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11 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1924–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kim Jackson v. State of Florida & Kim Jackson v. Ricky D. Dixon, etc.green1 sentence2025See, e.g., United States v. Crouch, supra, 84 F.3d 1508-11; see also Jackson v. State, 347 So. 3d 292 , 306 (Fla. 2022) (rejecting balancing test under Florida law in favor of federal two-pronged test). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Coxgreen1 sentence2010Accordingly, [the court] decline[s] to impose a requirement that the subject be informed of the right to refuse consent.” Id., 183-84; see also Henry v. State, supra, 621 P.2d 4 n.9 (adopting Schneckloth because “the formal waiver requirements appropriate in a trial setting or during custodial interrogation would unjustifiably hamper proper police investigation”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hughesgreen1 sentence2008See, e.g., State v. Hughes, 35 Kan. 626, 629 , 12 P. 28 (1886) (“the weight of authority and the better reason support the proposition that the acts and declarations of the parties, coupled with cohabitation, are competent evidence to go to the jury in proof of marriage”); id. (“As a general rule, the confession of a party voluntarily and deliberately made, is evidence of the highest nature against him. | 1 | 1 |
Tabor v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2007See State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 30-31 (S.D.2002); State v. Agnello, 226 Wis.2d 164, 179-80, 182 , 593 N.W.2d 427 (1999); see also Tabor v. Commonwealth, 613 S.W.2d 133, 134 (Ky.1981) (Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.78 requires voluntariness of confession to be established by preponderance of evidence); State v. Washington, 296 S.C. 54 , 56, 370 S.E.2d 611 (1988) (clarifying that, although state must prove voluntariness of confession beyond reasonable doubt at trial, voluntariness need only be proven by preponderance of evidence at suppression hearing). 2007See State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 30-31 (S.D. 2002); State v. Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 164, 179-80, 182 , 593 N.W.2d 427 (1999); see also Tabor v. Commonwealth, 613 S.W.2d 133, 134 (Ky. 1981) (Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.78 requires voluntariness of confession to be established by preponderance of evidence); State v. Washington, 296 S.C. 54 , 56, 370 S.E.2d 611 (1988) (clarifying that, although state must prove voluntariness of confession beyond reasonable doubt at trial, voluntariness need only be proven by preponderance of evidence at suppression hearing). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Agnellogreen2 sentences2007See State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 30-31 (S.D. 2002); State v. Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 164, 179-80, 182 , 593 N.W.2d 427 (1999); see also Tabor v. Commonwealth, 613 S.W.2d 133, 134 (Ky. 1981) (Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.78 requires voluntariness of confession to be established by preponderance of evidence); State v. Washington, 296 S.C. 54 , 56, 370 S.E.2d 611 (1988) (clarifying that, although state must prove voluntariness of confession beyond reasonable doubt at trial, voluntariness need only be proven by preponderance of evidence at suppression hearing). 2007See State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 30-31 (S.D. 2002); State v. Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 164, 179-80, 182 , 593 N.W.2d 427 (1999); see also Tabor v. Commonwealth, 613 S.W.2d 133, 134 (Ky. 1981) (Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.78 requires voluntariness of confession to be established by preponderance of evidence); State v. Washington, 296 S.C. 54 , 56, 370 S.E.2d 611 (1988) (clarifying that, although state must prove voluntariness of confession beyond reasonable doubt at trial, voluntariness need only be proven by preponderance of evidence at suppression hearing). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Tuttlegreen2 sentences2007See State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 30-31 (S.D.2002); State v. Agnello, 226 Wis.2d 164, 179-80, 182 , 593 N.W.2d 427 (1999); see also Tabor v. Commonwealth, 613 S.W.2d 133, 134 (Ky.1981) (Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.78 requires voluntariness of confession to be established by preponderance of evidence); State v. Washington, 296 S.C. 54 , 56, 370 S.E.2d 611 (1988) (clarifying that, although state must prove voluntariness of confession beyond reasonable doubt at trial, voluntariness need only be proven by preponderance of evidence at suppression hearing). 2007See State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 30-31 (S.D. 2002); State v. Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 164, 179-80, 182 , 593 N.W.2d 427 (1999); see also Tabor v. Commonwealth, 613 S.W.2d 133, 134 (Ky. 1981) (Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.78 requires voluntariness of confession to be established by preponderance of evidence); State v. Washington, 296 S.C. 54 , 56, 370 S.E.2d 611 (1988) (clarifying that, although state must prove voluntariness of confession beyond reasonable doubt at trial, voluntariness need only be proven by preponderance of evidence at suppression hearing). | 1 | 1 |
Pietros v. Pietrosgreen1 sentence1999See, e.g., In re Marriage of Johnson, 88 Cal. App. 3d 848, 852 , 152 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1979) (estopping party regardless of monetary detriment); K.A.T. v. C.A.B., 645 A.2d 570, 573-74 (D.C. App. 1994) (requiring financial detriment in order to invoke equitable estoppel doctrine); Knill v. Knill, supra, 306 Md. 538 (same); A.R. v. C.R., 411 Mass. 570, 574-75 , 583 N.E.2d 840 (1992) (finding no estoppel and declining to decide whether emotional detriment alone sufficient to uphold claim of equitable estoppel); Watts v. Watts, 115 N.H. 186, 188-89 , 337 A.2d 350 (1975) (estopping husband from denyi | 1 | 1 |
In Re Marriage of Johnsongreen2 sentences1999See, e.g., In re Marriage of Johnson, 88 Cal. App. 3d 848, 852 , 152 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1979) (estopping party regardless of monetary detriment); K.A.T. v. C.A.B., 645 A.2d 570, 573-74 (D.C. App. 1994) (requiring financial detriment in order to invoke equitable estoppel doctrine); Knill v. Knill, supra, 306 Md. 538 (same); A.R. v. C.R., 411 Mass. 570, 574-75 , 583 N.E.2d 840 (1992) (finding no estoppel and declining to decide whether emotional detriment alone sufficient to uphold claim of equitable estoppel); Watts v. Watts, 115 N.H. 186, 188-89 , 337 A.2d 350 (1975) (estopping husband from denyi 1999See, e.g., In re Marriage of Johnson, 88 Cal. App. 3d 848, 852 , 152 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1979) (estopping party regardless of monetary detriment); K.A.T. v. C.A.B., 645 A.2d 570, 573-74 (D.C. App. 1994) (requiring financial detriment in order to invoke equitable estoppel doctrine); Knill v. Knill, supra, 306 Md. 538 (same); A.R. v. C.R., 411 Mass. 570, 574-75 , 583 N.E.2d 840 (1992) (finding no estoppel and declining to decide whether emotional detriment alone sufficient to uphold claim of equitable estoppel); Watts v. Watts, 115 N.H. 186, 188-89 , 337 A.2d 350 (1975) (estopping husband from denyi | 1 | 1 |
Wiese v. Wiesegreen1 sentence1999See, e.g., In re Marriage of Johnson, 88 Cal. App. 3d 848, 852 , 152 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1979) (estopping party regardless of monetary detriment); K.A.T. v. C.A.B., 645 A.2d 570, 573-74 (D.C. App. 1994) (requiring financial detriment in order to invoke equitable estoppel doctrine); Knill v. Knill, supra, 306 Md. 538 (same); A.R. v. C.R., 411 Mass. 570, 574-75 , 583 N.E.2d 840 (1992) (finding no estoppel and declining to decide whether emotional detriment alone sufficient to uphold claim of equitable estoppel); Watts v. Watts, 115 N.H. 186, 188-89 , 337 A.2d 350 (1975) (estopping husband from denyi | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Washington
green
2 sentences2007See State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 30-31 (S.D. 2002); State v. Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 164, 179-80, 182 , 593 N.W.2d 427 (1999); see also Tabor v. Commonwealth, 613 S.W.2d 133, 134 (Ky. 1981) (Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.78 requires voluntariness of confession to be established by preponderance of evidence); State v. Washington, 296 S.C. 54 , 56, 370 S.E.2d 611 (1988) (clarifying that, although state must prove voluntariness of confession beyond reasonable doubt at trial, voluntariness need only be proven by preponderance of evidence at suppression hearing). 2007See State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 30-31 (S.D. 2002); State v. Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 164, 179-80, 182 , 593 N.W.2d 427 (1999); see also Tabor v. Commonwealth, 613 S.W.2d 133, 134 (Ky. 1981) (Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.78 requires voluntariness of confession to be established by preponderance of evidence); State v. Washington, 296 S.C. 54 , 56, 370 S.E.2d 611 (1988) (clarifying that, although state must prove voluntariness of confession beyond reasonable doubt at trial, voluntariness need only be proven by preponderance of evidence at suppression hearing). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
AUDLANE LBR. & BLDRS. SUP., INC. v. DE Britt Associates, Inc.
green
1 sentence2001Britt Associates, Inc., 168 So.2d 333 , 335 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1964). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Milau Associates, Inc. v. North Avenue Development Corp.
green
2 sentences2001In rejecting an implied warranty theory, the court in Milau Associates, Inc. v. North Avenue Development Corp., 368 N.E.2d 1247 (N.Y. 1977), recognized the limited reach of the minority rule: "Where courts in other jurisdictions have purported to apply an implied warranty of fitness to transactions which in essence contemplated the rendition of services, what was actually imposed was no more than a `warranty' that the performer would not act negligently. . . ." (Citations omitted.) Id., 1251 ; see also Audlan Lumber Builders Supply, Inc. v. D.E. 2001In rejecting an implied warranty theory, the court in Milau Associates, Inc. v. North Avenue Development Corp., 368 N.E.2d 1247 (N.Y. 1977), recognized the limited reach of the minority rule: "Where courts in other jurisdictions have purported to apply an implied warranty of fitness to transactions which in essence contemplated the rendition of services, what was actually imposed was no more than a `warranty' that the performer would not act negligently. . . ." (Citations omitted.) Id., 1251 ; see also Audlan Lumber Builders Supply, Inc. v. D.E. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Watts v. Watts
green
2 sentences1999See, e.g., In re Marriage of Johnson, 88 Cal. App. 3d 848, 852 , 152 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1979) (estopping party regardless of monetary detriment); K.A.T. v. C.A.B., 645 A.2d 570, 573-74 (D.C. App. 1994) (requiring financial detriment in order to invoke equitable estoppel doctrine); Knill v. Knill, supra, 306 Md. 538 (same); A.R. v. C.R., 411 Mass. 570, 574-75 , 583 N.E.2d 840 (1992) (finding no estoppel and declining to decide whether emotional detriment alone sufficient to uphold claim of equitable estoppel); Watts v. Watts, 115 N.H. 186, 188-89 , 337 A.2d 350 (1975) (estopping husband from denyi 1999See, e.g., In re Marriage of Johnson, 88 Cal. App. 3d 848, 852 , 152 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1979) (estopping party regardless of monetary detriment); K.A.T. v. C.A.B., 645 A.2d 570, 573-74 (D.C. App. 1994) (requiring financial detriment in order to invoke equitable estoppel doctrine); Knill v. Knill, supra, 306 Md. 538 (same); A.R. v. C.R., 411 Mass. 570, 574-75 , 583 N.E.2d 840 (1992) (finding no estoppel and declining to decide whether emotional detriment alone sufficient to uphold claim of equitable estoppel); Watts v. Watts, 115 N.H. 186, 188-89 , 337 A.2d 350 (1975) (estopping husband from denyi | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Ar v. Cr
green
1 sentence1999See, e.g., In re Marriage of Johnson, 88 Cal. App. 3d 848, 852 , 152 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1979) (estopping party regardless of monetary detriment); K.A.T. v. C.A.B., 645 A.2d 570, 573-74 (D.C. App. 1994) (requiring financial detriment in order to invoke equitable estoppel doctrine); Knill v. Knill, supra, 306 Md. 538 (same); A.R. v. C.R., 411 Mass. 570, 574-75 , 583 N.E.2d 840 (1992) (finding no estoppel and declining to decide whether emotional detriment alone sufficient to uphold claim of equitable estoppel); Watts v. Watts, 115 N.H. 186, 188-89 , 337 A.2d 350 (1975) (estopping husband from denyi | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Miller v. Miller
green
2 sentences1999See, e.g., In re Marriage of Johnson, 88 Cal. App. 3d 848, 852 , 152 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1979) (estopping party regardless of monetary detriment); K.A.T. v. C.A.B., 645 A.2d 570, 573-74 (D.C. App. 1994) (requiring financial detriment in order to invoke equitable estoppel doctrine); Knill v. Knill, supra, 306 Md. 538 (same); A.R. v. C.R., 411 Mass. 570, 574-75 , 583 N.E.2d 840 (1992) (finding no estoppel and declining to decide whether emotional detriment alone sufficient to uphold claim of equitable estoppel); Watts v. Watts, 115 N.H. 186, 188-89 , 337 A.2d 350 (1975) (estopping husband from denyi 1999See, e.g., In re Marriage of Johnson, 88 Cal. App. 3d 848, 852 , 152 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1979) (estopping party regardless of monetary detriment); K.A.T. v. C.A.B., 645 A.2d 570, 573-74 (D.C. App. 1994) (requiring financial detriment in order to invoke equitable estoppel doctrine); Knill v. Knill, supra, 306 Md. 538 (same); A.R. v. C.R., 411 Mass. 570, 574-75 , 583 N.E.2d 840 (1992) (finding no estoppel and declining to decide whether emotional detriment alone sufficient to uphold claim of equitable estoppel); Watts v. Watts, 115 N.H. 186, 188-89 , 337 A.2d 350 (1975) (estopping husband from denyi | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Royal School Laboratories, Inc. v. Town of Watertown
green
1 sentence1992Royal School Laboratories, Inc., v. Watertown, 358 F.2d 813 , 816 (2d Cir. 1966). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Givens v. Berkley
green
2 sentences1982Givens v. Berkley, 108 Ky. 236 , 56 S.W. 158 (1900). 1982Givens v. Berkley, 108 Ky. 236 , 56 S.W. 158 (1900). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
green
2 sentences1982Connecticut followed the more liberal, albeit minority, rule extending the privilege to false statements that were made with a good faith belief in their truth and without the intent to harm one’s reputation; Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 615-16 , 116 A.2d 440 (1955) ; see also Prosser, Torts (4th Ed. 1971) § 118, pp. 819-20; but see 1 Harper & James, Torts § 5.26, p. 449 (characterizing minority rule as qualified privilege extending only to cases involving candidates for public office); the matter appeared to be resolved in favor of the minority rule in New Yor 1982Connecticut followed the more liberal, albeit minority, rule extending the privilege to false statements that were made with a good faith belief in their truth and without the intent to harm one’s reputation; Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 615-16 , 116 A.2d 440 (1955) ; see also Prosser, Torts (4th Ed. 1971) § 118, pp. 819-20; but see 1 Harper & James, Torts § 5.26, p. 449 (characterizing minority rule as qualified privilege extending only to cases involving candidates for public office); the matter appeared to be resolved in favor of the minority rule in New Yor | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co.
green
2 sentences1982Connecticut followed the more liberal, albeit minority, rule extending the privilege to false statements that were made with a good faith belief in their truth and without the intent to harm one’s reputation; Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 615-16 , 116 A.2d 440 (1955) ; see also Prosser, Torts (4th Ed. 1971) § 118, pp. 819-20; but see 1 Harper & James, Torts § 5.26, p. 449 (characterizing minority rule as qualified privilege extending only to cases involving candidates for public office); the matter appeared to be resolved in favor of the minority rule in New Yor 1982Connecticut followed the more liberal, albeit minority, rule extending the privilege to false statements that were made with a good faith belief in their truth and without the intent to harm one’s reputation; Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 615-16 , 116 A.2d 440 (1955) ; see also Prosser, Torts (4th Ed. 1971) § 118, pp. 819-20; but see 1 Harper & James, Torts § 5.26, p. 449 (characterizing minority rule as qualified privilege extending only to cases involving candidates for public office); the matter appeared to be resolved in favor of the minority rule in New Yor | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Benner v. Atlantic Dredging Co.
green
2 sentences1951This was upon the authority of Benner v. Atlantic Dredging Co., 134 N. Y. 156, 161 , 31 N. E. 328 . 1951This was upon the authority of Benner v. Atlantic Dredging Co., 134 N. Y. 156, 161 , 31 N. E. 328 . | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Booth v. . R., W. O.T.R.R. Co.
green
2 sentences1951Co., 140 N. Y. 267, 278 , 35 N. E. 592 , the leading case adhering to the minority rule, it is indicated that if the blasting had been done pursuant to a contract with the state that would be an added reason to deny absolute liability. 1951Co., 140 N. Y. 267, 278 , 35 N. E. 592 , the leading case adhering to the minority rule, it is indicated that if the blasting had been done pursuant to a contract with the state that would be an added reason to deny absolute liability. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Sigafus v. Porter
green
2 sentences1924That the minority rule has become the settled rule of the United States Supreme Court, Sigafus v. Porter, 179 U. S. 116 , 21 Sup. Ct. 34, and a number of the States, cannot now affect our adoption of the majority rule, since that choice rests not alone upon the great weight of authority, but upon what appears to us to be the better reason and to achieve the fairer result. 1924That the minority rule has become the settled rule of the United States Supreme Court, Sigafus v. Porter, 179 U. S. 116 , 21 Sup. Ct. 34, and a number of the States, cannot now affect our adoption of the majority rule, since that choice rests not alone upon the great weight of authority, but upon what appears to us to be the better reason and to achieve the fairer result. | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.