minority rule in Colorado

2012See Hallman, 159 S.W.3d at 644 (citing cases that adopt the minority rule).

2012See Hallman, 159 S.W.3d at 644 (citing cases that adopt the minority rule).

2021See Hall v. Galmor, 2018 OK 59, ¶ 21 , 427 P.3d 1052, 1063 (“The shut-in well is capable of production in paying quantities such that the lease remains viable under the habendum clause . . . .”); Sandtana, Inc. v. Wallin Ranch Co., 2003 MT 329, ¶ 37 , 80 P.3d 1224, 1231 (“[D]iscovery of gas within the primary term was sufficient to continue the lease and . . . extraction was not necessary where there was no present market.”); Greene v. Coffey, 689 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (“‘[P]roduction’ is broadly defined to include 5In Boulder’s reply brief, it references a number of other defini

2021See Hall v. Galmor, 2018 OK 59, ¶ 21 , 427 P.3d 1052, 1063 (“The shut-in well is capable of production in paying quantities such that the lease remains viable under the habendum clause . . . .”); Sandtana, Inc. v. Wallin Ranch Co., 2003 MT 329, ¶ 37 , 80 P.3d 1224, 1231 (“[D]iscovery of gas within the primary term was sufficient to continue the lease and . . . extraction was not necessary where there was no present market.”); Greene v. Coffey, 689 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (“‘[P]roduction’ is broadly defined to include 5In Boulder’s reply brief, it references a number of other defini

2021See Hall v. Galmor, 2018 OK 59, ¶ 21 , 427 P.3d 1052, 1063 (“The shut-in well is capable of production in paying quantities such that the lease remains viable under the habendum clause . . . .”); Sandtana, Inc. v. Wallin Ranch Co., 2003 MT 329, ¶ 37 , 80 P.3d 1224, 1231 (“[D]iscovery of gas within the primary term was sufficient to continue the lease and . . . extraction was not necessary where there was no present market.”); Greene v. Coffey, 689 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (“‘[P]roduction’ is broadly defined to include 5In Boulder’s reply brief, it references a number of other defini

2021See Hall v. Galmor, 2018 OK 59, ¶ 21 , 427 P.3d 1052, 1063 (“The shut-in well is capable of production in paying quantities such that the lease remains viable under the habendum clause . . . .”); Sandtana, Inc. v. Wallin Ranch Co., 2003 MT 329, ¶ 37 , 80 P.3d 1224, 1231 (“[D]iscovery of gas within the primary term was sufficient to continue the lease and . . . extraction was not necessary where there was no present market.”); Greene v. Coffey, 689 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (“‘[P]roduction’ is broadly defined to include 5In Boulder’s reply brief, it references a number of other defini

2021See Hall v. Galmor, 2018 OK 59, ¶ 21 , 427 P.3d 1052, 1063 (“The shut-in well is capable of production in paying quantities such that the lease remains viable under the habendum clause . . . .”); Sandtana, Inc. v. Wallin Ranch Co., 2003 MT 329, ¶ 37 , 80 P.3d 1224, 1231 (“[D]iscovery of gas within the primary term was sufficient to continue the lease and . . . extraction was not necessary where there was no present market.”); Greene v. Coffey, 689 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (“‘[P]roduction’ is broadly defined to include 5In Boulder’s reply brief, it references a number of other defini

2017See, e.g., Smith v. Haden, 868 F. Supp. 1, 2-3 (D.D.C. 1994); Power Constructors, Inc. v. Taylor & Hintze, 960 P.2d 20, 31-32 (Alaska 1998); Teodorescu v. Bushnell, Gage, Reizen & Byington, 506 N.W.2d 275, 278-79 (Mich. Ct. App. 23 1993); Carbone v. Tierney, 864 A.2d 308, 319 (N.H. 2004); Kituskie, 714 A.2d at 1032 . ¶ 56 The minority rule relies on at least seven compelling rationales. ¶ 57 First, by the time the issue of collectibility arises in a legal malpractice trial, the need to prove it “is the result of an attorney’s established malpractice . . . .

2017See, e.g., Smith v. Haden, 868 F. Supp. 1, 2-3 (D.D.C. 1994); Power Constructors, Inc. v. Taylor & Hintze, 960 P.2d 20, 31-32 (Alaska 1998); Teodorescu v. Bushnell, Gage, Reizen & Byington, 506 N.W.2d 275, 278-79 (Mich. Ct. App. 23 1993); Carbone v. Tierney, 864 A.2d 308, 319 (N.H. 2004); Kituskie, 714 A.2d at 1032 . ¶ 56 The minority rule relies on at least seven compelling rationales. ¶ 57 First, by the time the issue of collectibility arises in a legal malpractice trial, the need to prove it “is the result of an attorney’s established malpractice . . . .

2017See, e.g., Smith v. Haden, 868 F. Supp. 1, 2-3 (D.D.C. 1994); Power Constructors, Inc. v. Taylor & Hintze, 960 P.2d 20, 31-32 (Alaska 1998); Teodorescu v. Bushnell, Gage, Reizen & Byington, 506 N.W.2d 275, 278-79 (Mich. Ct. App. 23 1993); Carbone v. Tierney, 864 A.2d 308, 319 (N.H. 2004); Kituskie, 714 A.2d at 1032 . ¶ 56 The minority rule relies on at least seven compelling rationales. ¶ 57 First, by the time the issue of collectibility arises in a legal malpractice trial, the need to prove it “is the result of an attorney’s established malpractice . . . .

2017See, e.g., Smith v. Haden, 868 F. Supp. 1, 2-3 (D.D.C. 1994); Power Constructors, Inc. v. Taylor & Hintze, 960 P.2d 20, 31-32 (Alaska 1998); Teodorescu v. Bushnell, Gage, Reizen & Byington, 506 N.W.2d 275, 278-79 (Mich. Ct. App. 23 1993); Carbone v. Tierney, 864 A.2d 308, 319 (N.H. 2004); Kituskie, 714 A.2d at 1032 . ¶ 56 The minority rule relies on at least seven compelling rationales. ¶ 57 First, by the time the issue of collectibility arises in a legal malpractice trial, the need to prove it “is the result of an attorney’s established malpractice . . . .

2012See Seitz v. Zac Smith & Co., 500 So.2d 706, 711 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987) (while the completed and accepted rule is the minority rule, and "severely criticized by some," it was still the law in Florida). 141 In contrast to the completed and accepted rule, the more modern foreseeability rule provides that a construction contractor is liable for injury or damage to a third person as a result of the condition of [its] work, even after completion of the work and its acceptance by the owner where i#t was reasonably foreseeable that third persons would be injured by such work due to the contractor's m

2009For example, in Pursell Construction, the Iowa Supreme Court refused to adopt the minority rule because the “fundamental nature of a comprehensive general liability policy” would then hold the insurer as “a guarantor of the insured’s performance of the contract,” and the insurance policy would thus take on the attributes of a performance bond. 596 N.W.2d at 71 ; see also Kvaerner, 908 A.2d at 899 (the minority rule improperly *536 converts an insurance policy into a performance bond).

2009The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the minority rule because it relied on “an overly broad interpretation of accident.” Kvaemer, 908 A.2d at 899 n. 9.

2009For example, in Lamar Homes, the dissent reasoned that the minority rule would dissuade contractors from avoiding unqualified subcontractors because the insurance companies, not the contractors, would pay for the consequences of a subcontractor’s defective workmanship. 242 S.W.3d at 20 (Brister, J., dissenting).

2009For example, in Lamar Homes, the dissent reasoned that the minority rule would dissuade contractors from avoiding unqualified subcontractors because the insurance companies, not the contractors, would pay for the consequences of a subcontractor’s defective workmanship. 242 S.W.3d at 20 (Brister, J., dissenting).

2009See, e.g., J.S.U.B., 979 So.2d at 885-86 .

1999See Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. Norton Co., 113 F.R.D. 588, 591 (D.Minn.1986); Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. Division of Bldg. & Const., 170 N.J.Super. 64 , 405 A.2d 487, 490 (Law Div. 1979).

1999See Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. Norton Co., 113 F.R.D. 588, 591 (D.Minn.1986); Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. Division of Bldg. & Const., 170 N.J.Super. 64 , 405 A.2d 487, 490 (Law Div. 1979).

1999See Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. Norton Co., 113 F.R.D. 588, 591 (D.Minn.1986); Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. Division of Bldg. & Const., 170 N.J.Super. 64 , 405 A.2d 487, 490 (Law Div. 1979).