preemption doctrine in Oklahoma

2010Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr , 518 U.S. 470 , 485 (1996); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. , 505 U.S. 504 , 516 (1992).

2010Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr , 518 U.S. 470 , 485 (1996); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. , 505 U.S. 504 , 516 (1992).

2018Id. ¶ 31, 977 P.2d at 1053 .

2018Id. ¶ 31, 977 P.2d at 1053 .

2017Bank v. Anderson , 539 U.S. 1, 2, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 2059, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003). ¶17 In Reeds v. Walker , this Court noted the link between complete preemption and the potential loss of subject matter jurisdiction: Although the complete preemption doctrine is ordinarily invoked to support removal of an action to federal court, we see no reason why it cannot be invoked in a state-court appellate proceeding to analyze federal question jurisdiction, which, if exclusive, would divest the state courts of subject matter jurisdiction. 2006 OK 43, ¶15 n.34, 157 P.3d 43 (internal citations omitted).

2017Bank v. Anderson , 539 U.S. 1, 2, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 2059, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003). ¶17 In Reeds v. Walker , this Court noted the link between complete preemption and the potential loss of subject matter jurisdiction: Although the complete preemption doctrine is ordinarily invoked to support removal of an action to federal court, we see no reason why it cannot be invoked in a state-court appellate proceeding to analyze federal question jurisdiction, which, if exclusive, would divest the state courts of subject matter jurisdiction. 2006 OK 43, ¶15 n.34, 157 P.3d 43 (internal citations omitted).

2010Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr , 518 U.S. 470 , 485 (1996); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. , 505 U.S. 504 , 516 (1992).

2010Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr , 518 U.S. 470 , 485 (1996); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. , 505 U.S. 504 , 516 (1992).

2011Bittle v. Bake, 2008 OK 10, ¶ 16 , 192 P.8d 810; White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 , 100 S.Ct. 2578 , 65 L.Ed.2d 665 (1980).

2011ANALYSIS 14 The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed following the preemption analysis of Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 718 , 724-725, 103 S.Ct. 8291 , 3299-8299, 77 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983).

2011Bittle v. Bake, 2008 OK 10, ¶ 16 , 192 P.8d 810; White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 , 100 S.Ct. 2578 , 65 L.Ed.2d 665 (1980).

2011Bittle v. Bake, 2008 OK 10, ¶ 16 , 192 P.8d 810; White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 , 100 S.Ct. 2578 , 65 L.Ed.2d 665 (1980).

2006RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 8(c). [33] Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, supra note 27 at 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425 . [34] Although the complete preemption doctrine is ordinarily invoked to support removal of an action to federal court, Biondo v. Life Ins.

2004“By using the phrase ‘relate to’ instead of more limited preemption language, Congress meant to include state laws with a ‘connection with or reference to’ an employee benefits plan.” Hawxhurst, 723 A.2d at 63 .

2003However, it is a consequence of a federal statute which contains one of the broadest preemption clauses ever enacted by Congress. [40] ERISA provisions supersede any and all state laws insofar as they now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan. [41] Congress has expressed an exclusive federal interest in regulating employee benefit plans. [42] The breadth of ERISA's preemption clause often results in plan beneficiaries or participants being left without a meaningful remedy. [43] Nevertheless, the Supreme Court made clear in Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329

2003However, it is a consequence of a federal statute which contains one of the broadest preemption clauses ever enacted by Congress. [40] ERISA provisions supersede any and all state laws insofar as they now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan. [41] Congress has expressed an exclusive federal interest in regulating employee benefit plans. [42] The breadth of ERISA's preemption clause often results in plan beneficiaries or participants being left without a meaningful remedy. [43] Nevertheless, the Supreme Court made clear in Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329

2003It is intended to govern two different types of employment relationships (1) those that fall within the narrow window authorized by the LMRA, and (2) those entirely unaffected by federal labor law. [6] The terms of 20 O.S.2001 § 1602 state in pertinent part: The Supreme Court ... may answer a question of law certified to it by a court of the United States ... if the answer may be determinative of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court and there is no controlling decision of the Supreme Court or Court of Criminal Appeals, constitutional provision, or statute of this state. [7] L

2003It is intended to govern two different types of employment relationships (1) those that fall within the narrow window authorized by the LMRA, and (2) those entirely unaffected by federal labor law. [6] The terms of 20 O.S.2001 § 1602 state in pertinent part: The Supreme Court ... may answer a question of law certified to it by a court of the United States ... if the answer may be determinative of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court and there is no controlling decision of the Supreme Court or Court of Criminal Appeals, constitutional provision, or statute of this state. [7] L

2003Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 376 , 106 S.Ct. 1103 , 89 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986), (in the context of a preemption analysis the High Court explained that the proper state court should decide whether state law provisions were severa-ble). .

2003Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 376 , 106 S.Ct. 1103 , 89 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986), (in the context of a preemption analysis the High Court explained that the proper state court should decide whether state law provisions were severa-ble). .

2002A State law is invalid under the preemption doctrine to the extent that it conflicts with a federal statute or when it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose of Congress." Wilson v. Harlow, 860 P.2d 793 , 799 (Okla. 1993) (citations omitted).

2000The preemption clause-included by Congress to implement ERISA's goal and purpose-is recognized as "deliberately expansive" and "conspicuous for its breadth" See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 , 111 S.Ct. 403, 407 , 112 L.Ed.2d 356 (1990); Pilot Life Ins.

2000The preemption clause-included by Congress to implement ERISA's goal and purpose-is recognized as "deliberately expansive" and "conspicuous for its breadth" See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 , 111 S.Ct. 403, 407 , 112 L.Ed.2d 356 (1990); Pilot Life Ins.

2000Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 , 107 S.Ct. 1549, 1552 , 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987).

2000Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 , 107 S.Ct. 1549, 1552 , 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987).

1997In Thayer v. McDonald, 781 P.2d 190 (Colo.App.1989), the Colorado Court of Appeals applied the same preemption to bar a claim of wrongful discharge for union-organizing activity.

1995The 10th Circuit again addressed the preemption doctrine post-Ci pollone in Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corporation, 985 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir.1993) (cert. denied), holding the Federal Aviation Act did *226 not expressly or impliedly preempt the state law tort claims there in issue. 6 In Myrick v. Freuhauf Corporation, 13 F.3d 1516 (11th Cir.1994) (cert. granted — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 306 , 130 L.Ed.2d 218 (1994)), the plaintiffs brought two state tort actions against the manufacturers of trucks that were not equipped with antilock brakes (claims of negligent design and dangerously defective produc

1995The 10th Circuit again addressed the preemption doctrine post-Ci pollone in Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corporation, 985 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir.1993) (cert. denied), holding the Federal Aviation Act did *226 not expressly or impliedly preempt the state law tort claims there in issue. 6 In Myrick v. Freuhauf Corporation, 13 F.3d 1516 (11th Cir.1994) (cert. granted — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 306 , 130 L.Ed.2d 218 (1994)), the plaintiffs brought two state tort actions against the manufacturers of trucks that were not equipped with antilock brakes (claims of negligent design and dangerously defective produc

1995The 10th Circuit again addressed the preemption doctrine post-Ci pollone in Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corporation, 985 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir.1993) (cert. denied), holding the Federal Aviation Act did *226 not expressly or impliedly preempt the state law tort claims there in issue. 6 In Myrick v. Freuhauf Corporation, 13 F.3d 1516 (11th Cir.1994) (cert. granted — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 306 , 130 L.Ed.2d 218 (1994)), the plaintiffs brought two state tort actions against the manufacturers of trucks that were not equipped with antilock brakes (claims of negligent design and dangerously defective produc

1986In the Peabody text it is stated that ”... even assuming that there exists a basis for a preliminary finding of preemption, still this statute would stand up under analysis and would fit within the 'state concern’ exceptions to the preemption requirement. * * * ” 666 F.2d at 1317 . 24 .