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5 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1933–2003 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc.green2 sentences2003Rather, we find that the risk-benefit analysis comports with our Supreme Court's determination that claims for design defect are to be evaluated under a risk-utility analysis "balancing the risks inherent in a product design against the utility of the product so designed." Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 264 Ga. 732, 735 (1), 450 S.E.2d 671 (1994). 2003Rather, we find that the risk-benefit analysis comports with our Supreme Court's determination that claims for design defect are to be evaluated under a risk-utility analysis "balancing the risks inherent in a product design against the utility of the product so designed." Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 264 Ga. 732, 735 (1), 450 S.E.2d 671 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
Haynes v. Stategreen2 sentences1984The majority test, the `same evidence' test, has three variants: a `required evidence' or `elements of the crime' variant; an `alleged evidence' or `allegations of the indictment' variant; and an `actual evidence' variant." Haynes v. State, 249 Ga. 119, 123, 124 ( 288 SE2d 185 ) (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 1984The majority test, the `same evidence' test, has three variants: a `required evidence' or `elements of the crime' variant; an `alleged evidence' or `allegations of the indictment' variant; and an `actual evidence' variant." Haynes v. State, 249 Ga. 119, 123, 124 ( 288 SE2d 185 ) (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Corey Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Adjustment
green
2 sentences1994Co. v. Morgan, 222 Ga. 255 (2) ( 149 SE2d 489 ) (1966), is sufficient without more to vest in the landowner the right to use the property under the zoning regulations in effect at the time of the filing of the application for the permit. [2] This rule is set forth in WMM Properties v. Cobb County, 255 Ga. 436 ( 339 SE2d 252 ) (1986), rendered 11 months after this Court in Corey Outdoor Advertising, supra, quoted at length from the majority rule, as set forth in Barker, supra. *426 Georgia courts have cited with approval and applied both the majority and the minority rule in this area of the la 1994Co. v. Morgan, 222 Ga. 255 (2) ( 149 SE2d 489 ) (1966), is sufficient without more to vest in the landowner the right to use the property under the zoning regulations in effect at the time of the filing of the application for the permit. 2 This rule is set forth in WMM Properties v. Cobb County, 255 Ga. 436 ( 339 SE2d 252 ) (1986), rendered 11 months after this Court in Corey Outdoor Advertising, supra, quoted at length from the majority rule, as set forth in Barker, supra. Georgia courts have cited with approval and applied both the majority and the minority rule in this area of the law. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
WMM Properties, Inc. v. Cobb County
green
2 sentences1994Co. v. Morgan, 222 Ga. 255 (2) ( 149 SE2d 489 ) (1966), is sufficient without more to vest in the landowner the right to use the property under the zoning regulations in effect at the time of the filing of the application for the permit. [2] This rule is set forth in WMM Properties v. Cobb County, 255 Ga. 436 ( 339 SE2d 252 ) (1986), rendered 11 months after this Court in Corey Outdoor Advertising, supra, quoted at length from the majority rule, as set forth in Barker, supra. *426 Georgia courts have cited with approval and applied both the majority and the minority rule in this area of the la 1994Co. v. Morgan, 222 Ga. 255 (2) ( 149 SE2d 489 ) (1966), is sufficient without more to vest in the landowner the right to use the property under the zoning regulations in effect at the time of the filing of the application for the permit. [2] This rule is set forth in WMM Properties v. Cobb County, 255 Ga. 436 ( 339 SE2d 252 ) (1986), rendered 11 months after this Court in Corey Outdoor Advertising, supra, quoted at length from the majority rule, as set forth in Barker, supra. *426 Georgia courts have cited with approval and applied both the majority and the minority rule in this area of the la | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Clairmont Development Co. v. Morgan
green
2 sentences1994Co. v. Morgan, 222 Ga. 255 (2) ( 149 SE2d 489 ) (1966), is sufficient without more to vest in the landowner the right to use the property under the zoning regulations in effect at the time of the filing of the application for the permit. [2] This rule is set forth in WMM Properties v. Cobb County, 255 Ga. 436 ( 339 SE2d 252 ) (1986), rendered 11 months after this Court in Corey Outdoor Advertising, supra, quoted at length from the majority rule, as set forth in Barker, supra. *426 Georgia courts have cited with approval and applied both the majority and the minority rule in this area of the la 1994Co. v. Morgan, 222 Ga. 255 (2) ( 149 SE2d 489 ) (1966), is sufficient without more to vest in the landowner the right to use the property under the zoning regulations in effect at the time of the filing of the application for the permit. [2] This rule is set forth in WMM Properties v. Cobb County, 255 Ga. 436 ( 339 SE2d 252 ) (1986), rendered 11 months after this Court in Corey Outdoor Advertising, supra, quoted at length from the majority rule, as set forth in Barker, supra. *426 Georgia courts have cited with approval and applied both the majority and the minority rule in this area of the la | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Blevins
green
1 sentence1981This minority rule is reasoned and is founded upon the principle that “... a reversal of a conviction completely wipes out that conviction and makes the situation as though it had not been rendered . . .” State v. Blevins, supra, 158 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Calvo v. . Davies
green
1 sentence1933In § 156 it is stated as the general rule that “An agreement for an extension of time, entered into between the mortgagee and a grantee who has assumed the mortgage, will, if valid and made on sufficient consideration, so as to be legally enforceable, discharge the original mortgagor or intermediate grantees who may likewise have assumed the mortgage, unless the extension is assented to by the mortgagor or intermediate grantee.” Referring to the minority rule, it is stated in § 158: “The view is taken in some jurisdictions that though, as between themselves, the original mortgagor and his gran | 1 | 1933–1933 |
George v. Andrews
neutral
1 sentence1933R. 130), in which it was held: “When a grantee covenants to pay a mortgage on the granted premises, executed by the grantor, the relation of principal and surety arises; and an extension by the mortgagee of the time of payment of the mortgage, without the mortgagor’s consent, releases the grantor from personal liability.” See also George v. Andrews, 60 Md. 26 (45 Am. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.