minority rule in Arkansas

2001In Valley Planting Co. v. Wise, 93 Ark. 1 , 123 S.W. 768 , 26 L.R.A.

2001In Valley Planting Co. v. Wise, 93 Ark. 1 , 123 S.W. 768 , 26 L.R.A.

1992We thought our position sound, citing the reasoning in Dullenty v. Rocky Mountain Fire & Casualty Co., 111 Idaho 98 , 721 P.2d 198 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Colonial Penn Franklin Insurance Co. v. Welch, 811 P.2d 838 (Idaho 1991): If an insurer is required to insure against a risk of an undesignated but owned vehicle, or a different and more dangerous vehicle of which it has no knowledge, it is thereby required to insure against risks of which it is unaware, unable to underwrite and unable to charge a premium therefor. ■ Appellants in this case suggest alternative reasons why we shou

1992We thought our position sound, citing the reasoning in Dullenty v. Rocky Mountain Fire & Casualty Co., Ill Idaho 98, 721 P.2d 198 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Colonial Penn Franklin Insurance Co. v. Welch, 119 Idaho 913 , 811 P.2d 838 (1991): If an insurer is required to insure against a risk of an undesignated but owned vehicle, or a different and more dangerous vehicle of which it has no knowledge, it is thereby required to insure against risks of which it is unaware, *595 unable to underwrite and unable to charge a premium therefor.

1992We thought our position sound, citing the reasoning in Dullenty v. Rocky Mountain Fire & Casualty Co., 111 Idaho 98 , 721 P.2d 198 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Colonial Penn Franklin Insurance Co. v. Welch, 811 P.2d 838 (Idaho 1991): If an insurer is required to insure against a risk of an undesignated but owned vehicle, or a different and more dangerous vehicle of which it has no knowledge, it is thereby required to insure against risks of which it is unaware, unable to underwrite and unable to charge a premium therefor. ■ Appellants in this case suggest alternative reasons why we shou

1992We thought our position sound, citing the reasoning in Dullenty v. Rocky Mountain Fire & Casualty Co., 111 Idaho 98 , 721 P.2d 198 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Colonial Penn Franklin Insurance Co. v. Welch, 811 P.2d 838 (Idaho 1991): If an insurer is required to insure against a risk of an undesignated but owned vehicle, or a different and more dangerous vehicle of which it has no knowledge, it is thereby required to insure against risks of which it is unaware, unable to underwrite and unable to charge a premium therefor. ■ Appellants in this case suggest alternative reasons why we shou

1979In Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Mayo, 244 Ark. 435 , 425 S.W. 2d 531 , where a right of way 125 feet wide and 1572 feet long was condemned, we expressed a preference for the following instruction on the measure of the landowners’ compensation: “You are instructed that the compensation to which the defendants are entitled in this cause is the fair market value of the lands within the right of way determined as of the date of taking, together with the difference, if any, in the fair market value of the remainder of the lands immediately before and immediately after the taking.” I have no quarre

1979In Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Mayo, 244 Ark. 435 , 425 S.W. 2d 531 , where a right of way 125 feet wide and 1572 feet long was condemned, we expressed a preference for the following instruction on the measure of the landowners’ compensation: “You are instructed that the compensation to which the defendants are entitled in this cause is the fair market value of the lands within the right of way determined as of the date of taking, together with the difference, if any, in the fair market value of the remainder of the lands immediately before and immediately after the taking.” I have no quarre

1976Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Mauney, supra; U.S.F. & G. v. Garrett, 156 S.C. 132 , 152 S.W. 772 (1930); 11 APPLEMAN, Insurance Law and Practice, supra. These are factual questions to be determined by the trier of fact, and when properly placed in dispute are not matters to be disposed of on motion for summary judgment.

1976Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Mauney, supra; U.S.F. & G. v. Garrett, 156 S.C. 132 , 152 S.W. 772 (1930); 11 APPLEMAN, Insurance Law and Practice, supra. These are factual questions to be determined by the trier of fact, and when properly placed in dispute are not matters to be disposed of on motion for summary judgment.

1968Counsel, in insisting that we have adopted the minority rule, cites Dudley v. Adams, 227 Ark. 376 , 298 S. W. 2d 701 (1957), and Terral v. Poe, 190 Ark. 346 , 79 S. W. 2d 69 (1935).

1968Counsel, in insisting that we have adopted the minority rule, cites Dudley v. Adams, 227 Ark. 376 , 298 S. W. 2d 701 (1957), and Terral v. Poe, 190 Ark. 346 , 79 S. W. 2d 69 (1935).

1968Counsel, in insisting that we have adopted the minority rule, cites Dudley v. Adams, 227 Ark. 376 , 298 S. W. 2d 701 (1957), and Terral v. Poe, 190 Ark. 346 , 79 S. W. 2d 69 (1935).

1968Counsel, in insisting that we have adopted the minority rule, cites Dudley v. Adams, 227 Ark. 376 , 298 S. W. 2d 701 (1957), and Terral v. Poe, 190 Ark. 346 , 79 S. W. 2d 69 (1935).

1960Perhaps the leading case in support of the majority is that of Washington Gas-Light Co. v. Lansden, 172 U.S. 534 , 19 S.Ct. 296, 303 , 43 L.Ed. 543 .

1960Perhaps the leading case in support of the majority is that of Washington Gas-Light Co. v. Lansden, 172 U.S. 534 , 19 S.Ct. 296, 303 , 43 L.Ed. 543 .

1958Co. v. Annunzio, 414 Ill. 559 , 112 N. E. 2d 101 , where the court observed that the majority interpretation is followed in nineteen states, while the minority rule has been applied administratively in Colorado and judicially in Oklahoma.

1958Co. v. Annunzio, 414 Ill. 559 , 112 N. E. 2d 101 , where the court observed that the majority interpretation is followed in nineteen states, while the minority rule has been applied administratively in Colorado and judicially in Oklahoma.

1958There is this significant concluding sentence to the NAACA article, written in May, 1957: “May the few States that still adhere to the minority rule have the courage to reverse ■ themselves and restore justice to injured workers — and we predict that at least one of the minority States, Michigan, will soon join the majority. . .” This language was a real prophecy because in Sheppard v. Michigan National Bank, 348 Mich. 577 , 83 N. W. 2d 614 , the Supreme Court of Michigan on June 10, 1957 reached the same conclusion that we had reached in Bryant Stave & Heading Co. v. White, and cited our case

1958There is this significant concluding sentence to the NAACA article, written in May, 1957: “May the few States that still adhere to the minority rule have the courage to reverse ■ themselves and restore justice to injured workers — and we predict that at least one of the minority States, Michigan, will soon join the majority. . .” This language was a real prophecy because in Sheppard v. Michigan National Bank, 348 Mich. 577 , 83 N. W. 2d 614 , the Supreme Court of Michigan on June 10, 1957 reached the same conclusion that we had reached in Bryant Stave & Heading Co. v. White, and cited our case

1957In Pennegar v. State, 87 Tenn. 244 , 10 S.W. 305 , 2 L.R.A. 703 , a similar question was before the court.

1957In Pennegar v. State, 87 Tenn. 244 , 10 S.W. 305 , 2 L.R.A. 703 , a similar question was before the court.

1956Also North Carolina listed as following the minority rule apparently adopted the usual-strain and unexpected result theories in Smith v. Cabarrus Creamery Co., 217 N. C. 468 , 8 S. E. 2d 231 .

1956Also North Carolina listed as following the minority rule apparently adopted the usual-strain and unexpected result theories in Smith v. Cabarrus Creamery Co., 217 N. C. 468 , 8 S. E. 2d 231 .

1956For instance, Arizona was originally listed as supporting the minority rule under the decision in Pierce v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 42 Ariz. 436 , 26 P. 2d 1017 , which was overruled in 1944 in In re Mitchell, 61 Ariz. 436 , 150 P. 2d 355 .

1956For instance, Arizona was originally listed as supporting the minority rule under the decision in Pierce v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 42 Ariz. 436 , 26 P. 2d 1017 , which was overruled in 1944 in In re Mitchell, 61 Ariz. 436 , 150 P. 2d 355 .

1956For instance, Arizona was originally listed as supporting the minority rule under the decision in Pierce v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 42 Ariz. 436 , 26 P. 2d 1017 , which was overruled in 1944 in In re Mitchell, 61 Ariz. 436 , 150 P. 2d 355 .

1956For instance, Arizona was originally listed as supporting the minority rule under the decision in Pierce v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 42 Ariz. 436 , 26 P. 2d 1017 , which was overruled in 1944 in In re Mitchell, 61 Ariz. 436 , 150 P. 2d 355 .

1953Mr. Justice Wood, Hatcher v. Buford, 60 Ark. 169 , 29 S. W. 641 , 27 L.

1953Mr. Justice Wood, Hatcher v. Buford, 60 Ark. 169 , 29 S. W. 641 , 27 L.

1952In the leading case of Carter v. Greenway, 152 Ark. 339 , 238 S. W. 65 , Judge Hart stated the rule as follows: “It is earnestly insisted by counsel for appellants that a check can not be made the basis of a gift causa mortis.

1952In the leading case of Carter v. Greenway, 152 Ark. 339 , 238 S. W. 65 , Judge Hart stated the rule as follows: “It is earnestly insisted by counsel for appellants that a check can not be made the basis of a gift causa mortis.

1951We held the doctrine applicable to exploding bottled beverages in the recent case of Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fort Smith v. Hicks, 215 Ark. 803 , 223 S. W. 2d 762 , but it is insisted that this is the minority rule and that appellee’s proof is insufficient to invoke the rule announced in that case.

1951We held the doctrine applicable to exploding bottled beverages in the recent case of Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fort Smith v. Hicks, 215 Ark. 803 , 223 S. W. 2d 762 , but it is insisted that this is the minority rule and that appellee’s proof is insufficient to invoke the rule announced in that case.

1947Green v. Green, 50 S. C. 514, 27 S. E. 952 , 62 Am.

1946R. 422, said: “It is insisted for appellant that in the event we overrule the minority rule and adhere to the majority rule, the opinion should he given a retroactive effect and applied to all such contracts entered into subsequent to the opinion in the O ’Brien case, 155 Ky. 498 , 159 S. W. 134 , because the overruled opinions do not involve the construction of any statutory or constitutional provision, hut are mere decisions expressive of general or common law. . . .

1941In the case of Chase v. Carney, 60 Ark. 491 , 31 S. W. 43 , Mr. Justice Battle said: “A part payment which will revive a debt barred by limitation, or form a new point from which the statute will begin to run, must be such as can be treated ‘ as an admission of the continued existence of the debt, and an implied promise to pay the balance.’ But no such promise can, as a general rule, be ‘implied’ where the part payment is accompanied by circumstances or declarations of the debtor showing that it is not his intention to admit, by the payment, the continued existence of the debt, and his obligat

1941In the case of Chase v. Carney, 60 Ark. 491 , 31 S. W. 43 , Mr. Justice Battle said: “A part payment which will revive a debt barred by limitation, or form a new point from which the statute will begin to run, must be such as can be treated ‘ as an admission of the continued existence of the debt, and an implied promise to pay the balance.’ But no such promise can, as a general rule, be ‘implied’ where the part payment is accompanied by circumstances or declarations of the debtor showing that it is not his intention to admit, by the payment, the continued existence of the debt, and his obligat

1941It discusses what was termed the minority rule of Pennsylvania (Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36 , 47 Am.

1924But the weight of authority is to the effect that, where real property is held as an estate in entirety, the interest of neither spouse is liable for the debts of the other; a conveyance by the husband and wife jointly passes title to the property clear of any claim of creditors of the husband; a judgment against-one spouse alone is not, during the joint lives of the tenants of the estate, a lien on the land; and, during coverture, there can be no sale of any part on execution against either.” Cases supporting’ both the minority and the majority rule are cited in the notes to the text quoted,

1923Most of the cases which declare what we think it is correct to term the minority rule make an exception as to gas, and seem to be influenced by the character of that fluid, and hold that it is of such a vagrant nature that it cannot be the subject of absolute ownership.- This seems to be the fact that influenced the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190 , applying the law of Indiana as declared by the Supreme Court of that State.