; Louisiana, Spillman v. Spillman (La.App.1987), 509 So.2d 442 ; and Pennsylvania, Mahoney v. Furches (1983), 503 Pa. 60 , 468 A.2d 458 .

2003Some jurisdictions that have applied the minority rule are North Carolina, Hatcher v. Rose (1991), 329 N.C. 626 , 407 S.E.2d 172 ; Missouri, Skyles v. Burge (Mo.App.1990), 789 S.W.2d 116 ; Louisiana, Spillman v. Spillman (La.App.1987), 509 So.2d 442 ; and Pennsylvania, Mahoney v. Furches (1983), 503 Pa. 60 , 468 A.2d 458 .

2003To grant the right to prepay when a land installment contract is silent “may cause economic hardships upon the lender, ‘not the least of which includes the loss of the bargained-for-rate of return, an increased tax burden, unanticipated costs occasioned by the need to reinvest the principal, and for those creditors anxious to ensure regular payments not unlike an annuity, it undoes the mortgagee’s purpose in making the loan.’ ” Young, supra, quoting In re Arthur v. Burkich (1987), 131 A.D.2d 105 , 520 N.Y.S.2d 638 . {¶ 15} In contrast, the minority rule 3 presumes a right to prepayment where t

2003To grant the right to prepay when a land installment contract is silent “may cause economic hardships upon the lender, ‘not the least of which includes the loss of the bargained-for-rate of return, an increased tax burden, unanticipated costs occasioned by the need to reinvest the principal, and for those creditors anxious to ensure regular payments not unlike an annuity, it undoes the mortgagee’s purpose in making the loan.’ ” Young, supra, quoting In re Arthur v. Burkich (1987), 131 A.D.2d 105 , 520 N.Y.S.2d 638 . {¶ 15} In contrast, the minority rule 3 presumes a right to prepayment where t

2003Some jurisdictions that have applied the minority rule are North Carolina, Hatcher v. Rose (1991), 329 N.C. 626 , 407 S.E.2d 172 ; Missouri, Skyles v. Burge (Mo.App.1990), 789 S.W.2d 116 ; Louisiana, Spillman v. Spillman (La.App.1987), 509 So.2d 442 ; and Pennsylvania, Mahoney v. Furches (1983), 503 Pa. 60 , 468 A.2d 458 .

1988State v. Kehn (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 11, 19 , 4 O.O.3d 74, 78 , 361 N.E.2d 1330, 1335 , certiorari denied (1977), 434 U.S. 858 , 98 S.Ct. 180 , 54 L.Ed.2d 130 ; State v. Carlson (1986), 31 Ohio App.3d 72, 75 , 31 OBR 112, 115, 508 N.E.2d 999 , 1002: Weissenberger, Ohio Evidence (1985) 32-33, Witnesses, Section 607.7.

1988State v. Kehn (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 11, 19 , 4 O.O.3d 74, 78 , 361 N.E.2d 1330, 1335 , certiorari denied (1977), 434 U.S. 858 , 98 S.Ct. 180 , 54 L.Ed.2d 130 ; State v. Carlson (1986), 31 Ohio App.3d 72, 75 , 31 OBR 112, 115, 508 N.E.2d 999 , 1002: Weissenberger, Ohio Evidence (1985) 32-33, Witnesses, Section 607.7.

1988State v. Kehn (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 11, 19 , 4 O.O.3d 74, 78 , 361 N.E.2d 1330, 1335 , certiorari denied (1977), 434 U.S. 858 , 98 S.Ct. 180 , 54 L.Ed.2d 130 ; State v. Carlson (1986), 31 Ohio App.3d 72, 75 , 31 OBR 112, 115, 508 N.E.2d 999 , 1002: Weissenberger, Ohio Evidence (1985) 32-33, Witnesses, Section 607.7.

1988State v. Kehn (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 11, 19 , 4 O.O.3d 74, 78 , 361 N.E.2d 1330, 1335 , certiorari denied (1977), 434 U.S. 858 , 98 S.Ct. 180 , 54 L.Ed.2d 130 ; State v. Carlson (1986), 31 Ohio App.3d 72, 75 , 31 OBR 112, 115, 508 N.E.2d 999 , 1002: Weissenberger, Ohio Evidence (1985) 32-33, Witnesses, Section 607.7.

1986While plaintiff wishes that this court would adopt the minority rule, see, e.g., Rich v. Rosenshine (1947), 131 W.

1986Va. 30 , 45 S.E. 2d 499 , which holds that a violation of a sidewalk snow-removal ordinance creates a prima facie case of negligence, we decline to embrace such a standard.

1979Reese v. Seattle, supra. A reasonable mistake will protect the officer under this less recognized rule, however, it is criticized as being unfair and unproductive of vigorous law enforcement.

1966The first, Hulett v. Carey, Admr., 66 Minn. 327 , at page 336, 69 N. W. 31 , 61 Am.

1966The first, Hulett v. Carey, Admr., 66 Minn. 327 , at page 336, 69 N. W. 31 , 61 Am.

1958The minority rule, that separate actions may be maintained to recover for personal injuries and for damages to property resulting from the same wrongful act, is set forth in the following cases: Thelin v. Stewart (1893), 100 Cal., 372 , 34 P., 861 ; Lamb v. Harbaugh (1895), 105 Cal., 680 , 39 P., 56 ; Ochs v. Public Service Ry.

1958The minority rule, that separate actions may be maintained to recover for personal injuries and for damages to property resulting from the same wrongful act, is set forth in the following cases: Thelin v. Stewart (1893), 100 Cal., 372 , 34 P., 861 ; Lamb v. Harbaugh (1895), 105 Cal., 680 , 39 P., 56 ; Ochs v. Public Service Ry.

1958The minority rule, that separate actions may be maintained to recover for personal injuries and for damages to property resulting from the same wrongful act, is set forth in the following cases: Thelin v. Stewart (1893), 100 Cal., 372 , 34 P., 861 ; Lamb v. Harbaugh (1895), 105 Cal., 680 , 39 P., 56 ; Ochs v. Public Service Ry.

1958The minority rule, that separate actions may be maintained to recover for personal injuries and for damages to property resulting from the same wrongful act, is set forth in the following cases: Thelin v. Stewart (1893), 100 Cal., 372 , 34 P., 861 ; Lamb v. Harbaugh (1895), 105 Cal., 680 , 39 P., 56 ; Ochs v. Public Service Ry.

1954But it was contended in oral argument that Ohio has adopted the minority rule as exemplified in the case of Drinkwater v. Dinsmore, 80 N. Y., 390 , 36 A. R., 624, and the case of Pittsburgh, G. é St.

1934It is of special interest for t-wo reasons: first, it is decisive of the latter case from that state known as Re: Santourian, 125 Misc., 688 , 212 N. Y.

1934In searching the authorities that adhere to the minority rule hereinbefore discussed, we find the. case of Riggs v Palmer, 115 N. Y., 506 , 22 NE 188 , 5 L.R.A., 340 , supporting that view.

1934In searching the authorities that adhere to the minority rule hereinbefore discussed, we find the. case of Riggs v Palmer, 115 N. Y., 506 , 22 NE 188 , 5 L.R.A., 340 , supporting that view.

1923R., 1014, the text lays down the general rule as to the care required of the operator of an automobile toward an invited guest, as follows : “The rule is established by the weight of authority that the owner or operator of an automobile owes the duty to an invited guest to exercise reasonable care in its operation, and not unreasonably to expose him to danger and injury by increasing the hazard of travel.” The other rule, as announced in the case of Massaletti v. Fitzroy, supra, is classified as a minority rule.

1923The text urges that to hold the driver or owner of an automobile liable for the absence of ordinary care would interfere with hospitality and recreation, in acts of kindness, consideration, etc., and cites language in support thereof from the case of O’Shea v. Lavoy, 175 Wis., 456 .