minority rule in Washington

2009Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wn.2d 125, 130 , 331 P.2d 856 (1958). ¶10 Washington’s rule is the minority rule, and it offers more protection of development rights than the rule generally applied in other jurisdictions.

2009Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wn.2d 125, 130 , 331 P.2d 856 (1958). ¶10 Washington’s rule is the minority rule, and it offers more protection of development rights than the rule generally applied in other jurisdictions.

2016Washington's vested rights doctrine originated at common law, but "is now statutory." 2 Town of Woodway, 180 Wn.2d at 173 .

2016Id. ¶19 Washington’s vested rights doctrine originated at common law, but “is now statutory.” 2 Town of Woodway, 180 Wn.2d at 173 .

1997In Erickson & Assocs., Inc. v. McLerran, 123 Wn.2d 864 , 872 P.2d 1090 (1994), we declined to expand application of the vested rights doctrine to master use permits, stating at 873-74: Development interests and due process rights protected by the vested rights doctrine come at a cost to the public interest.

1996Washington’s common law doctrine of vested rights is a minority rule: "Washington’s vesting rule runs counter to the overwhelming majority rule that 'development is not immune from subsequently adopted regulations until a building permit has been obtained and substantial development has occurred in reliance on the permit.’ ” Erickson & Assocs., 123 Wn.2d at 868 (quoting Richard L.

2005Coast Storage Co. v. Schwartz, 55 Wn.2d 848, 854-55 , 351 P.2d 520 (1960) (consent required of all interested parties to relocate express easement); State ex rel.

2005Coast Storage Co. v. Schwartz, 55 Wn.2d 848, 854-55 , 351 P.2d 520 (1960) (consent required of all interested parties to relocate express easement); State ex rel.

1997RCW 58.17.033 expands the vested rights doctrine, a rule already acknowledged to be a minority rule in the United States, West Main Assocs., 106 Wn.2d 47 , and creates substantial public policy issues in land use law relating to the vesting of rights.

1997RCW 58.17.033 expands the vested rights doctrine, a rule already acknowledged to be a minority rule in the United States, West Main Assocs., 106 Wash.2d 47 , 720 P.2d 782 , and creates substantial public policy issues in land use law relating to the vesting of rights.

1997In Controlled Atmosphere, Inc. v. Branom Instrument Co., 50 Wn.

1997In Controlled Atmosphere, Inc. v. Branom Instrument Co., 50 Wash.App. 343, 348-49 , 748 P.2d 686 (1988) the parties never made any implied indemnity arguments.

1969Thereafter, in State v. Cyr, 40 Wn.2d 840 , 246 P.2d 480 (1952), we again acknowledged the general rule in this jurisdiction, but noted that we follow the minority rule in regard to the form of the question allowed.

1969Thereafter, in State v. Cyr, 40 Wn.2d 840 , 246 P.2d 480 (1952), we again acknowledged the general rule in this jurisdiction, but noted that we follow the minority rule in regard to the form of the question allowed.

2020We have also explained that a patient does not waive the privilege by testifying as an adverse witness, as that testimony does “not constitute a ‘voluntary opening of the door.’” Randa v. Bear, 50 Wn.2d 415, 421 , 312 P.2d 640 (1957) (quoting Packard v. Coberly, 147 Wash. 345 , 265 P. 1082 (1928)).

2020We have also explained that a patient does not waive the privilege by testifying as an adverse witness, as that testimony does “not constitute a ‘voluntary opening of the door.’” Randa v. Bear, 50 Wn.2d 415, 421 , 312 P.2d 640 (1957) (quoting Packard v. Coberly, 147 Wash. 345 , 265 P. 1082 (1928)).

2020We have also explained that a patient does not waive the privilege by testifying as an adverse witness, as that testimony does “not constitute a ‘voluntary opening of the door.’” Randa v. Bear, 50 Wn.2d 415, 421 , 312 P.2d 640 (1957) (quoting Packard v. Coberly, 147 Wash. 345 , 265 P. 1082 (1928)).

2020We have also explained that a patient does not waive the privilege by testifying as an adverse witness, as that testimony does “not constitute a ‘voluntary opening of the door.’” Randa v. Bear, 50 Wn.2d 415, 421 , 312 P.2d 640 (1957) (quoting Packard v. Coberly, 147 Wash. 345 , 265 P. 1082 (1928)).

2020We subsequently limited this holding to some extent, clarifying that “we did not there adopt the minority rule that waiver, by permitting one treating physician to testify without objection, is a waiver as to all.” Phipps, 74 Wn.2d at 448 n.9.

2016Id. ¶19 Washington’s vested rights doctrine originated at common law, but “is now statutory.” 2 Town of Woodway, 180 Wn.2d at 173 .

2014Park v. City of Redmond, 107 Wn.2d 621, 637 , 733 P.2d 182 (1987)).

2014Park v. City of Redmond, 107 Wn.2d 621, 637 , 733 P.2d 182 (1987)).

2014“Washington’s rule is the minority rule, and it offers [greater] protection of [developers’] rights than the rule generally applied in other jurisdictions.” Id. ¶13 Washington adopted this rule because we recognize that development rights are valuable property interests, and our doctrine ensures that “ ‘new land-use ordinances do not unduly oppress development rights, thereby denying a property owner’s right to due process under the law.’ ” Id. at 251 (quoting Valley View Indus.

2014“Washington’s rule is the minority rule, and it offers [greater] protection of [developers’] rights than the rule generally applied in other jurisdictions.” Id. ¶13 Washington adopted this rule because we recognize that development rights are valuable property interests, and our doctrine ensures that “ ‘new land-use ordinances do not unduly oppress development rights, thereby denying a property owner’s right to due process under the law.’ ” Id. at 251 (quoting Valley View Indus.

2012Id.

2010See Goines v. State, 708 So.2d 656 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1998); State v. Kettles, 345 N.J.Super. 466 , 785 A.2d 925 (Ct.App.

2010See Goines v. State, 708 So.2d 656 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1998); State v. Kettles, 345 N.J.Super. 466 , 785 A.2d 925 (Ct.App.

2010Swenson also agreed to a joint recommendation of a high end standard range sentence as to those offenses. [2] The court also followed the agreed recommendation for the other offenses. [3] North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). [4] In contrast, Swenson cites to a minority rule that bars a former prosecutor from sitting as a judge if he or she previously prosecuted the defendant.

2010Swenson also agreed to a joint recommendation of a high end standard range sentence as to those offenses. [2] The court also followed the agreed recommendation for the other offenses. [3] North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). [4] In contrast, Swenson cites to a minority rule that bars a former prosecutor from sitting as a judge if he or she previously prosecuted the defendant.

1987Mercer Enters, v. Bremerton, 93 Wn.2d 624, 627 , 611 P.2d 1237 (1980); Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wn.2d 125, 130 , 331 P.2d 856 (1958).

1987Mercer Enters, v. Bremerton, 93 Wn.2d 624, 627 , 611 P.2d 1237 (1980); Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wn.2d 125, 130 , 331 P.2d 856 (1958).

1987The Oregon Court of Appeals has also indicated approval of the minority rule in Carter v. Forstrom, 80 Or.

1987App. 213 , 722 P.2d 23 (1986) (dicta).

1983"While it may be that the felony murder statute is harsh, and while it does relieve the prosecution from the burden of proving intent to commit murder, it is the law of this state." State v. Thompson, 88 Wn.2d 13, 17 , 558 P.2d 202 (1977); State v. Harris, 69 Wn.2d 928 , 421 P.2d 662 (1966); State v. Safford, 24 Wn.

1983"While it may be that the felony murder statute is harsh, and while it does relieve the prosecution from the burden of proving intent to commit murder, it is the law of this state." State v. Thompson, 88 Wn.2d 13, 17 , 558 P.2d 202 (1977); State v. Harris, 69 Wn.2d 928 , 421 P.2d 662 (1966); State v. Safford, 24 Wn.

1983"While it may be that the felony murder statute is harsh, and while it does relieve the prosecution from the burden of proving intent to commit murder, it is the law of this state." State v. Thompson, 88 Wn.2d 13, 17 , 558 P.2d 202 (1977); State v. Harris, 69 Wn.2d 928 , 421 P.2d 662 (1966); State v. Safford, 24 Wn.

1983"While it may be that the felony murder statute is harsh, and while it does relieve the prosecution from the burden of proving intent to commit murder, it is the law of this state." State v. Thompson, 88 Wn.2d 13, 17 , 558 P.2d 202 (1977); State v. Harris, 69 Wn.2d 928 , 421 P.2d 662 (1966); State v. Safford, 24 Wn.

1983"While it may be that the felony murder statute is harsh, and while it does relieve the prosecution from the burden of proving intent to commit murder, it is the law of this state." State v. Thompson, 88 Wn.2d 13, 17 , 558 P.2d 202 (1977); State v. Harris, 69 Wn.2d 928 , 421 P.2d 662 (1966); State v. Safford, 24 Wn.

1981Georgia follows the minority rule regarding restrictive covenants — if the covenant is overly broad as to time and area, it is null and void and will not be enforced. (b) Central Specialties Co. v. Schaefer, 318 F. Supp. 855 (N.D.

1981Ill. 1970); Insurance Center, Inc. v. Taylor, 94 Idaho 896 , 499 P.2d 1252 (1972); H & R Block, Inc. v. Lovelace, 208 Kan. 538 , 493 P.2d 205 , 50 A.L.R.3d 730 (1972); and Pancake Realty Co. v. Harber, 137 W.

1981Ill. 1970); Insurance Center, Inc. v. Taylor, 94 Idaho 896 , 499 P.2d 1252 (1972); H & R Block, Inc. v. Lovelace, 208 Kan. 538 , 493 P.2d 205 , 50 A.L.R.3d 730 (1972); and Pancake Realty Co. v. Harber, 137 W.

1981Ill. 1970); Insurance Center, Inc. v. Taylor, 94 Idaho 896 , 499 P.2d 1252 (1972); H & R Block, Inc. v. Lovelace, 208 Kan. 538 , 493 P.2d 205 , 50 A.L.R.3d 730 (1972); and Pancake Realty Co. v. Harber, 137 W.

1981Ill. 1970); Insurance Center, Inc. v. Taylor, 94 Idaho 896 , 499 P.2d 1252 (1972); H & R Block, Inc. v. Lovelace, 208 Kan. 538 , 493 P.2d 205 , 50 A.L.R.3d 730 (1972); and Pancake Realty Co. v. Harber, 137 W.

1981Ill. 1970); Insurance Center, Inc. v. Taylor, 94 Idaho 896 , 499 P.2d 1252 (1972); H & R Block, Inc. v. Lovelace, 208 Kan. 538 , 493 P.2d 205 , 50 A.L.R.3d 730 (1972); and Pancake Realty Co. v. Harber, 137 W.